Howcanthecallingtoparticipatethatwehaveidentifiedproducedigitalcitizenswhoseactsexceedtheirintentions?Toputitdifferently,atensionexistsbetweenthewaysinwhichthefigureofthedigitalcitizenisconceivedinhegemonicimaginariesandlegaldiscoursesandhowsheisperformativelycomingintobeingthroughactionsthatequiphertobeacitizeninwaysthatarenotacknowledgedoralwaysintended.

Forexample,whatresourcesofcyberspacedodigitallyequippedsubjectshavetheauthorizationtoaccessasaresultoftheworkingsofsearchalgorithmsandfiltersortheprotocolsthatgovernandnormalizetheretention,storage,sharing,anddiscoverabilityofinformation?[36]Iflegalityandimaginaryconfigurethecitizenasasubjectofpowerandplacedemandsonhertoparticipatedigitally(submission),whatwefindinterestinghereandinrelationtohowwehaveunderstoodbeingdigitalcitizensistheperformativityofparticipatingthatprovidesaglimpseofthecitizenasalsoapotentialsubjectofsubversion.How,forexample,doesparticipatinggiverisetosubversiveactions,suchasthoseofcriticalcitizenscience?[37]Or,asMatthewFullerandAndrewGoffeyputit,howdoinjunctionssuchasGoogle’s‘Don’tbeevil’maximbeliethepropensitiesthatareactivatedbyrelativelyunstablesociotechnicalarrangementsthataregenerativeof‘unintendedorsecondaryeffects’?

the‘actofhangingoutonline[wasfoundtohave]enormouspotentialforcreatingthecivicnetworksthatsupportreal-worldpoliticalengagement.’

Nevertheless,manystudieshavefoundlittleevidencethatsociallyandeconomicallydisadvantagedgroupparticipationincreaseswhenpoliticsisconductedthroughtheInternet,whetherinwaysthatmimicofflineforms,suchaspetitions,ornewones,suchassocialmedia

Despitetheirdifferences,theydogenerallyshareanimaginaryofcitizensubjectsasalreadyformedassubjectsofsubmission,wheretheirparticipationisamatterofaccess,skills,andusage.Itisanimaginaryofacitizenasasubjectwhoisoftensubmissive(ifnotobedient)andisactiveonlyinwaysrecognizedbygovernmentpoliciesandprogrammes.Alleffortsareaimedatdiscipliningsubjectsalongdigitalinclusionscalesthroughactionsthatinvolveaccess,skills,motivation,andtrust.Itisthroughrepetitionthattheseactionsbecomeembodiedandthroughwhichcitizensubjectsbecomegovernable.Digitalinclusionthusplacesdemandsonthecitizensubjecttouptaketheseactions,tobeskilledandtooled,andtolearnandbecomeknowledgeableandcompetentinlookingafterherselfandgoverninghersocialneeds

‘equipthewholecountrywiththeskills,motivation,andtrusttogoonline,bedigitallycapableandtomakethemostoftheinternet....Ifwesucceed,by2020everyonewhocanbedigitallycapable,willbe.’

Mossbergeretal.,forexample,understanddigitalcitizenshipastheabilitytofullyparticipateinsocietyonline,whichrequiresregularaccesstotheInternet,withadequatedevicesandspeeds,technologicalskillsandcompetence,andinformationliteracy.[21]Equippingthusincludesnotonlyhardware,suchasinstallingcomputersinclassroomsandlibrariesandexpandinghigh-speedbroadbandservices,butalsodevelopingskillsandcapabilitiesthroughtrainingcoursesincomputing,coding,andprogramming

Theempoweringpossibilitiesofaccessingandworkingwithdataalsounderpin‘opengovernmentdata’programmes.Opennessisextendedtomakinggovernmenttransparentthroughapublicrighttodataandfreedomtoinformation,aversionthatisalsoadvancedbycivicorganizationssuchasmySociety.[19]Thesecallforthanimaginaryofcitizensasdataanalystsequippedwiththeskillsnecessarytoanalysetheircommercialtransactionsandthusmakebetterdecisionsortoanalysethetransactionsofgovernmentsandthusholdthemtoaccount.

Becomingadigitalcitizeninvolvesrespondingtocallingswhereparticipatingisoneofthem.Participatingdemandsspecificactionsofskillingandtoolingthatcitizensneedtoundertaketoequipthemselves.

ForHalfordandSavage,whetherliberatingordividing,cyberspace(orwhattheyrefertoasthe‘Web’)isalwaysconsideredasanalreadygivenspace,anditssubjectsareseparate,independent,andpreformedratherthanperformed.Ratherthanassumingthat‘pre-formedsocialgroups“use”(ordon’tuse)technologies’,theyidentifya‘morecomplexprocessofmutualinteractionandstabilisation’wheredigitaltechnologiesarenotseparatedfromsocialprocessesbutinsteadinvolvedinconstitutingsubjectsindiverseandpervasiveways.[16]Inotherwords,theyadvancethattheWebisnotindependentfromtheactionsofsubjects.

‘A“digitaldivide”isneveronlydigital;itsconsequencesplayoutwhereverpoliticalandeconomicdecisionsaremadeandwherevertheirresultsarefelt.’

Inequalityisexpressedasleadingtotwodivisions:betweenthosewhodoanddonothaveaccessandbetweenthosewhodoordonotcontributetocontentorleavedigitaltraces.

Wefocusonthreeactsthatsymbolizeparticularlywellthedemandsforopenness—participating,connecting,andsharing.Theseactsarenotallinclusive;therearecertainlyotheracts,buttheycoverwhatwesuggestarekeydigitalactsandtheirenablingdigitalactions

Ifwefocusoncallingsandtheactionstheymobilizeandhowtheymakeactspossible,wealsoshiftourfocusfromafreedomversuscontroldichotomytotheplayofobedience,submission,andsubversion.Thisisaplayconfiguredbytheforcesoflegality,performativity,andimaginarywhichcalluponsubjectstobeopenandresponsibleandthroughwhichmostlygovernmentalbutalsocommercialandnongovernmentalauthoritiestrytomaintaintheirgripontheconductofthosewhoaretheirsubjects.

Itisoftenforgottenthatthecitizensubjectisnotmerelyanintentionalagentofconductbutalsoaproductofcallingsthatmobilizethatconduct

WeagreewithCohenontheseeminglyparadoxicalrelationbetweenimaginariesofopenness(copyleft,commons)andclosedness(copyright,privacy)andtheirconnectiontoinformationfreedomandcontrol.Sheisrighttoarguethatthisparadoxcannotberesolvedinlegaltheoryfortwomainreasons.First,freedomandcontrolarenotseparatebutrequireeachother,andhowthisplaysoutinvolvescalibrationwithinspecificsituatedpractices.[6]Second,andrelatedly,legaltheorydependsonaconceptionofabstractliberalautonomousselvesratherthansubjectsthatemergefromthecreative,embodied,andmaterialpracticesofsituatedandnetworkedindividuals

Today,beingopenhasbecomeademandonorganizationsandindividualstoshareeverythingfromsoftwareandpublicationstodataaboutthemselves.Fromopendata,opengovernment,opensociety

Wecannotsimplyassumethatbeingadigitalcitizenalreadymeanssomething,suchastheabilitytoparticipate,andthenlookforwhoseconductconformstothismeaning.Rather,digitalactsarerefashioning,inventing,andmakingupcitizensubjectsthroughtheplayofobedience,submission,andsubversion

Beingdigitalcitizensisnotsimplytheabilitytoparticipate.[2]Wediscussedinchapter1howJonKatzdescribedanethosofsharing,exchange,knowledge,andopennessinthe1990s.Today,thesehavebecomecallingstoperformourselvesincyberspacethroughactionssuchaspetitioning,posting,andblogging.Theseactionsrepeatedlycalluponcitizensubjectsofcyberspace,andherewewanttoaddresstheirlegal,performative,andimaginaryforce.

Tounderstanddigitalactswehavetounderstandspeechactsorspeechthatacts.Thespeechthatactsmeansnotonlythatinorbysayingsomethingwearedoingsomethingbutalsothatinorbydoingsomethingwearesayingsomething.ItisinthissensethatwehaveargueddigitalactsaredifferentfromspeechactsonlyinsofarastheconventionstheyrepeatanditerateandconventionsthattheyresignifyareconventionsthataremadepossiblethroughtheInternet.Ultimately,digitalactsresignifyquestionsofanonymity,extensity,traceability,andvelocityinpoliticalways.

Toputitsimply,whiledigitalactstraverseborders,digitalrightsdonot.Thisiswherewebelievethinkingaboutdigitalactsintermsoftheirlegality,performativity,andimaginaryiscrucialsincethereareinternationalandtransnationalspacesinwhichdigitalrightsarebeingclaimedthatifnotyetlegallyinforceareneverthelessemergingperformativelyandimaginatively.Yet,arguably,someemergingtransnationalandinternationallawsgoverningcyberspaceinturnarehavinganeffectonnationallegislations.Toputitdifferently,theclassicalargumentabouttherelationshipbetweenhumanrightsandcitizenshiprights,thattheformerarenormsandonlythelattercarrytheforceoflaw,isnotahelpfulstartingpoint.

Theimportantthingistoseparateacts(locutionary,illocutionary

Itiswellnighimpossibletomakedigitalutteranceswithoutatrace;onthecontrary,oftentheforceofadigitalspeechactdrawsitsstrengthfromthetracesthatitleaves.Aswesaidinchapter2,eachofthesequestionsraisedbydigitalactscanarguablybefoundinothertechnologiesofspeechacts—thetelegraph,megaphone,radio,andtelephonecometomindimmediately.Butitiswhentakentogetherthatwethinkdigitalactsresignifythesequestionsandcombinetomakethemdistinctfromspeechacts,intermsofboththeconventionsbywhichtheybecomepossibleandtheeffectsthattheyproduce.

Digitalactswillnoteliminatedistance(weunderstanddistancehereasnotmerelyquantitativebutalsoaqualitativemetric),butthespeedwithwhichdigitalactscanreverberateisphenomenal.

‘codeistheonlylanguagethatisexecutable.’[49]‘So[forGalloway]codeisthefirstlanguagethatactuallydoeswhatitsays—itisamachineforconvertingmeaningintoaction.’[50]WithAustin(andWittgenstein),thisconclusioncomesasamajorsurprisetous.Aswehavearguedinthischapter,forAustin(andWittgenstein)languageisanactivity,andinorbysayingsomethinginlanguagewedosomethingwithit—weact.Toputitdifferently,languageisexecutable.[51]Thereisnouniquenesstocodeinthatregard,althoughwhilecodeislikelanguage,itisdifferent.WethinkthatdifferenceistobesoughtinitseffectsandtheconventionsitcreatesthroughtheInternetratherthaninitsostensibleuniquenature

ForGalloway,‘now,protocolsreferspecificallytostandardsgoverningtheimplementationofspecifictechnologies.Liketheirdiplomaticpredecessors,computerprotocolsestablishtheessentialpointsnecessarytoenactanagreed-uponstandardofaction.’

