11 Matching Annotations
  1. Jul 2022
    1. 37:35 - Evolutionary benefits of habits

      learning creates habits - automated, reflexive behavior. The rational, reflective part of the brain is what can mitigate the bad habits.

    2. 11:32 - Reflective vs reflexive thought

      80% of what we think about is reflexive, we are on autopilot. We need to support the REFLECTIVE side. Most of us don't reflect on a daily basis. The more technology we have, the more we are on autopilot. Social media stimulates a positive feedback loop of our REFLEXIVE nature.

      Whenever we learn something new, we must apply reflective thinking but once learned and habituated, the reflexive system takes over.

  2. Apr 2022
    1. An initial stage of annotation might be provided bya professional reader hired to add aids to reading for the owner, including espe-cially mnemonic or meditative aids, or enhancements to the layout, but alsooccasionally self-reflexive or potentially dissenting observations.24 A successionof owner-readers could then add further corrections and comments.

      Stages of annotation in the medieval period

      When is Hypothes.is going to branch out into the business of professional readers to add aids to texts?! :)

      Link this to the professional summary industry that reads books and summarizes them for busy executives

      Link this to the annotations studied by Owen Gingerich in The Book Nobody Read.

  3. Oct 2021
    1. Its life out of its center enters into a relationship to it; the reflexive character of the centrally represented body is given to itself. Although the living being on this level is also absorbed in the here/now, lives out of the center, it has become conscious of the centrality of its existence. It has itself; it knows of itself; it notices itself -- and this makes it an I. (pp. 269-70)

      The "I" is born when the living being has become conscious of the centrality of its existence. It notices itself.

    2. The closed and centric positionality of the animal is characterized first and foremost by the immanent constitution of a self. While not occupying any definitive space, it is spatial inasmuch as it constitutes the non-relativizable "here" of the organism. Double aspectivity is defined for the animal with respect to a separation, and at the same time non-separation, between its core, its here, its self and its whole body of which the core is part. Thus the living thing whose organization exhibits a closed form is not only a self that 'has', but a special kind of self, a reflexive self or an itself. We may speak of a living thing of this kind as being present to the living thing that it is, as, by virtue of its set-apartness from this living thing, forming (not yet 'having', which is why it is not yet an 'I'!) an unshakeable point in this living thing in relation to which it reflexively lives as one thing. In the irreducible oscillation between being inside and being outside that distinguishes the positionality of the closed organism on the ground of simply being the body itself lies the boundary for the referentiality of the thing back to itself. (pp. 220-21) One can anticipate the movement of Plessner's dialectical logic in setting up the conditions for his anthropology. The animal has a self-presence but not a reflective access to it. The animal has achieved a distance to its own body (one might say a "detachment") but does not have a perspective on having such distance. It enjoys a qualitatively new level of agency in its relationship to its surround but it is still fully absorbed in its here and now. The animal is conscious inasmuch as it has awareness of that which it stands in opposition to and reacts to from out of its center (albeit without being able to thematize that relationship). Plessner refers to this as the animal's "frontality."

      Here, Moss helps clarify the word "detachment" as the living organism achieving some kind of distance from its own body, but does not have a perspective of it. Importantly, Plessner holds that the animal is conscious, but not self-conscious. Plessner's term for this type of consciousness is "frontality".

  4. May 2020
    1. R is reflexive iff ∀∀\forall x [x ∈∈\in U → xRx]

      For each x in the set, x must be related to x for the relation to be reflexive. In other words, each element must be related to itself.


      We have the set [1 2 3].

      For a relation to be reflexive, it must have (1 1), (2 2), and (3 3).

  5. Apr 2020
    1. criture réflexive.

      L'un des atouts de MS Word est justement d'inviter l'utilisateur à ne pas réfléchir à son médium d'écriture, mais de juste l'utiliser (je reprends le paradigme de «document comme une fin»).

      Est-il toujours pertinent d'écrire de manière réflexive, en constant dialogue avec le médium d'écriture? En écartant les spécialistes, quelles compétences techniques (ou compréhension des formats) peut-on souhaiter à grande échelle?

      L'interface de stylo pourrait-elle être encadrer l'utilisateur avec davantage de convivialité tout en lui dévoilant son paradigme (éduquer en écrivant, amicalement et professionnellement)? (C'est une question UX, mais qui permettrait probablement une adoption plus large.)

  6. Feb 2020
    1. Image Credit: Detail from "The School of Athens" by Raffaello Sanzio da Urbino (c. 1509–1511).

      Euclid's common notions appear to be grounds for many of Marx's arguments in Ch. 1, but also throughout the book.

      Near the beginning of Ch. 1 of the Elements Euclid lists them [PDF]:

      • Things that are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another (the Transitive property of a Euclidean relation).
      • If equals are added to equals, then the wholes are equal (Addition property of equality).
      • If equals are subtracted from equals, then the differences are equal (Subtraction property of equality).
      • Things that coincide with one another are equal to one another (Reflexive property).
      • The whole is greater than the part.

      Regarding the fifth, also see Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6 [=1045a]; Topics 6.13 (=150a15-16);

      On the concept of the "whole-before-the-parts" (along with the "whole of the parts" and the "whole in the part"), also see Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 67.

  7. May 2015
    1. sensation is never simple. It is always doubled by the feeling of having a fe eling. It is self-refere ntial. This is not necessarily the same as "sc1f-reAexive.