69 Matching Annotations
  1. Jul 2020
  2. Jun 2020
  3. Feb 2020
    1. k6 does not run in Node.js because it would perform poorly while running larger tests.Javascript is not generally well suited for high performance. It's a Go program - to achieve maximum performance - embedding a JavaScript runtime for running tests written in JavaScript.
  4. Jan 2020
    1. unless this turns out to be one of those really vivid dreams, like the one where you’re at the dentist but you’re naked and your dentist is Bette Midler and spiders keep coming out of your mouth.

      Simile

    2. Since then Guzmán has been in hiding except for an interview with Sean Penn, a guest spot with Jimmy Kimmel and a series of commercials for Buffalo Wild Wings. Mexican police finally are able to track him down during his four-week stint as a guest judge on “America’s Got Talent.”

      Exaggeration and hyperboles are frequently utilized by Barry in his effort to create a satirical piece.

    3. like suit-wearing seals trained to bark out talking points

      Uses similes to emphasize his lack of respect and even disdain toward the thing being compared.

  5. Oct 2019
    1. Programas efectivos de prevención e intervención en Bullying

      Múltiples y diversas intervenciones se han desarrollado para afrontar esta problemática (por ejemplo, Minton & O'Moore, 2008; Olweus, 1993; Smith, Ananiadou, & Cowie, 2003; Varela & Tijmes, 2008 entre otros). Sin embargo, a pesar de los numerosos programas existentes, solo unos pocos han demostrado ser efectivos. De hecho, los programas exitosos se caracterizan por abordar esta problemática en sus diversos niveles y no con actividades puntuales ni aisladas.

      Con respecto a la experiencia internacional, "Olweus Bullying Prevention Program", es uno de los programas pioneros en la intervención del Bullying (Olweus, 1993). Este programa se basa en un modelo comprensivo que opera en distintos niveles: escolar, sala de clases e individual. Tiene como objetivo reducir y eliminar tanto el Bullying directo como el indirecto, mejorar las relaciones de pares en el establecimiento educacional y crear las condiciones que permitan que tanto víctima como victimario logren funcionar mejor dentro y fuera de éste. Las estrategias del programa incluyen la promoción y creación de un ambiente positivo en todo el establecimiento educacional, donde la participación de los adultos (docentes y familias) es fundamental; y la creación de límites claros frente a la conductas que no son aceptadas dentro del contexto escolar, requiriendo que las sanciones que se aplican a los victimarios sean consistentes, no castigadoras e involucren un proceso de reflexión y reparación (Olweus, 2004). La evaluación de este programa indica que fue exitoso, disminuyendo en un 50% el autoreporte de Bullying (tanto de víctima como victimario), la incursión en otro tipo de conductas antisociales, y mejorando el clima escolar (Olweus, 2004).

      En Inglaterra se llevó a cabo el programa "Sheffield Anti-Bullying Project", inspirado en el programa de Olweus. Este programa busca desarrollar políticas institucionales en el establecimiento educacional que permitan detener la victimización por Bullying a nivel de toda la comunidad escolar, utilizando estrategias como el desarrollo de políticas integrales para detener la victimización, el desarrollo curricular para crear conciencia del problema, el trabajo individual, seguimiento y monitoreo tanto de la víctima como del agresor, modificación de los espacios físicos de riesgo, y el monitoreo permanente de los niveles de victimización dentro de la escuela. La evaluación del programa, llevado a cabo en cuatro establecimientos educacionales durante 18 meses, demostró que disminuyó el porcentaje de victimización (14% en primaria y 7% en secundaria), la tasa de agresión (12% en primaria y secundaria), y aumentaron las denuncias por agresión a los profesores (Smith, et al., 2003).

      El "Programa educativo de prevención de maltrato entre compañeros y compañeras" (SAVE) desarrollado en España, es otro ejemplo de programas con resultados exitosos. Este programa toma un modelo integral, preventivo, ecológico y comunitario e involucra a los alumnos, profesores, familia y comunidad. El programa no solo disminuyó las conductas de Bullying, sino que logró promover las relaciones interpersonales como un factor protector frente a la violencia escolar (Ortega, Del Rey, & Mora-Merchán, 2004).

