Reports of reinfection instead may be cases of drawn-out illness. A decline in antibodies is normal after a few weeks, and people are protected from the coronavirus in other ways.

Can You Get Covid-19 Again? It’s Very Unlikely, Experts Say

Biologically, a vaccine against the COVID-19 virus is unlikely to offer complete protection. Logistically, manufacturers will have to make hundreds of millions of doses while relying, perhaps, on technology never before used in vaccines and competing for basic supplies such as glass vials. Then the federal government will have to allocate doses, perhaps through a patchwork of state and local health departments with no existing infrastructure for vaccinating adults at scale. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has led vaccine distribution efforts in the past, has been strikingly absent in discussions so far—a worrying sign that the leadership failures that have characterized the American pandemic could also hamper this process. To complicate it all, 20 percent of Americans already say they will refuse to get a COVID-19 vaccine, and with another 31 percent unsure, reaching herd immunity could be that much more difficult.

A Vaccine Reality Check

The Case for Releasing the Young from Lockdown: A Briefing Paper for Pol­i­cy­mak­ers

The UK is ‘locked down’ because of coro­n­avirus (COVID-19). No clear exit strategy currently exists. This paper suggests a possible way forward that combines elements from economics and epi­demi­ol­ogy. The paper proposes as a policy a ‘release’ from lockdown of the young cohort of UK citizens aged between age 20 and 30 who do not live with parents. The paper cal­cu­lates that there are ap­prox­i­mately 4.2 million UK in­di­vid­u­als who fall into this 20-30 ageband and who live outside the original parental home. Of those, 2.6 million work in the private sector, so unless some cor­rec­tive action is taken they are likely to be extremely harshly affected, fi­nan­cially, when compared to employees in the public sector. The paper argues that a young-​workforce release of this kind would lead to sub­stan­tial economic and societal benefits without enormous health costs to the country. In this way, the nation might begin to move forward in the footsteps of the young. The paper’s key concept could in principle be im­ple­mented in other countries.

13113

In­ter­gen­er­a­tional Ties and Case Fatality Rates: A Cross-​Country Analysis

COVID-19 is spreading and has reached the state of a worldwide pandemic and health systems are or will be tested in how they can deal with it. So far, during this early phase of the pandemic, outcomes in terms of case-​fatality rates (CFR) differ widely across countries. We explore how dif­fer­ences in living arrange­ments of gen­er­a­tions within families con­tribute to the cross country dif­fer­ences. We document a strong positive cor­re­la­tion between countries’ CFRs and the share of working-​age families living with their parents. This suggest that policy needs to focus on inter-​generational social distance when combating this pandemic.

13114

De­mo­graphic De­ter­mi­nants of Testing Incidence and COVID-19 In­fec­tions in New York City Neigh­bor­hoods

New York City is the hot spot of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. This paper merges in­for­ma­tion on the number of tests and the number of in­fec­tions at the New York City zip code level with de­mo­graphic and so­cioe­co­nomic in­for­ma­tion from the decennial census and the American Community Surveys. People residing in poor or immigrant neigh­bor­hoods were less likely to be tested; but the like­li­hood that a test was positive was larger in those neigh­bor­hoods, as well as in neigh­bor­hoods with larger house­holds or pre­dom­i­nantly black pop­u­la­tions. The rate of infection in the pop­u­la­tion depends on both the frequency of tests and on the fraction of positive tests among those tested. The non-​randomness in testing across New York City neigh­bor­hoods indicates that the observed cor­re­la­tion between the rate of infection and the so­cioe­co­nomic char­ac­ter­is­tics of a community tells an in­com­plete story of how the pandemic evolved in a congested urban setting.

13115

The COVID-19 Conundrum in the De­vel­op­ing World: Pro­tect­ing Lives or Pro­tect­ing Jobs?

It is almost certain that the world economy is entering a recession of historic pro­por­tions; how bad things get will depend on how gov­ern­ments manage the Covid-19 pandemic. At the core of the problem lies a very difficult choice: whether to “flatten the curve” of the epidemic or whether to flatten the curve of the recession. It is unlikely that both can be achieved and, in this case, it is better to address the tradeoff heads-on rather than try to ignore it or assume it doesn’t exist. Because de­vel­op­ing countries are less prepared to deal with the con­se­quences of an economic downturn, they might not be able to afford “social dis­tanc­ing” policies for extended periods.

13136

Ex­plain­ing Governors’ Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States

13137

What is the response of US governors to the COVID-19 pandemic? In this research note, we explore the de­ter­mi­nants of im­ple­ment­ing stay-​at-home orders, focusing on governors’ char­ac­ter­is­tics. In our most con­ser­v­a­tive estimate, being a De­mo­c­ra­tic governor increases the prob­a­bil­ity of im­ple­ment­ing a stay-​at-home order by more than 50 percent. Moreover, we find that the prob­a­bil­ity of im­ple­ment­ing a statewide stay-​at-home order is about 40 percent more likely for governors without a term limit than governors with a term limit. We also find that De­mo­c­ra­tic governors and governors without a term limit are sig­nif­i­cantly faster to adopt statewide orders than Re­pub­li­can governors and governors with a term limit. There is evidence of politics as usual in these unusual times.

