Obscurity is also caused if, when you intend to insert a number of details, you do not first make your meaning clear; for instance, if you say, "I meant, after telling him this, that and the other thing, to set out," rather than something of this kind "I meant to set out after telling him; then this, that, and the other thing occurred."

It is a general rule that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver.

All these ideas may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors; those which succeed as metaphors will obviously do well also as similes, and similes, with the explanation omitted, will appear as metaphors.

Metaphors like other things may be inappropriate. Some are so because they are ridiculous; they are indeed used by comic as well as tragic poets. Others are too grand and theatrical; and these, if they are far-fetched, may also be obscure. For instance, Gorgias talks of "events that are green and full of sap," and says "foul was the deed you sowed and evil the harvest you reaped." That is too much like poetry. Alcidamas, again, called philosophy "a fortress that threatens the power of law,"

We thus see how the inappropriateness of such poetical language imports absurdity and tastelessness into speeches, as well as the obscurity that comes from all this verbosity -- for when the sense is plain, you only obscure and spoil its clearness by piling up words.

(1) The misuse of compound words. Lycophron, for instance, talks of the "many visaged heaven" above the "giant-crested earth," and again the "strait-pathed shore"; and Gorgias of the "pauper-poet flatterer" and [1406a] "oath-breaking and over-oath-keeping."

you do what I have suggested if you say that a man who begs "prays," and a man who prays "begs"; for praying and begging are both varieties of asking

Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to another. Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side.

e.g. porheueseai (advancing) and badizein (proceeding); these two are ordinary words and have the same meaning

Naturalness is persuasive, artificiality is the contrary; for our hearers are prejudiced and think we have some design against them, as if we were mixing their wines for them.

the language of prose is distinct from that of poetry.

These are the three things -- volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and rhythm -- that a speaker bears in mind.

For it is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must also say it as we ought; much help is thus afforded towards producing the right impression of a speech.

Conclusion). This has four parts. You must (1) make the audience well disposed towards yourself and ill disposed towards your opponent, (2) magnify or minimize the leading facts, (3) excite the required kind of emotion in your hearers, and (4) refresh their memories by means of a recapitulation. --

The best moment to employ interrogation is when your opponent has so answered one question that the putting of just one more lands him in absurdity. In replying to questions, you must meet them, if they are ambiguous, by drawing reasonable distinctions, not by a curt answer.

A speech has two essential parts: statement and proof

Each kind of rhetoric has its own appropriate style. The style of written prose is not that of spoken oratory, nor are those of political and forensic speaking the same. The written style is the more finished: the spoken better admits of dramatic delivery -- alike the kind of oratory that reflects character and the kind that stirs emotion.

Antithesis implies contrast of sense. Parisosis makes the two members of a period equal in length. Paromoeosis makes the first or last worlds of both members like each other. Homoeoteleuton denotes similarity in terminations only.

Tact and judgement are needed in all varieties of oratory.

The foundation of good style is correctness of language, which is discussed under five heads: (1) right use of connecting words; (2) use of special, and not vague general, terms; (3) avoidance of ambiguity; (4) observance of gender; (5) correct indication of grammatical number.

Four faults of prose style, with illustrative examples: (1) misuse of compound words; (2) employment of strange words; (3) long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets; (4) inappropriate metaphors.

Style, to be good, must be clear; it must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and excess of dignity.

the right thing in speaking really is that we should fight our case with no help beyong the bare facts; and yet the arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, whatever it is we have to expound to others.

Arrangement. A speech has two essential parts: statement and proof

The style of written prose is not that of spoken oratory, nor are those of political and forensic speaking the same. The written style is the more finished: the spoken better admits of dramatic delivery

The graphic power of "setting things before the eyes" implies the use of expressions that represent objects as in a state of activity:

Antithesis implies contrast of sense. Parisosis makes the two members of a period equal in length. Paromoeosis makes the first or last worlds of both members like each other. Homoeoteleuton denotes similarity in terminations only.

Prose rhythm. The form of the language should not be metrical, nor, on the other hand, without any rhythm at all. Of the various possible rhythms, the heroic is too grand, the iambic too ordinary, and the trochaic too like a riotous dance. The best rhythm for prose is the paean, since from this alone no definite metre arises.

A composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver; it should avoid (1) uncertainties as to puntuation, (2) zeugma, (3) parenthesis.

Four faults of prose style, with illustrative examples: (1) misuse of compound words; (2) employment of strange words; (3) long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets; (4) inappropriate metaphors.

As for Impossibility, we can clearly get what we want by taking the contraries of the arguments stated above.

That if of two similar things one is possible, so is the other.

But while it is easier to supply parallels by inventing fables, it is more valuable for the political speaker to supply them by quoting what has actually happened, since in most respects the future will be like what the past has been.

A fox, in crossing a river, was swept into a hole in the rocks; and, not being able to get out, suffered miseries for a long time through the swarms of fleas that fastened on her. A hedgehog, while roaming around, noticed the fox; and feeling sorry for her asked if he might remove the fleas. But the fox declined the offer; and when the hedgehog asked why, she replied, "These fleas are by this time full of me and not sucking much blood; if you take them away, others will come with fresh appetites and drink up all the blood I have left." "So, men of Samos," said Aesop, "my client will do you no further harm; he is wealthy already. But if you put him to death, [1394a] others will come along who are not rich, and their peculations will empty your treasury completely."

Public officials ought not to be selected by lot. That is like using the lot to select athletes, instead of choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from among a ship's crew, as if we ought to take the man on whom the lot falls, and not the man who knows most about it."

For the accuser uses probabilities to prove his case: and to refute a conclusion as improbable is not the same thing as to refute it as not inevitable.

Enthymemes are based upon one or other of four kinds of alleged fact: (1) Probabilities, (2) Examples, (3) Infallible Signs, (4) Ordinary Signs.

Objections, as appears in the Topics, may be raised in four ways -- either by directly attacking your opponent's own statement, or by putting forward another statement like it, or by putting forward a statement contrary to it, or by quoting previous decisions.

Three points must be studied in making a speech; and we have now completed the account of (1) Examples, Maxims, Enthymemes, and in general the thought-element -- the way to invent and refute arguments. [1403b] We have next to discuss (2) Style, and (3) Arrangement.

if he shows that a thing has happened, we show that it has not; if he shows that it has not happened, we show that it has. This, then, could not be the distinction if there were one, since the same means are employed by both parties, enthymemes being adduced to show that the fact is or is not so-and-so.

we believe that we cannot and shall not fail, or that we shall succeed completely

For there are two reasons why human beings face danger calmly: they may have no experience of it, or they may have means to deal with it: thus when in danger at sea people may feel confident about what will happen either because they have no experience of bad weather, or because their experience gives them the means of dealing with it.

Confidence is, about what things we feel it, and under what conditions. It is the opposite of fear, and what causes it is the opposite of what causes fear; it is, therefore, the expectation associated with a mental picture of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible: it may be due either to the near presence of what inspires confidence or to the absence of what causes alarm.

Of those we have wronged, and of our enemies or rivals, it is not the passionate and outspoken whom we have to fear, but the quiet, dissembling, unscrupulous; since we never know when they are upon us, we can never be sure they are at a safe distance

And since most men tend to be bad -- slaves to greed, and cowards in danger -- it is, as a rule, a terrible thing to be at another man's mercy; and therefore, if we have done anything horrible, those in the secret terrify us with the thought that they may betray or desert us.

Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future. Of destructive or painful evils only; for there are some evils, e.g. wickedness or stupidity, the prospect of which does not frighten us: I mean only such as amount to great pains or losses.

nger is always concerned with individuals -- a Callias or a Socrates -- whereas hatred is directed also against classes: we all hate any thief and any informer.

Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason.

And those who desire the same things as we desire, if it is possible for us both to share them together;

And towards those who are cleanly in their person, their dress, and all their way of life.

And also to those who are willing to treat us well where money or our personal safety is concerned: and therefore we value those who are liberal, brave, or just

we feel friendly to those who have treated us well, either ourselves or those we care for, whether on a large scale, or readily, or at some particular crisis; provided it was for our own sake.

