A real estate developer is interested in building a high rise apartment complex near an urban Ivy League university. To ensure the success of the project, a market research firm is hired to conduct focus groups with current students. Students are segmented by academic year (freshman, upper classmen, graduate studies) and amount of financial aid received. Study participants are given a series of index cards. Each card has 6 attributes to describe the potential building project (proximity to campus, cost, telecommunication packages, laundry options, floor plans, and security features offered). The estimated cost to construct the building described on each card is equivalent. Participants are asked to order the cards from least to most appealing. This forced ranking exercise will indirectly reveal the participants' priorities and preferences. Multi-variate regression analysis may be used to determine the strength of preferences across target market segments.

higgledy-piggledy

Meanwhile, in his Rhetoric (1367a) he defines a free man (eleutheros) as a masterless person who needs obey no one because he does not depend on having to produce or sell anything.

Well, this whole thing was cleared up by the logician Tarski, I guess, and some others, mayb e Russell or Peano. Anyhow, what you do is, you write down the axioms of your theory in a formal language with a given list of symb ols or alphab et. Then you write down the hyp othesis of your theorem in the same symb olism. Then you show that you can transform the hyp othesis step by step, using the rules of logic, till you get the conclusion. That's a pro of. Student : Really? That's amazing! I've taken elementary and ad- vanced calculus, basic algebra, and top ology, and I've never seen that done. I:M: : Oh, of course no one ever really do es it. It would take forever! You just show that you could do it, that's sucient.

The limit of any property rights that can be claimed in this manner are defined in the ‘Lockean Proviso’ which states that the aforementioned process of establishing private property only operates “when there is enoug h, and as good, left in common for others” (Bogart, 1985, p. 828; Locke, 1690, Chap. V, Sect. 27).

Indeed, the object, or res, of intellectual property may be so new that it is unknown to anyone else.

A universal definition of intellectual property might begin by identifying it as nonphysical property which stems from, is identified as, and whose value is based upon some idea or ideas. Furthermore, there must be some additional element of novelty. Indeed, the object, or res, of intellectual property may be so new that it is unknown to anyone else. The novelty, however, does not have to be absolute. What is important is that at the time of propertization the idea is thought to be generally unknown. The re

Res [Latin, A thing.] An object, a subject matter, or a status against which legal proceedings have been instituted. For example, in a suit involving a captured ship, the seized vessel is the res, and proceedings of this nature are said to be in rem. Res, however, does not always refer to tangible Personal Property. In matrimonial actions, for example, the res is the marital status of the parties.

Citators- A set of books and online sources that provide the subsequent judicial history and interpretation of reported cases or lists of cases and legislative enactments construing, applying, or affecting statutes. In America, the most widely used citators are Shepard's citations and Keycite.

In addition, the results imply that there is a lack of awareness about the importance of metadata among the scientific community –at least in practice– which is a serious problem as their involvement is quite crucial in dealing with problems regarding data management.

Lived Experience: A term used to describe individuals who have lived through the experience of being given a mental health diagnosis, extreme states, trauma, being a 'client' or 'consumer' within the mental health system, and so on. It is meant to be an open term that includes a variety of experiences and allows individuals to self-identify the labels and language they do or don't want to use for themselves.

We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual

Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things.

It is this way with all of us concerning language; we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things--metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities.

The "thing in itself" (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors.

What is a word? It is the copy in sound of a nerve stimulus.

to wit, that which shall count as "truth" from now on is established. That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth. For the contrast between truth and lie arises here for the first time. The liar is a person who uses the valid designations, the wo rds, in order to make something which is unreal appear to be real.

but we do know of countless individualized and consequently unequal actions which we equate by omitting the aspects in which they are unequal and which we now designate as "honest" actions.

and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things--metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities

first laws of truth

sabbee

Here Quintilian says that the dialecti-cians lay claim to invention and judgment (which contains a large part of arrangement in the con-clusions of each argument and in syllogisms). And finally in the second chapter of the eleventh book he says that if memory belongs to any art, then it belongs completely to arrangement and order. Therefore he should say that the dialecticians could rightly claim this part also, because in dialectic that has been rightly described, one should teach the truest theory of order and ar-rangement according to the precepts of the syl-logism and method.