Which Jobs Are Done from Home? Evidence from the American Time Use Survey

Which jobs are more likely to be affected by mobility re­stric­tions due to the Covid-19 pandemic? This paper uses American Time Use Survey data to measure the share of the work hours that are spent at home for different job cat­e­gories. We compute and provide home-​working shares by oc­cu­pa­tion (US census clas­si­fi­ca­tion, SOC and in­ter­na­tional ISCO clas­si­fi­ca­tion), and by industry (US census clas­si­fi­ca­tion, NAICS and in­ter­na­tional ISIC clas­si­fi­ca­tion).

13138

Lockdowns, Lone­li­ness and Life Sat­is­fac­tion

Using the 2012-13 American Time Use Survey, I find that both who people spend time with and how they spend it affect their happiness, adjusted for numerous de­mo­graphic and economic variables. Sat­is­fac­tion among married in­di­vid­u­als increases most with ad­di­tional time spent with spouse. Among singles, sat­is­fac­tion decreases most as more time is spent alone. Assuming that lockdowns constrain married people to spend time solely with their spouses, sim­u­la­tions show that their happiness may have been increased compared to before the lockdowns; but suf­fi­ciently large losses of work time and income reverse this inference. Sim­u­la­tions demon­strate clearly that, assuming lockdowns impose solitude on singles, their happiness was reduced, re­duc­tions that are made more severe by income and work losses.

13140

Should Contact Bans Be Lifted in Germany? A Quan­ti­ta­tive Pre­dic­tion of Its Effects

Many countries consider the lifting of re­stric­tions of social contacts (RSC). We quantify the effects of RSC for Germany. We initially employ a purely sta­tis­ti­cal approach to pre­dict­ing preva­lence of COVID19 if RSC were upheld after April 20. We employ these findings and feed them into our the­o­ret­i­cal model. We find that the peak of the number of sick in­di­vid­u­als would be reached already in April. The number of sick in­di­vid­u­als would fall below 1,000 at the beginning of July. When re­stric­tions are lifted com­pletely on April 20, the number of sick should rise quickly again from around April 27. A balance between economic and in­di­vid­ual costs of RSC and public health ob­jec­tives consists in lifting RSC for ac­tiv­i­ties that have high economic benefits but low health costs. In the absence of large-​scale rep­re­sen­ta­tive testing of CoV-2 in­fec­tions, these ac­tiv­i­ties can most easily be iden­ti­fied if federal states of Germany adopted exit strate­gies that differ across states.

13151

Germany’s Ca­pac­i­ties to Work from Home

Due to the COVID-19 crisis and the related “social dis­tanc­ing” measures, working from home (WfH) has suddenly become a crucial lever of economic activity. This paper combines survey and ad­min­is­tra­tive data to compute measures for the fea­si­bil­ity of working from home among German employees. Breaking down the data by oc­cu­pa­tion, region, industry, and employee char­ac­ter­is­tics, we document con­sid­er­able variation in the potential to WfH across all di­men­sions. We find that WfH is feasible for roughly 56 percent of the overall German workforce, while less than half of this potential was exploited in the pre-​pandemic economy.

13152

The Short-​Term Economic Con­se­quences of COVID-19: Exposure to Disease, Remote Work and Gov­ern­ment Response

In this ongoing project, we examine the short-​term con­se­quences of COVID-19 on em­ploy­ment and wages in the United States. Guided by a pre-​analysis plan, we document the impact of COVID-19 at the national-​level using a simple dif­fer­ence and test whether states with rel­a­tively more confirmed cases/deaths were more affected. Our findings suggest that COVID-19 increased the un­em­ploy­ment rate, decreased hours of work and labor force par­tic­i­pa­tion and had no sig­nif­i­cant impacts on wages. The negative impacts on labor market outcomes are larger for men, younger workers, Hispanics and less-​educated workers. This suggest that COVID-19 increases labor market in­equal­i­ties. We also in­ves­ti­gate whether the economic con­se­quences of this pandemic were larger for certain oc­cu­pa­tions. We built three indexes using ACS and O*NET data: workers rel­a­tively more exposed to disease, workers that work with proximity to coworkers and workers who can easily work remotely. Our estimates suggest that in­di­vid­u­als in oc­cu­pa­tions working in proximity to others are more affected while oc­cu­pa­tions able to work remotely are less affected. We also find that oc­cu­pa­tions classifed as more exposed to disease are less affected, possibly due to the large number of essential workers in these oc­cu­pa­tions.

13159

Did Cal­i­for­nia’s Shelter-​In-Place Order Work? Early Coronavirus-​Related Public Health Effects

On March 19, 2020, Cal­i­for­nia Governor Gavin Newsom issued Executive Order N-33-20 2020, which required all residents of the state of Cal­i­for­nia to shelter in place for all but essential ac­tiv­i­ties such as grocery shopping, re­triev­ing pre­scrip­tions from a pharmacy, or caring for relatives. This shelter-​in-place order (SIPO), the first such statewide order issued in the United States, was designed to reduce COVID-19 cases and mortality. While the White House Task Force on the Coro­n­avirus has credited the State of Cal­i­for­nia for taking early action to prevent a statewide COVID-19 outbreak, no study has examined the impact of Cal­i­for­nia’s SIPO. Using daily state-​level coro­n­avirus data and a synthetic control research design, we find that Cal­i­for­nia’s statewide SIPO reduced COVID-19 cases by 125.5 to 219.7 per 100,000 pop­u­la­tion by April 20, one month following the order. We further find that Cal­i­for­nia’s SIPO led to as many as 1,661 fewer COVID-19 deaths during the first four weeks following its enactment. Back-​of-the-envelope cal­cu­la­tions suggest that there were about 400 job losses per life saved during this short-run post-​treatment period.