      Por otra parte, Finlandia cuenta con el "Programa Anti-bullying Kiva" desarrollado en la Universidad de Turku y financiado por el Ministerio de Educación de este país, el cual presenta estrategias universales para prevenir situaciones de intimidación y, a su vez, detener la intimidación en curso. El programa contiene una serie de herramientas concretas para los educadores, lecciones para estudiantes, material de aprendizaje virtual, e indicaciones claras para los integrantes de la comunidad escolar para detener las situaciones de intimidación de manera efectiva (Salmivalli, Kärnä & Poskiparta, 2011; Kärnä, Voeten, Little, Poskiparta, Kaljonen & Salmivalli, 2011).

      Otros programas internacionales que han demostrado efectividad son el "Programa Apoyo Positivo al Estudiante" (Positive Behavior Support-PBS, Sprague & Golly, 2005) y los Programas Anti-bullying en Irlanda: "Programa ABC" (Minton & O'Moore, 2008). Todos se basan en una aproximación multinivel del fenómeno, la implementación de estrategias de prevención e intervención de manera sistemática, organizadas y planificadas a largo plazo. Así como también, la implementación de estrategias orientadas al desarrollo de un clima social escolar positivo y al fomento de habilidades socio-emocionales.

      En Chile, uno de los primeros programas en evaluar su efectividad fue el programa piloto "Aprendiendo Juntos", basado en el modelo de intervención del "Positive Behavior Support-PBS". Se implementó en un establecimiento educacional de la cuidad de Santiago, donde se logró disminuir en un 34,7%, los incidentes violentos entre los alumnos, medido a través de la disminución del promedio diario de alumnos derivados a inspectora1 en los años 2006 y 2007 (Varela, Tijmes & Sprague 2009). Otra experiencia chilena evaluada fue el Programa Recoleta en Buena implementado en 4 establecimientos educacionales donde se evaluó a 677 estudiantes el año 2006 y 553 el año 2008, de 5º básico a IVº medio. El programa logró disminuir el promedio de los reportes de violencia (víctimas, victimarios y testigos), salvo los reportes de violencia de tipo delictual (violencia más grave). Sin embargo, sus resultados reportaron efectividad a nivel primario permitiendo impactar en toda la comunidad escolar (Varela, 2011).

      Tanto la experiencia internacional como en Chile en la implementación de programas de prevención e intervención de violencia en las escuelas ha demostrado la importancia de abordar esta problemática desde un modelo ecológico (Orpinas, 2009). Es decir, que los programas presenten un abordaje integral, los cuales apunten a los distintos niveles del sistema escolar: políticas públicas, red educativa, familias, y personas, así como la interrelación entre estos niveles. Asimismo, las estrategias de intervención y de prevención deben ser organizadas, sistemáticas y planificadas a largo plazo. Estas estrategias deben estar orientadas a prevenir, intervenir y promover un clima social escolar positivo, incrementar la empatía, el desarrollo de las competencias sociales, la promoción de conductas prosociales, la resolución de conflictos y la mediación.

      A pesar de lo anterior, la experiencia ha demostrado que existe una escasez de estudios de efectividad sobre programas integrales de prevención del Bullying, a nivel de los países de Sudamérica. Es por esto que el presente artículo evalúa la efectividad de un programa de prevención e intervención de Bullying y Ciberbulling, basado en los lineamientos de los programas que han demostrado ser exitosos, en alumnas que cursan de 4º año básico a IVº año medio de un establecimiento educacional femenino de Santiago de Chile.

  6. Feb 2018
    1. 133,000 people behind bars in U.S. prisons and jails for drug possession – and 63,000 of these people are held pre-trial, which means they’re locked up simply because they’re too poor to post bail.

      Why are we doing this to our citizens, we are supposed to be helping them while all we are doing is mentally and physically hurting them more then the drugs do.

    2. 80 percent of those arrests are for simple drug possession.
    3. More than a million people are arrested each year in the U.S. for drug possession,
    4. Decriminalization benefits public safety and health.
    5. Our retrograde federal administration is ramping up the war on drugs – despite widespread public support for ending it and instead focusing our limited resources on health-based approaches to drug addiction and overdose deaths.

      why is the government fighting for what they believe is right and not what is best for their citizens, since their citizens have experimented with drugs.

