77 Matching Annotations
  1. Oct 2021
      • Just a test of Annotation, that will be extended.
      • compare & contrast Diigo & Hypothesis
      • diigo[]
  2. Aug 2021
    1. RRID:ZFIN_ZDB-GENO-100420-26

      DOI: 10.7554/eLife.44431

      Resource: (ZFIN Cat# ZDB-GENO-100420-26,RRID:ZFIN_ZDB-GENO-100420-26)

      Curator: @scibot

      SciCrunch record: RRID:ZFIN_ZDB-GENO-100420-26

      What is this?

  3. Jul 2021
  4. Mar 2021
    1. If you are a publisher, you better toss aside those ‘secret’ service provider data protection addendum and get ready to embrace ‘public’ joint-controller agreements with Facebook and other providers of plugins.

      ... How many orgs are actually doing this though?

    1. Results for individual PALB2 variants were normalized relative to WT-PALB2 and the p.Tyr551ter (p.Y551X) truncating variant on a 1:5 scale with the fold change in GFP-positive cells for WT set at 5.0 and fold change GFP-positive cells for p.Y551X set at 1.0. The p.L24S (c.71T>C), p.L35P (c.104T>C), p.I944N (c.2831T>A), and p.L1070P (c.3209T>C) variants and all protein-truncating frame-shift and deletion variants tested were deficient in HDR activity, with normalized fold change <2.0 (approximately 40% activity) (Fig. 1a).

      AssayResult: 4.9

      AssayResultAssertion: Normal

      StandardErrorMean: 0.57

    2. A total of 84 PALB2 patient-derived missense variants reported in ClinVar, COSMIC, and the PALB2 LOVD database were selected

      HGVS: NM_024675.3:c.2234A>G p.(Lys745Glu)


      AssayResult: 94.36

      AssayResultAssertion: Not reported

      PValue: > 0.9999

      Comment: Exact values reported in Table S3.

    2. To this end, 44 missense variants found in breast cancer patients were identified in the ClinVar database (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/clinvar) and/or selected by literature curation based on their frequency of description or amino acid substitution position in the protein (Supplemental Table S1).

      HGVS: NM_024675.3:c.3251C>T p.(Ser1084Leu)

    1. Source Data

      AssayResult: 7.73

      AssayResultAssertion: Abnormal

      ReplicateCount: 2

      StandardErrorMean: 2.25

      Comment: Exact values reported in “Source Data” file.

    2. Source Data

      AssayResult: 6.66

      AssayResultAssertion: Abnormal

      ReplicateCount: 2

      StandardDeviation: 0.28

      StandardErrorMean: 0.2

      Comment: Exact values reported in “Source Data” file.

    3. We, therefore, analyzed the effect of 48 PALB2 VUS (Fig. 2a, blue) and one synthetic missense variant (p.A1025R) (Fig. 2a, purple)29 on PALB2 function in HR.

      HGVS: NM_024675.3:c.2734T>G p.(W912G)

    1. Most Suspected Brugada Syndrome Variants Had (Partial) Loss of Function

      AssayResult: 16

      AssayResultAssertion: Abnormal

      ReplicateCount: 26

      StandardErrorMean: 2.3

      Comment: This variant had partial loss of function of peak current (10-50% of wildtype), therefore it was considered abnormal (in vitro features consistent with Brugada Syndrome Type 1). (Personal communication: A. Glazer)

    2. we selected 73 previously unstudied variants: 63 suspected Brugada syndrome variants and 10 suspected benign variants

      HGVS: NM_198056.2:c.2553C>A p.(Phe851Leu)

  5. Feb 2021
    1. Supplemental material

      AssayResult: 90

      AssayResultAssertion: Normal

      Comment: See Table S3 for details

    2. Supplemental material

      AssayResult: 17.1

      AssayResultAssertion: Normal

      Comment: See Table S3 for details

    3. We analysed a total of 82 blood samples derived from 77 individuals (online supplemental table 3). These 77 individuals corresponded either to new index cases suspected to harbour a pathogenic TP53 variant or to relatives of index cases harbouring TP53 variants.

      HGVS: NM_000546.5:c.572C>G p.(Pro191Arg)