13160

How Do We Think the COVID-19 Crisis Will Affect Our Careers (If Any Remain)?

13164

This study is the first in the world to in­ves­ti­gate the expected impact of the COVID-19 crisis on career outcomes and career as­pi­ra­tions. To this end, high-​quality survey research with a relevant panel of Belgian employees was conducted. About 21% of them fear losing their jobs due to the crisis—14% are concerned that they will even lose their jobs in the near future. In addition, 26% expect to miss out on pro­mo­tions that they would have received had the COVID-19 crisis not occurred. This fear of a negative impact is higher in vul­ner­a­ble groups, such migrants. In addition, we observe that many panel members believe they will look at the labour market dif­fer­ently and will have different work-​related pri­or­i­ties in the future. In this respect, more than half of the panel members indicate that they have attached more im­por­tance to working con­di­tions and work-life balance since the COVID-19 crisis.

Impacts of Social and Economic Factors on the Trans­mis­sion of Coro­n­avirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in China

This paper models the local and cross-​city trans­mis­sions of the novel coro­n­avirus in China between January 19 and February 29 in 2020. We examine the role of various so­cioe­co­nomic mediating factors, including public health measures that encourage social dis­tanc­ing in local com­mu­ni­ties. Weather char­ac­ter­is­tics two weeks ago are used as in­stru­men­tal variables for causal inference. Stringent quar­an­tine, city lockdown, and local public health measures imposed since late January sig­nif­i­cantly decreased the virus trans­mis­sion rate. The virus spread was contained by the middle of February. Pop­u­la­tion outflow from the outbreak source region posed a higher risk to the des­ti­na­tion regions than other factors including ge­o­graphic proximity and sim­i­lar­ity in economic con­di­tions. We quantify the effects of different public health measures in reducing the number of in­fec­tions through coun­ter­fac­tual analyses. Over 1.4 million in­fec­tions and 56,000 deaths could have been avoided as a result of the national and provin­cial public health measures imposed in late January in China.

13165

Immigrant Key Workers: Their Con­tri­bu­tion to Europe’s COVID-19 Response

This note describes the con­tri­bu­tion of migrant workers to the ongoing effort to keep basic services running in the Union during the COVID-19 epidemic. We quantify the preva­lence of migrant workers in the so called “key pro­fes­sions” that the Com­mis­sion and Member States have iden­ti­fied using the most recent wave of the EU Labour Force Survey. Our results show that migrant “key workers” are essential for critical functions in European societies.

155

In­equal­ity in the Impact of the Coro­n­avirus Shock: Evidence from Real Time Surveys

13183

We present real time survey evidence from the UK, US and Germany showing that the labor market impacts of COVID-19 differ con­sid­er­ably across countries. Employees in Germany, which has a well-​established short-​time work scheme, are sub­stan­tially less likely to be affected by the crisis. Within countries, the impacts are highly unequal and ex­ac­er­bate existing in­equal­i­ties. Workers in al­ter­na­tive work arrange­ments and in oc­cu­pa­tions in which only a small share of tasks can be done from home are more likely to have reduced their hours, lost their jobs and suffered falls in earnings. Less educated workers and women are more affected by the crisis.

When to Release the Lockdown? A Wellbeing Framework for Analysing Costs and Benefits

13186

It is politi­cians who have to decide when to release the lockdown, and in what way. In doing so, they have to balance many con­sid­er­a­tions (as with any decision). Often the different con­sid­er­a­tions appear in­com­men­su­rable so that only the roughest of judge­ments can be made. For example, in the case of COVID-19, one has to compare the economic benefits of releasing the lockdown with the social and psy­cho­log­i­cal benefits, and then compare the total of these with the increase in deaths that would result from an early exit. We here propose a way of doing this more sys­tem­at­i­cally.

When Do Shelter-​In-Place Orders Fight COVID-19 Best? Policy Het­ero­gene­ity across States and Adoption Time

Shelter in place orders (SIPOs) require residents to remain home for all but essential ac­tiv­i­ties such as pur­chas­ing food or medicine, caring for others, exercise, or traveling for em­ploy­ment deemed essential. Between March 19 and April 20, 2020, 40 states and the District of Columbia adopted SIPOs. This study explores the impact of SIPOs on health, with par­tic­u­lar attention to het­ero­gene­ity in their impacts. First, using daily state-​level social dis­tanc­ing data from SafeGraph and a difference-​in-differences approach, we document that adoption of a SIPO was as­so­ci­ated with a 5 to 10 percent increase in the rate at which state residents remained in their homes full-time. Then, using daily state-​level coro­n­avirus case data collected by the Centers for Disease Control and Pre­ven­tion, we find that ap­prox­i­mately three weeks following the adoption of a SIPO, cu­mu­la­tive COVID-19 cases fell by 44 percent. Event-​study analyses confirm common COVID-19 case trends in the week prior to SIPO adoption and show that SIPO-​induced case re­duc­tions grew larger over time. However, this average effect masks important het­ero­gene­ity across states — early adopters and high pop­u­la­tion density states appear to reap larger benefits from their SIPOs. Finally, we find that statewide SIPOs were as­so­ci­ated with a reduction in coronavirus-​related deaths, but estimated mortality effects were im­pre­cisely estimated.