A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return: those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends. This being assumed, it follows that your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasure in what is good and your pain in what is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other reason.

those who contradict us and deny their offence we punish all the more, but we cease to be incensed against those who agree that they deserved their punishment

with those who slight us before five classes of people: namely, (1) our rivals, (2) those whom we admire, (3) those whom we wish to admire us, (4) those for whom we feel reverence, (5) those who feel reverence for us: if any one slights us before such persons, we feel particularly angry

e persons with whom we get angry are those who laugh, mock, or jeer at us, for such conduct is insolent

Hence people who are afflicted by sickness or poverty or love or thirst or any other unsatisfied desires are prone to anger and easily roused:

Then again a man looks for respect from those who he thinks owe him good treatment, and these are the people whom he has treated or is treating well, or means or has meant to treat well, either himself, or through his friends, or through others at his request.

That is why youths and rich men are insolent; they think themselves superior when they show insolence

Contempt is one kind of slighting: you feel contempt for what you consider unimportant, and it is just such things that you slight. (2) Spite is another kind; it is a thwarting another man's wishes, not to get something yourself but to prevent his getting it. The slight arises just from the fact that you do not aim at something for yourself: clearly you do not think that he can do you harm, for then you would be afraid of him instead of slighting him, nor yet that he can do you any good worth mentioning, for then you would be anxious to make friends with him. (3) Insolence is also a form of slighting, since it consists in doing and saying things that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or because anything has happened to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved. (Retaliation is not "insolence," but vengeance.)

he emotion of anger: here we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in any one.

the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill

That the orator's own character should look right is particularly important in political speaking: that the audience should be in the right frame of mind, in lawsuits.

There are two kinds of enthymemes: (a) the demonstrative, formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; (b) the refutative, formed by the conjuction of incompatible propositions.

A maxim is a general statement about questions of practical conduct. It is an incomplete enthymeme. Four kinds of maxims. Maxims should be used (a) by elderly men, and (b) to controvert popular sayings. Advantages of maxims: (a) they enable a speaker to gratify his commonplace hearers by expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they themselves hold about particular cases; (b) they invest a speech with moral character.

The four general lines of argument are: (1) The Possible and Impossible; (2) Fact Past; (3) Fact Future; (4) Degree.

The orator must so speak as to make his hearers angry with his opponents.

Change is in all things sweet.

Victory also is pleasant, and not merely to "bad losers," but to every one; the winner sees himself in the light of a champion, and everybody has a more or less keen appetite for being that. The pleasantness of victory implies of course that combative sports and intellectual contests are pleasant

Some pleasant feeling is associated with most of our appetites we are enjoying either the memory of a past pleasure or the expectation of a future one, just as persons down with fever, during their attacks of thirst, enjoy remembering the drinks they have had and looking forward to having more.

All that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul.

abits also are pleasant; for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural; habit is a thing not unlike nature; what happens often is akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events often.

It may however be argued otherwise, that the crime is worse which breaks the written laws: for the man who commits crimes for which terrible penalties are provided will not hesitate over crimes for which no penalty is provided at all. -- So much, then, for the comparative badness of criminal actions.

Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions, nor this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been

From this point of view we can perform just or unjust acts in either of two ways -- towards one definite person, or towards the community. The man who is guilty of adultery or assault is doing wrong to some definite person; the man who avoids service in the army is doing wrong to the community.

Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature.

To sum up then, all actions due to ourselves either are or seem to be either good or pleasant. Moreover, as all actions due to ourselves are done voluntarily and actions not due to ourselves are done involuntarily, it follows that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either good or pleasant

for while there are no definite kinds of action associated with the fact that a man is fair or dark, tall or short, it does make a difference if he is young or old, just or unjust.

Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite

The ambitious man does wrong for sake of honour, the quick-tempered from anger, the lover of victory for the sake of victory, the embittered man for the sake of revenge, the stupid man because he has misguided notions of right and wrong, the shameless man because he does not mind what people think of him; and so with the rest -- any wrong that any one does to others corresponds to his particular faults of character.