ThepremiseofthisbookisthatthecitizensubjectactingthroughtheInternetisthedigitalcitizenandthatthisisanewsubjectofpoliticswhoalsoactsthroughnewconventionsthatnotonlyinvolvedoingthingswithwordsbutdoingwordswiththings.

Ifcallingssummoncitizensubjects,theyalsoprovokeopeningsandclosingsformakingrightsclaims.Weconsideropeningsasthosepossibilitiesthatcreatenewwaysofsayinganddoingrights.Openingsarethosepossibilitiesthatenabletheperformanceofpreviouslyunimaginedorunarticulatedexperiencesofwaysofbeingcitizensubjects,aresignificationofbeingspeakingandactingbeings.Openingsarepossibilitiesthroughwhichcitizensubjectscomeintobeing.Closings,bycontrast,contractandreducepossibilitiesofbecomingcitizensubjects

Whatwemeanbythisisthatasaclaim,theutterance‘havearightto’placesdemandsontheothertoactinaparticularway.

Thisindividualisautonomousnotbecauseitisseparateorindependentfromsocietybutasitsproductretainsthecapabilitytoquestionitsowninstitution.Castoriadissaysthatthisnewtypeofbeingiscapableofcallingintoquestiontheverylawsofitsexistenceandhascreatedthepossibilityofbothdeliberationandpoliticalaction.

Theseareimaginariesnotbecausetheyfailtocorrespondtoconcreteandspecificexperiencesorthingsbutbecausetheyrequireactsofimagination.Theyaresocialbecausetheyareinstitutedandmaintainedbyimpersonalandanonymouscollectives.Beingbothsocialandimaginary,theseinstitutesocietyascoherentandunifiedyetalwaysincoherentandfragmented.Howeachsocietydealswiththistensionconstitutesitspolitics

Tounderstandcitizensubjectswhomakerightsclaimsbysayinganddoing‘I,we,theyhavearightto’,wearemovingfromthefirstpersontothesecondandthethird,fromtheindividualtothecollective.Weneedtoconsidertwoadditionalforcesthatmakeactspossible.Thetwoforcesaretheforceofthelawandtheforceoftheimaginary.

Onthecontrary,citizensubjectsperformativelycomeintobeinginorbytheactofsayinganddoingsomething—whetherthroughwords,images,orotherthings—andthroughperformingthecontradictionsinherentinbecomingcitizens.

ThisistheprincipalreasonwhyweneedtoinvestigatenotonlythingsdoneinorbyspeakingthroughtheInternetbutalsothingssaidinorbydoingthingsthroughtheInternet.

‘Theforceoftheperformativeisthusnotinheritedfrompriorusage,butissuesforthpreciselyfromitsbreakwithanyandallpriorusage.Thatbreak,thatforceofrupture,istheforceoftheperformative,beyondallquestionoftruthormeaning.’[22]Forpoliticalsubjectivity,‘performativitycanworkinpreciselysuchcounter-hegemonicways.Thatmomentinwhichaspeechactwithoutpriorauthorizationneverthelessassumesauthorizationinthecourseofitsperformancemayanticipateandinstatealteredcontextsforitsfuturereception.’[23]Toconceiveruptureasasystemicortotalupheavalwouldbefutile.Rather,ruptureisamomentwherethefuturebreaksthroughintothepresent.[24]Itisthatmomentwhereitbecomespossibletodosomethingdifferentinorbysayingsomethingdifferent.

Thekeyissueinspeechactsbecomeswhether,andifsotowhatextent,whatissayableanddoablefollowsorexceedssocialconventionsthatgovernasituation.

Byadvancingtheideathatspeechisnotonlyadescription(constative)butalsoanact(performative),Austinushersinaradicallydifferentwayofthinkingaboutnotonlyspeakingandwritingbutalsodoingthingsinorbyspeakingandwriting.

butbodiesandtheirmovementsareimplicitinspeechthatacts.

Toputitdifferently,Austin’sconcernwithinfelicitousisnotaregretonhispartbutarecognitionthatspeechdoesnotonlyact,italsocanfailtoactorfailtoactinwaysanticipated.

Bysayingsomething,Ihaveaccomplishedsomething.Thus,‘of’sayingsomethinghasmeaning(locutionaryacts),whereas‘in’or‘by’sayingsomethinghasforce(illocutionaryandperlocutionaryacts).

Moreover,ourconcernwiththeInternetisnotthespeakingsubjectassuchbuthowmakingrightsclaimsbringscitizensubjectsintobeing.Howdodigitalactsbringcitizensubjectsintobeing?DoestheInternetintroducearadicaldifferenceforunderstandingcitizensubjects?DoesthelanguageoftheInternet—code—worklikenaturallanguage?

Thistraversingofactsproducesconsiderablecomplexitiesinbecomingdigitalcitizens.Second,weneedtospecifytowhatextentcertainrightsclaimedbydigitalactsareclassicalrights(e.g.,freedomofspeech),towhatextenttheyareanalogoustoclassicalrights(e.g.,anonymity),andtowhatextenttheyarenew(e.g.,therighttobeforgotten).

wewillspecifydigitalacts—callings(demands,pressures,provocations),closings(tensions,conflicts,disputes),andopenings(opportunities,possibilities,beginnings)—aswaysofconductingourselvesthroughtheInternetanddiscusshowthesebringcyberspaceintobeing

weconsiderthesubjectcalledthecitizenasasubjectofpower.Whilesubjecttopowerisproducedbysovereignsocieties,thesubjectofpowerisproducedbydisciplinaryandcontrolsocieties.Itisabsolutelyimportanttomakeitclearthatthecontemporarysubjectembodiesallthesethreeformsofpower.Thisisthesenseinwhichweconsiderthecitizensubjectasasubjectofpowerandasasubjectweinherit.

Ifwedistinguishprivacyfromanonymity,werealizethatanonymityontheInternethasspawnedanewpoliticaldevelopment.Ifprivacyistherighttodeterminewhatonedecidestokeeptoherselfandwhattosharepublicly,anonymityconcernstherighttoactwithoutbeingidentified.ThesecondconcernsthevelocityofactingthroughtheInternet.Forbetterorforworse,itisalmostpossibletoperformanactontheInternetfasterthanonecanthink.ThethirdconcernstheextensityofactingthroughtheInternet.ThenumberofaddresseesanddestinationsthatarepossibleforactingthroughtheInternetisstaggering.So,too,aretheboundaries,borders,andjurisdictionsthatanactcantraverse.Thefourthconcernstraceability.IfitisperformedontheInternet,anactcanbetracedinwaysthatarepracticallyimpossibleoutsidetheInternet.Takentogether,anonymity,velocity,extensity,andtraceabilityarequestionsthatareresignifiedbybodiesactingthroughtheInternet

Itistritetosay,butbeinganAmericancitizeninNewYorkisdifferentfrombeinganIraniancitizeninTehranandnotequivalentregardlessofhumanrightsconventions.Second,theboundariesofwhatissayableanddoableandthustheperformativityofbeingcitizensareradicallydifferentin,say,TunisandMadrid.Finally,theimaginaryforceofactingasacitizeninAthenshasaradicallydifferenthistorythanithas,say,inIstanbul.ThesecomplexitiesanddifferentiationscometomakeahugedifferenceinhowcitizensubjectsuptakecertainpossibilitiesandactandorganizethemselvesthroughtheInternet.

Afourthgroup,inwhichFuchsseeshimself,arguesthattheobjectiveconditionsthatledpeopletoprotestfoundmechanismsforexpressingsubjectivepositions,therebyhelpingorganizetheseprotests.[83]ByemphasizingadifferencebetweentheInternetingeneralandsocialmedia,FuchsidentifiesthreedimensionsofInternetusage,especiallybytheOccupymovement:buildingasharedimaginaryofthemovement,communicatingitsideastotheworldoutside,andengaginginintensecollaboration.[84]Fuchsalsohelpfullydevelopsamuchwiderlistofplatformsusedbythemovementratherthandumpingthemallintoanall-encompassingcategoryof‘socialmedia’.

Althoughalloftheseprotestswerestagedwithinrelativelythesameperiod,thereweresignificantdifferences,asonewouldexpect,forthereasons,methods,reactions,andeffectsoftheseacts.Yetitisfairtosaythattheyallsharedtwoqualities:alltheseactswerestagedinsquaresandstreetsandwerevaryinglyenactedthroughtheInternet.[81]Thishasresultedinnumerousinterpretationsoftherelationbetweenthetwo:squaresandsocialmedia.ItisquiteunfortunateattheoutsetthattheinterpretivedebatesabouttheimportanceoftheInternetinthestagingoftheseactshavebeenframedintermsof‘socialmedia’.

Butbeforeweproceed,letusnotethatwewillnotcontinuetousethelanguageofconceived,perceived,andlivedspace.Instead,wewillusethesamecategorieswehaveintroducedtodiscussthreeforcesofsubjectivationthatbringcitizensubjectsintobeing:legality,performativity,andimaginary.

Havingrecognizedthatspaceexistsinvariousregisters,scholarsalsostudysuchspacesascultural,social,legal,economic,orpoliticalspaces.Theirassumptionisnotthatsuchspacesexistasseparateandindependentfromspacespeopleinhabit,buttheseareanalyticalmeanstoconcentrateonasubsetofrelationsthatconstitutesuchspacesfordeeperunderstandingofhowpeopleinhabit,say,aculturalspace,whichissimultaneouslyyetasynchronouslyaconceived,perceived,andlivedspace.

FollowingHenriLefebvre,atleastthreeregistersofspaceshavebeenelaborated:conceivedspace,perceivedspace,andlivedspace.[76]Theessentialpointisthatinhabitingspacesinthreeregisters,weexperienceourbeing-in-the-worldthroughsimultaneousbutasynchronousregisters.Subjectsinhabitconceivedspacessuchasobjectifyingpracticesthatcode,recode,present,andrepresentspacetorenderitasalegibleandintelligiblespaceofhabitation.Peopleinhabitperceivedspacessuchassymbolicrepresentationsofspacethatguideourimaginativerelationshiptoit.Subjectsalsoinhabitlivedspacesthroughthingstheydoinorbyliving.Livedspacesarethespacesthroughwhichsubjectsact.Thesethreeregistersofspacearedistinctyetoverlappingbutalsointeracting:byinhabitingthem,wemakethem.