  6. Sep 2020
  7. Mar 2020
  8. Jun 2019
  9. May 2019
    1. 72°C for 45 s - 1 min. A final extension at 68-72°C for 10 min was performed. Relative expression of specific genes in cells subjected to different treatments was determined by semi-quantitative PCR. The optimal number of cycles required for achieving a linear amplification of serially diluted template was determined, which was then used with other samples to quantify the expression of specific genes. The PCR products were resolved on 1-2% agarose gel containing ethidium bromide and visualized under ultraviolet illumination. The specific primers used are shown in Figure 3.1.
    2. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was used to amplify specific nucleotide sequences from eDNA derived from human macrophages. The reaction consisted of Gene Forward primer Reverse primer ER-a 51-GTGGGAATGATGAAAGGTGG-31 51-TCCAGAGACTTCAGGGTGCT-31 51-TGAAAAGGAAGGTT AGTGGGAACC-ER-~ 51-TGGTCAGGGACATCATCATGG-31 31 Bcl-2 51-GTGGAGGAGCTCTTCAGGGA-31 51-AGGCACCCAGGGTGATGCCA-3' Mcl-1 51-CGGCAGTCGCTGGAGATTAT-31 51-GTGGTGGTGGTTGGTTA-31 51-TGGAGTGTCCTTTCTGGTCAACAG-Bfl-1 51-AGCTCAAGACTTTGCTCTCCACC-31 31 iN OS 51-GGCCTCGCTCTGGAAAGA-3 I 51-TCCATGCAGACAACCTT-31 51-CTCCTT AATGTCACGCACGATTTC-Actin 51-GTGGGGCGCCCCAGGCACCA-3 I 31 Figure 3.1. The table shows the forward and reverse pnmers designed agamst specific genes used for amplifying products using PCR. an initial denaturation at 94°C for 4 min, followed by 20-30 cycles of denaturation at 94°C for 30 s, annealing at primer specific temperature for 30 s, and extension at 68
    3. Polymerase Chain Reaction
    1. In a typical ligation reaction, a total of 100 ng of vectorwas usedwhereas;theconcentration of insert varies from 300 to 500 ng. For10μlreaction volume, 1μlligation buffer (provided by the manufacturer) and 0.5μlof T4-DNA ligasewere added in vector-insertmixture. The reaction was maintainedat 16oC for 14-16h.After ligation, 2μl of the ligation mixture (of total volume of10 μl reaction) was added to a vial of ultra-competentDH5α bacterial cells and incubated in ice for 30 minutes. The ligation mixture was allowed toheat shock at 42oC for 90 seconds followed by quick transfer onice. About1ml of LB broth was added to the tube and incubated at 37oC for 1 hour. The bacterial cells were then pelleted by centrifugation at 6000rpm for 5 min and plated on LB plate containing appropriate antibiotic
    2. Ligationand transformationof DNA
    1. of ice cold deionized water (water was kept in the cold room overnight) was added to a 250 mL volumetric flask which was placed on ice. To the water, 52.1 mL of triethylamine solution (~7.2 M, Cat. No-T088, Sigma-Aldrich) was added with the help of a glass measuring cylinder, and mixed well. The volume of the solution was made up with ice cold water till the mark on the volumetric flask, and the flask was mixed well. A pH meter (Eutech instruments 510) was calibrated using pH 7.0 and pH 10.0 solutions (Eutech instruments 510). Approximately 100 mL of 1.5 M triethylamine solution from the volumetric flask was added to a 250 mL conical flask that was placed on ice. A magenetic bead was placed in the flask and the ice bucket was placed on the magnetic stirrer. The pH measuring probe was immersed into the solution, and CO2was bubbled through the triethylamine solution and stirred until the pH reached 8.5. The conical flask was covered with paraffin film and kept on ice until the solution wasused (within 1-4 h)
    2. During the HPLC run,a triethylammonium bicarbonatesolution(1.5 M) was prepared. Triethylamine and water mixture generates heat, and therefore, approximately 100 mL
    3. Preparation triethylammonium bicarbonate solution
  10. Feb 2019
  11. Jan 2019
    1. Wherefore, after I have abridged the record of my father, then will I make an account of mine own life.

      The passing of info/energy/knowledge from one gene-ration to the next is often visualized and spoken of in terms of a light bridge or rainbow bridge. The process being described here as an abridgment should also be understood to signify the building and maintenance of this type of metaphysical technology for the transposing of whole bodies of information via spiritual connection between The Fathers and The Children.

      See 3 Nephi 26:6

  12. Dec 2018
    1. foolish imaginations of his heart

      Constructs which mistake the head as superior to the heart or as an adequate starting place for imaginings will always lead to destruction since the head can not handle nor is it designed for the necessary embedding and recursion which is a seed bearing fruit in itself. But it is sure that, before the brain breaks down and eventually falls/fails, those who mistake it as the best foundation will inevitably turn to mocking them who follow through with flow of spirit through and back to the heart. (see Lehi's Dream 1 Nephi 8:26-27 and Nephi's visitation of the same dream in 1 Nephi 11:35-36)

      This phrase,"foolish imaginations" can and ought to be read as the "FULLish imaginations of his heart." In earlier verses we see that a FULL rendering of Lehi's heart brought about fulfillment on several levels already. This "fulfillment" even took the immediate form of a "filament" (pillar of light which struck a rock in front of Lehi just as the communication struck his heart with overpowering energy). The electrical charging effects of Full Imagining can be transmitted beyond the individual and others can be made to feel these effects, however, unless they are allowed to take hold in the heart where embedding and recursion can take place, then they are short lived and sometimes can have disastrous overall effect upon others who rely on second-hand spirit and external motivation. (see 1 Nephi 3:28-31 and 1 Nephi 17:53-54)

    1. And I know that the record which I make is true. And I make it with mine own hand and I make it according to my knowledge.

      In the first paragraph there is an evocation of the triad of First Principles: Mythos, Typos, Logos (GOD, Place, Word) The Mythic moves and opens up spaces. From that spatial existence known by/as Persons and Places come Things - works/words, art/artifacts, etc. Myths open spaces and rational accounts limit them. These are two parts of one eternal process. Mythos creates space through its mysterious movements. Then within the spatial existence opened by Mythos we have a spatial/special relationship between Peope & Place which always begins to generate Names and other Words. From there the Spirit continues to flow through linguistic channels (Logos) and finally deposited back into the realm of Myth to begin again. [If at any point in this process there is a failure to complete and continue the cycle then what comes about is "vain imaginings" as opposed to the reimagining encouraged on this site. This will be a major theme throughout the BOM.]

      Limitation - One man's account, one man's knowledge. The content itself is a product of the quality of experience and great knowledge accumulated through the person of Nephi (who is likely a higher dimensional type for millions of others who share to some degree in the experience of "favor" and "goodness" on any and all planes). The accuracy of recording relies on the "Learning of the Jews" (Scientific Judgements and Measurements of Truth) and the "Language of the Egyptians" (Science of Expression of Truth through Active Arts).<br> Compare Alma 32:26-43

  13. Nov 2018
  14. Sep 2018
    1. a class of men who would not represent the province for which they are appointed, and who could give no pledge that they would maintain its institutions.

