Polymarket should be seen as “social epistemic tool” useful for the public to get “a view of how important certain events are and what kind of things are likely to happen.”

Through living relations, the world speaks itself. The world becomes its own language for anyone who wishes to listen. [...] In perceiving we always participate in the world, which thus starts to speak. And through speaking we not only resonate to the world, but we actually transform it.

In accord with these different cultural emphases Chinese preschoolers develop theory of mind insights in a different sequence than Western children, Both groups of children understand the diversity of desires first. But Chinese children, unlike Western children consistently understand knowledge acquisition before they understand the diversity of beliefs. (Wellman, et al. 2006; Wellman, et al. 2011).

Deutsch’s index and his ‘facts’, then, seemedto his students to embody a moral value in addition to epistemological utility.

Why%do%I%write?

If you're not 100% sure whether you know how compilers work, then you don't know how they work.

By the way, that quotation indicates one thing that Mario Bunge thinks knowledge is not: namely, knowledge is not what @ctietze has called the collector's fallacy. If you want to know what Bunge thinks knowledge is, I recommend his Epistemology & Methodology I–III, which are volumes 5–7 of Bunge's 8-volume Treatise on Basic Philosophy (in fact, it's 9 books since the third volume of Epistemology & Methodology is two books: parts I and II). See, e.g., Figure 7.3: "A scientific research cycle", on page 252 of Epistemology & Methodology I, Chapter 7, Part 2: "From intuition to method", and subsequent sections.

Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (born 12 January 1946) is an historian of science who comes from Liechtenstein. He was director of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin from 1997 to 2014. His focus areas within the history of science are the history and epistemology of the experiment, and further the history of molecular biology and protein biosynthesis.

“See that bird? It’s a brown-throated thrush, but in Germany it’s called a halzenfugel, and in Chinese they call it a chung ling, and even if you know all those names for it, you still know nothing about the bird. You only know something about people: what they call the bird. Now that thrush sings, and teaches its young to fly, and flies so many miles away during the summer across the country, and nobody knows how it finds its way.”

Conceptual knowledge has a hierarchical structure, with the definition of every concept referring to more fundamental concepts. This leads to the question of where this recursive process ends, i.e. what the most fundamental concepts are. When considering human knowledge as a whole, this is a non-trivial problem in epistemology.

One complicating issue when trying to make sense across multiple communities is that not only do different communities have different cultures and practices, but also different epistemologies: different languages to describe their community and the soci(et)al context it operates in, with often different meanings attached to the terminologies used.

relational epistemology

από τις 53 μελέτες που είχαν υποβληθεί από παραγωγούς της γλυφοσάτης στην EFSA μόλις δύο ήταν επιστημονικά αξιόπιστες με βάση τα διεθνή πρότυπα του ΟΟΣΑ. Οι 34 ήταν μη αξιόπιστες ενώ οι υπόλοιπες 17 μερικά αξιόπιστες.

Σε ό,τι αφορά τις επιστήμες, το σημείο που ειλικρινά με έπληξε διανοητικά είναι το να ακούω -κυρίως από τους γιατρούς- να μιλούν για «την Επιστήμη», στον ενικό. Καθώς και το να βλέπω τους πολιτικούς να σπεύδουν να υιοθετούν αυτόν τον όρο, για παράδειγμα, να ισχυρίζονται, επειδή τους συμφέρει, «εμείς ακούμε την Επιστήμη».

Datafication, the authors argued, involves much more than converting symbolic materialinto digital form, for it is datafication, not digitization, that “made [digital] text indexable andthus searchable”

Η δύναμη της επιστημονικής σκέψης δεν είναι οι απόλυτες βεβαιότητες και οι αλήθειες, αλλά η διαχείριση των λαθών και της εγγενούς αβεβαιότητας της ανθρώπινης σκέψης.

Οι ανθρωπογενείς παρανοήσεις σχετικά με το «αλάνθαστο» και την «αυθεντία» του επιστημονικού λόγου, που εσφαλμένα συγχέονται με τη μεθοδολογική «αντικειμενικότητα» των επιμέρους επιστημών, ίσως αποδειχτούν τα πιο αποφασιστικά εμπόδια για την επαρκή και λιγότερο επώδυνη αντιμετώπιση της νέας επιδημίας.

