This will of course depend on your perspective, but: beware Finnish and other highly inflected languages. As a grammar nerd, I actually love this stuff. But judging by my colleagues, you won’t.

Entire sentences are also important because in many languages, the declination of some word in a sentence depends on the gender or the number (singular/plural) of another part of the sentence. There are usually more interdependencies between words than in English. The consequence is that asking a translator to translate two half-sentences and then combining these two half-sentences through dumb string concatenation will not work, for many languages, even though it would work for English. That’s why translators need to handle entire sentences.

(there are languages, which have far more than 2 forms)

Our languages are filled with slang and idioms that make no literal sense. If you were to try to tell a non-native English speaker to hold their horses, there’s a good chance they’ll look at you like your head is on backwards.Similarly, you’d probably be confused if a French person told you that they had the cockroach. But that just means that they were feeling depressed.

Language doesn’t exist inside of a vacuum. Every language is strongly influenced by the culture the language was born from.

However, the "etc." cannot be interpreted as a conjunction in formal logic.

“Electricity;”

I had heard of some discoveries having been made by an English philosopher

Natural philosophy is the genius that has regulated my fate

Albertus Magnus

Seneca

would owe their being to me

air-pump

a course of lectures upon natural philosophy

Dr. Darwin

In soil, bacteria tend to live in a state of dormancy due to prevailing oligotrophic conditions, which would not be particularly favorable for the development of competence

with their habits. Sometimes I heard four or five at once in different parts of the wood, by accident one a bar behind another, and so near me that I distinguished not only the cluck after each note, but often that singular buzzing sound like a fly in a spider’s web, only prop

Crucial to understanding the workings of power is an understandingof the nature of power in the fullness of its materiality. To restrict power’sproductivity to the limited domain of the “social,” for example, or tofigure matter as merely an end product rather than an active factor infurther materializations, is to cheat matter out of the fullness of its capacity.

abuse or perversion of terms from their na1ura

But the greatest drawback of our educational methods is that we pay an excessive amount of altention to the natural sciences and not enough to ethics.

Nature has been incorporated into social theorizing only in as far as it either has become an object to which meaning is attributed and which hence figures as part of human reflexivity, as object met with emotions or attitudes; or, it is seen as an object of transformation by those forces which act upon it: economic forces, but foremost forces emanating from science and technology. The natural environment, including the biosphere and a multitude of environmental risks which have come to the fore today, negate clear-cut boundaries between the effects of human intervention, and hence agency, and synergistic processes which are 'natural' but still a result of human interaction with the environment. Time, it has been emphasized, is not only embedded in symbolic meaning or intersubjective social relations but also in artifacts, in natural and in culturally made ones. Likewise, the ongoing transformation and endangering of the natural environment is performed by processes which are chemical and atmospheric, biological and physical. But they all interact with social processes tied to energy production and use, modes of food production and land utilization, demographic pressures and possible interferences through use of tech-nology.

The claim to the existence of a concept of 'social time', distinct from other forms of time, was thus made early in the history of social thought. It continues to focus upon the claims of the peculiar nature of the 'social constitution' or the 'social construction' of time. These claims evidently put the category of 'social time' into the wider realm of 'symbolic time', a cultural phenomenon, the constitution of which has remained the object of inquiry of more disciplines than sociology alone, but which separates it from time in nature, embedded in things and artifacts.

Recognising ourselves as having evolved, and thus being the times of nature, allows for the humanly constituted aspects of time to become one expression among the others. Biologists have dispelled the idea that only humans experience time or organise their lives by it. Waiting and timing in nature presuppose knowledge of time and temporality, irrespective of their being symbolised, conceptualised, reckoned, or measured. Yet, once time is constituted symbolically, it is no longer reducible to the communication of organisms or physical signals; it is no longer a mere sensory datum. For a person to have a past and to recognise and know it entails a representational, symbolically based imagination. Endowed with it, people do not merely undergo their presents and pasts but they shape and reshape them. Symbolic meaning thus makes the past infinitely flexible. With objectified meaning we can not only look back, reflect, and contemplate but we can reinterpret, restructure, alter, and modify the past irrespective of whether this is done in the light of new knowledge in the present, to suit the present, or for purposes of legitimation.

In other words, the idea of time as socially constituted depends fundamentally on the meaning we impose on 'the social', whether we understand it as a prerogative of human social organisation or, following Mead, as a principle of nature.

A brief expansion of these general social science assumptions about nature will clarify this point. Nature as distinct from social life is understood to be quantifiable, simple, and subject to invariant relations and laws that hold beyond time and space (Giddens 1976; Lessnoff 1979· ~yan 1979). This view is accompanied by an understanding of natural time as coming in fixed, divisible units that can be measured whilst quality, complexit~, ~nd mediating knowledge are preserved exclusively for the conceptuahsat10n of human social time. On the basis of a further closely related idea it is proposed that nature may be understood objectively. Natural scientists, explain Elias (1982a, b) and Giddens ( 1976), stand in a subject-object relationship to their subject matter. Natural scientists, they suggest, are able to study objects directly and apply a causal framework of analysis whilst such direct causal links no longer suffice for the study of human society where that which is investigated has to be appreciated as unintended outcomes of intended actions and where the investigators interpret a pre-interpreted world. Unlike their colleagues in the natural sciences, social scientists, it is argued, stand in a subject-subject relation to their subject matter. In a?ditio? to the differences along the quantity-quality and object-subject d1mens10ns nature is thought to be predictable because its regularities -be they causal, statistical, or probabilistic -are timeless. The laws of nature. are c?nsi~ered to be true in an absolute and timeless way, the laws of society h1stoncally developed. In contrast to nature, human societies are argued to be fundamentally historical. They are organised around :alues, goals, morals, ethics, and hopes, whilst simultaneously being mfl~enc~d by tradition, habits, and legitimised meanings.