      §§.24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. he will see that the first nominations are to be made by the existing governments. Thus the Government of Canada, that of New Brunswick and that of Nova Scotia will appoint legislative councillors, but afterwards the Federal Government will make the appointments. The honorable member for Quebec can, with reason, draw the conclusion that there is no guarantee that the views of the provinces will be respected. I for my part have investigated the matter, more in connection with the power that will be vested in the legislative councillors. I asserted that by appointing them for life and limiting their number, an absolute authority would be created, which would be quite beyond the control of the people and even of the Executive; that the power of this body will be so great, that they will always be in a position to prevent every reform if they thought proper, and that a collision between the two branches would be inevitable and irremediable. The danger arising from the creating of such a power is exactly that of being obliged to destroy it if they resist too obstinately the popular demands. In England there is no necessity for breaking down the obstructions sometimes presented by the House of Lords, because the Crown having it in its power to appoint new peers, can overcome the difficulty. Here there will be no means of doing it, when the number of councillors is fixed. Accordingly, I have looked at the question through the medium of the powers assigned to the councillors, whereas the honorable member for the county of Quebec fears lest the Government should make choice of men who would not represent public opinion in the provinces; that they might appoint members all of French origin or all of English origin to represent Lower Canada, or take them all from among

      §§.24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. In our Constitution it is the duty of the Legislative Council to exercise the conservative influence, and to modify the legislation too energetic and too full of outside effervescence, which is sent for their consideration from the House of Commons. But when public opinion gains vigor from the obstacles which it encounters, and the reforms demanded are rational and come before them in due course, there is no danger that the legislation which embodies them will be obstructed in its progress; for the people will rise in their majesty and in their sense of justice, as did the people of England in 1832, and the obstacles they might meet with on their way would be swept away as by a torrent. (Hear, hear.) HON. MR. DORION—That is exactly where the danger lies. HON. MR. CAUCHON—That is the danger which assailed the House of Lords in 1832, but no one would venture to confront to the last extremity a danger such as this. But the honorable member for Quebec tells us, if I understand him rightly, that we have not sufficient guarantees for Lower Canada in the appointment of the legislative councillors. The selection of legislative councillors has no bearing whatever on the question we are now considering, viz., whether the appointment by the Crown is or is not preferable to the elective principle. But in answer to him I will say, that the scheme before us seems to be quite clear. According to this plan the candidates for the Legislative Council will be recommended by the local governments and appointed by the General Government, and it is by this very division of powers that the selections are sure to be good, and made in conformity with the desire and sentiments of the provinces. HON. MR. DORION—Only the first nominations are to be made in this manner, not those which may be made afterwards. HON. MR. CAUCHON—The first nominations will be made by the present Governments, and the federal councillors will be taken from the present legislative councillors to the number prescribed, 24, provided so many can be found who will accept the post, and who possess the requisite property qualification. The Conference has engaged, by the terms of the scheme, to respect the rights of the Opposition, and any government who should fail to carry out so solemn an engagement would well deserve to lose the public confidence. (Hear, hear.) I repeat that the mode of appointing the councillors in no wise affects the conservative principle of nomination on which the constitution of the Legislative Council ought to be based.

      §§.24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. It is true that the House of Lords, Conservative though it be, finds itself removed from all popular influence; but its numbers may be increased upon the recommendation of the responsible advisers of the Crown, if such a measure were to become necessary to obtain the concurrence of both Houses, or to prevent a collision between them. The position which its members occupy in it establishes a sort of compromise between the Crown and the popular element. But this new House, after Confederation, will be a perfectly independent body; its members will be nominated for life, and their number cannot be increased. How long will this system work without bringing about a collision between the two branches of the Legislature? Let us suppose the Lower House composed in a great part of Liberals, for how long a time would it submit to an Upper House named by Government? Be kind enough to observe, Mr. SPEAKER, that under the old system, the Legislative Council possessed the same elements of existence as the House of Lords, and that the Crown could increase its numbers at need; it augmented it in 1849, as it threatened to augment the House of Lords in 1832. Observe, again, that it is precisely this control exercised by the Crown over the Upper House that the hon. gentleman found so fatal to legislation previous to 1856. But there is a more rational manner of appreciating the part sustained by the House of Lords in the British Constitution. No one denies to the Sovereign the abstract right of increasing at will the House of Lords; but such right has never been exercised but for the purpose of rewarding men distinguished for great national services and when, in 1832, WILLIAM IV. granted Earl GREY the tremendous power to swamp the representative body of the great landed nobility, it was because the country was moving with rapid strides towards revolution, and because there remained to the Sovereign but two alternatives, either to lessen the moral weight of the House of Lords, or to see his own throne knocked to pieces from under his feet.

      §§.22, 24, 26, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. It must then have been a real revolution, this nomination of one hundred new peers, a revolution as real as that which menaced the Throne; and do we not feel persuaded that if one day our Federal Legislative Council were to place itself obstinately and systematically in opposition to popular will, matured and strengthened by ordeals, it would not be swept away by a revolutionary torrent such as threatened to sweep away the House of Lords in 1832? This Council, limited as to numbers , because the provinces insist on maintaining in it an equilibrium without which they would never have consented to a union, this Council, sprung from the people—having the same wants, hopes and even passions, would resist less the popular will in America, where it is so prompt and active, than could the House of Lords in England, where the masses are inert because they have not political rights; reason tells us thus because they would be a less powerful body socially or politically.

      §§.22, 24, 26, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. “The second point which Her Majesty’s Government desire should be reconsidered”—and this phrase is positively, so far as words can give it, a command on the part of Her Majesty’s Government that it shall be reconsidered :— The second point which Her Majesty’s Government desire should be reconsidered is the constitution of the Legislative Council. They appreciate the considerations which have influenced the Conference in determining the mode in which this body, so important to the constitution of the Legislature, should be composed. But it appears to them to require further consideration whether, if the members be appointed “for life, and their number be fixed, there will be any sufficient means of restoring harmony between the Legislative Council and the popular Assembly, if it shall ever unfortunately happen that a decided difference of opinion shall arise between them. These two points, relating to the prerogative of the Crown and the Constitution of the Upper Chamber have appeared to require distinct and separate notice. Is not that a pretty emphatic dissent ?