Οταν δεν συμβαίνει αυτό, όταν δηλαδή οι επιστήμονες αθετούν ή, έστω, παραβλέπουν την αναγκαία μεθοδολογική και διαφωτιστική λειτουργία τους, τότε από ερευνητές της πραγματικότητας μετατρέπονται σε «ειδικούς», που αναλαμβάνουν τον ρόλο -αλλά όχι και την ευθύνη- της επίλυσης διάφορων προβλημάτων τα οποία, ενώ σχετίζονται με την επιστημονική τους αρμοδιότητα, ταυτόχρονα την υπερβαίνουν, λόγω των επιπτώσεων που θα έχουν στη ζωή των ανθρώπων οι «λύσεις» που εισηγούνται.

In autoepistemic logic, which rejects the law of excluded middle, predicates may be true, false, or simply unknown

While propositional logic can only express facts, autoepistemic logic can express knowledge and lack of knowledge about facts.

The autoepistemic logic is a formal logic for the representation and reasoning of knowledge about knowledge.

I may own the truth–with the quicksand waiting to hide me when the words are written.

“At exactly which point in the process does the pebble become magic?” says Mark.

Unlike logicism, probabilism doesn’t require an absolute belief about what the truth of a statement is. However, it does require that any statement actually is either absolutely true or absolutely false. Suppose you want to know if there is any water in the refrigerator. To eliminate uncertainty, you look inside, and there appears to be only an eggplant. Now, is there water in the refrigerator? Well, with probability nearly 1.0, it’s sort of true that there is (in the cells of the eggplant).3 And with probability nearly 1.0, it’s sort of false (you were thirsty and there’s nothing to drink). It’s a rock-bottom principle of the mathematics that the probability of a statement being true and the probability of it being false have to add up to 1.0. (This is a different way of stating the Law of the Excluded Middle.) Here the probabilities of sort-of truth and sort-of falsity add up to nearly 2.0, which is uninterpretable as a probability. The math doesn’t work for sort-of truths.

a long time before I learned to distinguish between the operations of my various senses

A decades-long effort on the right has resulted in a parallel set of institutions meant to encourage tribal epistemology. They mimic the form of mainstream media, think tanks, and the academy, but without the restraint of transpartisan principles. They are designed to advance the interests of the right, to tell stories and produce facts that support the tribe. That is the ultimate goal; the rhetoric and formalisms of critical thinking are retrofit around it.

Lettvin, along with the young neuroscientist Patrick Wall, joined McCulloch and Pitts at their new headquarters in Building 20 on Vassar Street. They posted a sign on the door: Experimental Epistemology.

ew are qualified to give judgment on any work of ar

here is no subject area, no ontologicallyidentifiable domai

healthy skepticismtoward Cartesian doubt

We know by now that there is no GreenwichMean Time in knowledge production in the posthuman era.

For clearly it applies not only to rhetoric, but to all teachmgof tne arts and letters, to everything we call the humanities.

o one, or almost no one, fads to beheve 1n climate chan~Je out of sincere ignorance. Ttiey •choose-to d1sbeheve either for material gain or 1ust to be dicks.

he would extend this to "science" tout court-does not use value-free lan-guage, that value-free language does not exist, and that we cannot posit a purely transparent language devoid of distracting ornament, through which we transact business with pure facts.

epistemological

The issue of disaster, and phases and social change is an important consid­eration since the "what is a disaster?" debate draws directly upon whether disasters are a "social problem," {e.g., Drabek 1989; Kreps and Drabek 1996), part of a "reconstructionist" approach {e.g., Stallings 1991), or part of social change {e.g., Quarantelli 1987a). I do not see these important aspects of these approaches as contradictory. Interestingly, these three approaches reflect the three main theoretical issues of sociology (see Hinkle 1980): social statics {generally associated with functionalism), social change {generally associated with conflict theory), and social emergence{generally associated with symbolic interactionism).

For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.

These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.

Universal consent proves nothing innate. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.

Education as a practice has placed a much higher value on observation and hands-on experience than on scientific evidence, Seidenberg said. "We have to change the culture of education from one based on beliefs to one based on facts."

I told him exactly what I was permitted to tell, and no more.

“Facts?” he repeated. “Take a drop more grog, Mr. Franklin, and you’ll get over the weakness of believing in facts! Foul play, sir!” he continued, dropping his voice confidentially. “That is how I read the riddle. Foul play somewhere–and you and I must find it out. Was there nothing else in the tin case, when you put your hand into it?”

The picture presented of me, by my old friend Betteredge, at the time of my departure from England, is (as I think) a little overdrawn. He has, in his own quaint way, interpreted seriously one of his young mistress’s many satirical references to my foreign education; and has persuaded himself that he actually saw those French, German, and Italian sides to my character, which my lively cousin only professed to discover in jest, and which never had any real existence, except in our good Betteredge’s own brain. But, barring this drawback, I am bound to own that he has stated no more than the truth in representing me as wounded to the heart by Rachel’s treatment, and as leaving England in the first keenness of suffering caused by the bitterest disappointment of my life.