13190

Economic Policies for COVID-19

This note describes some of the early policy de­vel­op­ments in the UK and the way in which the framing and un­der­stand­ing of a novel economic problem evolved to include a focus on liveli­hoods combining social pro­tec­tion and business support ori­en­ta­tions. It high­lights various points including the rapid iterative nature of policy de­vel­op­ment based on con­sul­ta­tion in the face of un­cer­tainty, as well as a trade-off between risk-​sharing with com­mer­cial banks to limit adverse selection and the rapid pre­ven­tion of in­sol­ven­cies. We consider some of the policy-​making lessons to date and conclude with sug­ges­tions for issues that policy makers might consider to support workers in the near and medium term.

156

Who Can Work from Home?

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many states have adopted stay-​at-home orders, rendering a large segment of the workforce unable to continue doing their jobs. These policies have dis­tri­b­u­tional con­se­quences, as workers in some oc­cu­pa­tions may be better able to continue their work from home. I identify the segments of the U.S. workforce that can plausibly work from home by linking oc­cu­pa­tion data from O*NET to the American Community Survey. I find that lower-​wage workers are up to three times less likely to be able to work from home than higher-​wage workers. Those with lower levels of education, younger adults, ethnic mi­nori­ties, and im­mi­grants are also con­cen­trated in oc­cu­pa­tions that are less likely to be performed from home.

13197

The Cost of the COVID-19 Crisis: Lockdowns, Macro­eco­nomic Ex­pec­ta­tions, and Consumer Spending

We study how the dif­fer­en­tial timing of local lockdowns due to COVID-19 causally affects house­holds’ spending and macro­eco­nomic ex­pec­ta­tions at the local level using several waves of a cus­tomized survey with more than 10,000 re­spon­dents. About 50% of survey par­tic­i­pants report income and wealth losses due to the corona virus, with the average losses being $5,293 and $33,482 re­spec­tively. Aggregate consumer spending dropped by 31 log per­cent­age points with the largest drops in travel and clothing. We find that house­holds living in counties that went into lockdown earlier expect the un­em­ploy­ment rate over the next twelve months to be 13 per­cent­age points higher and continue to expect higher un­em­ploy­ment at horizons of three to five years. They also expect lower future inflation, report higher un­cer­tainty, expect lower mortgage rates for up to 10 years, and have moved out of foreign stocks into liquid forms of savings. The im­po­si­tion of lockdowns can account for much of the decline in em­ploy­ment in recent months as well as declines in consumer spending. While lockdowns have pro­nounced effects on local economic con­di­tions and house­holds’ ex­pec­ta­tions, they have little impact on approval ratings of Congress, the Fed, or the Treasury but lead to declines in the approval of the President.

13224

Does Policy Com­mu­ni­ca­tion during COVID-19 Work?

13355

Using a large-​scale survey of U.S. house­holds during the Covid-19 pandemic, we study how new in­for­ma­tion about fiscal and monetary policy responses to the crisis affects house­holds’ ex­pec­ta­tions. We provide random subsets of par­tic­i­pants in the Nielsen Homescan panel with different com­bi­na­tions of in­for­ma­tion about the severity of the pandemic, recent actions by the Federal Reserve, stimulus measures, as well as rec­om­men­da­tions from health officials. This ex­per­i­ment allows us to assess to what extent these policy an­nounce­ments alter the beliefs and spending plans of house­holds. In short, they do not, contrary to the powerful effects they have in standard macro­eco­nomic models.

Oc­cu­pa­tional Exposure to Contagion and the Spread of COVID-19 in Europe

Social contacts are a key trans­mis­sion channel of in­fec­tious diseases spread by the res­pi­ra­tory or close-​contact route, such as COVID-19. There is no evidence, however, on the question of whether the nature and the or­gan­i­sa­tion of work affect the spread of COVID-19 in different countries. I have developed a method­ol­ogy to measure country-​specific levels of oc­cu­pa­tional exposure to contagion driven by social contacts. I combined six in­di­ca­tors based on Oc­cu­pa­tion In­for­ma­tion Network (O*NET) and the European Working Condition Survey (EWCS) data. I then applied them to 26 European countries, and found sub­stan­tial cross-​country dif­fer­ences in levels of exposure to contagion in com­pa­ra­ble oc­cu­pa­tions. The resulting country-​level measures of levels of exposure to contagion (excluding health pro­fes­sions) predict the growth in COVID-19 cases, and the number of deaths from COVID-19 in the early stage of pandemic (up to four weeks after the 100th case). The re­la­tion­ship between levels of oc­cu­pa­tional exposure to contagion and the spread of COVID-19 is par­tic­u­larly strong for workers aged 45-64. I found that 20-25% of the cross-​country variance in numbers of COVID-19 cases and deaths can be at­trib­uted to cross-​country dif­fer­ences in levels of oc­cu­pa­tional exposure to contagion in European countries. My findings are robust to con­trol­ling for the strin­gency of con­tain­ment policies, such as lockdowns and school closures. They are also driven by country-​specific patterns of social contacts at work, rather than by oc­cu­pa­tional struc­tures. Thus, I conclude that measuring workplace in­ter­ac­tions may help to predict the next waves of the COVID-19 pandemic.

