On 2025-02-12 19:57:09, user Aron Troen wrote:
Review Part I: Overview
Careful, comprehensive, and accurate evaluation of the emergency food supply available to conflict affected populations is crucial for the design and implementation of an effective humanitarian response in any war.
This study claims to model the caloric content and diversity of the food delivered to the Gaza enclave from October 2023 through August 2024 of the current war, and asks whether it was sufficient to provide for the needs of Gaza’s population.
To do so, the researchers construct a “retrospective model” of the per-capita calorie supply over time incorporating:
- A simulation of the baseline food supply at the onset of the war, and its depletion during the initial phase of the war, consisting of assumed household stocks of humanitarian food aid (2.3.1); data on the capacity of UNRWA and WFP warehouses before the war (2.3.2); Estimated private food stores (2.3.3), and; estimated agriculture and livestock production before the war and its estimated rate of decline (2.3.4).
- A simulation of daily age and sex-adjusted per-capita food pre-war intake of the Gazan population (rather than their consensus humanitarian requirements) based on the distribution of intakes derived from a health survey of non-communicable disease conducted among adults in Gaza in 2020 during the COVID pandemic.
- Selected, partial data on the supply of humanitarian food aid by UN agencies, and assumed geographic distribution of the food supply and population.
Unfortunately, the study suffers from fundamental flaws which invalidate its findings and conclusions.
In any model, simulations depend heavily on the validity of the selected data and of each of the model’s assumptions. This study makes multiple assumptions and relies on heavily on data from the UNRWA dashboard, which the authors and UNRWA acknowledge to be incomplete, and whose reliability is controversial. Notably, the UN data do not fully cover private sector food delivery, which comprise a large proportion (up to 40%) of the total available food supply. It does not make a serious effort to analyze additional data from COGAT that includes more complete coverage of the food supplied to Gaza. Of the URNWA data analyzed, the researchers assign food weights to pallets that underestimate the weight of food provided by as much as half (!) according to publicly available UN food supply requirements. These and other significant limitations, detailed below, are enough to raise serious concerns about the validity of the findings, and to limit the conclusions that may be reliably drawn from them.
However, an even more basic question must be asked: Why simulate or model the calorie supply, with all the uncertainty that the model’s multiple assumptions introduce into the findings, if the available energy can be simply calculated from the reported weight and type of foods supplied to Gaza, which can then be compared to the humanitarian standards for the energy requirement of emergency-affected populations?
Some of the limitations of the data and the uncertainty of the results are listed by the authors. However, merely acknowledging limitations is not sufficient to justify overreach in the discussion of the results and their policy implications. In their conclusions, the authors suggest that their study provides valid and useful evidence for a “forensic analysis” of claims that Israel has deliberately starved Gaza’s population, concluding that “Israel, as the de facto occupying power, did not ensure that sufficient food was consistently available to the population of Gaza…”. They further state that their findings will be used to estimate the “resulting effect on nutritional outcomes among Gazan children”. These conclusions are not supported by the findings and appear to reflect political motivation and bias. Indeed, contrary to the portrayal of the results, it is remarkable that the model shows that the overall caloric supply to the emergency-affected population of Gaza was adequate during the majority of the period analyzed, despite a brief shortfall, even with intense combat between Israel and Hamas, and despite the limitations of the model’s questionable assumptions and data.
Presenting simulations with greater certainty than they merit can be harmful. Past simulations made by the authors about the war in Gaza have proven erroneous (For example, in February they projected that total deaths from the conflict would reach between 58,260 to 85,750 deaths by August , whereas even the problematic Gaza MOH (Hamas) eventually reported a significantly lower number of 39,623 for the same period (see for example: https://gaza-projections.org/; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gaza-fatality-data-has-become-completely-unreliable; https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/questionable-counting/ ). The gap between the authors’ past projections on the war and the available information ought to have given them pause before publishing highly consequential political conclusions from tentative simulations. The gravity of the crisis is severe enough without magnifying the uncertainty surrounding the available data. For a discussion of the harms associated with conflating simulated projections with reality, see for example, Beyar R, Skorecki K. Concerns regarding Gaza mortality estimates. Lancet. 2024 Nov 16;404(10466):1925-1927. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(24)01683-0. More recently, a US State Department statement reprimanded the irresponsible exaggeration of the food crisis by one of the key international humanitarian NGOs that provides data to the IPC: “At a time when inaccurate information is causing confusion and accusations, it is irresponsible to issue a report like this. We work day and night with the UN and our Israeli partners to meet humanitarian needs — which are great — and relying on inaccurate data is irresponsible.” ( https://il.usembassy.gov/statement-from-u-s-ambassador-jacob-lew-on-fews-net-report/ ).