Deleuzethinksthat,bycontrast,incontrolsocieties‘thekeythingisnolongerasignatureornumberbutacode:codesarepasswords,whereasdisciplinarysocietiesareruled...byprecepts.’[67]Heobservesthat‘thedigitallanguageofcontrolismadeupofcodesindicatingwhetheraccesstosomeinformationshouldbeallowedordenied.’[68]ForDeleuze,controlsocietiesfunctionwithanewgenerationofmachinesandwithinformationtechnologyandcomputers.Forcontrolsocieties,‘thepassivedangerisnoiseandtheactive[dangersare]piracyandviralcontamination.

Deleuzewasnowconvincedthat‘[w]e’removingtowardcontrolsocietiesthatnolongeroperatebyconfiningpeoplebutthroughcontinuouscontrolandinstantcommunication.’[65]Thespaceofcontrolsocietieswasdiffuseanddispersedanddecisivelycyberneticinitsmodesofgovernment.

Thespacesthatsovereignpowerproducescorrespondtosuchstrategiesandtechnologiesofexclusion:expulsion,prohibition,banishment,eviction,exile,anddeportationaresuchexamples.Bycontrast,beingasubjectofpowermobilizesstrategiesandtechnologiesofdiscipline,whichrequiresubmissionbutopenuppossibilitiesofsubversion.Thespacesthatdisciplinarypowerproducesareappropriatetosuchstrategiesandtechnologiesofdiscipline:asylums,camps,andbarracksbutalsohospitals,prisons,schools,andmuseumsasspacesofconfinement.Eachofthesespacesisaspaceofcontestation,competitiveandsocialstrugglesinandthroughwhichcertainformsofknowledgeareproducedinenunciationsthatperformsubjects.Neitherspacesofexclusionnorspacesofdisciplinearestaticorcontainerspaces.Theyaredynamicandrelationalspaces.Thereareno‘physical’spacesseparatefrompowerrelationsandnopowerrelationsthatarenotembeddedinspatializingstrategiesandtechnologiesofpower.

Deibertrightlyarguesthat‘althoughcyberspacemayseemlikevirtualreality,it’snot.EverydeviceweusetoconnecttotheInternet,everycable,machine,application,andpointalongthefibre-opticandwirelessspectrumthroughwhichdatapassesisapossiblefilteror“chokepoint,”agreyareathatcanbemonitoredandthatcanconstrainwhatwecancommunicate,thatcansurveilandchokeoffthefreeflowofcommunicationandinformation.’[59]NotonlydoesthismeanthattheInternethasmaterialeffectssuchasdatacentres,serverclusters,andcode,thoughthisiscertainlytrueandtherearestudiesaboutthesematerialforms.

Ratherthanunderstandingcyberspaceasaseparateandindependentspace,weinterpretitasaspaceofrelations.Putdifferently,DonnaHaraway’sCyborgManifesto(1984),whichisnotaboutthethenincipientInternetbutabouttheinterconnectednessofhumansandmachines,isjustasrelevanttoourageoftheInternetthroughwhichwebothsayanddothings.

Ifthecomputerizationofsocietyraisessuchquestions,theanalysisoftheproduction,dissemination,andlegitimationofknowledge,onwhichithasaprofoundeffect,cannotberestrictedtounderstandingcomputerizationascommunicationorcomputer-mediatedcommunication.Rather,theobjectofinvestigationoughttobelanguagegamesthatbecamepossiblethroughwhatLyotardsawasnetworkedcomputers

WhatwefindinLyotard—albeitinincipientform—isthatratherthanconceivingaseparateandindependentspace,thepointistorecognizethatpowerrelationsincontemporarysocietiesarebeingincreasinglymediatedandconstitutedthroughcomputernetworksthateventuallycametobeknownastheInternet.

Sincethemeansofproduction,dissemination,andlegitimationofknowledgeprincipallyinvolveslanguage,Lyotardsawlanguageasthemainsiteofsocialstruggle.Itisnotsurprising,then,thatLyotardwasattractedtoLudwigWittgensteinandJ.L.Austintodevelopamethodofunderstandinglanguageasameansofsocialstruggle.

WehavealreadycharacterizedcyberspaceasaspaceofrelationsbetweenandamongbodiesactingthroughtheInternet.Wenotedearlierthat1984wasthebirthoftheconceptofcyberspace.Yetduringtheverysameyear,amuchlessknownwork,orrather,aworkknownmuchmoreforitstitle,Jean-FrançoisLyotard’sThePostmodernCondition(1984),appeared.

Wedisagreewiththisviewofcode.AlthoughwegatherfromLessigandotherscholarssuchasRonDeibertandJulieCohentheimportanceofcode,wecannotagreethatcodecanordoeshavesuchadetermininginfluence.[45]Wewill,however,explainthislaterinchapter3,wherewediscussinmoredetailtheimportanceoflanguageandtheirreducibledifferencesbetweenspeech,writing,andcode.Fornow,wewanttoemphasizethatifweareboundtousetheconcept‘cyberspace’andcompareittosomethingcalled‘real’space,we’dbetterunderstandthecomplexregistersinwhichcyberspaceexistsratherthanbeingopposedtoanostensible‘real’space.

TheanathemaforLessigisthelossofthisfreedomincyberspace.Inrealspace,governingpeoplerequiresinducingthemtoactincertainways,butinthelastinstance,peoplehadthechoicetoactthiswayorthatway.Bycontrast,incyberspaceconductisgovernedbycode,whichtakesawaythatchoice.Incyberspace,‘iftheregulatorwantstoinduceacertainbehavior,sheneednotthreaten,orcajole,toinspirethechange.Sheneedonlychangethecode—thesoftwarethatdefinesthetermsuponwhichtheindividualgainsaccesstothesystem,orusesassetsonthesystem.’[37]Thisisbecause‘codeisanefficientmeansofregulation.Butitsperfectionmakesitsomethingdifferent.Oneobeystheselawsascodenotbecauseoneshould;oneobeystheselawsascodebecauseonecandonothingelse.Thereisnochoiceaboutwhethertoyieldtothedemandforapassword;onecompliesifonewantstoenterthesystem.Inthewellimplementedsystem,thereisnocivildisobedience.’[38]WhatLessigsuggestsisthatcyberspaceisnotonlyseparateandindependentbutconstitutesanewmodeofpower.Youconstituteyourselfasasubjectofpowerbysubmittingtocode.

LeavingasidetheparadoxofusinganAmericanexperienceandlanguageforcreatingauniversal‘civilizationofthemind’,thedeclarationrevealsthatcyberspaceistobeconceivednotonlyasmetaphysical(nobodiesandnomatter)butalsoasanautonomousspace

InthedocumentaryfilmNoMapsforTheseTerritoriesherecounts,‘[A]llIknewabouttheword“cyberspace”whenIcoinedit,wasthatitseemedlikeaneffectivebuzzword.Itseemedevocativeandessentiallymeaningless.’[31]ThisisreminiscentofNietzsche’sgenealogicalprinciplethatjustbecausesomethingcomesintobeingforonepurposedoesnotmeanthatitwillservethatpurposeforever.

Cyberspaceisaspaceofsocialstrugglesandnolessormore‘real’than,say,socialspaceorculturalspace—conceptsthatalsodescriberelationsbetweenbodiesandthings.Yetthisseparationbetween‘real’spaceandcyberspaceissopervasiveandcarriesabaggagethatneedsquestioning.

thefigureofthecitizencannotenterintodebatesabouttheInternetasasubjectwithouthistoryandwithoutgeography—andwithoutcontradictions.Rather,acriticalapproachtothefigureofthecitizenataminimumrecognizesthatitisbothasubjecttopowerandsubjectofpowerandthatthisfigureembodiesobedience,submission,andsubversionasitsdispositions

Theimaginaryofcitizenshipincludesawholeseriesofstatementsandutterancesaboutwhatcitizenshipis,oughttobe,hasbeen,willhavetobe,andsoon.Theimaginaryofcitizenshipisobviouslymobilizedbyandparticipatesintheformationofthelegalityofcitizenshipanditsperformativity

Wehaveidentifiedthisasthecontradictionbetweensubmissionandsubversionorconsentanddissent.JacquesRancièrecapturesthisasdissensus.[27]Wewillreturntodissensusinchapter7.Second,whilearticulatingaparticulardemand(forinclusion,recognition),performingcitizenshipenactsauniversalrighttoclaimrights.Thisisthecontradictionbetweentheuniversalismandparticularismofcitizenship.

First,performingcitizenshipbothinvokesandbreaksconventions.Weshallcharacterizeconventionsbroadlyassociotechnicalarrangementsthatembodynorms,values,affects,laws,ideologies,andtechnologies.Associotechnicalarrangements,conventionsinvolveagreementorevenconsent—eitherdeliberateoroftenimplicit—thatconstitutesthelogicofanycustom,institution,opinion,ritual,andindeedlaworembodiesanyacceptedconduct.Sinceboththelogicandembodimentofconventionsareobjectsofagreement,performingtheseconventionsalsoproducesdisagreement.Anotherwayofsayingthisisthattheperformativityofconductsuchasmakingrightsclaimsoftenexceedsconventions

‘wemakerightsclaimstocriticizepracticeswefindobjectionable,toshedlightoninjustice,tolimitthepowerofgovernment,andtodemandstateaccountabilityandintervention.’

Ifmakingrightsclaimsisperformative,itfollowsthattheserightsareneitherfixednorguaranteed:theyneedtoberepeatedlyperformed.Theircomingintobeingandremainingeffectiverequiresperformativity.Theperformativeforceofcitizenshipremindsusthatthefigureofthecitizenhastobebroughtintobeingrepeatedlythroughacts(repertoires,declarations,andproclamations)andconventions(rituals,customs,practices,traditions,laws,institutions,technologies,andprotocols).Withouttheperformanceofrights,thefigureofthecitizenwouldmerelyexistintheoryandwouldhavenomeaningindemocraticpolitics.

Ifindeedweunderstandthisdynamicoftakinguppositionsassubjectivation,wethenidentifythreeforcesthroughwhichcitizensubjectscomeintobeing:legality,performativity,andimaginary.Theseareneithersequentialnorparallelbutsimultaneousandintertwinedforcesofsubjectivation

Whoisthenthecitizen?Balibarsaysthatthecitizenisapersonwhoenjoysrightsincompletelyrealizingbeinghumanandisfreebecausebeinghumanisauniversalconditionforeveryone.[19]Wewouldsaythecitizenisasubjectwhoperformsrightsinrealizingbeingpoliticalbecausebecomingpoliticalisauniversalconditionforeveryone.