13227

The COVID-19 Crisis and Telework: A Research Survey on Ex­pe­ri­ences, Ex­pec­ta­tions and Hopes

13229

While a con­sid­er­able number of employees across the globe are being forced to work from home due to the COVID-19 crisis, it is a guessing game as to how they are ex­pe­ri­enc­ing this current surge in telework. Therefore, we examined employee per­cep­tions of telework on various life and career aspects, dis­tin­guish­ing between typical and extended telework during the COVID-19 crisis. To this end, we conducted a state-​of-the-art web survey among Flemish employees. Notwith­stand­ing this ex­cep­tional time of sudden, oblig­a­tory and high-​intensity telework, our re­spon­dents mainly attribute positive char­ac­ter­is­tics to tele­work­ing, such as increased ef­fi­ciency and a lower risk of burnout. The results also suggest that the over­whelm­ing majority of the surveyed employees believe that tele­work­ing (85%) and digital con­fer­enc­ing (81%) are here to stay. In contrast, some fear that telework di­min­ishes their promotion op­por­tu­ni­ties and weakens ties with their col­leagues and employer.

Air Pollution Exposure and COVID-19

13367

In light of the existing pre­lim­i­nary evidence of a link between Covid-19 and poor air quality, which is largely based upon cor­re­la­tions, we estimate the re­la­tion­ship between long term air pollution exposure and Covid-19 in 355 mu­nic­i­pal­i­ties in the Nether­lands. Using detailed secondary and ad­min­is­tra­tive data we find com­pelling evidence of a positive re­la­tion­ship between air pollution, and par­tic­u­larly PM2.5 con­cen­tra­tions, and Covid-19 cases, hospital ad­mis­sions and deaths. This re­la­tion­ship persists after con­trol­ling for a wide range of ex­plana­tory variables. Our results indicate that a 1 μ/m3 increase in PM2.5 con­cen­tra­tions is as­so­ci­ated with 9.4 more Covid-19 cases, 3.0 more hospital ad­mis­sions, and 2.3 more deaths. The re­la­tion­ship between Covid-19 and air pollution with­stands a number of sen­si­tiv­ity and ro­bust­ness exercises including in­stru­ment­ing pollution to mitigate potential en­do­gene­ity and modelling spatial spillovers using spatial econo­met­ric tech­niques.

Unequal Con­se­quences of COVID-19 across Age and Income: Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Evidence from Six Countries

Covid-19 and the measures taken to contain it have led to un­prece­dented con­straints on work and leisure ac­tiv­i­ties, across the world. This paper uses na­tion­ally rep­re­sen­ta­tive surveys to document how people of different ages and incomes have been affected across six countries (China, South Korea, Japan, Italy, UK and US). We first document changes in income/work and leisure. Second, we document self-​reported negative and positive non-​financial effects of the crisis. We then examine attitudes towards rec­om­men­da­tions (wearing a mask in par­tic­u­lar) and the approach taken by public au­thor­i­ties. We find sim­i­lar­i­ties across countries in how people of different gen­er­a­tions have been affected. Young people have ex­pe­ri­enced more drastic changes to their lives, and overall they are less sup­port­ive of these measures. These patterns are less clear across income groups: while some countries have managed to shield lower income in­di­vid­u­als from negative con­se­quences, others have not. We also show that how people have been affected by the crisis (pos­i­tively or neg­a­tively) does little to explain whether or not they support measures im­ple­mented by the public au­thor­i­ties. Young people are overall less sup­port­ive of such measures in­de­pen­dently of how they have been affected.

13366

The Effect of Business Cycle Ex­pec­ta­tions on the German Ap­pren­tice­ship Market: Es­ti­mat­ing the Impact of COVID-19

13368

A firm’s ex­pec­ta­tion about the future business cycle is an important de­ter­mi­nant of the decision to train ap­pren­tices. As German firms typically train ap­pren­tices to either fill future skilled worker positions, or as a sub­sti­tute for other types of labor, the current coro­n­avirus crisis will have a strong and negative impact on the German economy according to the current business cycle ex­pec­ta­tions of German firms. To the extent that the training decision of a firm depends on its per­cep­tion of the business cycle, we expect a downward shift in the firm’s demand for ap­pren­tices and con­se­quently also a decrease in the equi­lib­rium number of ap­pren­tice­ship contracts. We analyze German data on the ap­pren­tice­ship from 2007 to 2019 and apply first­d­if­fer­ences re­gres­sions to account for un­ob­served het­ero­gene­ity across states and oc­cu­pa­tions, allowing us to identify the as­so­ci­a­tion between changes in two popular measures of business cycle ex­pec­ta­tions (the ifo Business Climate Index and the ifo Em­ploy­ment Barometer) and sub­se­quent changes in the demand for ap­pren­tices, the number of new ap­pren­tice­ship contracts, unfilled vacancies and un­suc­cess­ful ap­pli­cants. Taking into account the most recent data on business cycle ex­pec­ta­tions up to May 2020, we estimate that the coronavirus-​related decrease in firms’ ex­pec­ta­tions about the business cycle can be as­so­ci­ated with a predicted 9% decrease in firm demand for ap­pren­tices and an almost 7% decrease in the number of new ap­pren­tice­ship positions in Germany in 2020 (-34,700 ap­pren­tice­ship contracts; 95% con­fi­dence interval: +/- 8,800).

Dereg­u­la­tion in a Time of Pandemic: Does Pollution Increase Coro­n­avirus Cases or Deaths?