      §§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. In order to protect local interests, and to prevent sectional jealousies, it was found requisite that the three great divisions into which British North America is separated, should be represented in the Upper House on the principle of equality. There are three great sections, having different interests, in this proposed Confederation.
    2. To the Upper House is to be confided the protection of sectional interests ; therefore is it that the three great divisions are there equally represented, for the purpose of defending such interests against the combinations of majorities in the Assembly.
    1. [Page 88]

      §. 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867

      Referenced in Singh v. Canada (Gen. Div.), 1990 CanLII 6922 (ON SC)

    2. But the very essence of our compact is that the union shall be federal and not legislative. Our Lower Canada friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step ; and, for my part, I am quite willing they should have it. In maintaining the existing sectional boundaries and handing over the control of local matters to local bodies, we recognize, to a certain extent, a diversity of interests ; and it was quite natural that the protection for those interests, by equality in the Upper Chamber, should be demanded by the less numerous provinces.
    1. bishop gave judgment, declaring the marriage null in a canonical sense. Regarded in a civil point of view, the marriage was still valid until it should have been declared null by a civil tribunal. It became necessary, therefore, to carry the cause before the Superior Court, and my honorable friend, the member for Because, who took the case in hand with his usual zeal and legal address, obtained from the court, after a suitable inquiry, a judgment declaring the marred null in a civil sense, and ordering that it should be registered as such in all places where it should be needful. If this affair had occurred in Upper Canada, what recourse would the parties have had ? The parties being Catholics, the case would have been brought before the bishop, who would also have declared the marriage null after suitable inquiry; but the cause would not have had the same conclusion in the civil court, particularly had it depended on certain impediments which have force in Lower Canada, but none in Upper Canada. It would have become necessary to go to Parliament to pray for an act, which, in a Catholic point of view, would be a mere decree of separation, but which the Parliament would have termed an act of divorce. This power to grant a separation is therefore necessarily vested in the Parliament, by whatever names such separation may be designated, and we are not to be reproached for the interpretation which others may give to such name, different from that which we assign to it. I thought it right to make myself understood on this point, because I do not choose that people should be able to say we are afraid of explaining our position with regard to the question of divorce and marriage, and I believe that I have shown that our position is consistent with our religious laws and our principles as Catholics. I regret that I have dwelt so long on the matters touched upon by the honorable member for Hochelaga ; but after his speech, and considering the position he assumed, he must have expected an answer.

      §§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. HON. SOL. GEN. LANGEVIN—I beg your pardon, it means that a marriage contracted in no matter what part of the Confederacy, will be valid in Lower Canada, if contracted according to the laws of the country in which it takes place ; but also, when a marriage is contracted in any province contrary to its laws, although in conformity with the laws of another province, it will not be considered valid. Let us now examine the question of divorce. We do not intend either to establish or to recognize a new right ; we do not mean to admit a thing to which we have constantly refused to assent, but at the Conference the question arose, which legislature should exercise the different powers which already exist in the constitutions of the different provinces. Now, among these powers which have been already and frequently exercised de facto, is this of divorce. As a member of the Conference, without admitting or creating any new right in this behalf, and while declaring, as I now do, that as Catholics we acknowledge BO power of divorce, I found that we were to decide in what legislative body the authority should be lodged which we found in our Constitutions. After mature consideration, we resolved to leave it in the Central Legislature, thinking thereby to increase the difficulties of a procedure which is at present so easy. We thought then, as we still think, that in this we took the most prudent course. The following illustration will prove this still more forcibly. I t is known to the House how zealous a partisan the honorable member for Brome (Mr. DUNKIN) is of the cause of temperance. Well, we will suppose that the honorable gentleman were present as a member of a municipal council in which it was to be decided whether all the taverns in a very populous part of the parish, which could not be suppressed, should be banished to a remote corner of the parish, where they would no longer be a temptation and a stumbling-block ; would he not vote for such a measure ? Would he not send them to a place where they would be least accessible to the population, and would he not think he had done a meritorious act, an act worthy of a good friend of the temperance cause ? Just so in a question of divorce ; the case is exactly analogous. We found this power existing in the constitutions of the different provinces, and not being able to get rid of it, we wished to banish it as far from us as possible. One thing it would be vain to deny, namely, that although we, as Catholics, do not admit the liberty of divorce, although we hold the marriage bond to be indissoluble, yet there are cases in which we both admit and require the annulling of the marriage tie—in cases, for instance, where a marriage has been contracted within the prohibited degrees without the necessary dispensations. An instance of this occurred very recently. A few months since, an individual belonging to my county, who had married a young girl of a neighboring parish, without being aware at the time of his marriage of the relationship which existed between him and his wife, found out several months afterwards that they were related in such a degree that they required a dispensation from the bishop. That dispensation had not been obtained. He spoke of it to his wife, who refused to apply for a dispensation, as a step towards the legal celebration of their marriage. It became necessary, therefore, to have the marriage annulled. The affair was brought before the Ecclesiastical Court, and, after a minute investigation, the diocesan

      §§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. HON. SOL. GEN. LANGEVIN—The honorable member for Verchères does not choose to be convinced ; so I will make no further attempt to convince him. The resolution in question signifies just what I have stated.

      §§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. may be summed up as follows :—The Central Parliament may decide that any marriage contracted in Upper Canada, or in any other of the Confederated Provinces, in accordance with the laws of the country in which it was contracted, although that law might be different from ours, should be deemed valid in Lower Canada in case the parties should come to reside there, and vice versa.