    6. Half of all adults in the U.S. have used an illegal drug at some point.
  7. Dec 2017
  8. Oct 2017
  9. Apr 2017
  10. Mar 2017
    1. or instance, young animals are endearing, even when the adults of the species are not; so the child may feel encouraged to derive not only the obvious contextual implication that he is dirty, but also the further contextual implication that he is, nevertheless, endearing.

      In this case we have a scenario like the Juliet one where the metaphor is very rich and can have many possibly characteristics to pick out. The related characteristics each have to have a certain weight so that the hearer can have a clue on which one is the most relevant in the instance. It seems to me that in this example, void of context, uttering these words can leave the hearer puzzled if the reference is for being dirty or being endearing, while in the Juliet example which is much more rich in context, we can exclude that Romeo is saying Juliet is a celestial object.

    2. The greater effort imposed indicates that greater effect is intended. By uttering (13), the speaker thus encourages the hearer to look for a range of further contextual implications not shared by (14), and to assume that within this range there are some that she is prepared to endors

      So would the authors say that even though the hyperbole is blatantly false (because we haven't gone to every person in the world and measured their niceness), the intended meaning is still safe because the relevance of the statement still holds that the utterer wanted to convey this higher degree of intended effect?

    3. f we are right, loose uses are non-literal uses in the sense described above: they are based on resemblance relations among representations, and involve interpretive rather than descriptive dimensions of language use

      In order to determine the "loosness" of a statement however, we need context, that is we must call upon pragmatics. If the speaker utters "I live in Paris" and we have no context about the exact location of her residence, then we might as well believe she lives right in the center of the city, and then the truth-conditional semantics seem to be false.

    4. The qualification 'near Paris' demands some processing effort, which, given the presumption of relevance, should be offset by some cognitive effect

      The problem I have with "near Paris" is that regarding each city, there are norms of what is included within the city and what is not. For example, many of you may have heard from philosophical readings of Piraeus, the port of Athens. Now, Piraeus is not in Athens (and I believe never was, not even in Aristotle's time let's say). However, in contemporary common conversation, Piraeus is often said to be in Athens, for sake of simplicity, even though it is located quite some time from the center of Athens, similar to the distance I imagine Issy-les-Moulineaux to be located from the center of Paris. If someone tells me "I live in Athens" and someone else tells me "I live in Piraeus", even though the two are picking out different locations in essence, to me this has no significance, partly because everything is centered around a big city, including its peripheries, but also because I know the people in Piraeus and the people in Athens live live quite the same lives. In my opinion the statements I live in Paris and I live near Paris don't have much difference and their relevance are more or less the same

    5. Hence, Peter is entitled to assume that Marie intended him to interpret her utterance in this way, which is consistent with the principle of relevance

      I get the point being made in this paragraph and the her statement is heavily based on the relevance to the hearer, Peter. But if we consider this example in a normal everyday conversation, one living in this area just outside of Paris would most likely say that she/he lived in Paris no matter what, because the distance from Paris is insignificant, in my opinion, to make this distinction. I say this because someone living in the outskirts of the city or just outside the city is still closely related to the city. To make my point a little more clear, when I try to explain to my friends in Greece where in America I live, more often than not I simply say "45 minutes out of New York". To the hearer, especially one that's never been to New York, the relevance factor is focused on the city, even though I have some distance from it and I'm by no means living in the city. But my point is not undermined, because despite me living outside the city, I still have gone to the city many times and I can still make this point even though I know my hearer will find it more relevant that I live within distance of New York rather than that I live in Connecticut.

    6. n a nutshell, for an utterance to be understood, it must have one and only one interpretation consistent with the fact that the speaker intended it to seem relevant to the hearer-adequately relevant on the effect side and maximally relevant on the effort side

      This is confusing to me, because when I think back to the Juliet example, the utterance "Juliet is the sun" there is certainly not one and only one interpretation. Further, there is a different level of relevance of each interpretation of the utterance.

    7. conveyed, but not asserted

      I am confused as to the difference between these two terms in this context...

    8. Speakers may try hard or not at all to be relevant to their audience

      Is it that difficult to be relevant to your audience?