The COVID-19 virus, also known as the coro­n­avirus, is currently spreading around the world. While a growing lit­er­a­ture suggests that exposure to pollution can cause res­pi­ra­tory illness and increase deaths among the elderly, little is known about whether increases in pollution could cause ad­di­tional or more severe in­fec­tions from COVID-19, which typically manifests as a res­pi­ra­tory infection. Using variation in pollution induced by a rollback of en­force­ment of en­vi­ron­men­tal reg­u­la­tions by the En­vi­ron­men­tal Pro­tec­tion Agency (EPA) and a dif­fer­ence in dif­fer­ences design, we estimate the effects of increased pollution on county-​level COVID-19 deaths and cases. Despite popular media coverage to the contrary, we find that counties with more Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) sites saw increases in pollution following the EPA’s rollback of en­force­ment, while counties with fewer sites saw a smaller increase in pollution. We find that increases in pollution are as­so­ci­ated with increases in cases and deaths from COVID-19.

13231

Stay-​At-Home Orders, Social Dis­tanc­ing and Trust

13234

Better un­der­stand­ing whether and how com­mu­ni­ties respond to gov­ern­ment decisions is crucial for policy makers and health officials in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this study, we document the so­cioe­co­nomic de­ter­mi­nants of COVID-19 stay-​at-home orders’ com­pli­ance in the U.S. Using cell phone data measuring changes in average distance traveled and non-​essential vis­i­ta­tion, we find that: stay-​at-home orders reduce mobility by about 8­–10 per­cent­age points; high-​trust counties decrease their mobility sig­nif­i­cantly more than low-trust counties post-​lockdown; and counties with rel­a­tively more self-​declared democrats decrease sig­nif­i­cantly more their mobility. We also provide evidence that the estimated eeffct on com­pli­ance post-​lockdown is es­pe­cially large for trust in the press, and rel­a­tively smaller for trust in science, medicine or gov­ern­ment.

Modelling the Dis­tri­b­u­tional Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis

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Given the rapid spread of the COVID-19 virus, the State has had to respond rapidly and quite severely to flatten the curve and slow the spread of the virus. This has had sig­nif­i­cant im­pli­ca­tions for many aspects of life with dif­fer­en­tial impacts across the pop­u­la­tion. The lack of timely available data con­strains the es­ti­ma­tion of the scale and direction of recent changes in the income dis­tri­b­u­tion, which in turn constrain pol­i­cy­mak­ers seeking to monitor such de­vel­op­ments. We overcome the lack of data by proposing a dynamic cal­i­brated mi­crosim­u­la­tion approach to generate coun­ter­fac­tual income dis­tri­b­u­tions as a function of more timely external data than is available in dated income surveys. We combine now­cast­ing methods using publicly available data and a household income gen­er­a­tion model to perform the first cal­i­brated sim­u­la­tion based upon actual data aiming to assess the dis­tri­b­u­tional im­pli­ca­tions of the COVID-19 crisis in Ireland. We extend the standard de­f­i­n­i­tion of dis­pos­able income by adjusting for work-​related ex­pen­di­ture, housing costs and capital losses. We find that market incomes decreased along the dis­tri­b­u­tion of dis­pos­able income, but decreases in euro terms were more pro­nounced at the top than at the bottom. Despite this, in­equal­ity in market incomes as measured by the Gini co­ef­fi­cient increased over the crisis. Once we account for the decline in housing and work-​related expenses, house­holds situated among the bottom 70% of the dis­tri­b­u­tion actually improved their financial situation on average, whereas losses are recorded for the top 30%.

Job Search during the COVID-19 Crisis

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This paper measures the job-​search responses to the COVID-19 pandemic using realtime data on vacancy postings and ad views on Sweden’s largest online job board. First, the labour demand shock in Sweden is as large as in the US, and affects in­dus­tries and oc­cu­pa­tions het­ero­ge­neously. Second, the scope and direction of search change. Job seekers respond to the shock by searching less in­ten­sively and by redi­rect­ing their search towards less severely hit oc­cu­pa­tions, beyond what changes in labour demand would predict. The redi­rec­tion of job search changes relative hiring costs, and has the potential to amplify labour demand shifts.

Social Stability Chal­lenged: Pandemics, In­equal­ity and Policy Responses

The public health measures im­ple­mented by gov­ern­ments to limit the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic will produce sig­nif­i­cant economic con­se­quences that are likely to ex­ac­er­bate social and economic in­equal­i­ties. In this paper we provide a framework to analyse how income in­equal­ity, besides other struc­tural and policy-​related features, shapes the trade-off between economic lockdown and contagion. We then supply empirical evidence, by means of sim­u­la­tion analysis, on the dis­trib­u­tive effects of the lockdown for 31 European countries. Our results confirm that the lockdown is likely to sig­nif­i­cantly increase in­equal­ity and poverty and that the magnitude of the change is larger in more unequal countries. Such a cu­mu­la­tive process shapes a serious challenge for social and economic stability in the most vul­ner­a­ble countries, which needs adequate policy response. However, the magnitude of the com­pen­sat­ing measures is likely to be fi­nan­cially un­sus­tain­able, forcing them to lift necessary public health measures pre­ma­turely in order to avoid social collapse. This is likely to increase the risk of a new spread of the pandemic that might easily spill over to other countries. A supra­na­tional, co­or­di­nated health and fiscal policy effort is therefore in the interest of all economies willing to be part of a glob­alised economy.