Therightsthatthecitizenholdsarenottherightsofanalready-existingsovereignsubjectbuttherightsofafigurewhosubmitstoauthorityinthenameofthoserightsandactstocallintoquestionitsterms.Thisistheinescapableandinheritedcontradictionbetweensubmissionandsubversionofthefigureofthecitizenthatcanbeexpressedinaparadoxicalphrase:submissionasfreedom.

IfwefocusonhowpeopleenactthemselvesassubjectsofpowerthroughtheInternet,itinvolvesinvestigatinghowpeopleuselanguagetodescribethemselvesandtheirrelationstoothersandhowlanguagesummonsthemasspeakingbeings.Toputitdifferently,itinvolvesinvestigatinghowpeopledothingswithwordsandwordswiththingstoenactthemselves.ItalsomeansaddressinghowpeopleunderstandthemselvesassubjectsofpowerwhenactingthroughtheInternet.

Forus,thisalsomeansthatactsoftruthaffordpossibilitiesofsubversion.Beingasubjectofpowermeansrespondingtothecall‘howshouldone“governoneself”byperformingactionsinwhichoneisoneselftheobjectiveofthoseactions,thedomaininwhichtheyarebroughttobear,theinstrumenttheyemploy,andthesubjectthatacts?’[14]Indescribingthisashisapproach,Foucaultwasclearthatthe‘developmentofadomainofacts,practices,andthoughts’posesaproblemforpolitics.[15]ItisinthisrespectthatweconsidertheInternetinrelationtomyriadacts,practices,andthoughtsthatposeaproblemforthepoliticsofthesubjectincontemporarysocieties.

Whatdistinguishesthecitizenfromthesubjectisthatthecitizenisthiscompositesubjectofobedience,submission,andsubversion.Thebirthofthecitizenasasubjectofpowerdoesnotmeanthedisappearanceofthesubjectasasubjecttopower.Thecitizensubjectembodiestheseformsofpowerinwhichsheisimplicated,whereobedience,submission,andsubversionarenotseparatedispositionsbutarealways-presentpotentialities.

Butthesearenotpureforms;rather,thecitizensubjectembodiestheseaspotentialities.Beingasubjecttopowerismarkedbythecitizen’sdominationbythesovereign,andherrightsderivefromthatwhichisgiventoherbythe(patriarchal)sovereign.Beingasubjectofpowermeansbeinganagentofpower,evenifthisrequiressubmission.

asubjectisacompositeofmultipleforces,identifications,affiliations,andassociations.Thesubjectisdividedbytheseelementsratherthanbytraditionandmodernity.Italsoassertsthatasubjectisasiteofmultipleformsofpower(sovereign,disciplinary,control)thatembodiescompositedispositions(obedience,submission,subversion).

thatquestiontheassumptionthatcitizenshipismembershipinonlyanation-state

Thefieldbeginswithcitizenshipdefinedasrights,obligations,andbelongingtothenation-state.Threerights(civil,political,andsocial)andthreeobligations(conscription,taxation,andfranchise)governrelationshipsbetweencitizensandstates.Civilrightsincludetherighttofreespeech,toconscience,andtodignity;politicalrightsincludevotingandstandingforoffice;andsocialrightsincludeunemploymentinsurance,universalhealthcare,

howmultipleactorswouldneedtoresistsurveillancestrategiesbutalsothequestionofhowInternetuserswilladjusttheireverydayconduct.ItisanopenquestionwhetherInternetusers‘willcontinuetoparticipateintheirownsurveillancethroughself-exposureordevelopnewformsofsubjectivitythatismorereflexiveabouttheconsequencesoftheirownactions’

Givenitspervasivenessandomnipresence,avoidingorshunningcyberspaceisasdystopianasquittingsocialspace;itisalsocertainthatconductingourselvesincyberspacerequires,asmanyactivistsandscholarshavewarned,intensecriticalvigilance.Sincetherecannotbegenericoruniversalanswerstohowweconductourselves,moreorlesseveryincipientorexistingpoliticalsubjectneedstoaskinwhatwaysitisbeingcalleduponandsubjectifiedthroughcyberspace.Inotherwords,toreturnagaintotheconceptualapparatusofthisbook,thekindsofcitizensubjectscyberspacecultivatesarenothomogenousanduniversalbutfragmented,multiple,andagonistic.Atthesametime,thefigureofacitizenyettocomeisnotinevitable;whilecyberspaceisafragileandprecariousspace,italsoaffordsopenings,momentswhenthinking,speaking,andactingdifferentlybecomepossiblebychallengingandresignifyingitsconventions.Thesearethemomentsthatwehighlighttoarguethatdigitalrightsarenotonlyaprojectofinscriptionsbutalsoenactment.

digitalactsresignifyfourpoliticalquestionsabouttheInternet

Wearguethatmakingrightsclaimsinvolvesnotonlyperformativebutalsolegalandimaginaryforces.Wethenarguethatdigitalactsinvolveconventionsthatincludenotonlywordsbutalsoimagesandsoundsandvariousactionssuchasliking,coding,clicking,downloading,sorting,blocking,andquerying.

WedevelopourapproachtobeingdigitalcitizensbydrawingonMichelFoucaulttoarguethatsubjectsbecomecitizensthroughvariousprocessesofsubjectivationthatinvolverelationsbetweenbodiesandthingsthatconstitutethemassubjectsofpower.WefocusonhowpeopleenactthemselvesassubjectsofpowerthroughtheInternetandatthesametimebringcyberspaceintobeing.Wepositionthisunderstandingofsubjectivationagainstthatofinterpellation,whichassumesthatsubjectsarealwaysandalreadyformedandinhabitedbyexternalforces.Rather,wearguethatcitizensubjectsaresummonedandcalledupontoactthroughtheInternetand,assubjectsofpower,respondbyenactingthemselvesnotonlywithobedienceandsubmissionbutalsosubversion.

whenweconsiderTwitter,forinstance,wecanask:Howdoconventionssuchasmicrobloggingplatformsconfigureactionsandcreatepossibilitiesfordigitalcitizenstoact?

citizenshipasasiteofcontestationorsocialstruggleratherthanbundlesofgivenrightsandduties.[41]Itisanapproachthatunderstandsrightsasnotstaticoruniversalbuthistoricalandsituatedandarisingfromsocialstruggles.Thespaceofthisstruggleinvolvesthepoliticsofhowwebothshapeandareshapedbysociotechnicalarrangementsofwhichweareapart.Fromthisfollowsthatsubjectsembodyboththematerialandimmaterialaspectsofthesearrangementswheredistinctionsbetweenthetwobecomeuntenable.[42]Whowebecomeaspoliticalsubjects—orsubjectsofanykind,forthatmatter—isneithergivenordeterminedbutenactedbywhatwedoinrelationtoothersandthings.Ifso,beingdigitalandbeingcitizensaresimultaneouslytheobjectsandsubjectsofpoliticalstruggl

Soratherthandefiningdigitalcitizensnarrowlyas‘thosewhohavetheabilitytoread,write,comprehend,andnavigatetextualinformationonlineandwhohaveaccesstoaffordablebroadband’or‘activecitizensonline’oreven‘Internetactivists’,weunderstanddigitalcitizensasthosewhomakedigitalrightsclaims,whichwewillelaborateinchapter2.

Butthefigureofcyberspaceisalsoabsentincitizenship

Toputitdifferently,thefigureofthecitizenisaproblemofgovernment:howtoengage,cajole,coerce,incite,invite,orbroadlyencourageittoinhabitformsofconductthatarealreadydeemedtobeappropriatetobeingacitizen.WhatislosthereisthefigureofthecitizenasanembodiedsubjectofexperiencewhoactsthroughtheInternetformakingrightsclaims.Wewillfurtherelaborateonthissubjectofmakingrightsclaims,butthefigureofthecitizenthatweimagineisnotmerelyabearerorrecipientofrightsthatalreadyexistbutonewhoseactivisminvolvesmakingclaimstorightsthatmayormaynotexist.

MarkPoster,forexample,arguesthattheseinvolvementsaregivingrisetonewpoliticalmovementsincyberspacewhosepoliticalsubjectsarenotcitizens,understoodasmembersofnation-states,butinsteadnetizens.[34]Byusingtheterm‘digitalcitizenship’asaheuristicconcept,NickCouldryandhiscolleaguesalsoillustratehowdigitalinfrastructuresunderstoodassocialrelationsandpracticesarecontributingtotheemergenceofaciviccultureasaconditionofcitizenship

WhatisimportanttorecognizeisthatalthoughtheInternetmaynothavechangedpoliticsradicallyinthefifteenyearsthatseparatethesetwostudies,ithasradicallychangedthemeaningandfunctionofbeingcitizenswiththeriseofbothcorporateandstatesurveillance

Moresignificantly,digitalstudiesspansbothsocialsciencesandhumanitiesaswellasscienceandtechnologystudiesandasksquestionsconcerningtherelationofdigitaltechnologiestosocialandculturalchange.

First,bybringingthepoliticalsubjecttothecentreofconcern,weinterferewithdeterministanalysesoftheInternetandhyperbolicassertionsaboutitsimpactthatimaginesubjectsaspassivedatasubjects.Instead,weattendtohowpoliticalsubjectivitiesarealwaysperformedinrelationtosociotechnicalarrangementstothenthinkabouthowtheyarebroughtintobeingthroughtheInternet.[13]WealsointerferewithlibertariananalysesoftheInternetandtheirhyperbolicassertionsofsovereignsubjects.Wecontendthatifweshiftouranalysisfromhowwearebeing‘controlled’(asbothdeterministandlibertarianviewsagree)tothecomplexitiesof‘acting’—byforegroundingcitizensubjectsnotinisolationbutinrelationtothearrangementsofwhichtheyareapart—wecanidentifywaysofbeingnotsimplyobedientandsubmissivebutalsosubversive.Whileusuallyreservedforhigh-profilehacktivistsandwhistle-blowers,weask,howdosubjectsactinwaysthattransgresstheexpectationsofandgobeyondspecificconventionsandindoingsomakerightsclaimsabouthowtoconductthemselvesasdigitalcitizens

Alongwiththesepoliticalsubjects,anewdesignationhasalsoemerged:digitalcitizens.Subjectssuchascitizenjournalists,citizenartists,citizenscientists,citizenphilanthropists,andcitizenprosecutorshavevariouslyaccompaniedit.[7]Goingbacktotheeuphoricyearsofthe1990s,JonKatzintroducedthetermtodescribegenerallythekindsofAmericanswhowereactiveontheInternet.[8]ForKatz,peoplewereinventingnewwaysofconductingthemselvespoliticallyontheInternetandweretranscendingthestraitjacketofatleastAmericanelectoralpoliticscaught

Moreover,withthedevelopmentoftheInternetofthings—ourphones,watches,dishwashers,fridges,cars,andmanyotherdevicesbeingalwaysalreadyconnectedtotheInternet—wenotonlydothingswithwordsbutalsodowordswiththings.

