10 Matching Annotations
  1. Jul 2022
    1. i think there's a lot of latent potential in this coordination mechanisms layer um especially i think there's a bunch of really good ideas around um things like futarki and other struck 00:17:59 i'm not necessarily sure that that particular construction will work but i think we need to a lot of experiments with those kinds of governance structures to see if there could be ways of governing systems algorithmically 00:18:11 and and with a way of aggregating a lot of our perspectives and thoughts and values um in a much more systematic way than sort of like uh very brittle representative democracy that like doesn't really scale to to 00:18:23 millions of people um and i think you know in terms of a lot of the mechanisms and structures that that we want to build um there's a lot more theory that is needed there's a lot more implementations that 00:18:35 are needed there's a lot more rigorous study and assessment of of performance and so on that is needed so um really encourage you to kind of pick out any of these

      Indyweb could be a good option for coordination layer.

  2. Jan 2022
    1. Zimmerman, M. I., Porter, J. R., Ward, M. D., Singh, S., Vithani, N., Meller, A., Mallimadugula, U. L., Kuhn, C. E., Borowsky, J. H., Wiewiora, R. P., Hurley, M. F. D., Harbison, A. M., Fogarty, C. A., Coffland, J. E., Fadda, E., Voelz, V. A., Chodera, J. D., & Bowman, G. R. (2021). SARS-CoV-2 simulations go exascale to predict dramatic spike opening and cryptic pockets across the proteome. Nature Chemistry, 13(7), 651–659. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41557-021-00707-0

  3. Sep 2021
  4. Jan 2021
  5. Oct 2020
    1. Large societies need other enforcement mechanisms: government, religion, written codes.

      Larger groups, such as societies, use other mechanisms to enforce norms, such as: government, religion, written codes.

  6. Apr 2020
  7. Feb 2014
    1. By contrast, any positive or negative effects that intellectual property rights have on the wider populace are diffused, and any individual member of the wider populace has little motive (and potentially insufficient means) to overco me the significant barriers to active political lobbying. As a result, the intrinsic trend is for intellectual INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY FOR INNOVATION 11   property holders to actively lobby, largely unopposed, for greater rights protections. (Fisher, 1999, Sect. II. C.)

      Both positive and negative effects stemming from intellectual property rights to the wider populace are diffused, thus the wider populace has little motive to oppose changes to laws and policies that support intellectual property.

    2. In addition to broad economic trends affecting domestic politics evenly, Fisher also notes the uneven distribution of effects stemming from intellectual property rights (1999, Sect. II. C.). The positive effects of intellectual property rights accrue strongl y to a small number of rights - holders (the paper assumes that there are no significant negative effects to rights - holders); for this reason, rights - holders have significant motive (and potentially greater means) to overcome the significant barriers to acti ve political lobbying.