13249

Firm-​level Ex­pec­ta­tions and Behavior in Response to the COVID-19 Crisis

This paper studies the de­ter­mi­nants of firms’ business outlook and man­age­r­ial mit­i­ga­tion strate­gies in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis using a rep­re­sen­ta­tive panel of German firms. We first demon­strate that the crisis amplifies pre-​crisis weak­nesses: Firms that appear rel­a­tively weak before the crisis are harder hit initially, and, on top of the initial impact, expect more dif­fi­cul­ties for their busi­nesses going forward. Con­se­quently, such firms are first to cut em­ploy­ment and in­vest­ment. Second, our results highlight that ex­pec­ta­tions regarding the duration of the shutdown—which, at this point of the crisis, exhibit plausibly random variation—are an important de­ter­mi­nant of the chosen mit­i­ga­tion strate­gies: Firms that expect the shutdown to last longer are more likely to lay off workers and to cancel or postpone in­vest­ment projects.

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The Short-​Term Economic Con­se­quences of COVID-19: Oc­cu­pa­tion Tasks and Mental Health in Canada

In this paper, we document the short-​term impact of COVID-19 on labour market outcomes in Canada. Following a pre-​analysis plan, we in­ves­ti­gate the negative impact of the pandemic on un­em­ploy­ment, labour force par­tic­i­pa­tion, hours and wages in Canada. We find that COVID-19 had drastic negative effects on labour market outcomes, with the largest effects for younger, not married, and less educated workers. We in­ves­ti­gate whether the economic con­se­quences of this pandemic were larger for certain oc­cu­pa­tions. We then built indices for whether (1) workers are rel­a­tively more exposed to disease, (2) work with proximity to coworkers, (3) are essential workers, and (4) can easily work remotely. Our estimates suggest that the impact of the pandemic was sig­nif­i­cantly more severe for workers more exposed to disease and workers that work in proximity to coworkers, while the effects are sig­nif­i­cantly less severe for essential workers and workers that can work remotely. Last, we rely on a unique survey, the Canadian Per­spec­tive Survey, and show that reported mental health is sig­nif­i­cantly lower among the most affected workers during the pandemic. We also find that those who were absent form work because of COVID-19 are more concerned with meeting their financial oblig­a­tions and with losing their job than those who remain working outside of home, while those who tran­si­tion from working outside the home to from home are not as concerned with job loss.

13254

We conduct a unique, Amazon MTurk-​based global ex­per­i­ment to in­ves­ti­gate the im­por­tance of an exponential-​growth pre­dic­tion bias (EGPB) in un­der­stand­ing why the COVID-19 outbreak has exploded. The sci­en­tific basis for our inquiry is the received wisdom that in­fec­tious disease spread, es­pe­cially in the initial stages, follows an ex­po­nen­tial function meaning few positive cases can explode into a wide­spread pandemic if the disease is suf­fi­ciently trans­mit­table. We define pre­dic­tion bias as the sys­tem­atic error arising from faulty pre­dic­tion of the number of cases x-weeks hence when presented with y-weeks of prior, actual data on the same. Our design permits us to identify the root of this under-​prediction as an EGPB arising from the general tendency to un­der­es­ti­mate the speed at which ex­po­nen­tial processes unfold. Our data reveals that the “degree of convexity” reflected in the predicted path of the disease is sig­nif­i­cantly and sub­stan­tially lower than the actual path. The bias is sig­nif­i­cantly higher for re­spon­dents from countries at a later stage relative to those at an early stage of disease pro­gres­sion. We find that in­di­vid­u­als who exhibit EGPB are also more likely to reveal markedly reduced com­pli­ance with the WHO-​recommended safety measures, find general vi­o­la­tions of safety protocols less alarming, and show greater faith in their gov­ern­ment’s actions. A simple be­hav­ioral nudge which shows prior data in terms of raw numbers, as opposed to a graph, causally reduces EGPB. Clear com­mu­ni­ca­tion of risk via raw numbers could increase accuracy of risk per­cep­tion, in turn fa­cil­i­tat­ing com­pli­ance with suggested pro­tec­tive behaviors.

13257

Exponential-​Growth Pre­dic­tion Bias and Com­pli­ance with Safety Measures in the Times of COVID-19

In­te­grat­ing Social Insurance and Social As­sis­tance Programs for the Future World of Labor

Given the preva­lence of informal labor, most countries have combined con­trib­u­tory social insurance programs (pensions, un­em­ploy­ment benefits, and health insurance), with non-​contributory insurance programs and several types of “safety nets.” All of these programs involve different types of subsidies and taxes, sometimes implicit. Because of design problems and the lack of co­or­di­na­tion/in­te­gra­tion between programs, these subsidies/taxes tend to cause four problems: 1) they can reduce in­cen­tives to con­tribute to mandatory insurance programs and to create formal jobs; 2) they can be re­gres­sive since re­dis­tri­b­u­tion often benefits middle/high income workers more than low income workers 3) they do not provide con­tin­u­ous pro­tec­tion as workers change oc­cu­pa­tions and constrain rather than fa­cil­i­tate, labor mobility; and 4) coverage tends to exclude many informal sector workers in the middle of the income dis­tri­b­u­tion. As such, existing programs are not well prepared to deal with a world of labor char­ac­ter­ized by per­sis­tent low pro­duc­tiv­ity jobs, more frequent labor market tran­si­tions including across sectors and ge­o­graphic regions and higher equi­lib­rium un­em­ploy­ment rates for some groups of workers. This paper develops a policy framework to integrate, in a trans­par­ent way, the insurance function (actuarially-​fair risk pooling or savings) and the re­dis­trib­u­tive function (transfers) of the social pro­tec­tion system in order to expand coverage, improve equity, and reduce labor market dis­tor­tions. We il­lus­trate this type of in­te­gra­tion with the case of old-age pensions which is typically the most important in­ter­ven­tion, at least from a fiscal per­spec­tive.