Instead of providing clarity based on credible and verifiable research and analysis, this exercise is used for political advocacy in belittling the very serious challenges faced by Israel, humanitarian agencies and the private sector, who collectively have supplied massive quantities of food to the emergency-affected population of Gaza, despite the intense and ongoing war. It is always difficult to obtain accurate information during a war.
Real-time projections that recognize the inevitably incomplete data (beyond lip-service), with carefully stipulated assumptions and caveats, can be useful to inform prospective decision-making and humanitarian efforts in the face of uncertainty. In contrast, “retrospective modelling” based on blatantly cherry-picked data, questionable assumptions, and presenting simulated outcomes as truth to reach politically charged conclusions does not advance scholarly discourse, and has pernicious real-world consequences.
Comments on the Introduction<br />
The objectives of the study are not explicitly stated in the introduction. While the authors’ justified dismay over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and their aim of assessing the food availability of Gaza is clear, the framing of the introduction (as well as the discussion and conclusions of the paper) is selective and tendentious, leaving the impression that rather than evaluating the food supply to Gaza during an intense conflict in order to provide valid scientific insight for improving the humanitarian response, the study is an exercise in political and ideological advocacy under the facade of academic research and analysis.
The highly selective introduction obscures more than it illuminates. It begins by asserting that “the population of the Gaza Strip has experienced seven decades of protracted conflict”. These seventy years (!) conflate fundamental historical transformations, from the time when Gaza was under Egyptian control until the 1967 war, in which Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank, followed bythe October 1973 war, the first Palestinian intifada (1987-1991), Oslo Accords (1993) in which the Palestinian Authority was created and assumed control over Gaza (1994-2006), the second intifada (2000-2004) and Israel’s full unilateral withdrawal from Gaza (2005), the violent Hamas takeover in 2007, thousands of rockets launched at Israel and ensuing small wars, and Hamas’s construction of a vast underground military complex under Gaza. Reducing this long and complex history to a simple story of protracted conflict and implied victimization elides complex dimensions including rapid population growth from ~250,000 Gazans in 1950 to ~2.2 million in 2023, major improvements in health and nutrition achieved through cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli health professionals, and significant economic, social and political developments (for example: “Health in the occupied Palestinian territories”; Tulchinsky, Ted H et al. (2009) The Lancet, Volume 373, Issue 9678, 1843).
Mention of “70 years of conflict” is followed in the same breath with “16 years of enforced restrictions on trade and the movement of people and goods, including food [1]”. The reference given for this statement, which was authored by the UN conference on trade and development in January 2024 is a preliminary analysis of the impact of the current war on the destruction in Gaza. It does not mention restrictions on food. On the contrary, it refers to the massive provision of (food) aid to Gaza by the international community. Moreover, there is no mention that the 16 years of restrictions on Gaza were a response to the election of Hamas, a jihadist terror organization not only dedicated to the destruction of Israel, but also at odds with the PLO-led Palestinian Authority, which it violently overthrew in Gaza in 2006-2007. There is also no mention that during the 16 years since seizing power, Hamas instigated recurring wars against Israel in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and finally in October 2023. This glaring omission leaves the impression that restrictions on Gaza were arbitrary.
Hamas is only mentioned in a passing reference to “the 7 October Hamas attacks”, which serves as a point of departure for describing the massive destruction and harm inflicted on Gaza by Israel. There is no mention anywhere in the article of responsibility of the Hamas government in Gaza, for the consequences of their failed governance for their own civilian’s welfare ( https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/us/politics/hamas-power-gaza-violence-israel.html) "https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/us/politics/hamas-power-gaza-violence-israel.html)") . The absence of central details of the attack on Israel, which continued long after October 7th – over 1200 people brutally murdered and mutilated, 255 abducted, as well as the parallel bombardment of millions of Israelis with thousands of rockets and missiles – is a remarkable omission and reflects the biased political approach. Similarly, in framing the Israeli response as “large-scale aerial bombing and ground operations,” there is conspicuously no reference at all to the dilemmas posed by Hamas’ strategy of (ab)using the civilian population under their control as human shields, and of the hostages held by Hamas, rocket launchers, and an estimated 500 kilometres of underground military infrastructure constructed by Hamas under hospitals, schools, mosques, residences and agricultural areas in Gaza ( https://mwi.westpoint.edu/gazas-underground-hamass-entire-politico-military-strategy-rests-on-its-tunnels/) "https://mwi.westpoint.edu/gazas-underground-hamass-entire-politico-military-strategy-rests-on-its-tunnels/)") . In artificially removing this core information from the framing of the article, the rationale of Israel’s response and strategy in seeking to disarm Hamas is also erased, preventing the credible analysis of this complex tragedy, including its impact on food availability. <br />
The introduction proceeds to provide fatality figures in politically salient terms: "Israel has conducted large-scale aerial bombing and ground operations in Gaza, resulting in at least 41,272 deaths". The citation of a UN source for this figure creates the misleading perception that these claims are from a neutral source and that they were verified by the UN. However, OCHA cites these numbers with the disclaimer: "according to figures of Gaza's Hamas-run Ministry of Health, which have not been independently verified and may include Palestinian combatants who were killed." Notably, the authors fail to mention the IDF estimates of 17-20,000 combatants killed during this period, and with a natural death rate of ~5,500 people per year, the civilian death rate is lower than implied, although terrible enough without need for inflation.
