297 Matching Annotations
  1. Jan 2021
    1. While there are always going to be cases where one is more appropriate than the other, border-bottom offers much more precise control over text-decoration and is therefore probably the preferred method. Here's a quick (likely not exhaustive) list of properties that border-bottom can control/enable that text-decoration cannot:
  2. Dec 2020
  3. Nov 2020
    1. logInfoToStdOut (boolean) (default=false) This is important if you read from stdout or stderr and for proper error handling. The default value ensures that you can read from stdout e.g. via pipes or you use webpack -j to generate json output.
  4. jct.lucidrhino.design jct.lucidrhino.design
    1. The heart of the JCT Charity is to restore dignity to those who have lost all. To show respect to all, (especially those who have little self-respect), and to hod out that helping hand. Never have people felt so isolated as now. Being heard is an important part of building ‘community’. Many we seek to help can’t speak English for example. JCT aims to give a voice to those who have not had one and to help them to interact and contribute again.

      Text needs editing to:

      The heart of JCT Charity is to restore dignity to those who have lost all. To show respect to all, and to hold out that helping hand to those in crisis of some kind. Never have people felt so isolated as now. Being heard is an important part of this. Many we seek to help can’t speak English for example. JCT aims to help people interact and contribute again.

    2. Many have said that COVID-19 has brought communities together. Neighborhoods have risen to the challenge of helping each other out in really practical ways, food banks have emerged, street Whatsapp groups popped up everywhere and friends doing each other’s shopping. And yet isolation and personal crisis are to be found everywhere. JCT sees the need to make an impact in these times, allowing connection, enabling a dialogue, joining communities together. For us Covid has forced us to close many of our previous services especially drop-ins for people who were homeless or in need. This crisis forced us to work in a more focused way, one to one, with many of our clients concentrationg of getting housing and funds for those in the greatest need. What we found was that we were able to make a greater difference to those we were able to work with over this time, and from this JCT were able to fashion a new, highly effective, method of casework. The lockdown has helped us identify a specific way to help in this time of great need.

      Copy needs editing to:

      During the pandemic, Jesus Centre staff are collaborating and are working diligently to adapt existing services and develop new projects for people in social and economic hardship. Our plan is to channel our resources where they are most needed and to continue to support the homeless, elderly and refugees who are struggling even more throughout the Coronavirus pandemic

  5. Oct 2020
    1. "Most Native Americans did not neatly distinguish between the natural and the supernatural. Spiritual power permeated their world and was both tangible and accessible"

      This shows how much more open Natives were to the super Naturaul unlike the Europeans who were more than likely christians.

    2. my first question: is what do they mean exactly by "kinship"?

      My second question is: what does the reading mean by Chiefdoms?

    3. "Food surpluses enabled significant population growth, and the Pacific Northwest became one of the most densely populated regions of North America"

      This is significant because it shows how succesful the natives were before the Europeans showed up and spread native European diseases to Natives.

    1. I don’t think the right answer is to use something like the Mnemonic medium to memorize a cookbook’s contents. I think a likelier model is: each time you see a recipe, there’s some chance it’ll trigger an actionable “ooh, I want to make this!”, dependent on seasonality, weather, what else you’ve been cooking recently, etc. A more effective cookbook might simply resurface recipes intermittently over time, creating more opportunities for a good match: e.g. a weekly email with 5-10 cooking ideas, perhaps with some accompanying narrative. Ideally, the cookbook would surface seasonally-appropriate recipes. Seasonality would make the experience of “reading” a cookbook extend over the course of a year—a Timeful text.

      Indigenous peoples not only used holidays and other time-based traditions as a means of spaced repetition, but they also did them for just this purpose of time-based need. Winter's here and the harvest changes? Your inter-tribal rituals went over your memory palace for just those changes. Songs and dances recalled older dishes and recopies that hadn't been made in months and brought them into a new rotation.

      Anthropologists have collected examples of this specific to hunting seasons and preparations of the hunt in which people would prepare for the types of game they would encounter. Certainly they did this for feast times and seasonal diets as well. Indians in the Americas are documenting having done things like this for planting corn and keeping their corn varieties pure over hundreds of years.

  6. Sep 2020
    1. 19 Now the Lord God had formed out of the ground all the wild animals(AA) and all the birds in the sky.(AB) He brought them to the man to see what he would name them; and whatever the man called(AC) each living creature,(AD) that was its name. 20 So the man gave names to all the livestock, the birds in the sky and all the wild animals.

      God had given Adam the responsibility to name all living creatures on Earth after the first days of creation. In Ursula K. Le Guin’s “She Unnames Them”, the idea of how labels or given names could take away from “personal choice” and “freedom” was explored throughout the text. Instead of believing that humans are above animals and living creatures, Buddhists view animals as very sacred beings and are to be shown with respect and to never be harmed. They also believe that humans can be reborn as animals, all interconnected within one another, supporting their beliefs of showing extreme care towards animals and allowing them to live freely.