Since our traditional understanding of natural time e~erged as inadequate and faulty we have to recognise that the analysis of social time is flawed by implication.

Past, present, and future, historical time, the qualitative experience of time, the structuring of 'undifferentiated change' i?to episodes, all are established as integral time aspects of the subJect matter of the natural sciences and clock time, the invariant measure, the closed circle, the perfect symmetry, and reversible time as our creations.

Sorokin and Merton (1937) may be said to have provided the 'definitive' classic statement on the distinction between social and natural time. They associate the physical time of diurnal and seasonal cycles with clock time and define this time as 'purely quantitative, shorn of qualitative variation' (p. 621). 'All time systems', Sorokin and Merton suggest further, 'may be reduced to the need of providing means for synchronising and co-ordinating the activities and observations of the constituents of groups' (p. 627).

Whilst social theorists are no longer united in the belief that all time systems are reducible to the functional need of human synchro~is_ation and co-ordination they seem to have little doubt about the validity of Sorokin and Merton's other key point that, unlike social time, the time of nature is that of the clock, a time characterised by invariance and quantity. Despite significant shifts in the understanding of social time, the assumptions about nature, natural time, and the subject matter of the natural sciences have remained largely unchanged.

That there are such things as rights anterior to the establishment of governments: for natural, as applied to rights, if it mean anything, is meant to stand in opposition to legal—to such rights as are acknowledged to owe their existence to government, and are consequently posterior in their date to the establishment of governmen

before they stuck a concrete university here.

oil and gas and mineral wealth,

The anonymous and autonomous functions of the body

nature

reality

value the “natural” separations

Ese estado interior positivo es deseado tanto para uno mismo como para los demás, hasta el punto de convertirse en un propósito o meta de vida.

(Invariant local form theorem for n.d.o.). Let D(M): C?(V(M))--C?(W(M)) be a n.d.o. of order k. Then D looks the same in every coordinate system, i.e., there exists a map P: E V- W lal (k a n-tuple such that locally D(f)(x)>P(Djf(x)) under every local coordinate system.

ding T9:R'--R'. Then there exists a unique n.d.o. D(M):C'(Vi(M)) -*C??(V2(M)) such that D(R n) = p. Proof. Given an n-manifold M, we construct D(M): C??(V1(M)) C ??( V2(M )) as follows: Suppose s E C ( V1(M )), and Tp: R n ->UCM is a chart. Define D(M)(s)rU=(9(-l)*P(T9*s). The assumption on P implies that this gives a well-defined n.d.o. with the required property

Suppose V1(M) and V2(M) are two n.v.b. and P:C??(V,(Rn)) ->C (V2(Rn)) is a differential operator such that Tp*P= Pap* for every embed-

consider the linear space C?(F(M)) of all smooth sections of F(M), and for an embedding p:M-*N there is an induced map p*:C?(F(N))*C??(F(M)) given by qg*s= F()-'osoT. Thus M-C??(F(M)) is a functor from 9ln to the category of real vector spaces. Definition 0.3. A natural differential operator (n.d.o.) from one n.v.b. F1 to another n.v.b. F2 is a family of differential operators {D(M):C??(Fi(M)) -> C?(F2(M)), M an n-manifold} such that (P*D(N)= D(M)q* for every embedding 9p: M-*N.

As intellectual property lacks scarcity, and the protection of it fails the Lockean Proviso, there is no natural right to intellectual property. As such, the justification for intellectual property rights arises from the social con tract, and in the case of the United States, the Constitution.

The Privatization of the Natural State Proponents also invoke Locke’s discussion of the making of private property from the natural state by the joining of one’s efforts to the natural state (Menell, 1999, p. 129). The argument goes that authors (ar tists, inventors, etc.) join their efforts to the natural state of undefined ideas, and through their efforts arrive at an intellectual work; and by that effort, they may make a legitimate claim on that intellectual work as their property (Menell, 1999, p. 129; Locke, 1690, Chap. V, Sect. 26).

And JSTOR really was in an impossible bargaining position. Important scientific papers do not have cheaper alternatives. If someone wants to read Watson and Crick's paper on DNA or Einstein's paper on the photoelectric effect, it is not as if there is a paper by John Doe that is just as good and available for less. Academic publishers are, in effect, natural monopolies that can demand as much money as we can afford, and possibly more.

As birds are born to fly, horses to run, and wild beasts to show fierceness, so to us peculiarly belong activity and sagacity of understanding; hence the origin of the mind is thought to be from heaven. 2. But dull and unteachable persons are no more produced in the course of nature than are persons marked by monstrosity and deformities, such are certainly but few.

As birds are born to fly, horses to run, and wild beasts to show fierceness, so to us peculiarly belong activity and sagacity of understanding

We can now see that a writer must disguise his art and give the impression of speaking naturally and not artificially.

for this, the student must not only have the requisite aptitude but he must learn the different kinds of discourse and practice himself in their use