The Role of Private Agents in Affordable Housing Policy: A Summary
By: B. Stebbins
In the article, Graddy and Bostic analyze the consequences of our increasing reliance on private agents in the formulation and implementation of affordable housing policy and conclude that these private agents do respond to policy incentives - albeit to varying degrees - mitigating concerns about the loss of public control in this policy area. They state that although the federal government has a set of broad policy goals of providing safe, affordable, and quality housing for all, it has not always been able to implement such policy goals well. The widespread dissatisfaction with public production due to its high cost, often poor design and administration led the federal government to move away from and rely on lower levels of government for implementation. This devolution of affordable housing policy has brought a dispersion of authority across state, regional, and local governments and diffuse accountability. Not only do local governments have little incentive to meet federal or regional goals but to the extent that oversight is left at the local level, accountability and coordination will end up being narrowly focused (Graddy & Bostic).
Compounding these challenges of authority and accountability, Graddy and Bostic state that the primary problem in providing affordable housing is that in the places it is needed most, the rents and sale prices required to make a residence affordable do not support financially feasible projects. Multiple policy instruments like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program, HOME Investment and Partnership Program, Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program, Section 8 housing vouchers, tax-exempt bonds, density bonus permits, and inclusionary zoning practices are used to incentivize private developers to produce affordable housing. However, the response from private developers to these incentives are different based upon the framework in which they operate and lead to varying degrees of power and influence among the various institutions and actors. Adding to this primary problem is what these affordable housing projects will look like and how they align with local community needs (Graddy & Bostic).
According to Graddy and Bostic, in both of their case studies of the Massachusetts and New Jersey frameworks, affordable housing production clearly differs, and degrades, once the jurisdictional threshold, as defined by each state, for acceptable housing performance is achieved. This is obviously problematic because jurisdictional changes do not have to be addressed once the acceptable housing performance is achieved, even though the problem of affordable housing may not have been fully addressed. This is because developers recognize and do not seek out jurisdictions for housing projects that would significantly increase their affordable housing share, leaving little incentives for jurisdictions above the threshold to permit more affordable housing. In sum, the most important consequence of our current affordable housing policy is that private developers take a leading role in deciding when and where affordable housing will be built. Thus, the structure of governance of affordable housing policy is of utmost importance in mitigating these concerns of private agents acting in their own self-interest (Graddy & Bostic).
Citation: Graddy, E., & Bostic, R. (2010). The Role of Private Agents in Affordable Housing Policy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, 20, I81-I99. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20627910