    9. In such a process, the hearer is taking a large share of the responsibility for the conclusions he arrives at. As a result, different hearers with different background knowledge and different imaginations will follow somewhat different routes.

      So different people will get different things out of the same metaphor

    10. We want to argue that they differ not in kind but only in degree of looseness

      First impression: this thesis sets up an argument that seems nit-picky and seemingly unnecessary. Differentiating between degrees and types is a way of putting things into boxes that doesn't necessarily represent the way things are well, just the way in which an individual views them.

    11. We claim that interests are simply by-products of the general search for relevance: as a result of our cognitive history, some topics in our memory are richer in information and, either temporarily or permanently, more accessible than others, so that information relating to them is likely to produce greater effect for less effort, i.e. be more relevant as defined.

      Interesting point

    12. On this approach, the claim that a man with one hair is bald is just as false as the claim that a man with a full head of hair is bald. What distinguishes them is not the fact that one is true and the other false, but the fact that one is an acceptable loose use because many of its logical and contextual implications are true, whereas the other is unacceptable since a hearer would be able to derive from it virtually no true descriptive information about the state of affairs it purports to represent

      useful distinction

    13. nd implication (9), which is contextually implied by both

      I wouldn't agree that (4) implies (9), even though it is a possibility, it doesn't necessarily follow from "it is winter" that "we should stay at home"

    14. Marie's first answer, 'I live in Paris', is effective enough to convey just what she wants; it may be more effective than the literally true second answer, 'I live near Paris'.

      Another helpful example

    15. ny object in the world can, in principle, be used to represent any other object that it resembles. For instance, a piece of rope can be used to represent a snake which it resembles in shape

      I agree with this point, but just playing a little devils advocate, what allows us to do this? That is, why can we use one object to represent another that it resembles? What allows us to do this? Is it just because of their sheer resemblance?

    16. but also calculable

      What is entailed by an implicature being calculable?

    17. : it is an exceptionless generalisation about human communicative behaviour.

      What makes the principle of relevance different from every other principle, etc. in modern pragmatics

    18. Any utterance addressed to someone automatically conveys a presumption of its own relevance. This fact, we call the principle of relevanc

      The principle of relevance

    19. We claim that humans automatically aim at maximal relevance, i.e. maximal cognitive effect for minimal processing effort.

      Claim concerning human information processing

    20. For instance, when I draw you a diagram of how to get to my house, you do not infer that I intend you to travel across white paper, in two dimensions, past landmarks clearly labelled CHURCH and NEWSPAPER SHOP, a distance of 8 inches from door to door. You have to make some assumption about which properties of the representation carry over to the original.

      Helpful example

    21. Every utterance used in verbal communication interpretively represents a thought entertained by the speaker-the very thought that the speaker wants to communicate. That much the hearer is entitled to expect; that much is necessary for verbal communication to be possible at all. However, the hearer is not invariably entitled to expect a literal interpretation of the speaker's thought, nor is such an interpretation always necessary for successful communi- cation to take place. A less-than-literal interpretation of the speaker's thought may be good enough: may indeed be better on some occasions than a strictly literal one.

      So a literal interpretation may not be what a hearer gets, but they can expect that what's being said is an interpretive representation of what the speaker is thinking

    22. Let us say that when one representation is interpretively used to represent another, all of whose implications it shares, it is a literal interpretation of that other representation. On this account, literalness is just a limiting case of interpretive resemblance.

      So two representations with all the same implications are literal interpretations of each other

    23. By our definition, propositions (4) and (5) resemble one another more in context (6a-b) than in context (7a-b): in (6a-b) they share implication (8), which is contexually implied by (4) and analytically implied by (5), and implication (9), which is contextually implied by both; whereas in (7a-b), (4) and (5) share no implications at all. This seems to match our intuitions, insofar as intuitions are possible given the artificiality of the example.

      Could use some clarification here

    24. We are thus defining interpretive resemblance as a context- dependent notion: two propositions P and Qmay resemble one another closely in one context and less closely or not at all in another context.

