story of three Inuit tribe members who get stranded in a blizzard during a hunt

Integrating the community into other DOI related activities and services

Formal incentives to fulfil mission & wind-down – infrastructures exist for a specific purpose and that purpose can be radically simplified or even rendered unnecessary by technological or social change. If it is possible the organisation (and staff) should have direct incentives to deliver on the mission and wind down.

Living will – a powerful way to create trust is to publicly describe a plan addressing the condition under which an organisation would be wound down, how this would happen, and how any ongoing assets could be archived and preserved when passed to a successor organisation. Any such organisation would need to honour this same set of principles.

Cannot lobby – the community, not infrastructure organisations, should collectively drive regulatory change. An infrastructure organisation’s role is to provide a base for others to work on and should depend on its community to support the creation of a legislative environment that affects it.

Transparent operations – achieving trust in the selection of representatives to governance groups will be best achieved through transparent processes and operations in general (within the constraints of privacy laws).

Non-discriminatory membership – we see the best option as an “opt-in” approach with a principle of non-discrimination where any stakeholder group may express an interest and should be welcome. The process of representation in day to day governance must also be inclusive with governance that reflects the demographics of the membership.

Stakeholder Governed – a board-governed organisation drawn from the stakeholder community builds more confidence that the organisation will take decisions driven by community consensus and consideration of different interests.

Whose values do we put through the A.G.I.? Who decides what it will do and not do? These will be some of the highest-stakes decisions that we’ve had to make collectively as a society.’’

The Fediverse indeed does, because its decentralization is a matter ofarchitecture, not just policy. A subreddit moderator has control only insofar asReddit, a soon-to-be public company,22 permits that control. Because Redditcan moderate any piece of content—indeed, to ban a subreddit outright—no matter whether the subreddit moderator agrees, it is subject to publicpressure to do so. Perhaps the most famous example is Reddit’s banning ofthe controversial pro-Trump r/The_Donald subreddit several months beforethe 2020 election.

It is not by erecting fences between power and right that governance can be steered toward justice, but by entangling power within solidarity, care, and other modes of right relationship.

Discourse within the public sphere signals the normative will of the democratic citizenry to the steering institutions of governance. It also articulates and rearticulates (expresses and reshapes) the core of the civic, the vital beating heart of a democracy. This core is a political morality of intentional action motivated by reasoned understanding and moral imagination. In the political morality I see emerging, the separation of the political and the normative is subsiding. Conceptually, power and right are becoming entangled rather than bifurcated. 

I am uncertain whether such a shift towards participatory governance is possible. A useful analogy is that of Wikipedia and other Wikimedia projects, which are undergoing a significant “phase shift”, from the culture defined by the community of early contributors, to a broader and more inclusive culture– one centered not just on encyclopedic prowess, but also institutional organizing. This example suggests that such a shift is possible, but hard. It requires both significant resources, which have been invested in the case of Wikimedia, but also strong leadership that is in dialogue with the community and can negotiate together the changes (this has happened to a lesser extent). 

Modularity is a form of multistakeholder, co-regulatory governance, in which modules—discrete mechanisms, protocols, and codes—are developed through processes that include a range of perspectives. This novel co-regulatory approach proposes to achieve greater multinational alignment in internet governance, while respecting the inherent sovereignty of national and regional governments, some of which have already adopted new digital platform accountability regimes. Modularity works by identifying tasks common to laws in multiple countries and creating global, multi-stakeholder processes and institutions that can operationalize those tasks. It facilitates compliance with different jurisdictions and reduces the cost of enforcement, all without the necessity of treaties or other mechanisms that constrain or replace official authority.

As users begin migrating to the noncommercial fediverse, they need to reconsider their expectations for social media — and bring them in line with what we expect from other arenas of social life. We need to learn how to become more like engaged democratic citizens in the life of our networks.

The majority of scholarship on platform governance focuses on for-profit, corporate social media with highly centralized network structures. Instead, we show how non-centralized platform governance functions in the Mastodon social network. Through an analysis of survey data, Github and Discourse developer discussions, Mastodon Codes of Conduct, and participant observations, we argue Mastodon’s platform governance is an exemplar of the covenant, a key concept from federalist political theory. We contrast Mastodon’s covenantal federalism platform governance with the contractual form used by corporate social media. We also use covenantal federalist theory to explain how Mastodon’s users, administrators, and developers justify revoking or denying membership in the federation. In doing so, this study sheds new light on the innovations in platform governance that go beyond the corporate/alt-right platform dichotomy.