      §§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. The honorable gentleman has asked the Government what meaning was to be attached to the word ” marriage,” where it occurred in the Constitution. He desired to know whether the Government proposed to leave to the Central Government the right of deciding at what age, for example, marriage might be contracted. I will now answer the honorable gentleman as categorically as possible, for I am anxious to be understood, not only in this House, but also by all those who may hereafter read the report of our proceedings. And first of all I will prove that civil rights form part of those which, by article 43 (paragraph 15) of the resolutions, are guaranteed to Lower Canada. This paragraph reads as follows :— 15. Property and civil rights, excepting those portions thereof assigned to the General Parliament. Well, amongst these rights are all the civil laws of Lower Canada, and among these latter those which relate to marriage; now it was of the highest importance that it should be so under the proposed system, and therefore the members from Lower Canada at the Conference took great care to obtain the reservation to the Local Government of this important right, and in consent-‘ ing to allow the word ” marriage ” after the word “divorce,” the delegates have not proposed to take away with one hand from the Local Legislature what they had reserved to it by the other. So that the word ” marriage,” placed where it is among the powers of the Central Parliament, has not the extended signification which was sought to be given to it by the honorable member. With the view of being more explicit, I now propose to read how the word marriage is proposed to be understood :— The word marriage has been placed in the draft of the proposed Constitution to invest the Federal Parliament with the right of declaring what marriages shall be held and deemed to be valid throughout the whole extent of the Confederacy, without, however, interfering in any particular with the doctrines or rites of the religious creeds to which the contracting parties may belong. This is a point of great importance, and the French Canadian members ought to rejoice to see that their fellow-countrymen in the Government have not failed in their duty on a question of so serious a nature. On many other points many of them will doubtless claim that we have not thoroughly fufilled our duty, but as regards the matter in question there can be no difference of opinion, as I we have all a common rule to guide us ; and I repeat that they ought to rejoice that their co-religionists in the Conference have not been found wanting on this occasion. The whole

      §§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. Remarks have also been made about the laws of divorce and marriage, and the honorable member for the division of DeLanaudière (Hon. Mr. OLIVIER) told us that the Conference had done well in transferring the power of divorce to the General Government. On his part, I think this was a wise view of the question, and I am glad to have the opportunity of now telling him so. He was, however, very uneasy about the word ” marriage.” Well, I will try to put him right and at his ease on that point; and I will give him the answer as I find it put down in writing, so that no possible misunderstanding may continue to exist. If the honorable gentleman will but take his pen, he will be able to note my answer :—” The word ‘ marriage’ has been inserted to give the General Legislature the right to decide what form of marriage will be legal in all parts of the Confederation, without in any way interfering with the rules and prescriptions of the Church to which the contracting parties belong.”

      §§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. One of them is a matter in which Lower Canada is somewhat peculiarly interested— the system of marriage and divorce, which, I see, is to be left in the hands of the Federal Government.

      §§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. filature, should be composed. But it appears to them to require further consideration whether, if the members be appointed for life, and their number be fixed, there will be any sufficient means of restoring harmony between the Legislative Council and the popular Assembly, if it shall ever unfortunately happen that a decided differ emcee of opinion shall arise between them. Now the point of this (Mr. CARDWELL’S) objection clearly is to the number being fixed, not to the principle of nomination, nor to members being appointed lord life.

      §§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. Will the representatives from the Lower Provinces allow that import duty to be imposed ? No, undoubtedly they will not. Attempt to carry it in the interest of Upper Canada and you will at once transform the whole of them into advocates for the repeal of the union. Thus you create cause for agitation in all the sections, and it will not long continue until you will again see another deadlock.

      §.26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. It is said that, as you have a responsible government, the Government of the day will be held responsible to the people, through their representatives in the lower branch of the Legislature for the appointments, it may make to this House. Admitting this to be the case, we know what the tendency is in England, and what it was in this country when the Government had the appointment of the members of the Legislative Council ; the effect will be to find a place in this House for men distinguished for the aid they have given at elections to certain men or parties, and not as a reward of true merit or legislative ability. Furthermore, if this House is to be of any value at all, it is as affording a wholesome check over hasty and unwise legislation. But if you place the whole legislation of the country in the hands of a single man or body, I care not whether it is democratic or aristocratic in its tendencies, a power like that in the hands of the Executive to create the Legislative Council is a dangerous one. Unrestrained or unchecked action by a single elected body of the most democratic character is apt to go astray if they feel they have only themselves to consult. This is what is proposed to be done under this scheme ; but let this House be elected, as before, by the people ; let them be returned for a period of eight years as at present, or even longer if desired, and then, if there is a demand for legislation of a selfish or ill-considered character—a demand which, founded on ignorance or passion, is likely to right itself after the lapse of a few years—the members of this House would take the responsibility upon themselves of rejecting it, and public opinion would eventually sustain them and acknowledge that they have done some service to the country. But inasmuch as you appoint these members for life, you have no check over them, nor are they so likely to check legislation of an immature and ill-considered character. While the Ministry of the day which appoints them remains in power, it will expect and receive a cordial support from them ; but let it be defeated, and a ministry, formed out of the opposite party, obtain office, there will certainly be difficulty —there will be a tendency to dead-locks between the two branches of the legislature, and a repetition of those scenes which were witnessed in this country some years ago, and which formed one of the principal causes that brought about the rebellion of 1837.

      §§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. what is meant by the regulation of the law of divorce ; but what is meant by the regulation of the marriage question ? Is the General Government to be at liberty to set aside all that we have been in the habit of doing in Lower Canada in this respect ? Will the General Government have the power to determine the degree of relationship and the age beyond which parties may marry, as well as the consent which will be required to make a marriage valid ?