IftheInternet—or,moreprecisely,howweareincreasinglyactingthroughtheInternet—ischangingourpoliticalsubjectivity,whatdowethinkaboutthewayinwhichweunderstandourselvesaspoliticalsubjects,subjectswhohaverightstospeech,access,andprivacy,rightsthatconstituteusaspolitical,asbeingswithresponsibilitiesandobligations?

AsRonaldDeibertrecentlysuggested,whiletheInternetusedtobecharacterizedasanetworkofnetworksitisperhapsmoreappropriatenowtoseeitasanetworkoffiltersandchokepoints.[4]ThestruggleoverthethingswesayanddothroughtheInternetisnowapoliticalstruggleofourtimes,andsoistheInternetitself.

EvgenyMorozov’sTheNetDelusion(2011),Turkle’sownAloneTogether(2011),orJamieBartlett’sTheDarkNet(2014)strikemuchmoresombre,ifnotworried,moods.WhileMorozovdrawsattentiontotheconsequencesofgivingupdatainreturnforso-calledfreeservices,Turkledrawsattentiontohowpeoplearegettinglostintheirdevices.BartlettdrawsattentiontowhatishappeningincertainareasoftheInternetwhenpushedunderground(removedfromaccessviasearchengines)andthusgivingrisetonewformsofvigilantismandextremism.PerhapsthespyingandsnoopingbycorporationsandstatesintowhatpeoplesayanddothroughtheInternethasbecomeawatershedevent.

ThatformanypeopleAaronSwartz,Anonymous,DDoS,EdwardSnowden,GCHQ,JulianAssange,LulzSec,NSA,PirateBay,PRISM,orWikiLeakshardlyrequireintroductionisyetfurtherevidence.Thatpresidentsandfootballerstweet,hackersleaknudephotos,andmurderersandadvertisersuseFacebookorthatpeopleposttheirsexactsarenotsocontroversialasjustrecognizableeventsofourtimes.ThatAirbnbdisruptsthehospitalityindustryorUberthetaxiindustryistakenforgranted.ItcertainlyfeelslikesayinganddoingthingsthroughtheInternethasbecomeaneverydayexperiencewithdangerouspossibilities.

Theoretically informed sociological analyses of digital life can challenge the often implicit assumptions of those approaches which reinscribe divisions between humans and technologies, online and offline lives, agency and structure, and freedom and control. While these may be old dichotomies for some, they continue to have force and need to be challenged.

While much attention is reserved for whistleblowers and hactivists as the vanguards of Internet rights, there are many more anonymous political subjects of the Internet who are not only making rights claims by saying things but also by doing things through the Internet.

Like other social spaces that sociologists study, cyberspace is not designed and arranged and then experienced by passive subjects. Like the physical spaces of cities that geographers have long studied, it is a space that is bought into being by citizen subjects who act in ways that submit to but also at the same time go beyond and transgress the conventions of the Internet. In doing so they are not simply obedient and submissive but also subversive and participate in the making of and rights claims to cyberspace through their digital acts.

Such a conception moves us away from how we are being ‘liberated’ or ‘controlled’ to the complexities of ‘acting’ through the Internet where much of what makes it up is seemingly beyond the knowledge and consent of citizen subjects. To be sure, one cannot act in isolation but only in relation to the mediations, regulations and monitoring of the platforms, devices, and algorithms or more generally the conventions that format, organize and order what we do, how we relate, act, interact, and transact through the Internet. But it is here between and among these distributed relations that we can identify a space of possibility—a cyberspace perhaps—that is being brought into being by the acts of myriad subjects.

The problem is that popular critics have become too concerned about the Internet creating obedient subjects to power rather than understanding that it is also creating submissive subjects of power who are potentially and demonstrably capable of subversion. I believe that addressing the question I posed at the beginning requires revisiting the question of the (political) subject. By reading Michel Foucault, Etienne Balibar conceived of the citizen as not merely a subject to power or subject of power but as embodying both. Balibar argued that being a subject to power involves domination by and obedience to a sovereign whereas being a subject of power involves being an agent of power even if this requires participating in one’s own submission. However, it is this participation that opens up the possibility of subversion and this is what distinguishes the citizen from the subject: she is a composite subject of obedience, submission, and subversion where all three are always-present dynamic potentialities.

. Fellows particularly advocate for improved transparency and improved effectiveness of local government services through open government data (Maruyama, Douglas, and Robertson 2013). After finishing the year fellows pursue a range of non- and for-profit career paths

Altering the infrastructure for governance marks CfA as different from other progressive organizations focused on, for example, electoral politics or youth mobilization. Participation entails personalized involvement where individuals create or alter digital infrastructures to support community need

The benefit of these spaces is best summed up as flexibility. Members are supported as they join the space, become peripheral participants, and potentially, become longstanding members engaged in ongoing projects. Hacking, like art, becomes not the domain of the elite or reified objects but intimately tied with everyday experiences throughout one's life (Dewey, 1934). The pragmatic devotion of HMSs to recursive problem-solving attracts members who see HMSs bringing informal education and collaborative sociality to their city. In interviews GeekSpace members freely offered beliefs about why they saw HMSs as vital to reforming their city at large. Flexibility, exercised through the constant churn of hands-on work on projects, was coupled with optimism for making a better future. Kligler-Vilenchik et al. (2012) describe a similar desire in civically-minded youth organizations as a "wish to help" (para. 1.5), a form of engagement more familiar to volunteerism than hackers that exert their collective power through protest or software (Coleman, 2012; Sauters, 2013). Above all else, this optimism drives HMS members as they seek to reframe what hacking and making can accomplish.

democratization of hacking itself. This claim, however, threatens to unrealistically situate hackerspaces as paragons of learning and overly central to hacker culture at large, and democracy as a panacea. As discussed, GeekSpace was not without exclusion that operated in spite of its official ideology. Further, GeekSpace was constantly being re-built around individual conflicts, organizational collaborations, and cultural shifts. Returning to revisit the question of collectivity itself, the emphasis of the collective is on maximizing perceptions of individual agency through material and social encounters. This harkens back to Thomas' (2011) observation that "collectives provide tools for the unique and individual expression of identity within the collective itself'' (p. 2) and is why "community," which works quite oppositely, is likely the wrong form of social structure at work. HMSs provide a context for a negotiated sociality -sometimes warm conversations, frequently simply co-working. This provides a physical example of Turkle's (1985) observation that, online, "hacker culture is a culture of loners who are never alone" (p. 196). The failure of the first incarnation of GeekSpace was, in the eyes of members, an abundance of socialization.

Hacker and maker represented not so much discrete categories as fluid identities that emerged by on mode of work, personal history, and comfort with cultural alignment. This cozy relationship troubles easy stereotypes of hacking as related to scientific rationality and making to felt experience. For example, as Lingel and Regan (2014) observe, the experiences of software developers can be both highly rational and deeply embodied, resulting in their thinking about coding as process, embodiment, and community. The thrill or pleasure of hacking being linked simply to transgression or satisfaction of completing a difficult job seems lacking (Taylor, 1999; Turkle, 1984). From the side of craft, Daniella Rosner (2012) draws a historic connection to the humble bookbindery as a material-workspace collaboration and site of personalized routines and encounters with tools that lead to complex collaborations. These ethnographies take into account passions and relative definitions of technology that are often neglected in organizational studies. Thus, these inroads to informal learning could be mutually informed by Leonardi's (2011) notion of imbrication, where material and individual agencies are negotiated through routines over time.

Third, the space acted as a recruitment tool for participants and served as a source of solidarity as members rallied around the space. This emphasis on actively inviting new members drew attention to the group's latent desire for open-access, a radical shift from the often insular nature of hacker culture.

Hacker and maker spaces are nearly universally defined within relatively affluent western cultures, raising obvious questions of economic privilege as well as more difficult ones of how spaces are defined by various cultural imaginaries. Mirroring previous work on collective organizations, HMS members' desire for an idealized space appears driven both by their exposure to a participatory democracy (Turner, 2013) and shortcomings they see in that model. Participatory culture, as an ideal, may be a utopian goal (Jenkins & Carpentier, 2013, p. 2; Turner, 2008), imagined here through material engagement.

For example, in the old space, visitors needed to obtain two signatures from two members to be approved for membership. This was seen by the directorship as a small barrier to entry and by female visitors as an unnerving time to be "judged" by uncertain criteria and leadership. In other words, what the two founders saw as a "weak" culture was interpreted as a "strong" one by women visitors. Querying the power dynamics of interactions takes us further towards unpacking when a cultural style can be inhibiting of participation, particularly geeks among who may embrace alternative masculinities (Kendall, 2002; McRobbie & Garber, 1976; Wilkins, 2008).

ad-hoc groups that form and just disband. They form again and disband. Then the individual ties between units in the group become stronger as part of this experience."

Projects were vital to linking personal interests to sharing and collaboration, with one member, echoing the overall pragmatism of the space, describing them as "education in disguise."

The "doing it together" instinct in HMSs may be one precipitated out around projects. Cognitive, classroom-based definitions of project-based learning tend to be formulaic (Blumenfeld et al., 1991). By comparison, the colloquial definition of project can be handily ambiguous about what is under construction. A project can be artistic, technical, or culinary (in the case of "food hacking"). It can be related to one's occupation, entirely recreational, or part of a movement from one to the other.

A physical workshop, then, helped reconcile often highly individualistic and introverted personalities to pursue collaborative learning together. The community nature of the space meant that it was easy to drop by, and relationships often developed between members. However, GeekSpace was initially populated by members often in technical professions and used as a "social club" to blow off steam, play foosball, and drink. The learning that occurred there was mainly self-education and listening to the occasional guest speaker. In retrospect, members, particularly those not coming from technical backgrounds, saw the failure of this space as the lack of collaborative work in the form of projects.

Quite to the contrary, members were self-regulating and saw tools and space as providing deterministic solutions (Jordan, 2008). The materialities of the space and tools allowed them to operate a democratic-meritocratic system focused on shared work with a minimum of hierarchy or rules. This spatio-materialistic perspective echoed a hacker reliance on "rough consensus and running code" that moved projects forward (Davies, Clark, & Legare, 1992, p. 543).