Ranking the voting systems: STAR Voting > Approval Voting > Ranked Choice Voting > Plurality ("pick only one") voting.Ranked Choice Voting is marginally better than plurality voting, but it has problems. The chief defect with Ranked Choice Voting is its non-monotonicity, whereby increasing your support for your genuine favorite can actually hurt their odds of winning. This may be what happened in Alaska [1].STAR Voting is a slight modification to Score Voting, where you simply score each candidate and are not forced to rank them. You are given the discretion to give multiple candidates the same score if you so choose. STAR is highly expressive and simple to count: just sum the scores.Approval Voting is appealing because of its simplicity. Both ballots and how they are counted would require only superficial changes versus plurality, such as changing the prompt from "Vote for only one" to "Vote for as many as you like." Approval has a good balance of utility and simplicity.If we are going to invest time and effort into achieving voting reform, it would be a shame to spend that effort on RCV rather than superior alternatives.[1] https://electionscience.org/commentary-analysis/rcv-fools-pa...

MAKERDAO

fully decentralized’ Dai is insecure from incentive misalignment.

These attacks affect both the current single-collateral Dai (SCD or ‘Sai’) and the upcoming multi-collateral Dai (MCD) implementations, as well as similar systems with on-chain governance.

To reduce liquidity indirectly, projects can provide incentives that make individual token holders less willing to sell.

Nevertheless, designers can limit the value of attacks by limiting the scope of what governance can do

inefficient outcomes

Can they reshape the contours and boundaries of their socialsituations instead of being shaped by them?

In searching for a configuration of intelligences in the world that would make possible for humansto govern, we want the exemplar human agents X, Y and Z to be able to impact the socio-econo-politicalsystem rather than be steered and moulded by it.

Consequently, theshape of the gridlock [9], in which further progression towards an ever-greater executive capacity givento a selected group of institutions has become nearly impossible, is not an anomaly to be overcome.The gridlock is the only configuration in which the global system could have settled. It isthe configuration any system is bound to adopt when it is composed of a multitude of differentlypositioned, differently oriented, heterogeneous decision-makers, operating in different dimensionsand scales, none of which universally dominant and all are co-dependent and constrained by others.

Approaching the two extremes of the ‘hierarchical versus collective’ axis as irreconcilablemodels and the two extremes of the ‘governor versus governed’ as distinct social locations seem to bemisleading rather than useful. These are just two opposite conceptual idealisations of an actual broadrepertoire of patterns of distribution of influence.

Only if an event of communication triggers a change and thischange is observed as being causally connected to that same event, the communication event can betreated as a decision. In this sense, a decision is a special category of actions that is, the exercising ofintentionality—doing something in order to change the state of affairs. This is how intentional mentaloperations of humans become functional in the context of a social system.

At first sight, it might seem that no one but humans (even though in actuality only a few of them)hold positions of influence and power over social systems. We wish, however, to challenge this view.We argue that while human-driven governance is conceivable and in principle possible—and it is thegoal of our research to draw the path towards such future—for now, it is not human beings but ratherthe social system which governs itself [6, 7].

This understanding of governance makes apparent that, for any particular challenge considered byany particular designated ‘governor,’ there is, typically, a considerable number of impactful selectionsthat are made elsewhere

we posit that there is no need to define the global system as a configurationof only such social forms (e.g., international organisations) that remain after the presupposed unitsof their respective environments (e.g., nation states) have first been excluded

welfare models of the Government in providing food security to poor households and designing gender budgeting in energy infrastructure are also welcome.

multistakeholder data governance

In all cases, institutions need to have a security and privacy strategy. Endpoint protection platforms, two-factor authentication, and cloud monitoring tools are some of the technologies that IT staff use to protect institutional data and individuals' identities.

Politically and legally, the principle of subsidiarity ensures that education remains a national competence for EU Member States (Ertl, 2006), while, theoretically, scholarly research points to the continued relevance of the state within a multi-scalar governance complex (Levinson et al., 2020; Tröhler, 2020).

Politically and legally, the principle of subsidiarity ensures that education remains a nationalcompetence for EU Member States (Ertl, 2006), while, theoretically, scholarly research points tothe continued relevance of the state within a multi-scalar governance complex

When the originators of DAOstack set about to architect solutions for decentralized governance, they recognized that given the complexity of the problem, the best solutions would emerge only over time, especially since needs would vary across use cases.So, first and foremost, they designed DAOstack to be not a fixed offering in decentralized governance, but rather a sandbox for ongoing experimentation, in which bits and pieces of governance infrastructure can be easily mixed and matched for each organization, like LEGO building blocks or WordPress templates.