      §§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. If the two Canadas were alone interested, the majority would have its own way—would look into the Constitution closely—would scan its every doubtful provision, and such a proposal as this about the Legislative Council would have no chance of being carried, for it is not very long since the House, by an overwhelming majority, voted for the substitution of an elected for a nominated Upper Chamber. In fact, the nominated Chamber had fallen so low in public estimation—I do not say it was from the fault of the men who were there, but the fact is, nevertheless, as I state it— that it commanded no influence. There was even a difficulty in getting a quorum of it together. So a change became absolutely necessary, and up to the present moment the new system has worked well; the elected members are equal in every respect to the nominated ones, and it is just when we see an interest beginning to be felt in the proceedings of the Upper House that its Constitution is to be changed, to return back again to the one so recently condemned. Back again, did I say ? No, sir, a Constitution is to be substituted, much worse than the old one, and such as is nowhere else to be found. Why, even the British House of Lords, conservative as it is, is altogether beyond the influence of the popular sentiment of the country. Their number may be increased on the recommendation of the responsible advisers of the Crown, if required to secure united action or to prevent a conflict between the two Houses. From the position its members occupy, it is a sort of compromise between the popular element and the influence or control of the Crown. But the new House for the Confederation is to be a perfectly independent body —these gentlemen are to be named for life— and there is to be no power to increase their number. How long will the system work without producing a collision between the

      §§.24, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. to be believed that, as promised in the document we are considering, such a Government as we have ” will take care of the Opposition, or consider their right to be represented in the Council?” (Hear, and laughter.) Sir, I thank the delegates for their kind solicitude for the Opposition, but I do not believe they will do anything of the kind. Have we not heard the Honorable Attorney General West, a few nights ago, state, turning to his followers, ” If I were to advise the nomination, I should advise the selection of the best men I could find—and of course of my own party ?” (Hear.) So it will be, sir ; and, if this precious scheme is carried, we shall have a Legislative Council divided in the following proportion :—For Upper Canada, we should probably have liberals in the proportion of three to nine ; for I suppose the honorable member for South Oxford has made sacrifices enough to deserve at least that consideration, and, as his friends compose one-fourth of the Executive Council, I dare say we should get one fourth of the Upper Canada Legislative Councillors liberal too. HON. ATTY. GEN. MACDONALD—Hear, hear HON. MR. HOLTON—Just 25 per cent. HON. MR. DORION—Just 25 per cent, of liberals for Upper Canada. Then, in addition, we should get from Nova Scotia ten conservative, from Prince Edward Island four more, and four from Newfoundland. Thus we shall have eighteen conservatives from the Lower Provinces, which, added to thirty-six from Canada, would make fifty-four conservatives against twenty-two liberals, taking the ten New Brunswick councillors to be all liberals. Now, supposing three per cent, as the average number of deaths per annum—the average proportion of change— it would take nearly thirty years to bring about a change in the character of a majority of the Council, even supposing all the additions made to it to be from the liberal ranks. But, sir, that will hardly be the case. In some of the Lower Provinces there will be Conservative governments now and then, and there may occasionally be conservative governments in Canada. (Hear, and laughter.) So this generation will certainly pass away before the views of the Liberal party will ever find expression in the decisions of the Upper House.

      §§.24, 25, and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. No, honorable gentleman—but circumstances forced the Government in 1856 to bring on their measure for rendering this House elective ; and the circumstances of the country in 1864 required that we should have recourse to some other means to put an end to the dead-lock in which the Province was placed.

      §§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. The Government for the time being were thus, by the force of circumstances, obliged to bring forward the measure for altering the constitution of the Legislative Council. The measure was passed by a pretty large majority; and I think that until now the elective principle has worked remarkably well indeed, and that the electors have sent to this House gentlemen who would do honor to any deliberative body in the world—I care not where, whether in England, or on the continent of Europe, or in America. But difficulties have arisen since the passing of the Act of 1856, and the Government of the country came almost to a dead-lock. Some remedy had to be found, and gentlemen of opposite parties wisely came together with the view of devising a plan which would not only cure our domestic difficulties, but give greater power and force to the British North American colonies.

      §§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. This was not, as I have stated already, because of any predilection on our part for the elective principle. I t was not because we thought that the elective principle was much better than the system of appointment by the Crown—at all events before the introduction of responsible government. Before that, the gentlemen who nominated members of this House were responsible to no one. The appointments then were all made on one side. Even after the union, but before responsible government was established, or before it was put in a thoroughly practical working state, the appointments had been made in a partial manner. (Hear, hear.) And it is not surprising that we experienced the difficulties we did until that period. After the establishment of responsible government the position was very different—the resolutions of the 3rd September, 1841, having declared that no Government could be carried on except by heads of departments having the confidence of the representatives of the people in the lower branch of the Legislature. If, from that moment, bad appointments happened to be made to the Legislative Council, then the Government for the time being was responsible to the people for those appointments. And, when the people wanted an elective Council at that time, they did not base the demand upon constitutional principles, but were led by their passions, which had been excited by their recollections of the past. They did not reason the thing out ; and, in fact, the great majority of the people here, as everywhere else, are not able to reason out constitutional points—they are led by those who are at the head of the different parties.

      §§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. What shall I say on the subject of marriage—the basis of all our institutions ? Is it not dangerous to have it at the mercy of the Federal Government ? We shall soon be told probably that it is but a sounding affair, and before long, mayors will take the place of the curés, and will celebrate the marriages of their constituents. Our laws which regulate our marriages at present are very important to us, and are based on the Roman law. These are the only laws suitable to Canadians, and the wise provisions characterizing them were the fruit of the experience of several ages. We should not incur the risk of any change in them by a legislature, the majority of whose members do not hold our opinions on this subject.