The causes of our deliberately intending harmful and wicked acts contrary to law are (1) vice, (2) lack of self-control

We may describe "wrong-doing" as injury voluntarily inflicted contrary to law. "Law" is either special or general. By special law I mean that written law which regulates the life of a particular community; by general law, all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere.

we should know the moral qualities characteristic of each form of government, for the special moral character of each is bound to provide us with our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it

A Democracy is a form of government under which the citizens distribute the offices of state among themselves by lot, whereas under oligarchy there is a property qualification, under aristocracy one of education

all your brothers are ugly, but you are handsome yourself; or when you find a treasure that everybody else has overlooked;

In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength; which means that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others.

Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise.

By "productive" I mean those from which we get our income; by "enjoyable," those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of them. The criterion of "security" is the ownership of property in such places and under such Conditions that the use of it is in our power; and it is "our own" if it is in our own power to dispose of it or keep it. By "disposing of it" I mean giving it away or selling it. Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is really the activity -- that is, the use -- of property that constitutes wealth.

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees.

It is useful, in framing laws, not only to study the past history of one's own country, in order to understand which constitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to learn for what kinds of nation the various kinds of constitution are suited.

for it is on a country's laws that its whole welfare depends.

As to Peace and War, he must know the extent of the military strength of his country, both actual and potential, and also the mature of that actual and potential strength; and further, what wars his country has waged, and how it has waged them.

The main matters on which all men deliberate and on which political speakers make speeches are some five in number: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation.

that rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical branch of politics; and it is partly like dialectic, partly like sophistical reasoning

Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies.

For of the three elements in speech-making -- speaker, subject, and person addressed -- it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object.

Take, for instance, the line of argument concerned with 'the more or less'. On this line of argument it is equally easy to base a syllogism or enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially disconnected subjects -- right conduct, natural science, or anything else whatever.

This argument also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may breathe hard without having a fever.

when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward a "complete proof," meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed (peperhasmeuou ); for the word perhas has the same meaning (of "end" or "boundary") as the word tekmarh in the ancient tongue.

The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited.

persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions.

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible.

it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health.

it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason,

Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience. Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him

Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others

Ancient witnesses are more trustworthy than contemporary.

The Epideictic speaker is concerned with virtue and vice, praising the one and censuring the other.

The political speaker will also appeal to the interest of his hearers, and this involves a knowledge of what is good. Definition and analysis of things "good."

There are three kinds of rhetoric: A. political (deliberative), B. forensic (legal), and C. epideictic (the ceremonial oratory of display). Their (1) divisions, (2) times, and (3) ends are as follows: A. Political (1) exhortation and dehortation, (2) future, (3) expediency and inexpediency; B. Forensic (1) accusation and defence, (2) past, (3) justice and injustice; C. Epideictic (1) praise and censure, (2) present, (3) honour and dishonour.

The honest rhetorician has no separate name to distinguish him from the dishonest.

Four uses of rhetoric

The argumentative modes of persuasion are the essence of the art of rhetoric: appeals to the emotions warp the judgement

anyone is under the impression that people who rob others or falsify accounts or do any evil thing get the advantage, he is wrong in his thinking; for none are at a greater disadvantage throughout their lives than such men; none are found in more difficult straits, none live in greater ignominy; and, in a word, none are more miserable than they.

Now you will appreciate even more clearly from the things which I am going to say that I am far from being a corrupter of our youth.

if it be true that cleverness in speech results in plotting against other people's property

I suppose that you are not unaware of the fact that the government of the state is handed on by the older men to the youth of the coming generation

You must bear these things in mind, and not pass judgement in any trial without the exercise of reason, nor be as careless when you sit in judgement as you are in your private occupations, but must examine thoroughly each point and search for the truth, mindful of your oaths and of the laws under which you have come together to dispense justice

Indeed he has often been advised by me, among others, that while men who are in public life and desire to be in favor must adopt the principle of doing what is most serviceable and noble and of saying what is most true and just, yet they must at the same time not neglect to study and consider well how in everything they say and do they may convince the people of their graciousness and human sympathy

These are great things and compel our admiration; but the facts which I now give entitle him to even greater praise. For although he saw that you respected only the kind of generals who threatened and tried to terrify the other cities and were always for setting up some revolution or other among your allies

For if I have had the affection of men who have received rewards in recognition of excellence, but have nothing in common with the sycophant, then how, in all reason, could you judge me to be a corrupter of youth?