In the third chapter rhetoric is separated into five parts: invention, arrangement, style, mem-ory, delivery. I am now not at all surprised that Quintilian is so bereft of dialectic in this division, for he was unable to recognize that here he h is confused dialectic itself with rhetoric, since in-vention, arrangement, and memory belong to di-alectic and only style and delivery to rhetoric. Indeed, Quintilian's reason for dividing rhetoric into these five parts derived from the same single source of error as did the causes of the previous confusion. The orator, says Quintilian, cannot be perfected without virtue, without grammar, with-out mathematics, and without philosophy. There-fore, one must define the nature of the orator from all these subjects. The grammarian, the same man says, cannot be complete without mu-sic, astrology, philosophy, rhetoric, and history. Consequently there are two parts of grammar, methodology and literary interpretation. As a re-sult Quintilian now finally reasons that rhetoric cannot exist unless the subject matter is first of all discovered, next arranged, then embellished ' and finally committed to memory and delivered. Thus these are the five parts of rhetoric.

wretchedly spent on false conjectures about these disciplines?

Maecenas

invention is a process which supplies arguments, whereas arrangement is a different process which organizes arguments.

dialectic, that is to the natural use of reason

But these points may perhaps be left to the consideration of those who think that the substance of eloquence lies in the power to persuade. But if eloquence be the art of speaking well (the definition which I adopt), so that a true orator must be, above all, a good man, it must assuredly be acknowledged that it is a useful art.

oratory is the art of speaking well

that oratory is the art of speaking well, since when the best definition is found, he who seeks for another must seek for a worse

With this character of it, the definition that oratory is the science of speaking well agrees excellently, for it embraces all the virtues of oratory at once and includes also the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well unless he be a good man

The most common definition therefore is that oratory is the power of persuading. What I call a power, some call a faculty and others a talent, but that this discrepancy may be attended with no ambiguity, I mean by "power" δύναμις (dynamis). 4. This opinion had its origin from Isocrates, if the treatise on the art which is in circulation under his name is really his. That rhetorician, though he had none of the feelings of those who defame the business of the orator, gives too rash a definition of the art when he says, "That rhetoric is the "worker of persuasion," πειθοῦς δημιουργός (peithous dēmiourgos), for I shall not allow myself to use the peculiar term that Ennius applies to Marcus Cethegus, suadae medulla, "marrow of persuasion." 5. In Plato too, Gorgias, in the dialogue inscribed with his name, says almost the same thing, but Plato wishes it to be received as the opinion of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero, in several passages of his writings, has said that the duty of an orator is to speak in a way adapted to persuade. 6. In his books on rhetoric also, but with which, doubtless, he was not satisfied, he makes the end of eloquence to be persuasion.

Rhetoric, then, (for we shall henceforth use this term without dread of sarcastic objections) will be best divided, in my opinion, in such a manner that we may speak first of the art, next of the artist, and then of the work. The art will be that which ought to be attained by study and is the knowledge how to speak well. The artificer is he who has thoroughly acquired the art, that is, the orator, whose business is to speak well. The work is what is achieved by the artificer, that is, good speaking. All these are to be considered under special heads, but of the particulars that are to follow, I shall speak in their several places; at present I shall proceed to consider what is to be said on the first general head.

or oratoria will be taken in the same sense as elocutoria, oratrix as elocutrix, but the word rhētorikē, of which we are speaking, is the same sort of word as eloquentia, and it is doubtless used in two senses by the Greeks. 3. In one acceptation, it is an adjective, ars rhetorica, as navis piratica: in the other a substantive, like philosophia or amicitia.

We must not, therefore, start from any and every accepted opinion, but only from those we have defined -- those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority they recognize

(b) they invest a speech with moral character.

make his audience feel

A maxim is a general statement about questions of practical conduct. It is an incomplete enthymeme. Four kinds of maxims. Maxims should be used (a) by elderly men, and (b) to controvert popular sayings. Advantages of maxims: (a) they enable a speaker to gratify his commonplace hearers by expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they themselves hold about particular cases; (b) they invest a speech with moral character.

Four faults of prose style, with illustrative examples: (1) misuse of compound words; (2) employment of strange words; (3) long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets; (4) inappropriate metaphors.

the right thing in speaking really is that we should fight our case with no help beyong the bare facts; and yet the arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, whatever it is we have to expound to others

powers of persuasion most of all enhanced by a knowledge

Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future. Of destructive or painful evils only; for there are some evils, e.g. wickedness or stupidity, the prospect of which does not frighten us: I mean only such as amount to great pains or losses.

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.

We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites.

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees.

It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion.

But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art.

Definition of pleasure, and analysis of things pleasant. -- The motives for wrongdoing, viz. advantage and pleasure, have thus been discussed in chapters 6, 7, 11.

enthymeme

Definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.

we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish.

who devote themselves to disputation,(2) since they pretend to search for truth, but straightway at the beginning of their professions attempt to deceive us with lies?

Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.

GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.

Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth

SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end.

art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion

it is not an art at all, in my opinion

Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.

that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion

Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?

rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion

rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust

libido