      §§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

  15. Aug 2018
    1. The 29th section of the scheme submitted to us says : ” The Federal Parliament shall have the power of making laws for the peace, the well-being, and the good government of the Confederate provinces, and in particular in respect of the following matters.” The powers of the Federal Government will be in reality unlimited. The fact of the enumeration of these thirty-seven heads does not in the least restrain the power of the Federal Government from legislating on everything. The exceptions are few. I would ask the Honorable Premier, for instance, whether the Federal Government has not the power to enact that marriage is a civil contract ? He cannot deny it, and I do not believe that that clause will in any way suit Lower Canada. In a matter of divorce, I consider that the power of legislating upon it ought to be vested in the Federal Government ; but as to the passing of a marriage act, we have the authority of the past to convince us that Lower Canada will never be satisfied with what is proposed in the plan of Confederation. On a former occasion, when a member of the Parliament of Canada moved to enact that marriage should be made a civil contract, all the members for Lower Canada voted against the motion, and the whole country was opposed to it. I shall also inquire whether the Federal Government will not have the right to enact that religious corporations shall no longer exist in the country, or that they shall not be allowed to hold real property, except what is absolutely necessary for their lodging accommodation. According to the resolutions which have been submitted to us, the Federal Government would certainly have this right. It has been said that article 15 of the 43rd resolution replies to this objection, but I can see nothing in that article which restricts the right of the Federal Government to legislate on this matter. The 43rd resolution defines the powers of the local governments, and article 15 of that resolution declares that they may make laws respecting ” property and civil rights, excepting those portions thereof assigned to the General Parliament.” That article reserves to the local legislatures nothing relative to religious corporations, and the Federal Government would have full power to decree that those corporations shall not hold immovable property. The supreme power is that which has the right to legislate upon, and regulate the existence of, the corporations in question, and they can only possess civil rights so long as the Government permits them to exist. The same might be said of most of the institutions to which Lower Canada is attached. I am therefore right in saying that, so far as those things which Lower Canada most holds to are concerned, Confederation is in fact a Legislative union, because upon the Federal Government is conferred the right of legislating upon those subjects which Lower Canada holds most dear.

      Preamble and §§.91(26)(29), 92(11)(12)(13), and 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. A good deal has been said about a possible dead-lock between this House and the other House, but there has been little of that in past times, and nothing of a serious nature. If, however, the amendment passes, I can imagine a dead-lock which might be extremely prejudicial to this House —prejudicial to its influence in the country ; nay, almost destructive of it. Suppose these resolutions to be carried in the other House by a large majority, which I have little doubt will be the case, and we carry an amendment here—suppose all the legislatures of the Lower Provinces adopt the resolutions, and this House stands alone in rejecting them— do you believe the British Parliament will be turned aside from what it believes to be the best interests of British America by the action of this House ? I can imagine a dead-lock occurring then, and one in consequence of which the opinion of this House might be set aside and its vote disregarded.

      §§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. although he earnestly believed that the majority of his own constituents were in favor of a Legislative Council appointed by the Crown. As for the objection which had been urged that between an Upper House composed exclusively of life members, and an elective Lower House, there might be the danger of a direct collision in the event of one rejecting an important measure which the other had passed, he did not think there was much danger of such a contingency. Indeed he would remind honorable members that the only instance of anything like a dead-lock between the two Houses, which had occurred within late years, at all events, was since the introduction of the elective principle, when the Council in 1859 refused to pass the Supply Bill on account of certain items contained in it, providing for the expense of the removal of the Government to Quebec. The Government on that occasion were left in a minority in this House, although they had a majority in the Assembly, and it was only after an adjournment of some days and upon a reconsideration of the question, after bringing up some life members from Lower Canada, that the Government carried the vote by a majority of two or three. Upon the whole, however, he thought that the life members of the Council would admit that the elective members had so far, at all events, comported themselves in such a way as to maintain the character of the House as a conservative body, free from all violent party feeling, and exercising a wholesome check against all ill-considered or hasty legislation. The real danger, he thought, was that if the House in process of time were to become a purely elective body, and party lines became more closely drawn, the same partisan spirit which too often swayed the proceedings of the popular branch of the Legislature, might find its way into their chamber, larger powers, such as originating money bills, might be claimed, and a collision between the two Houses might then occur at any time.