Among the first to begin studying with me were Eunomus, Lysitheides, and Callippus; and following them were Onetor, Anticles, Philonides, Philomelus, and Charmantides.56 All these men were crowned by Athens with chaplets of gold,57 not because they were covetous of other people's possessions, but because they were honorable men and had spent large sums of their private fortunes upon the city.

teaching the kind of eloquence which enables people to gain their own advantage contrary to justice

Well, then, whom ought you to believe? Those who know intimately both my words and my character, or a sycophant who knows nothing about me at all, but has chosen to make me his victim?

I have had so many pupils, and they have studied with me in some cases three, and in some cases four years, yet not one of them will be found to have uttered a word of complaint about his sojourn with me

And yet, when anyone devotes his life to urging all his fellow-countrymen to be nobler and juster leaders of the Hellenes, how is it conceivable that such a man should corrupt his followers? What man possessed of the power to discover discourses of this character would try to search for those that are pernicious and have to do with pernicious things, especially a man who has reaped from his works the rewards which I have had?

They, again, are satisfied if through the prestige of their names they can draw a number of pupils into their society; I, you will find, have never invited any person to follow me,

That is why I stated that, while both are entitled to your praise, they are the more entitled to it who are able to execute the harder task.

First of all, tell me what eloquence could be more righteous or more just than one which praises our ancestors in a manner worthy of their excellence and of their achievements? Again, what could be more patriotic or more serviceable to Athens than one which shows that by virtue both of our other benefactions and of our exploits in war we have greater claims to the hegemony than the Lacedaemonians

For I ask you not only to show me no mercy, if the oratory which I cultivate is harmful, but to inflict on me the extreme penalty if it is not superior to any other.44 But I should not have made so bold a proposal, if I were not about to show you what my eloquence is and to make it very easy for you to pass judgement upon it.

Pan-Hellenic assemblies—discourses which, as everyone will agree, are more akin to works composed in rhythm and set to music than to the speeches which are made in court.

Now, in fact, no citizen has ever been harmed either by my “cleverness” or by my writings, and I think the most convincing proof of this is furnished by this trial; for if any man had been wronged by me, even though he might have held his tongue up till now, he would not have neglected the present opportunity, but would have come forward to denounce me or bear witness against me.

but to judge me to be the kind of man which the accusation and the defense in this trial will show me to be;

my accuser endeavors to vilify me, charging that I corrupt young men30 by teaching them to speak and gain their own advantage in the courts contrary to justice, while in his speech he makes me out to be a man whose equal has never been known either among those who hang about the law-courts or among the devotees of philosophy; for he declares that I have had as my pupils not only private persons but orators, generals, kings, and despots;31 and that I have received from them and am now receiving enormous sums of money.

Indeed no one may rely on the honesty of his life as a guarantee that he will be able to live securely in Athens; for the men who have chosen to neglect what is their own and to plot against what belongs to others do not keep their hands off citizens who live soberly and bring before you only those who do evil; on the contrary, they advertise their powers in their attacks upon men who are entirely innocent, and so get more money from those who are clearly guilty.2

You should remember this and not trust too hastily the assertions of the accuser nor hear the defendant in uproar and anger.

not to seek to run through the whole of it at the first sitting, but only so much of it as will not fatigue the audience

for while some things in my discourse are appropriate to be spoken in a court-room, others are out of place amid such controversies, being frank discussions about philosophy and expositions of its power. There is in it, also, matter which it would be well for young men to hear before they set out to gain knowledge and an education; and there is much, besides, of what I have written in the past, inserted in the present discussion, not without reason nor without fitness, but with due appropriateness to the subject in hand.

in my eighty-second year. Wherefore, you may well forgive me if my speech appears to be less vigorous15 than those which I have published in the past.

if I were to attempt a eulogy of myself, I should not be able to cover all the points which I proposed to discuss, nor should I succeed in treating them without arousing the displeasure or even the envy of my hearers.

“cleverness” of speech

But in order that I may not appear to be breaking down the pretensions of others while myself making greater claims than are within my powers, I believe that the very arguments by which I myself was convinced will make it clear to others also that these things are true.

