erhapsthe most important historical lesson is thatvirtually all the visions cherished by partici-pants were abandoned or transformed.

And how could itbe regulated? Regulators take years to makedecisions, yet the Internet was still like achild, growing and changing rapidly.

Anumber of other options were considered atthe 1990 Harvard workshop. For example,NSF could have turned over backbone opera-tions to a nonprofit operator. Wolff even sug-gested ‘‘privatization by function,’’ in whichcommercially viable services such as mailand news would be blocked from the NSFbackbone, while more specialized researchapplications would continue to use it.

foregorapid growth.63 However, the Merit partners’rhetoric stressing the threat of congestionand the need for gigabit speeds framed thisoption as undesirable or even impossible.

Noting that US First Amendmentprotections do not apply to the private sec-tor, they contended, ‘‘What hasn’t been dis-cussed is the public’s right to free speech incyberspace

no provisionhad been made to keep Internet traffic statis-tics publicly available

First, because NSF did not imposeperformance requirements on the NAP oper-ators, the NAPs became congested andimpeded backbone traffic flow. 57 Second, inthe absence of a regulatory requirement fornondiscriminatory interconnection amongISPs, large backbone providers or privateNAPs were able to exclude smaller playersand thus undermine competition, increaseconcentration, and drive up prices. The lackof rules specifying universal unmetered inter-connection led to an unequal two-tier back-bone peering system, in which large ISPsagreed to exchange traffic for free butcharged smaller ISPs for the same service. 58Third, the lack of regulation means that un-like phone companies, backbone providerscan, and sometimes do, harm subscribers bycutting off their connectivity on short no-tice. 59 Fourth, NSF did not require neededupgrades to network service, such asimproved security. Other commentatorsraised a host of concerns ranging from tech-nical to social and political.

Thebackbone’s communications links had al-ways been leased from commercial providers,the regional and local networks that made upthe bulk of the Internet did not change own-ership, the TCP/IP protocols had been andremained nonproprietary, and control overrouting and technical development stayedwith nonprofit groups. Privatization was lessa change in ownership than a change inwho could serve NSF’s users, how thoseusers were subsidized (directly throughgrants, rather than through a subsidizedinfrastructure), and who made policy forthe backbone.

Internet connections were tobe commercially provided, with governmentefforts focused on developing applicationssuch as educational software, subsidizing ac-cess for libraries and schools, providing train-ing for librarians and educators, and makinggovernment information available over thenetwork.

TheGore Bill, as it was known, stressed the threatof foreign competition as its political ratio-nale and reflected three beliefs: that high-speed (gigabit) networks were essential toresearch and as an economic driver, thatindustry would not provide such networksbecause the market and technology werenot yet proven, and that government over-sight was needed to ensure equitable accessand proper network use.

Merit informed NSFthat it planned to create a nonprofit corpora-tion called Advanced Network & Services, forwhich IBM and MCI would provide severalmillion dollars in funding as well as person-nel and equipment.

restricted fromusing the NSFnet backbone due to the NSF’sAcceptable Use Policy

ome saw the networkas a public trust, others as an opportunityfor profit; some wanted a testbed for high-performance technology, while others hopedfor an economic driver and an edge in inter-national competition.

he 1982 consent decree(effective 1984) that broke up AT&T

The resulting 1987 report raised anew political issue: the threat of competitionfrom Europe and Japan.

NSFnet’s technicaldesign created a monopoly at the backbonelevel—an arrangement that would sooncause strife within the community.

Merit, a consortium of Michi-gan universities founded in 1966 to promotecampus and state-wide networking. Meritserved as project manager, provided engi-neering support, and ran the Network Oper-ations Center. Merit’s partners were the Stateof Michigan Strategic Fund (which offered$5 million), IBM (which supplied the packetswitches), and MCI (which provided the cir-cuits).

Therefore, NSF didnot address the issue of commercial use of thenetwork by the awardee in the solicitation orthe Cooperative Agreement. Similarly, noneof the offerors addressed commercial use inits proposal.1

For scientists who cared littleabout networking per se and simply wantedto get on with their research, applicationswith consistent, user-friendly interfaceswere as important as the network itself:

Public reaction on the ClaudeAI subreddit appears to be split into roughly three camps. The majority see the story as an indictment of the government's cybersecurity, citing its inability to hire the required level of talent and its history of leaks. A second large group is skeptical of the claim, considering it sensationalist or even an Anthropic marketing stunt.

The AI-generated image of Neukgu had prompted Daejeon city government to issue an emergency text to residents, warning them of a wolf near the intersection.

90 percent of people oppose it. There's no reason existing AI companies should be facing reduced liability

90 percent of people oppose it. There's no reason existing AI companies should be facing reduced liability.

We have also provided access to GPT-5.4-Cyber to the U.S. Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) and the UK AI Security Institute (UK AISI) so that they can conduct evaluations focused on the model's cyber capabilities and safeguards.

The survey did not investigate the causes of the increase in Claude usage, but timing coincided with a period that included a public dispute with the US government

However, PIPA is the agency's first standalone bot, meaning it can be used across multiple government agencies. Crucially, the bot can be embedded within web and mobile apps, as well as within third-party personal assistants, such as Google Home and Alexa.  According to Keenan, the gang of five digital assistants released so far by the DHS have answered "more than 2.3 million questions, reducing the need for people to have to pick up a phone or come into a service centre for help.” “This is what our digital transformation program is all about – making life simpler and easier for all Australians.”

uman Services has a number of public-facing chatbots already. The newest of them is ‘Charles’, launched last year, which offers support for the government’s MyGov service.Others include ‘Sam’ and ‘Oliver’, both of which launched in 2017. The department’s customer-facing digital assistants have so far answered more than 2.3 million questions. Human Services also uses a number of staff-facing chatbots. In November Keenan revealed that the department had launched an Augmented Intelligence Centre of Excellence, which the minister said would boost collaboration with industry, academia and other government entities.

Before implementing Alex 2.5 years ago, IP Australia staffers were taking 12,000 calls per month."Now I'm not saying Alex was the only intervention we had, but it was one of the main ones. Acting on the insights we were getting from Alex, we're now down to 5,000 calls per month and still dropping," Stokes said. "The value for money and return on investment is quite good."