      §§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. It is said they have not [Page 89] the power. But what is to prevent them from enforcing it? Suppose we had a conservative majority here, and a reform majority above— or a conservative majority above and a reform majority here—all elected under party obligations,—- what is to prevent a dead-lock between the chambers ? It may be called unconstitutional—- but what is to prevent the Councillors (especially if they feel that in the dispute of the hour they have the country at their back) from practically exercising all the powers that belong to us ? They might amend our money bills, they might throw out all our bills if they liked, and bring to a stop the whole machinery of government. And what could we do to prevent them ? But, even supposing this were not the case, and that the elective Upper House continued to be guided by that discretion which has heretofore actuated its proceedings,—still, I think, we must all feel that the election of members for such enormous districts as form the constituencies of the Upper House has become a great practical inconvenience. I say this from personal experience, having long taken an active interest in the electoral contests in Upper Canada. We have found greater difficulty in inducing candidates to offer for seats in the Upper House, than in getting ten times the number for the Lower House. The constituencies are so vast, that it is difficult to find gentlemen who have the will to incur the labor of such a contest, who are sufficiently known and popular enough throughout districts so wide, and who have money enough — (hear) — to pay the enormous bills, not incurred in any corrupt way,—do not fancy that I mean that for a moment—but the bills that are sent in after the contest is over, and which the candidates are compelled to pay if they ever hope to present themselves for re-election. (Hear, hear.) But honorable gentlemen say—” This is all very well, but you are taking an important power out of the hands of the people, which they now possess.” Now this is a mistake. We do not propose to do anything of the sort. What we propose is, that the Upper House shall be appointed from the best men of the country by those holding the confidence of the representatives of the people in this Chamber. It is proposed that the Government of the day, which only lives by the approval of this Chamber, shall make the appointments, and be responsible to the people for the selections they shall make. (Hear, hear.) Not a single appointment could be made, with regard to which the Government would not be open to censure, and which the representatives of the people, in this House, would not have an opportunity “of condemning. For myself, I have maintained the appointed principle, as in opposition to the elective, ever since I came into public life, and have never hesitated, when before the people, to state my opinions in the broadest manner ; and yet not in a single instance have I ever found a constituency in Upper Canada, or a public meeting declaring its disapproval of appointment by the Crown and its desire for election by the people at large. When the change was made in 1855 there was not a single petition from the people asking for it—-it was in a manner forced on the Legislature. The real reason for the change was, that before Responsible Government was introduced into this country, while the old oligarchical system existed, the Upper House continuously and systematically was at war with the popular branch, and threw out every measure of a liberal tendency. The result was, that in the famous ninety-two resolutions the introduction of the elective principle into the Upper House was declared to be indispensable. So long as Mr. ROBERT BALDWIN remained in public life, the thing could not be done ; but when he left, the deed was consummated. But it is said, that if the members are to be appointed for life, the number should be unlimited— that, in the event of a dead lock arising between that chamber and this, there should be power to overcome the difficulty by the appointment of more members. Well, under the British system, in the case of a legislative union, that might be a legitimate provision. But honorable gentlemen must see that the limitation of the numbers in the Upper House lies at the base of the whole compact on which this scheme rests. (Hear, hear.) It is perfectly clear, as was contended by those who represented Lower Canada in the Conference, that if the number of the Legislative Councillors was made capable of increase, you would thereby sweep away the whole protection they had from the Upper Chamber. But it has been said that, though you may not give the power to the Executive to increase the numbers of the Upper House, in the event of a dead-lock, you might limit the term for which the members are appointed. I was myself in favor of that proposition. I thought it would be well to provide for a more frequent change in the composition of the Upper House, and lessen the danger of the chamber being largely composed of gentlemen whose advanced years might forbid the punctual and vigorous discharge of their public [Page 90] duties. Still, the objection made to this was very strong. It was said : ” Suppose you appoint them for nine years, what will be the effect ? For the last three or four years of their term they would be anticipating its expiry, and anxiously looking to the Administration of the day for re-appointment ; and the consequence would be that a third of the members would be under the influence of the Executive.” The desire was to render the Upper House a thoroughly independent body—one that would be in the best position to canvass dispassionately the measures of this House, and stand up for the public interests in opposition to hasty or partisan legislation. It was contended that there is no fear of a dead-lock. We were reminded how the system of appointing for life had worked in past years, since Responsible Government was introduced ; we were told that the complaint was not then, that the Upper Chamber had been too obstructive a body—not that it had sought to restrain the popular will, but that it had too faithfully reflected the popular will. Undoubtedly that was the complaint formerly pressed upon us—{hear, hear)—and I readily admit that if ever there was a body to whom we could safely entrust the power which by this measure we propose to confer on the members of the Upper Chamber, it is the body of gentlemen who at this moment compose the Legislative Council of Canada. The forty-eight Councillors for Canada are to be chosen from the present chamber. There are now thirty-four members from the one section, and thirty-five from the other. I believe that of the sixty-nine, some will not desire to make their appearance here again, others, unhappily, from years and infirmity, may not have strength to do so ; and there may be others who will not desire to qualify under the Statute. It is quite clear that when twenty-four are selected for Upper Canada and twenty-four for Lower Canada, very few indeed of the present House will be excluded from the Federal Chamber ; and I confess I am not without hope that there may be some way yet found of providing for all who desire it, an honorable position in the Legislature of the country. (Hear, hear.) And, after all, is it not an imaginary fear—that of a dead-lock ? Is it at all probable that any body of gentlemen who may compose the Upper House, appointed as they will be for life, acting as they will do on personal and not party responsibility, possessing as they must, a deep stake in the welfare of the country, and desirous as they must be of holding the esteem of their fellow-subjects— would take so unreasonable a course as to imperil the whole political fabric ? The British House of Peers itself does not venture, à l’outrance, to resist the popular will, and can it be anticipated that our Upper Chamber would set itself rashly against the popular will? If any fear is to be entertained in the matter, is it not rather that the Councillors will be found too thoroughly in harmony with the popular feeling of the day ? And we have this satisfaction at any rate, that, so far as its first formation is concerned—so far as the present question is concerned—we shall have a body of gentlemen in whom every confidence may be placed.

      §§.24, 26, and 29 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. Much had been said about the risk of collision between two elective Houses, that legislation might come to a dead-lock; now it was a remarkable fact that under the present system there had been no such difficulties, while both in England and in Canada, previous to the introduction of the elective system, they had occurred, and on several occasions the power of the Crown had been called in to overcome them by appointing additional members. What would be the position of the House under the new scheme? It would be the most irresponsible body in the world; and if a dead-lock should occur there would be no way of overcoming it, for the casualties of death, resignation or acceptance of office, which had been so strongly insisted upon as sufficiently numerous to enable the Government of the day to modify the character of the House, would not in his opinion be adequate to meet such an exigency. Such was apparently the view of the Colonial Secretary; and it would in all probability be found necessary to leave the Crown unfettered in the exercise of its prerogative of appointment.

      §.26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

  16. Jul 2018
    1. 17

      Step 25:

      Insert the 4 101345 studs into the boards with appropriate pre-drilled holes.

      Step 26:

      Attach the boards to the desk, next to the circular cutouts.



  17. Apr 2018
    1. there might be some misunderstanding and difference of opinion, as for example those clauses by one of which it was stated that the civil laws of the country were to be under the control of the local governments, and by the other of which the law of marriage was placed under the control of the General Government. The law of marriage pervaded the whole civil code, and he wanted to know how it could be placed under a different legislature from that which was to regulate the rest of the civil law.

      §§. 91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

  18. Jun 2017
  19. Mar 2017
  20. Dec 2016