The most important shift in learning during this period was members' relationship to knowledge. GeekSpace attempted to democratize hacking and move towards a more inclusive model. This stands in contrast to Jean Burgess' observation that hacking "as an ideal, permits rational mastery ... but in reality, it is only the technical avant-garde (like computer scientists or hacker subcultures) who achieve this mastery" (Burgess, 2012, p. 30). Individualized encounters with software gave way to making and hardware tinkering where users learned by doing (Rosenberg, 1982). Collaborative work in the space took place in small groups clustered around a project, or the projects were passed from person to person to solve specific problems. The frustrations members had with the first phase of the space organically shifted to a set of practices based in materials, routines, and projects. "Collaboration on ideas and [their] physical manifestations," in the words of a GeekSpace director, is "how you tell somebody's part of the community."

Somewhat paradoxically, the group took advantage of their backgrounds in software even as they were careful to denote they weren't ''those kinds" of hackers. In correcting misunderstandings they both negotiated the stigma around hacking while retaining the term as central to their operations, albeit less so than before. Wayne, a director, would use the term in public because he knew people might question it. He saw this as a chance for redefinition, to get people to "realize that we're not just guys who read 2600 and try and make free long distance calls." Nancy similarly described it as a "word we 're trying to take back" from the media. Even as outwardly the organization shifted to being a maker space the word hacker continued to be a potent way they could mark the difference of their space as compared with other types of shared workshops.

Mike, the most involved director, described a conscious move towards maker culture and away from "being like a closed little nerd group that requires a prerequisite of being able to program in C." Software production was frequently used as a point of contrast to the current space. Making captured a notion of productivity and openness that the previous iteration lacked. Mark described the current version of GeekSpace as "more of a makerspace ... there's a lot of physical fabrication happening." The original members, by comparison, were "more software [oriented]... specifically, hardcore infosec [information security]," harkening back to the group's roots in local 2600 meetings and professional occupations.

Interviews were transcribed and color-coded using Microsoft Word, then categorized using Excel according to the central research questions of this study.

Recruitment was conducted in-person or over email. Interviews were conducted in-person, or if that option was not available, over Skype. The 13 interviews ranged from 25 to 63 minutes in length. No compensation was offered.

Henry Jenkins similarly noted that "do it yourself' is a diffuse notion that can be conflated to an individualistic perspective on creative and technical work, and thus he advocates for moving towards more "collective enterprises within networked publics" (Knobel & Lankshear, 2010, p. 232). Compared with hacking, making is more involved with creating objects within a lineage of craft or art. Rather than hacking's strategic to bring about differences (an outcome), making is more

Maker culture has been criticized for simply being a de-politicized version of hacker culture, naively unable to reconcile its own promises of a revolution (Morozov, 2014). While maker culture's connection with socio-economic change and hacker culture at larger is debatable, it seems more certain it comes with an attendant set of nested practices and attitudes. Lindtner and Li (2012) describe maker culture as ''technological and social practices of creative play, peer production, a commitment to open source principles, and a curiosity about the inner workings of technology" (p. 18). Chris Anderson (2012) claims that the maker movement has three characteristics: the use of digital tools for creating products, cultural norms of collaboration, and design file standards (p. 21 ). Hughes (2012) notes maker culture's emphasis on being open-source and posited that it ''ties together physical manufacturing skills with the higher end technical skills of hardware construction and software programming" (p. 3884).

Members of HMSs, driven by hacker and maker culture, infrastructure their own space and populate it with tools, effectively de-virtualizing materialities. Buildings and tools in HMSs are treated very much as code: malleable, changeable, and durable.

Compared with the contentious history of hacker culture, the history of making is comparatively unmapped. It can be most accurately described as a new craft movement (Rosner & Ryokai, 2009) that recalls relationships with materials through craft (Sennett, 2008) and hobbies (Gelber, 1999).

Jordan stipulates that the commonality of various perspectives on hacking (Himanen, 2001; Wark, 2004) is the hack, or the "ability to create new things, to make alterations, to produce differences" (Jordan, 2008, p. 7). These differences are linked with what Steven Levy (1984) called a "hands-on imperative" (p. 28) and enjoyment from deep concentration. By this line of thinking, the prerogative of hacking is that people should encounter technology not just to gain experience but for the enjoyment of pushing boundaries of what it was meant to do. Taylor (1999) describes the "kick" of hacking as "satisfying the technological urge of curiosity" (p. 17). This transgressing of the internal logic of systems lends a thrill that is difficult to pin down but is understood by those who have experienced it (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Tim Jordan's (2008) assertion that "hacking both demands and refutes technological determinism" (p. 133) gestures at a blending of material and social agencies in specific contexts. In other words, hackers see systems as malleable even as they rely on them to accomplish goals. Jordan saw this as paradoxical perhaps because technological determinism tends to be only viewed in the negative (Peters, 2011 ). Viewing his statements as a reflection on enabling and constraining (Giddens, 1986) engagements with materialities, rather than "determinism" per se, brings us towards a more productive theoretical framework for thinking about the connection of HMSs to informal learning.

For example, Leonardi's (2011) theory of imbrication, drawing on Latour, posits that individuals and technologies both have agency. Investigating the interplay between the two requires micro-interactionist investigations of everyday routines. The most prominent example of imbrication in HMSs comes from an influential presentation at the 2007 Chaos Computer Congress (CCC) where Haas, Ohlig & Weiler presented "design patterns" to create a hackerspace. This PowerPoint turned into a widely-circulated PDF describing socio-material "patterns" to bring about changes to routines for better sustainability, independence, regularity and conflict resolution (Haas, Ohlig & Weiler, 2007). Their invoking of design patterns recalls similar efforts in software (Gamma, Helm, Johnson & Vlissides, 1995) and architecture (Alexander, 1979) to combine social and material agencies to bring about a beneficial goal. The presenters were eager to stress that these were not blueprints, only practices that could be reflexively modified as needed. They were no determinists, but were utterly pragmatic in the sense of relying on implementation, failure, and modification to solve problems in a given system.

Depending on when you happened to drop by, you might conclude that it was a raucous party spot, infosec operations center, or hat manufacturer. The LOpht did not host a single group or set of activities. Rather, it served multiple purposes for the hacker community. The permanence of HMSs similarly serves as a magnet to attract interested members, enabling and constraining the wide variety of activities that occur therein.

served as third places (Oldenburg, 1997), or spaces for informal gathering and bonding outside of home and work. Touchstones for hacker and maker space members emerge time and again, such as German models imported to the United States via Noisebridge and Resistor NYC (Haas, Ohlig & Weiler, 2007). However their "true" origins will likely be always be subject to debate because, in addition to a lack of documentation, these spaces are both quotidian and encourage a plurality of uses.

The public nature of these gatherings was an advantage but also a source of frustration for "elite" members who grumbled about having to deal with "newbies." The publicness of these meetings ensured interplay between pseudo-anonymous bulletin-board systems (BBSs), longstanding members and genuinely interested newcomers.

Coleman (2010) asserts that previous literature such as Taylor's "fails to substantially address (and sometimes even barely acknowledge) is the existence and growing importance of face-to-face interactions" (p. 48). For example, Vichot (2009) notes how communities of hackers that coalesce online use "real space" to gain visibility needed to accomplish their collective political goals.

However, hacker and maker spaces are not synonymous with hacker culture at large. As previously discussed, since at least the mid-1990s, hackers have encompassed too wide an array of concerns and histories to safely be referred to as a unified group. Hacker and maker spaces, while a significant movement and informed by a more popular definition of "hacker," hardly define everyone who calls themselves a hacker.

Doug Thomas (2002) concluded that "hacker culture, in shifting away from the traditional norms of subculture formation, forces us to rethink the basic relationships between parent culture and subculture" (p. 171). Similarly, such a splintering of meanings draws into question how conveniently a lineage by generations can be identified (Coleman, 2012; Taylor, 2005). Hacker and maker space members draw on the "shared background of cultural references, values, and ideas" (Soderberg, 2013, p. 3) of a more accessible hacker culture that is social, everyday, and lived (Williams, 1995). The culture of HMSs is made visible through interactions as members draw on hacker and maker culture at large as an explanation for what it is that goes on there

This popularization is well captured by Brian Alleyne's (2011) observation that "we are all hackers now," a far cry from the insularity of the late 1980s (Meyer, 1989). The term hacker is freely applied to contexts as diverse as data-driven journalism (Lewis & Usher, 2013), urban exploration (Garrett, 2012), and creative use of IKEA products (Rosner & Bean, 2009). I frame hacking as "popular" to underscore its accessible, immediate, and participatory aspects (Jenkins, 2006), even if it is not popular in the same way as "fan cultures" (Jenkins, McPherson & Shattuc, 2002). Rather than media, the popular tum in hacking is linked to interactions with objects, platforms, and practices that invite participation and thereby increase the scope of who have typically considered themselves hackers in new and unforeseen ways.

By comparison, HMSs are collective organizations centered around maintaining a specific space. The current study's site of investigation is a single relatively bounded group (GeekSpace). Members are circumscribed by the built environment of the shared workshop and a shared repertoire of online communication tools (website, mailing lists, wikis).

this pragmatic attitude enable collaborations across ideological boundaries, it also facilitates partnerships" (p. 5), echoing William James' (1975) observation that pragmatism serves as a "method for settling metaphysical disputes that might otherwise be interminable" (p. 27). A pragmatic attitude from various iterations of

I retain hacker because hackers pace members draw upon hacker culture, broadly considered, even though the sites that identify as HMSs vary widely.

The grassroots nature of HMSs provides a contrast to the less popular FabLabs (Gershenfeld, 2005), which operate as franchises that require expensive tools, and Computer Clubhouses (Kaf ai, Peppler, & Chapman, 2009), which are extensions of schools. Hacker and maker space backers such as Mitch Altman claim that hands-on interactions with technology enable a more flexible and personalized learning experience than an institutionalized curriculum (Baichtal, 2011 ).