The next thing I have to do, is to present such additional information as I possess on the subject of the Moonstone, or, to speak more correctly, on the subject of the Indian plot to steal the Diamond.

witnessed

Mr. Bruff thinks as I think, that the whole story ought, in the interests of truth, to be placed on record in writing–and the sooner the better.

Actually, no, it hasn't, no matter what the Bunny's sign says. The scientific method is designed specifically to root out bias and false assumptions, including political ones. Sure, individual scientists can be political, but the scientific method is not. Its ideological agnosticism is why it works so well. In fact, the self-correcting nature of science means it is the best source of secular knowledge that humankind possesses.

h

reflection on unconscious values embedded in computing and the practices that it supports can and should be a core principle of technology design

Values in design is an approach to studying sociotechnical systems from the perspective of values, and starts from the assumption that technology is never neutral

Kuhn (1970, p. 167) commented that science education tends to elide the processthrough which knowledge has been constructed, whereas students of other subjectsare exposed to varying interpretations over time. As a result, he suggested, sciencestudents are blind to the history of their subject, seeing it only as unproblematicprogress. The interview data suggest that this is indeed a point of difference betweenthe ‘arts’ and ‘science’ students in this sample. While both of them tend to have adualistic view of science itself, the ‘arts’ students seem to be more at ease with arelativistic view of knowledge in history.

The distinction between hard and soft fieldsrelates to the extent to which knowledge is constructed on the basis of a frameworkof shared assumptions. The pure sciences (hard) typically maintain a degree ofinternal unity over aims, methods of investigation and evaluation criteria, which maycome to be seen as derived from reality itself, rather than constructed by disciplinaryconvention. The humanities and social sciences (soft), in contrast, tend to becharacterized by internal discord, encouraging a view of knowledge as a matter ofinterpretation.

Research suggests that students majoring in hard fields with a high degree ofdisciplinary consensus are more likely to subscribe to beliefs in absolute knowledgethan those majoring in soft fields, and that these beliefs may be encouraged byaspects of the disciplinary context in which they work (Paulsen & Wells, 1998;Schommer-Aikins et al., 2003). Neumann (2001) reviews evidence of disciplinarydifferences in a number of aspects of teaching and learning, noting that soft disci-plines tend to emphasize critical thinking, oral and written expression, and analysisand synthesis of course content, while hard disciplines tend to emphasize skills indealing with facts and figures, with little writing required beyond the exposition ofexperimental results. In a large-scale undergraduate survey Entwistle and Tait(1995) found that students’ learning styles varied between different disciplines in linewith the demands of their course. Students of science and economics, for example,were more likely to use surface strategies, perhaps encouraged by assessmentpatterns that emphasized the reproduction of facts. In contrast, markers in historyand English were likely to penalize a reproducing orientation and a serialist (listing)style (Entwistle & Tait, 1995, p. 96).

Such tutor comments suggest that ‘science’ students are less ready to criticallyevaluate source material, a feature that can be related to the tendency already notedin their writing to downplay the role of human interpretation in the construction ofknowledge

They are also rooted in the understanding that what we count as knowledge, what we ask questions about, and how we answer those questions are not value-free; people benefit and suffer, differentially based on their positionality, as a result of these decisions.

Finally, the sophisticated contextual approach circles back around to unite the two previous categories, in a way. From this approach knowledge is seen as created by individuals to serve a purpose. What is true depends on evidence and a given context. There are authorities, but they are not absolute. Knowledge is always changing and you come to know by creating knowledge, collecting the most up-to-date and appropriate evidence.

In the subjective approach, the individual recognizes that not all knowledge is absolute but takes it to a position that there is no authority, knowledge depends entirely on what works for each individual. In the subjective approach the stance is often “If I believe something, it is true for me. You can believe something different, and that’s true for you.” Knowing comes from personal experience.

The simplistic and absolute approach is an outlook where knowledge is simple: there is a right and wrong. There is a Truth. Knowledge comes from some official authority, and you come to know when that authority transmits the information to you.

In talking back to something through annotation are we not inherently questioning some authority, immediately pushing ourselves out of an absolute stance?

conversing with an author

you come to know by creating knowledge

he never deceives himself but when he neglects to return back to nature

Read As We May Think again

those who know