13258

The Impact of COVID-19 on the U.S. Child Care Market: Evidence from Stay-​At-Home Orders

Stay-​at-home orders (SAHOs) have been im­ple­mented in most U.S. states to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. This paper quan­ti­fies the short-run impact of these con­tain­ment policies on the supply of and demand for child care. The child care market may be par­tic­u­larly vul­ner­a­ble to a SAHO-type policy shock, given that many providers are liquidity-​constrained. Using plausibly exogenous variation from the staggered adoption of SAHOs across states, we find that online job postings for early care and education teachers declined by 13% after enactment. This effect is driven ex­clu­sively by private-​sector services. Indeed, hiring by public programs like Head Start and pre-​kindergarten has not been in­flu­enced by SAHOs. In addition, we find little evidence that child care search behavior among house­holds has been altered. Because forced supply-​side changes appear to be at play, our results suggest that house­holds may not be well-​equipped to insure against the rapid tran­si­tion to the pro­duc­tion of child care. We discuss the im­pli­ca­tions of these results for child de­vel­op­ment and parental em­ploy­ment decisions.

13261

Were Urban Cowboys Enough to Control COVID-19? Local Shelter-​In-Place Orders and Coro­n­avirus Case Growth

One of the most common policy pre­scrip­tions to reduce the spread of COVID-19 has been to legally enforce social dis­tanc­ing through state or local shelter-​in-place orders (SIPOs). This paper is the first to explore the com­par­a­tive ef­fec­tive­ness of early county-​level SIPOs versus later statewide mandates in curbing COVID-19 growth. We exploit the unique lab­o­ra­tory of Texas, a state in which the early adoption of local SIPOs by densely populated counties covered almost two-​thirds of the state’s pop­u­la­tion prior to Texas’s adoption of a statewide SIPO on April 2, 2020. Using an event study framework, we document that coun­ty­wide SIPO adoption is as­so­ci­ated with a 14 percent increase in the percent of residents who remain at home full-time, a social dis­tanc­ing effect that is largest in urbanized and densely populated counties. Then, we find that in early adopting counties, COVID-19 case growth fell by 19 to 26 per­cent­age points two-​and-a-half weeks following adoption, a result robust to controls for county-​level het­ero­gene­ity in outbreak timing, coro­n­avirus testing, and border SIPO policies. This effect is driven nearly entirely by highly urbanized and densely populated counties. In total, we find that ap­prox­i­mately 90 percent of the curbed growth in statewide COVID-19 cases in Texas came from the early adoption of SIPOs by urbanized counties. These results suggest that the later statewide mandate yielded rel­a­tively few health benefits.

13262

The Impacts of COVID-19 on Minority Un­em­ploy­ment: First Evidence from April 2020 CPS Microdata

COVID-19 abruptly impacted the labor market with the un­em­ploy­ment rate jumping to 14.7 percent less than two months after state gov­ern­ments began adopting social dis­tanc­ing measures. Un­em­ploy­ment of this magnitude has not been seen since the Great De­pres­sion. This paper provides the first study of how the pandemic impacted minority un­em­ploy­ment using CPS microdata through April 2020. African-​Americans ex­pe­ri­enced an increase in un­em­ploy­ment to 16.6 percent, less than an­tic­i­pated based on previous re­ces­sions. In contrast, Latinx, with an un­em­ploy­ment rate of 18.2 percent, were dis­pro­por­tion­ately hard hit by COVID-19. Adjusting for concerns of the BLS regarding mis­clas­si­fi­ca­tion of un­em­ploy­ment, we create an upper-​bound measure of the national un­em­ploy­ment rate of 26.5 percent, which is higher than the peak observed in the Great De­pres­sion. The April 2020 upper-​bound un­em­ploy­ment rates are an alarming 31.8 percent for blacks and 31.4 percent for Latinx. Difference-​in-difference estimates suggest that blacks were, at most, only slightly dis­pro­por­tion­ately impacted by COVID-19. Non-​linear de­com­po­si­tion estimates indicate that a slightly favorable industry dis­tri­b­u­tion partly protected them being hit harder by COVID-19. The most impacted group are Latinx. Difference-​in-difference estimates un­equiv­o­cally indicate that Latinx were dis­pro­por­tion­ately impacted by COVID-19. An un­fa­vor­able oc­cu­pa­tional dis­tri­b­u­tion and lower skills con­tributed to why Latinx ex­pe­ri­enced much higher un­em­ploy­ment rates than whites. These findings of early impacts of COVID-19 on un­em­ploy­ment raise important concerns about long-term economic effects for mi­nori­ties.

13264

An Economic Model of the COVID-19 Epidemic: The Im­por­tance of Testing and Age-​Specific Policies

This paper in­ves­ti­gates the role of testing and age-​composition in the Covid-19 epidemic. We augment a standard SIR epi­demi­o­log­i­cal model with in­di­vid­ual choices regarding how much time to spend working and consuming outside the house, both of which increase the risk of trans­mis­sion. In­di­vid­u­als who have flu symptoms are unsure whether they caught Covid-19 or simply a common cold. Testing reduces the time of un­cer­tainty. In­di­vid­u­als are het­ero­ge­neous with respect to age. Younger people are less likely to die, ex­ac­er­bat­ing their will­ing­ness to take risks and to impose ex­ter­nal­i­ties on the old. We explore het­ero­ge­neous policy responses in terms of testing, con­fine­ments, and selective mixing by age group.

13265