Perhaps the biggest one is inefficiency. If you give everyone a voice, things can get very noisy very quickly, like an annoying neighborhood association meeting, multiplied by a thousand. The more you distribute decision-making power throughout an organization, the more you risk either taxing everyone’s attention with a sea of decision-making or creating gridlock among decision-makers — or both.So, if you’re going to coordinate a crowd effectively, you need technology not just for making proposals and tallying votes, but also for managing the collective attention. You need ways to determine who can make proposals and how. You need ways to determine which proposals should actually get the attention of the voters — sort of like means of voting on what to vote on. And you need ways to determine who should be involved in each decision, according to reputation or subject-matter credibility.

self-governance

Planetary governance must be seen not just as an extension of Internationalism but in contrast to it. Internationalism, such as the United Nations, is a kind of Federalism. It presumes the sanctity of the isomorphic Nation-State, and it understands the organization of the world as primarily the circumscription of plots of land. In many ways, it is fundamentally ethnocentric, fundamentally traditionalist, and as such its form represents a misalignment of the governor and the governed.

The core of OpenFaaS is an independent open-source project originally created by Alex Ellis in 2016. It is now being built and shaped by a growing community of contributors and end-users.

According to a report jointly released by Indian Cellular and Electronics Association and consulting firm KPMG,

“ContributionofSmartphonestoDigitalGovernanceinIndia

Governed under a Temporary Benevolent Dictatorship (TBD)

Felt is a set of tools for building customizable self-governing communities.

a co-op of worker-owners, and hopefully one day a platform co-op (communities owning themselves? absurd)

Our team is building open source community tools and Svelte fits our identity as an independent labor of love with an organic community.

That is to say: if the problem has not been the centralized, corporatized control of the individual voice, the individual’s data, but rather a deeper failure of sociality that precedes that control, then merely reclaiming ownership of our voices and our data isn’t enough. If the goal is creating more authentic, more productive forms of online sociality, we need to rethink our platforms, the ways they function, and our relationships to them from the ground up. It’s not just a matter of functionality, or privacy controls, or even of business models. It’s a matter of governance.

Departmental communication was a one-sided process, with nodal institutions seeking sectoral information without looking to build climate capacity in the state or involving departments in the ideation process. As a result some recommendations do not seem grounded in what is politically or developmentally tenable.

While senior state bureaucrats have been supportive of developing a plan, there is little evidence that they have championed adapting to or mitigating climate change as a cause, at either the political or bureaucratic levels.1

Illegal economies often work faster than governments’ and NGOs’ ability to formalise and implement conservation strategies

Congress will likely not commence except for in case of emergency, which would require lawmakers to be present since no remote voting system yet exists or is allowed under current rules.

Early in the life of the Audius network, the AudiusDAO will control governance. During this bootstrap-ping phase, the Audius DAO will also have the abilityto intervene in catastrophic circumstances to x criticalissues in the Audius blockchain code, such as issues en-abling fraud or resulting in unintended loss of Audiusor Loud tokens.

The Politics of Sustainability and Development

That’s true not just within the classroom environment, but in the web of interactions students experience

Freedom to organizeAragon lets you freely organize and collaborate without borders or intermediaries. Create global, bureaucracy-free organizations, companies, and communities.

The world’s first digital jurisdictionAragon organizations are not only great because they are decentralized, global and unstoppable. They will also benefit from the Aragon Network, the world’s first digital jurisdiction.

oversight by an independent and respected body or bodies t

Effective governors communicate what the priorities of your organization are and what is expected of people.

most IT governance strategies prove to be ineffective in practice due to application of traditional strategies and ways of thinking.

Lean IT governance balances your short-term and long-term needs. Too many organizations have allowed technical debt to grow in recent years, for the skills of their IT staff to stagnate, and to continue to tolerate traditional IT process strategies from yesteryear. This is because they allowed short-term priorities to trump long-term health. We must do better.

Since November 1st you will get your mail from public authorities and institutions as Digital Post. This means you have to read it online. It is important that you know how to find and read your Digital Post.

NemID is a digital signature and an all in one login for public and private services on the Internet.

Borger.dk is an Internet portal for the citizens of Denmark. Here you can find different self-services and get information on issues regarding the public authorities. 

By requiring a lock up period for the DCR to obtain tickets, Decred hopes that only users invested in the long-term growth of the network will be involved in the consensus process. Short-term speculators and day traders of DCR will not be able to participate in consensus or governance without making their holdings illiquid.

One concern in the Decred community is that the rising ticket price (about 100 DCR, as of mid-2018) excludes small holders from participating in governance and block validation.

Mention has been made of the new environmental body. Strictly speaking, under this clause as it currently stands, the Government would be able to establish, under secondary legislation, the kind of body that the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, who is no longer in his place, was arguing for earlier—a body so powerful it could sanction other public bodies, including the Government, if it was able to reproduce the powers that presently rest with the European Commission. That is an enormous power, which this House would not allow the Executive arm of government on its own without primary legislation conducted through the two Houses.