In the second and third paragraphs, the introduction does provide background describing the baseline nutritional status of Gaza’s population, and the reported impact of the war. However, many of the statistics cite UN reports which are not always verifiable or impartial, and the presentation is selective, uncritical, and at times inaccurate. For example, the introduction states on p2. line 26-29 that "by December 2023, those who remained [in North Gaza and Gaza City governorates] appeared largely cut off from aid", because "the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) last delivered food to the north on 23 January 2024, being then barred from further deliveries, while the UN World Food Programme (WFP) ceased its food convoy operations to the north on 20 January [21], only resuming these on a limited basis in March." This implies that, between 23 January and sometime in March no was food supplied to the two Northern Governorates, when in fact COGAT reports on private sector delivery of at least 150 food trucks to the North in this period ( https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/media/qtvbs5u0/humanitarian-situation-in-gaza-cogat-assessment-mar-15.pdf) "https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/media/qtvbs5u0/humanitarian-situation-in-gaza-cogat-assessment-mar-15.pdf)") .
The introduction places the onus for all food scarcity on Israel, asserting for example that “Israel has placed enhanced restrictions on aid flows and distributions, closing all but two southern crossing points into Gaza up to May 2024 and rejecting multiple consignments for ostensible security reasons [18]." This arguably misrepresents the complex and objectively challenging situation, including attacks, looting and hoarding of aid by Hamas, and omits the well-documented controversy and contrary evidence. Furthermore, the authors fail to mention that Erez crossing was destroyed by Hamas terrorists during the October 7th attack on Israeli borders and that this is the reason it was closed. Moreover, prior to the war, Erez was a pedestrian crossing, and extensive work by Israel in collaboration with the US, Jordan and international agencies, allowed its reconstruction and opening in April 2024 as a truck crossing.
On the specifics of food supply, the introduction cites IPC projections issued in December 2023 and March 2024, but ignores the FRC report published on June 4 ( https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/documents/IPC_Famine_Review_Committee_Report_FEWS_NET_Gaza_4June2024.pdf) "https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/documents/IPC_Famine_Review_Committee_Report_FEWS_NET_Gaza_4June2024.pdf)") acknowledging that the previous analyses were based on significant undercounting of the amount of aid. <br />
Furthermore, the authors fail to note that IPC reports are intended to sound the alarm and mobilize international action to prevent famine before it occurs, because once it occurs, it is often too late to save lives of those acutely affected. Despite the institutional processes designed to obtain political and technical consensus, such reports are often based on inevitably flawed and limited data from actors involved in the conflict. Given the contentious nature of the war in Gaza, projections made by the IPC and others have often been conflated with the actual situation, and abused to advance political agendas. [See for example: GM Steinberg and LD Klaff, “Politicization of Tragedy: The Case of the Gaza Conflict and Food Aid” in The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 120 (2024) pp. 749-750; and a critique of the reports by Caner, INSS special publication July 2024 ( https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/special-publication-240724-1.pdf ); and by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs https://www.gov.il/en/pages/transparency-and-methodology-issues-in-the-ipc-special-brief-of-18-march-2024 and https://www.gov.il/en/pages/the-third-ipc-report-on-gaza-june-2024-3-sep-2024 ]. Unfortunately, this study echoes the tendentious discourse. Examples of its selective and misleading use of the IPC reports include:
• "In December 2023 the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)… classified 25% of the population in the northern governorates as experiencing catastrophic acute food insecurity, updating this projection to 55% in March 2024": Firstly, it is misleading to compare the "current" classification in Phase 5 in December (25%) with the projected classification in March (55%, although it was 50% in the actual report). The "current" classification in the March report was 30%. Secondly, and much more problematic, the article doesn't refer to the IPC reports which covered the period from March to September (published in June and October) which pointed to a steady decline in the population classified in phase 5 to 15% in June and 6% in September-October.<br />