Scholars drawing on a constructivist line of scholarship (Papert, 1993) draw attention to the self-discovery that comes from encounters with objects (Cetina, 1997). This argument has been extended to technical learning, as free encounters with technical objects and systems are argued to encourage epistemological pluralism (Turkle & Papert, 1990). Experiential learning originates from Lewin, Piaget, and Dewey, and focuses on a continuous process of learning grounded in experiences that arise from an interplay between individual and environment (Kolb, 1984). The spatial nature of HMSs can be seen as a way to negotiate different learning styles

Matt Ratto (2011) defines "critical making" as a combination of critical thinking and material production. His contribution for the current discussion is: if critical makers can "reintegrate technical and social work and thereby innovate both" (p. 258). Design appears a fertile inroad for thinking about empowerment and politics, as particular genres of technology are created through complex social, economic, and cultural processes, leading to literacies that can be drawn on and reconfigured (Balsamo, 2011 ). DiSalvo's (2009) notion of critical making involves users in the design process through practices such as tracing and projection, resulting in the creation of new publics. This was later developed into "adversarial design" (DiSalvo, 2012), which confronts the politics of technologies of objects with an intent to encourage participation. Rafi Santo's (2011, 2013) "hacker literacies" similarly positions hacking as enabling critical thinking within a framework of media literacies.

Hacker and maker spaces arise from grassroots networks through a shared interest in maintaining a semi-permanent space for solo and collaborative work. They generally employ democratic and meritocratic conventions rather than ''top-down" organizational practices. These conventions evolve over time as they are reflexively modified by members through communication (McPhee & Zaug, 2009) and practices (Cox, 2005; Wenger, 1998) in and around physical space. This loose organizational structure and plurality of participant identities results in a tremendous variety of spaces that are best thought of as having a family resemblance (Wittgenstein, 1953) of organizational conventions and shared histories rather than consistency in interests or ideology. Some are firmly entrenched in information security (infosec) while others maintain a focus on artistic endeavors involving welding and woodwork. Several have arisen with an overtly feminist orientation and push back against the often male-dominant nature of these spaces.

Specifically, members encouraged learning and collaboration predominantly through a belief in materialities, particularly as GeekSpace's collective identity shifted from hacker to maker. Members altered the space to serve individual and collective goals rather than employing deliberation or strong organizational methods.

Hacker and maker spaces (HMSs) are open-access workshops devoted to creative and technical work. Their growing numbers (over 500 worldwide) make them a significant grassroots movement supporting informal learning. Scholars have found pedagogical benefits of tinkering and hacking, but the cultural contexts from which these practices arise remain under-studied.

hile hackers create these new worlds, we donot possess them. That which we create is mortgaged to others, and to the interests of others,to states and corporations who control the means for making worlds we alone discover. We donot own what we produce - it owns us.

And most people genetically need adults, because, again, this is cultural learning. You learn from other people, so it’s odd to learn by reading. Once you start interacting with a computer, you start wondering, what kind of initiative could the computer actually take? What kinds of the equivalent of knowledge could the computer actually deal with? [Computer scientist John] McCarthy got off on this before anybody. Papert was working with [Marvin] Minsky at MIT, so they had been already thinking about this when I started thinking about the Dynabook. My thought was, “Man, we have to have an AI inside of it,” because it’s the next logical step after a well-written essay.

This is equivalent to what Montessori was saying: If you want to live in the 21st century, you’d better embody it. You can’t teach it in a classroom. And so, Papert was saying, “Hey, this is math. It’s not just learning math. It’s an environment. It has all these things.”

So, in theory, you’re supposed to shake the iPhone and that means undo. Did you ever, did anybody ever tell you that? It’s not on the website. It turns out almost no app responds to a shake. And there’s no other provision. In fact, you can’t even find out how to use the iPhone on the iPhone. You ever notice that?

FC: But there could have been another way? AK: It’s been an idea in the ARPA/PARC community—which hasn’t been funded since 1980 or so, but a lot of us are still alive—one of the ideas was that in personal computing, what you really need is some form of mentor that’s an integral part of the user interface. FC: Something like a digital assistant? AK: It’s something just like the GUI, which I had a lot to do with designing. I did that, more or less, as a somewhat disappointed reaction to realizing [AI] is just a hard problem. We had some of the best AI people in the whole world at PARC, but the computers were really small for what AI needs.

I mean if you look at that first paper, besides the comment about touch-screen displays, there was a side comment saying that one of the first pieces of software that an individual will write on their personal computer will be something that will suppress advertising.

I mean if you look at that first paper, besides the comment abouttouch-screen displays, there was a side comment saying that one of the firstpieces of software that an individual will write on their personal computer will besomething that will suppress advertising

FC:But there could have been another way?AK:It’s been an idea in the ARPA/PARC community—which hasn’t beenfunded since 1980 or so, but a lot of us are still alive—one of the ideas was thatin personal computing, what you really need is some form of mentor that’s anintegral part of the user interface.FC: Something like a digital assistant?AK:It’s something just like the GUI, which I had a lot to do with designing. Idid that, more or less, as a somewhat disappointed reaction to realizing [AI] isjust a hard problem. We had some of the best AI people in the whole world atPARC, but the computers were really small for what AI needs.

And most people genetically need adults, because, again,this is cultural learning. You learn from other people, so it’s odd to learn byreading.Once you start interacting with a computer, you start wondering, what kind ofinitiative could the computer actually take? What kinds of the equivalent ofknowledge could the computer actually deal with? [Computer scientist John]McCarthy got off on this before anybody. Papert was working with [Marvin]Minsky at MIT, so they had been already thinking about this when I startedthinking about the Dynabook. My thought was, “Man, we have to have an AIinside of it,” because it’s the next logical step after a well-written essay.

So, in theory, you’re supposed to shake the iPhone and that means undo.Did you ever, did anybody ever tell you that? It’s not on the website. It turnsout almost no app responds to a shake. And there’s no other provision. In fact,you can’t even find out how to use the iPhone on the iPhone. You ever noticethat?

X closer examination of these myths nil1 reveal several interesting paradoxes. On the one hand, it is clear that we are in the midst of a cultural shift on a par with the great paradigm shifts in the history of science-our understandings of basic philosophical issues are changing. Tl'e can track shifts in our thinking about the nature of reality, the nature of knowledge and even the nature of the human being. On the other hand, there is e~idencc to suggest that not enough has changed in our thinking about certain philosophical issues, especially as these relate to the concept of 'information' and ideas about originality, privacy: citizen empowerment, democracy and community. I conclude with a list of questions that emerge from the transformation of one 'age' to another.

How might civic hackathons be improved? Balsamo does not deny contradictory influences exist in these spaces nor avoid engaging because they are “neoliberalist.” Rather, she suggests that sites of messy innovation are also potential sites of learning. Accordingly, my hope is that civic hackathons might be treated more seriously as moments for education and public engagement around the politics of technology. This can be a radical notion because culture, narratives, myths, rituals, expressions, and knowledge might still be reworked.

Civic hackathons are undeniably fraught. Our projections about civic futures are entangled with collective fantasies abouttechnology. This is a story at least as old as science fiction, yet never ultimately removed from our social realities. In some cases small tasks stimulated the civic imagination on larger public problems. In others, cultural reproduction led people to imagine technology that was already racialized, reflecting collective fears that rise to the top. Yet, I resist dismissing civic hackathons. Donna Haraway would certainly see the fallacy in demanding we return to the deliberation of Tocqueville’s town hall meetings. Plus, as anyone who has participated in local government can tell you, city council meetings are hardly a gold standard for civic participation. Mills reminds us that our rationalities are bounded and exist within a particular historic context. We might never get technology out of politics, or the politics out of technology. In a sense, civic technology may itself be a cyborg formed from our collective hopes and fears, one that we might better learn to live with.

This was their space, not ours. Later thatafternoon I found a cluster of neighborhood kids clustering around a young woman who was teaching them basics of programming. They were intently leaning on her shoulder to get a better view of her laptop. To my mind this image captures the gamble of civic innovation: participants sneaking community voices in and rallying around their concerns, hoping they won’t be just another wave of gentrification driven by technology rather than rising rents.

Put slightly differently, if we want civic hackathons to produce ideas that improve society, we need to more deeply and sincerely shape choices, thought processes, and activities that might make technology civic.

As a communication scholar I have been drawn to Winner’s thesis that confronting, working on, and talking about technology can make ethics visible and allow us to make different choices. It is a constant struggle of modernity to confront the idea that technology might be a quick fix. Civic hackathons are just such a site where technology is co-designed and choices made visible. Quite contrary to the idea that participants were unaware, awful ideas didn’t go unnoticed– in many cases they werevocally disputed.

A real-time crime tracking application is a prime example of cultural reproduction — how technological artifacts can be encoded in ways that reflect racist fears.

After we were done, pictures were taken of the group and distributed online to groups in other cities performing similar activities, contributing to the spectacle of the day.

The discussion of the rich social life of data behind the scenes stimulated a discussion for a spin-off project on aggregating geographic data about environmental issues in city. The apparently rote task of transcribing the presence of open data was an inroad to broader questions about how data was constructed behind the scenes and ways residents might add to it.

We failed to assemble a pitch because the civic imagination could not simply float alone. It needed a technological metaphor to give practices traction. Many of the pitched projects had the opposite problem. They started with an existing technology and grafted the goals of the city to it, essentially transposing a model of informed citizenship onto it. These technologies were not so much re-drawing government as increasing its utility.

An audience member yelled out, “what skills does a hack require?” Abhi shook his head. “Not much,” he replied, “you could solve a problem through marketing.” When asked, only around a third of the room raised their hands to identify as software developers.

In addition to moments of the expression of civic imagination, I am attentive to failure — times where conceptual roadblocks were encountered, spectacles failed, and cultural reproduction turned ugly. Being attentive to failure is necessary because civic hackathons tend to be universally celebrated as successes in popular literature. As Anne Balsamo noted in the case of Xerox PARC (p. 55), sites of technological production tend to also be involved in their own hype and myth-making (Also see: Balsamo, 1996). It is necessary to see what is entangled with the fiction.

Duncombe was frustrated by the liberal left’s insistence on using dry logic to make political arguments. He looked to the political right and far left as groups that fostered affective fantasies. To him, an “ethical spectacle” is participatory fantasy that is open-ended, transparent, and performative (Duncombe, 2007, p. 17). Duncombe saw ethical spectacles as directly democratic, breaking down hierarchies, fostering communities, and encouraging diversity. He held a strong form of participation, as participants in a spectacle “must also contribute to its construction” (Duncombe, 2007, p. 127). The civic

Material forms give coherence to the civic imagination. For example, Ross (2013) proposed that cultural practices of viewing the city “from above” in plans stimulated city planners’ civic imagination while they applied expertise in the planning process.