Formal training makes such men more skilfull and more resourceful in discovering the possibilities of a subject;

I think all intelligent people will agree with me that while many of those who have pursued philosophy have remained in private life,(16) others, on the other hand, who have never taken lessons from any one of the sophists have become able orators and statesmen.

I should have preferred above great riches that philosophy had as much power as these men claim;

For they are themselves so stupid and conceive others to be so dull that, although the speeches which they compose are worse than those which some laymen improvise, nevertheless they promise to make their students such clever orators that they will not overlook any of the possibilities which a subject affords

But these professors have gone so far in their lack of scruple that they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous.

And let no one suppose that I claim that just living can be taught;(25) for, in a word, I hold that there does not exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures.

Formal training makes such men more skilfull and more resourceful in discovering the possibilities of a subject; for it teaches them to take from a readier source the topics which they otherwise hit upon in haphazard fashion.

many of those who have pursued philosophy have remained in private life,(16) others, on the other hand, who have never taken lessons from any one of the sophists have become able orators and statesmen.

For what has been said by one speaker is not equally useful for the speaker who comes after him; on the contrary, he is accounted most skilled in this art who speaks in a manner worthy of his subject and yet is able to discover in it topics which are nowise the same as those used by others

I should have preferred above great riches that philosophy had as much power as these men claim;

observes that the teachers of wisdom and dispensers of happiness are themselves in great want but exact only a small fee from their students

But these professors have gone so far in their lack of scruple that they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous

created the impression that those who choose a life of careless indolence are better advised than those who devote themselves to serious study

Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by them.

Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?

I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back.

he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.

Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?

CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the inferior.

'Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest portion of the day to that in which he most excels,' (Antiope, fragm. 20 (Dindorf).)

S: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole; and he should even force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the pain, in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable; let him who has done things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say 'Yes' or 'No' to that?

SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?

SOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty?

SOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say—'in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant'?

SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent?

SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word 'flattery'; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, 'What is rhetoric?' For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?

SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference?

And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric!

GORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men who win their point.

For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise;

And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,' and are learning and belief the same things?

I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.

SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?

GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

rhetoric makes men able to speak?

Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, 'I boast myself to be.'

Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.

If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?

you undertake to answer any questions which you are asked?

fray, but not for a feast.

How then is it necessary to regard as just the blame of Helen, who either passionately in love or persuaded by discourse or abducted by force or constrained by divine constraints did the things she did, escaping responsibility every way?

And many fall into useless troubles and terrible diseases and incurable dementias; thus sight engraves in the mind images of things seen. And the frightening ones, many of them, remain; and those that remain are just like things said.

For just as different drugs draw off different humors from the body, and some put an end to disease and others to life, so too of discourses: some give pain, others delight, others terrify, others rouse the hearers to courage, and yet others by a certain vile persuasion drug and trick the soul.

He who persuaded (as constrainer) did wrong; while she who was persuaded (as one constrained by means of the discourse) is wrongly blamed.

For if all people possessed memory concerning all things past, and awareness of all things present, and foreknowledge of all things to come, discourse would not be similarly similar;

By means of words, inspired incantations serve as bringers-on of pleasure and takers-off of pain. For the incantation's power, communicating with the soul's opinion, enchants and persuades and changes it, by trickery. Two distinct methods of trickery and magic are to be found: errors of soul, and deceptions of opinion.

Accordingly, if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy.

For the will of a god cannot be hindered by human forethought.

her father was in fact the god, but said to be mortal, Tyndareus and Zeus--of whom the one, by being, seemed, while the other, by speech, was disproved--and the one was the mightiest of men while the other was tyrant over all

It is not unclear, not even to a few, that the woman who is the subject of this discourse was the foremost of the foremost men and women, by nature and by birth

practice whatever' you hear.

if you focus your attention, your mind, making progress by this means, will perceive more.

Therefore it must be that he knows everything.

Because it is necessary for the man who intends to speak correctly to speak about the things which he knows. It follows that he will know everything

And, first of all, how will it not be possible for a man who knows about the nature of all things to act rightly in every case and (teach the city) to do so too?

And they say that this procedure is also not only good but exceptionally democratic, whereas I think that democratic is the last thing it is.

We learn our words in this fashion and we don't know who our teachers are.