      Interpretive resemblance depends on context

    25. interpretati

      Representation in virtue of resemblance

    26. r descripti

      Representation in virtue of truth-conditions

    27. Any object in the world can, in principle, be used to represent any other object that it resembles. For instance, a piece of rope can be used to represent a snake which it resembles in shape. An utterance can be used to represent another utterance which it resembles in meaning-either closely, as in the case of a paraphrase or translation, or more distantly, as in the case of a summary. Generally speaking, an utterance can be used to represent any representation which it resembles in content, whether a public representation such as another utterance, or a mental representation such as a thought.

      New idea

    28. Rather, she intends him to entertain the proposition(s) most salient in her mind and to construct around it (or them) a complex thought which merely bears some similarity to her own. For instance, the mother wants the child to realise quite clearly that she thinks he is dirty, and to get at least an inkling of her accompanying thoughts

      So a speaker using a metaphor doesn't intend for their hearer to get their exact same thoughts/associations, rather they want the hearer to understand the most important associations and then get a general idea of the other accompanying thoughts

    29. In her modest way, the mother who calls her child a piglet achieves some unparaphrasable effects: for instance, she seems more indulgent than if she had called him a dirty child.

      Similar to what we were talking about last class - metaphors seem to have meaning beyond what can be translated into literal language

    30. Such views are no longer considered adequate to account for other cognitive abilities, but are still called upon, for want of any alternative, when it comes to explaining what is evoked by a metonymy, a synecdoche, a metaphor, or an irony. No other explanation is given of how figurative interpretations are recovered. Grice's account merely adds an inferential step of confirmation to these mysteriously retrieved figurative interpre- tations.

      So association isn't enough to explain how the figurative meanings of metaphors, etc. come to a hearer's mind

    31. The initial implausibility of any hypothetical rule of literal truthfulness might be overlooked if the appeal to such a rule had useful theoretical consequences; if it helped to explain how not only literal talk, but also loose talk and metaphor are understood. But in this respect, modern accounts are neither essentially different from, nor superior to, classical rhetorical accounts

      The problem with hypothetical rules of literal truthfulness : they don't account for loose talk and metaphor are understood

    32. One generally accepted answer is that there is a rule (or norm, or principle, or maxim, or convention, or presumption) of literal truthfulness whereby the utterer of a declarative sentence, in expressing a certain proposition, automatically vouches for its truth (similar rules of literal commitment can be formulated for non-declarative utterances)

      So Peter would assume that the car is actually in the garage simply because Mary said so

    33. Literal talk, loose talk and metaphorical talk are often seen as different in kind. We want to argue that they differ not in kind but only in degree of looseness, and that they are understood in essentially the same way.

      Seems like this is going to be the main argument of the paper

  11. Feb 2017
    1. or the task was to give the meaning of all expressions in a certain infinite set on the basis of the meaning of the parts ;

      So how does this infinite set of expressions apply to the synonyms of language or the ambiguous nature of language itself that is a necessary implicitly?

    2. rege's theor

      This idea was formulated in non-symbolic terms in his The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884). Later, in his Basic Laws of Arithmetic (vol. 1, 1893; vol. 2, 1903; vol. 2 was published at his own expense), Frege attempted to derive, by use of his symbolism, all of the laws of arithmetic from axioms he asserted as logical. Most of these axioms were carried over from his Begriffsschrift, though not without some significant changes. The one truly new principle was one he called the Basic Law V: the "value-range" of the function f(x) is the same as the "value-range" of the function g(x) if and only if ∀x[f(x) = g(x)]. The crucial case of the law may be formulated in modern notation as follows. Let {x|Fx} denote the extension of the predicate Fx, i.e., the set of all Fs, and similarly for Gx. Then Basic Law V says that the predicates Fx and Gx have the same extension iff ∀x[Fx ↔ Gx]. The set of Fs is the same as the set of Gs just in case every F is a G and every G is an F. (The case is special because what is here being called the extension of a predicate, or a set, is only one type of "value-range" of a function.) (stanford.edu)

    3. ost philosophers of language, and recently even by some linguists,

      What's the difference between the fields of philosophy of language and linguistics? This is a really interesting potential distinction.

  12. Jan 2017
    1. . There is only one world, the “real”world:

      This is a phenominological view, not necessarily an objective one...

