Her point is this: Metaphors are so often visual in nature, that we tend to equate understanding something with the ability to visualise it. Which explain why Einstein–always a visual thinkers–hated quantum mechanics. Because while the standard model helps making perfect mathematical sense of particle physics, it’s simply not possible to visualise what it proves to be true. But here’s the thing: metaphors don’t have to be visual in nature, and in fact going beyond the visual often allows us to naturally accommodate ambiguity. Trompe l’oeil images are just as maddening and hard to let go of as trying to visualise a quark that exists simultaneously in multiple places, but anyone can attest to feelings of ‘being torn‘ or ‘in two minds‘. Time is another metaphor that is notoriously hard to visualise, which hasn’t stopped anyone from experiencing it. Again it’s also a phenomenon that most of us feel behave in a highly irrational manner; slowing to a creep in one moment only to jump into action the next. The point that Julia Ravanis makes, the perspective she helps me see, is that quantum mechanics doesn’st have to ‘not make sense’. That the act of sense-making includes a chosen perspective, and that being mindful that there are more than one possible, even within science, means that the boundaries between it and the humanities are crumbling.
[[Julia Ravanis]] in [[Skönheten i Kaos by Julia Ravanis]] is here said to argue that a way of moving past 'quantum mechanics does not make sense' is by letting go of default (visual) metaphors and using other metaphors that can embrace ambiguity. This sounds somewhat like [[Is het nieuwe uit te leggen in taal van het oude 20031104104340]] or even [[Avoid greedy reductionism 20041114065928]] accusation levelled here at Einstein.