To Mills, the imagination was activated according to the structure of society, conceptualization of “the mechanics by which it is changing” (p. 6), and prevailing “varieties” of individuals of the period. Individuals have personal troubles that can be connected with issues of a public matter. The civic imagination has the potential to be activated around deep societal problems, which may involve institutional crises. The civic imagination is closely connected with participation. Castoriadis (1987)diverged from Marx by believing that not all futures were determined by history.Castoriadis believed that society’s future was collectively created and given traction through the imagination. That is, it was only “through the collective agency of the social imaginary that a society is created, given coherence and identity, and also subjected to auto-alterations” (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 7). To Appadurai (1996), the imagination was also intimately related to action because it was only in the service of fulfilling an as-yet unproven goal that we are driven to act.

Dunne and Raby’s (2013) notion of speculative design helps outline how future-oriented thought works at civic hackathons. They suggest that speculative design on “wicked problems” creates “spaces for discussion and debate about alternative ways of being, and to inspire and encourage people’s imaginations to flow freely” (Dunne & Raby, 2013, p. 2). They find merit in dreaming, as the future is an “aid imaginative thought” (p. 3). Materialities assist development of ideas and approaches to collectively thinking about possible futures. For them, critique has a place in design, particularly humor. Designers can “pull new technological developments into imaginary but believable everyday situations so that we can explore possible consequences before they happen” (p. 57). Speculative design is a helpful bridge to the civic imagination.

Balsamo's notion of technocultural innovation is quite appropriate for negotiating between critical and design positions on hackathons. First, she defines technologies asmessy combinations of practices, materialities, and affordances. They were never fully captured in artifacts to begin with, and she would simply not regard civic hackathons as their sole point of emergence. Second, although designers hold a particular role in technocultural innovation, Balsamo makes it clear that everyday people can interact with, talk about, act out, and pitch ideas, thereby co-constructing technologies. Many of the examples she provides, such as interactive museum exhibitions, are very hackathon-esque spectacles that bring people into contact with technologies in the process of being designed. Third, Balsamo provides concepts and vocabulary for describing moments of collective design. Cultural models of technology might be reproduced or made anew through the technocultural imagination. Balsamo does not treat the influence of corporations or mythologies of technology (Balsamo, 1996)as necessarily spoiling innovation. Individuals all draw on specific models of technology — practices, affordances, materialities — from everyday life, which must include those created by large companies. Participants can get space of their own, as in the case of Xerox PARC’s RED group, that provide autonomy. Yet, they do not exactly get outside of technology, a point that McKenzie Wark has similarly driven home (Wark, 2004).

Innovation always occurs against a larger social and cultural backdrop because "all participants [in collective design] bring gendered, racial, and class-based assumptions to the designing process" (p. 37). Diversity in collective design may helpindividuals imagine better together, as we all bring different assumptions about technology.

hackathons were also subjected to public parody, drawing attention to their elitism. The “Stupid Shit No One Needs & Terrible Ideas Hackathon” first ran in 2014.

At least since Doug Engelbart’s “mother of all demos” the introduction of new products has been accompanied by showmanship. Demonstrations are theater where possible uses for technology are presented (Smith, 2009). Hackathons have been argued to be the “front stage” for data and can be contrasted with the murky “back stage” of data production, munging, and interpretation (Gregg, 2014b). The difference with Balsamo might be that she does not put performance in scare quotes.

I do not believe she was necessarily re-treading the intractable sociological debate between "structure and agency." Rather, she was suggesting a sensory-oriented theory of collaborative design rooted in feminism and media studies.

“performance of innovation” (Balsamo, 2011) described how individuals collaboratively design technology in public settings. According to Balsamo, technology design emerges from a collaborative and cultural process that she terms "technoculture." Innovations are not objects, but like technology they are, “assemblages of practices, materialities, and affordances” (Balsamo, 2011, p. 8). Through performance and embodied action, technocultural innovation has a “dual logic”: the expression of the technological imagination and cultural reproduction.

A more diverse range of participants attended, as civic hackathons were more frequented by community organizers, activists, and students than seasoned software engineers. Those who turned up were also more diverse in ways other than occupation – racially, ethnically, and by gender. These events were largely run by Hack for LA with a wide range of partners. Rarely did sponsors emphasize working code

the civic hackathon violated the very conventions of hackathons. It had “no hacking” in the traditional sense of creating or modifying working software. This curious disappearing act of code in hackathons over the last several years was controversial among programmers. Thea Aldrich of Random Hacks of Kindness wondered aloud when I interviewed her in 2013, “don’t community organizers already have ways to engage politically?” To Thea “civic hacking” was a form of civic engagement particular to the technically adept.

that civic hackathons are highly fluid and contested spaces where power is negotiated. However, critical and design perspectives clearly differ on the theorized relationship between civic participation and technology. The imposed civic ideology perspective tells us high technology corporations force an essentially bogus ideology on the event. Participants

Simply diversifying participantion is no guarantee that outcomes benefit diverse communities, and declaring an event civically important does not make it so. After years of participating in and running civic hackathons I noticed a new turn. This new type of civic hackathon was intentionally run to foster performance, spectacle, and communicative activities around a loose shell of technology-oriented activities. Technology became more talked about than materially captured.

Citizens were asked to take over responsibilities that were previously handled by the state, and participants would “recognize problems only insofar as technology can operationalize and solve them.”

More staunch critics questioned if the White House was being duplicitous by inviting “civic hackers” under the guise of transparency while having the worst administrative record for prosecuting whistleblowers.

In Are Civic Hackathons Stupid? Emily Badger noted how government officials expected too much of civic hackathons, which rarely produced the expected technology that can be scaled to different sites. They required resources and labor to run, which could lead to burnout. Still, she was reluctant to entirely write them off. Some problems needed local solutions and civic hackathons could “bring officials and residents together in a context that has nothing to do with paying parking tickets or reporting potholes, and in a format that appeals to people who would never turn up for a public meeting.”

Initially at least, civic hackathons were initially positioned as a form of public outreach for civic hackers, a loose-knit community interested in applying technology for social good. James Crabtree (2007) defined “civic hacking” as “the development of applications to allow mutual aid among citizens rather than through the state.” In particular, he suggested an extra-institutional definition, thatcivic hacking filled in where e-democracy had failed. The meaning of “civic” at this stage leaned towards a libertarian perspective, which remains a persistent critique of hacking among critical studies scholars (Golumbia, 2013).

Civic hackathons are spaces where the technological imagination and civic imagination collide and jostle as people collectively envision future technologies. Finally, I suggest three lessons drawn from civic hackathons to demonstrate the contradictory and even treacherous ways civic innovation produces ideas. In the conclusion I consider how we might read civic hackathons alongside other modern political formations. After all, civic hackathons are just one part in a larger formation of “open government” that prioritizes direct participation and institutional collaboration as a pathway to reform.

civic hackathons in Los Angeles were rich spaces for observing communication about technology throughspeeches, group collaboration, and pitches.

The two perspectives are also not mutually exclusive — a participant might be frustrated at the rushed, corporatized nature of a certain civic hackathon and come to explore ideas about improving civic life.

Civic hackathons have been hotly debated in recent years. Critical studies scholars have lambasted civic hackathons for aligning with middle-class citizenship(Irani, 2015)and co-opting participant labor (Gregg, 2014a). Silicon Valley is often the fait accompliin these perspectives, bringing a flawed ideology that seduces organizers and participants into transposing technological language onto civic issues (Also see: Barbrook & Cameron, 1996; Morozov, 2013). In this paper I refer to this perspective as an “imposed civic ideology.” The second perspective comes from design scholars interested in material participation (Marres, 2012) as cohering publics to work on particular social issues. Lodato and DiSalvo (2016) suggested that civic hackathons served two purposes. First, they help people think through civic issues using props — “objects, services, and systems that engage with issues” (p. 16). Second, they cohere ephemeral proto-publics for short-term engagement on issues of public concern. As they summarized, "what is important is not the inventiveness of a particular prototype product or service, but rather, how the event fosters opportunities for collaborative or collective issue articulation" (p. 15). They drew attention to how outcomes of civic hackathons may more likely be social and cultural than functional material objects. I refer to this design perspective as an “emergent civic subjectivity.”

For these women, the values and practices of everyday life intertwine with technical labor. In the 1970s, theorists like Dick Hebdige, Henri LeFebvre, and Michel DeCertau took up everyday life as a site for radically re-imagining social life. The potency of domesticity and the social status of quotidian craftwork became a key precursor to contemporary Feminist thought. Today, it has reemerged in the work of modern-day hackers.By designing hackerspaces to serve domestic and familial needs, and by surfacing a new emotional style through failure, members of women-operated hackerspaces are

HackerMoms built on the language of hacking, and its emerging discourse of digital production, to define and legitimate women as hackers and, accordingly, relevant actors in high-tech-nology markets. To accomplish this, members accorded feminized emotional and craft-based skills the same respect as accorded to computer engineering competencies within more “traditional” (predominantly male) hacker collectives.

Showing and discussing their “hacks” became part of recognizing what Eva Illouz (2008: 20) would call a cultural resource, “a way for actors to devise strate-gies of action that help them implement certain definitions of the good life.”

By framing the work of women-operated hackerspace members as vital forms of hacking, they embraced the counterculture, but not the one most prevalent on the playa at Burning Man, home of the San Francisco Bay Area digerati. They instead embraced a personal counterculture, one based on their own family narratives—resurrecting a phrase widely celebrated within the 1970s Feminist movement: “the personal is political.”

In these situations, the audience is familiar and vulnerable along with participants. An important aspect of this type of fail-ure is the opportunity of eventual success it presents. FC participants enjoy the journey, so to speak, while seeking out hopeful destination points. The imposed failure, on the other hand, is unsolicited and offered in brief comments from (faceless) people outside the group. There is no reciprocity and little opportunity for mutual vulnerability or growth, as with the club. In this case, the ideal destination point is prescribing to others’ notions of what constitutes success.

a HackerMoms member remarked, “when you avoid using the word ‘hacker’ you lend credence to hack-ing being a negative thing; by using it, you begin claiming the word as your own and reworking it.” This logic of appropriation calls to mind Smith’s initial purpose for assum-ing the hacking category: underscoring connections between hacking and women’s work

At HackerMoms, many members like Renz used craft techniques to create objects and “hack” physical craft materials. From the perspective of those who saw HackerMoms as “anti-hackerspace,” celebrating craft and art making without computation rendered the concept of hacking ambiguous and insig-nificant. This concern often resonated with engineers and scientists like Renz’s husband, a physicist, who confessed to her he did not consider her work hacking (Interview with Daniela Rosner, 18 April, 2013).

The Underachievers Manifesto by English author Neil Gaiman that hung on the FC wall: “I hope that in this year to come, you make mistakes. Because if you are making mistakes then you are making new things [...].”