    2. Logic, I should maintain, must no moreadmit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with thereal world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract andgeneral features.

      Is logic built on science or is science built on logic?

    3. Who did you meet?” “I met a man.” “That is a very indefinitedescription.” We are therefore not departing from usage in our termi-nology. Our question is: What do I really assert when I assert “I meta man”? Let us assume, for the moment, that my assertion is true,and that in fact I met Jones. It is clear that what I assert isnot“I metJones.” I may say “I met a man, but it was not Jones”; in that case,though I lie, I do not contradict myself, as I should do if when I sayI met aj168man I really mean that I met Jones. It is clear also that theperson to whom I am speaking can understand what I say, even if heis a foreigner and has never heard of Jones

      Are there varying degrees of how definite things can be? For example, You can say that you met Jones, but Jones is not the Jones, he is simply a Jones, as you have not provided any distinction such as last name or characteristic.

  13. Aug 2016
  14. Apr 2016
    1. Blog post discussing a more productive format for a meetup than the typical case where developers turn up, watch speaker(s) for 30-60 minutes, then leave.

  15. Mar 2016
  16. Jan 2016
    1. Hypothes.is

      Авторство з будь-ким, в будь-якому місці Наша місія полягає в тому, щоб створити новий шар в Інтернеті.

      Використовуйте Hypothes. Програмні платформи: Mac OS X, Windows, Linux, Інтернет

      ЛІЦЕНЗІЯ Open Source

      ТВОРЕЦЬ Hypothes.is

      Ми вважаємо, що прості інструменти можуть допомогти всім нам поліпшити якість інформації в Інтернеті та в великому світі навколо нас.

      Наша команда будує відкриту платформу для обговорення в Інтернеті. Ця платформа використовує анотації, щоб піднести пропозицію, критику або нотатки на вершину новин, блогів, наукових статей, книг з точки зору обслуговування, ініціатив для голосування, законодавства і багато іншого. У всьому, що ми будуємо, ми керуємося принципами. Зокрема, що наша платформа буде вільною, відкритою, некомерційною, нейтральною і міцною.

      Ми створюємо програмне забезпечення, яке буде давати поштовх для стандартів, і сприяти спільноті.

      Ми некомерційна організація, фінансована через великодушність Knight, Mellon, Shuttleworth, Sloan and Helmsley Foundations — та за підтримки сотень людей, які так само хочуть побачити цю ідею втіленою. Ви можете переглянути наші податкові декларації тут.

      Наші зусилля на основі проекту анотації, в який ми робимо основний внесок і у стандарти анотації для цифрових документів, розроблюваних веб Робочої групи W3C Анотація. Ми активно співпрацюємо з розробниками, видавцями, науковими установами, дослідниками та особами, що розробляють платформу для наступного покоління веб-додатків читання і запису. Ви можете слідкувати за нашим прогресом у галузі розвитку по нашій дорожньої карти.

      Якщо ви хочете взяти участь, завантажте наше розширення і створіть обліковий запис. Будь ласка, підтримайте наші зусилля.

      Ось презентація на 2013 Персональна демократичного форуму, який забезпечує трохи більше контексту для нашого проекту.

      КАТЕГОРІЯ: Управління та продуктивності

      <br> КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА:

      web-based, note-taking, annotation, annotator

      (базується на веб, конспектування, анотація, коментатор)

  17. Nov 2015
    1. So in both cases we are writing contracts that say “I require input with this shape, and I will give you output with that shape.” This is the essence of ruling out runtime errors in Elm. We always know what kind of values a function needs and what kind it produces, so we can just check that we always follow these rules.
  18. Jun 2015
    1. Things like how you don't pick your passions, they pick you

      "Everyone thinks that they know what they want; sometimes your drug chooses you." -- k.d. lang, "My Last Cigarette"

      https://youtu.be/CCvalE8SClU

  19. May 2015
    1. stirred air stirs meaning

      This makes me think of k.d. lang discussing the experience of recording with Roy Orbison: "when you’re standing that close to a vocalist, you can feel the air move, and the body resonating, and everything. And Roy was very operatic, so he had a great deal of air moving, and even though he may look meek, he used his body a lot to get that projection."

      Image Description