17 Matching Annotations
  1. Jun 2022
    1. The goal is to gain “digital sovereignty.”

      the age of borderless data is ending. What we're seeing is a move to digital sovereignty

    1. All wireless devices have small manufacturing imperfections in the hardware that are unique to each device. These fingerprints are an accidental byproduct of the manufacturing process. These imperfections in Bluetooth hardware result in unique distortions, which can be used as a fingerprint to track a specific device. For Bluetooth, this would allow an attacker to circumvent anti-tracking techniques such as constantly changing the address a mobile device uses to connect to Internet networks. 

      Tracking that evades address changes

      An operating system can change the hardware address it broadcasts in avoid tracking. But subtle differences in the signal itself can still be identified and tracked.

    1. the one thing that you have to keep conveying to people about the consequences of surveillance is that it's all very well to say that you have nothing to hide, but when you're spied upon, everybody that's connected to you gets spied upon. And if we don't push back, the most vulnerable people in society, the people that actually keep really massive violations of human rights and illegality in check, they're the people who get most affected.

      "I Have Nothing To Hide" counter-argument

      Even if you have nothing to hide, that doesn't mean that those you are connected with aren't also being surveilled and are part of targeted communities.

  2. Apr 2022
    1. Dorothea Salo (2021) Physical-Equivalent Privacy, The Serials Librarian, DOI: 10.1080/0361526X.2021.1875962

      Permanent Link: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/81297

      Abstract

      This article introduces and applies the concept of “physical-equivalent privacy” to evaluate the appropriateness of data collection about library patrons’ use of library-provided e‑resources. It posits that as a matter of service equity, any data collection practice that causes e‑resource users to enjoy less information privacy than users of an information-equivalent print resource is to be avoided. Analysis is grounded in real-world e‑resource-related phenomena: secure (HTTPS) library websites and catalogs, the Adobe Digital Editions data-leak incident of 2014, and use of web trackers on e‑resource websites. Implications of physical-equivalent privacy for the SeamlessAccess single-sign-on proposal will be discussed.

    1. I thought that the point of disappearing messages was to eat your cake and have it too, by allowing you to send a message to your adversary and then somehow deprive them of its contents. This is obviously a stupid idea.But the threat that Snapchat — and its disappearing message successors —was really addressing wasn’t communication between untrusted parties, it was automating data-retention agreements between trusted parties.

      Why use a disappearing message service

      The point of a disappearing message service is to have the parties to the message agree on the data-retention provisions of a message. The service automates that agreement by deleting the message at the specified time. The point isn't to send a message to an adversary and then delete it so they can't prove that it has been sent. There are too many ways of capturing the contents of a message—as simple as taking a picture of the message with another device.

    1. Weinberg’s tweet announcing the change generated thousands of comments, many of them from conservative-leaning users who were furious that the company they turned to in order to get away from perceived Big Tech censorship was now the one doing the censoring. It didn’t help that the content DuckDuckGo was demoting and calling disinformation was Russian state media, whose side some in the right-wing contingent of DuckDuckGo’s users were firmly on.

      There is an odd sort of self-selected information bubble here. DuckDuckGo promoted itself as privacy-aware, not unfiltered. On their Sources page, they talk about where they get content and how they don't sacrifice privacy to gather search results. Demoting disinformation sources in their algorithms would seem to be a good thing. Except if what you expect to see is disinformation, and then suddenly the search results don't match your expectations.

  3. Dec 2021
    1. About 7 in 10 Americans think their phone or other devices are listening in on them in ways they did not agree to.

      I'm enough of a tinfoil hat wearer to this this might be true. Especially since my google home talks to me entirely too much when I'm not talking to it.

  4. Nov 2021
  5. May 2021
  6. Nov 2020
  7. Jul 2020
  8. Jun 2020
  9. Apr 2020
  10. Mar 2020
    1. Right now, if you want to know what data Facebook has about you, you don’t have the right to ask them to give you all of the data they have on you, and the right to know what they’ve done with it. You should have that right. You should have the right to know and have access to your data.
  11. Apr 2018
    1. What can we build that would allow people to 1.) annotate terms of service related to tools they adopt in a classroom? and 2.) see an aggregated list of all current annotations. Last, if we were to start critically analyzing EdTech Terms of Service, what questions should we even ask?

  12. Mar 2017
  13. Jan 2017
    1. Almost half of eight- to 11-year-olds have agreed impenetrable terms and conditions to give social media giants such as Facebook and Instagram control over their data, without any accountability, according to the commissioner’s Growing Up Digital taskforce. The year-long study found children regularly signed up to terms including waiving privacy rights and allowing the content they posted to be sold around the world, without reading or understanding their implications.