• "In March 2024 Oxfam claimed that the population in northern Gaza had only 245 Kcal per person-day available": apart from the referral to March, the press release cited here does meet basic academic standards ( https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/people-northern-gaza-forced-survive-245-calories-day-less-can-beans-oxfam) "https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/people-northern-gaza-forced-survive-245-calories-day-less-can-beans-oxfam)") . Although it says that "Oxfam’s analysis is based on the latest available data used in the recent Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis for the Gaza Strip.", it seems to refer to a graph on page 8 of the March 18th report presenting similar numbers for Northern Gaza, yet no source is given for that graph, nor is it clear who conducted the analysis, based on which data and using which methodology. The IPC report only describes the study in vague terms: "An in-depth analysis of the border crossing manifest allowed to generate approximate kilocalories values per truck and per unit of analysis then distributed per area, using information provided by OCHA and the Food Security Sector." It should be noted that following criticism from Israel on this improper conduct which violated the IPC's standards of transparency, the subsequent IPC reports on Gaza omit any caloric analyses of aid. The 245 Kcal per person-day is about a quarter of the lowest figure for Northern Gaza in this article (1000 Kcal) which only highlights that Oxfam analysis is detached from reality and not worthy of being cited. This value is contrasted with “Israeli academics, working with data from the Israeli Ministry of Defence’s Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) agency, put this figure at 3160 for all of Gaza during January-April 2024 [25] (p2. l41).” The citation is out of date. A revised study assessing the food supply for the period of January-July 2024 is in press. The nationality of the authors of the cited research ought to be irrelevant.
• "Since May 2024, the re-opening of crossings into northern Gaza and increased food deliveries appeared to mitigate food insecurity, though the IPC projected that 22% of Gaza would remain in catastrophic food insecurity conditions between June and September": However, the authors of this article downplay this acknowledgment of the improvement by citing a reference to a projection which proved drastically wrong. While the IPC report from June projected 22% in phase 5 in September, the IPC report published in October found that the actual share in September was 6%. However, the article does conclude that "a steep increase in food availability occurred from late April 2024, coinciding with the reopening of crossings into northern Gaza, and by June acute malnutrition prevalence appeared to be relatively low, despite very limited dietary diversity." Thus, based on the authors’ inclusion of this data, their reference to the 22% should be removed and replaced by the actual decline to 6% as reported in the October IPC report.
• "the consumer price index for food rising from 210 pre-war to 600 by March 2024" citing the WFP's unofficial calculations. While it is true that according to the official statistics from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics the price index for food nearly tripled from September 2023 to March 2024 following the outbreak of the war, the index subsequently decreased by 28 percent from 332.70 to 240.01 as the food supply improved during the analysis period ( https://data.humdata.org/dataset/state-of-palestine-consumer-price-index) "https://data.humdata.org/dataset/state-of-palestine-consumer-price-index)") .<br />
• An analysis of the IPC report from June by the Israel Ministry of Foreign affairs highlights several positive trends in the IPC's main outcome indicators between March and July ( https://www.gov.il/en/pages/the-third-ipc-report-on-gaza-june-2024-3-sep-2024) "https://www.gov.il/en/pages/the-third-ipc-report-on-gaza-june-2024-3-sep-2024)") . The positive trends reflect the impact of the humanitarian efforts which are analyzed in this study and which should not be ignored. <br />
If the purpose of the paper is to contribute to an understanding of how to fix the problem rather than the blame, then the framing of the introduction and subsequent discussion ought to recognize that Hamas exercises agency and has made decisions that have contributed to the plight of the Gazan population whom they govern, including with regard to the nutritional aspect of the humanitarian crisis. A more balanced study could be helpful to further understanding and foster cooperation instead of inflaming controversy. This would help address the present crisis and advance future rehabilitation. In short, the introduction (and the rest of the paper) should present a balanced account of the knowns and unknowns regarding the present food security crisis, the challenges of obtaining valid and verifiable data, which also plagues the current analysis, and the need for clarity, specifically with regard to the adequacy of the international humanitarian effort in supplying food to the emergency-affected population.