As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, we are not asking for anything more; we are just asking for what is in the existing provisions. We are just trying to put it into language that most people would be able to understand and not tie it up in legal knots.

My Lords, is the Minister familiar with Einstein’s theory of relativity? The reason I ask is because if you do the sums, I reckon that there is just over 12 months to go between now and the proposed date of exit from the European Union. We are talking about a three-month consultation period—starting heaven knows when, because we still do not know when the document for the consultation will be launched—then we have perhaps another nine months to pass an environment Bill through Parliament, if it is to be a statutory body, and then perhaps another six months to set up the organisation, fund it and appoint ​the staff. That sounds like a minimum of 18 months to go into 12. But of course, as Einstein pointed out, if you can travel at a speed faster than 186,000 miles per second, you can stretch time, so I hope that the Minister is proposing to invoke Einstein’s theory of relativity in ensuring that the body will be in place by the proposed date of exit.

On Amendments 66, 112 and 113, I simply say that, if the Government are sincere in their stated commitment —as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said—to uphold all the environmental commitments that we are signed up to and to uphold the spirit of the transfer of EU law into UK law, they should have absolutely no hesitation in supporting all these amendments.

I also share the anxiety of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, about whether there will be real welly behind the regulator. I was chief executive of the Environment Agency, the environmental regulator, which had to help negotiate the urban wastewater treatment directive infraction proceedings that produced the Thames tideway. In spite of wanting and willing there to be an example elsewhere in the world of a body established by a Government that is capable of fining its own Government —and hence its own establishing power—I have not been able to find one. I hope, however, that Ministers will look assiduously at producing that result.

Most of our environmental protection today is as a result of being in the EU. Ministers wanting to deliver have been helped to do so by the threat of infraction. So the thing that is missing from all this—although the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, touched on it—is the governance and delivery of the sanction. If it is not delivered, what is the sanction? If it is not money, it will not work.

can the Minister assure the Committee that the new green watchdog will be in place on a statutory basis by exit day?

There is no point in having high aspirations unless you have an effective mechanism to ensure that you deliver. As a member of the European Union, we have been subject to scrutiny and enforcement by the Commission, ultimately through infraction notices. As I pointed out at Second Reading, 46% of the judgments handed down by the European Court of Justice on UK infringements since 2003 related to the environment.The Government have accepted that after Brexit there will be a governance gap and that therefore a new green watchdog will be required to hold the Government to account on their environmental performance. The purpose of Amendments 112 and 113 is to ensure that this new green watchdog is in place by exit day and that it will mirror as closely as possible the current arrangements that we have as a member of the EU.

es decir, formas difusas y casi microbianas e intermitentes de poder.

desde esta perspectiva las organizaciones constituyen conversaciones para la acción. Hay un cierto grado de recurrencia y formalización en estas conversaciones, que Winograd y Flores (1986) caracterizan en términos de actos lingüísticos distintivos. Las organizaciones son redes de compromisos que operan a través de actos lingüísticos, como las promesas y

And, in general, to observe with intelligence & faithfulness all the social relations under which he shall be placed.

instil into them the precepts of virtue & order.

4. The best mode of government for youth in large collections, is certainly a desideratum not yet attained with us

Thecharterincludesnineteenrightsandonesetofduties,whichareimportanttooutline

TheUnitedNationsWorldSummitontheInformationSociety(WSIS),heldinDecember2003inGeneva,iswidelyrecognizedasa‘constitutionforcyberspace.’[52]TheimportanceofWSISisthatitdrawsitsimaginaryforcefromtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(1948)andinstitutesparallelsbetweenthoserightsanddigitalrights.[53]Theorganizationofthesummitandthedeclarationofitsprinciplesweretheresultsofyearsofwork.Itssixty-sevenprincipleshavemoreclausesthanmanyconstitutionsinclude.Itisanambitiousdocument,anditsfirstprincipleaffirm

‘wemakerightsclaimstocriticizepracticeswefindobjectionable,toshedlightoninjustice,tolimitthepowerofgovernment,andtodemandstateaccountabilityandintervention.’

Forus,thisalsomeansthatactsoftruthaffordpossibilitiesofsubversion.Beingasubjectofpowermeansrespondingtothecall‘howshouldone“governoneself”byperformingactionsinwhichoneisoneselftheobjectiveofthoseactions,thedomaininwhichtheyarebroughttobear,theinstrumenttheyemploy,andthesubjectthatacts?’[14]Indescribingthisashisapproach,Foucaultwasclearthatthe‘developmentofadomainofacts,practices,andthoughts’posesaproblemforpolitics.[15]ItisinthisrespectthatweconsidertheInternetinrelationtomyriadacts,practices,andthoughtsthatposeaproblemforthepoliticsofthesubjectincontemporarysocieties.