    2. When the woman saw that the fruit of the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable(AT) for gaining wisdom, she took some and ate it.

      Despite being told by God that she and her husband were not allowed to eat the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, Eve gave into her temptations. The idea of the "forbidden fruit" has been carried into other pieces of literature, using an apple to symbolize a character's temptation leading to downfall.

      For example, in the fairy tale, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, when Snow White eats the poisoned apple, offered by the evil witch, who parallels the serpent, she falls into a death-like sleep.

  7. Aug 2020
  8. Jul 2020
    1. Because the Web IDE is based on the Monaco Editor, you can find a more complete list of supported languages in the Monaco languages repository. Under the hood, Monaco uses the Monarch library for syntax highlighting.
  9. Jun 2020
  10. May 2020
    1. Once running, kaniko will then get the data from STDIN and create the build context as a compressed tar. It will then unpack the compressed tar of the build context before starting the image build.
    1. Pipes are great for taking output of one command and transforming it using other commands like jq. They’re a key part of the Unix philosophy of “small sharp tools”: since commands can be chained together with pipes, each command only needs to do one thing and then hand it off to another command.
  11. Apr 2020
    1. Python contributed examples¶ Mic VAD Streaming¶ This example demonstrates getting audio from microphone, running Voice-Activity-Detection and then outputting text. Full source code available on https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech-examples. VAD Transcriber¶ This example demonstrates VAD-based transcription with both console and graphical interface. Full source code available on https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech-examples.
    1. Python API Usage example Edit on GitHub Python API Usage example¶ Examples are from native_client/python/client.cc. Creating a model instance and loading model¶ 115 ds = Model(args.model) Performing inference¶ 149 150 151 152 153 154 if args.extended: print(metadata_to_string(ds.sttWithMetadata(audio, 1).transcripts[0])) elif args.json: print(metadata_json_output(ds.sttWithMetadata(audio, 3))) else: print(ds.stt(audio)) Full source code
    1. DeepSpeech is an open source Speech-To-Text engine, using a model trained by machine learning techniques based on Baidu's Deep Speech research paper. Project DeepSpeech uses Google's TensorFlow to make the implementation easier. NOTE: This documentation applies to the 0.7.0 version of DeepSpeech only. Documentation for all versions is published on deepspeech.readthedocs.io. To install and use DeepSpeech all you have to do is: # Create and activate a virtualenv virtualenv -p python3 $HOME/tmp/deepspeech-venv/ source $HOME/tmp/deepspeech-venv/bin/activate # Install DeepSpeech pip3 install deepspeech # Download pre-trained English model files curl -LO https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech/releases/download/v0.7.0/deepspeech-0.7.0-models.pbmm curl -LO https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech/releases/download/v0.7.0/deepspeech-0.7.0-models.scorer # Download example audio files curl -LO https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech/releases/download/v0.7.0/audio-0.7.0.tar.gz tar xvf audio-0.7.0.tar.gz # Transcribe an audio file deepspeech --model deepspeech-0.7.0-models.pbmm --scorer deepspeech-0.7.0-models.scorer --audio audio/2830-3980-0043.wav A pre-trained English model is available for use and can be downloaded using the instructions below. A package with some example audio files is available for download in our release notes.
    1. Library for performing speech recognition, with support for several engines and APIs, online and offline. Speech recognition engine/API support: CMU Sphinx (works offline) Google Speech Recognition Google Cloud Speech API Wit.ai Microsoft Bing Voice Recognition Houndify API IBM Speech to Text Snowboy Hotword Detection (works offline) Quickstart: pip install SpeechRecognition. See the “Installing” section for more details. To quickly try it out, run python -m speech_recognition after installing. Project links: PyPI Source code Issue tracker Library Reference The library reference documents every publicly accessible object in the library. This document is also included under reference/library-reference.rst. See Notes on using PocketSphinx for information about installing languages, compiling PocketSphinx, and building language packs from online resources. This document is also included under reference/pocketsphinx.rst.
    1. Running the example code with python Run like this: cd vosk-api/python/example wget https://github.com/alphacep/kaldi-android-demo/releases/download/2020-01/alphacep-model-android-en-us-0.3.tar.gz tar xf alphacep-model-android-en-us-0.3.tar.gz mv alphacep-model-android-en-us-0.3 model-en python3 ./test_simple.py test.wav To run with your audio file make sure it has proper format - PCM 16khz 16bit mono, otherwise decoding will not work. You can find other examples of using a microphone, decoding with a fixed small vocabulary or speaker identification setup in python/example subfolder
    2. Vosk is a speech recognition toolkit. The best things in Vosk are: Supports 8 languages - English, German, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, Russian, Vietnamese. More to come. Works offline, even on lightweight devices - Raspberry Pi, Android, iOS Installs with simple pip3 install vosk Portable per-language models are only 50Mb each, but there are much bigger server models available. Provides streaming API for the best user experience (unlike popular speech-recognition python packages) There are bindings for different programming languages, too - java/csharp/javascript etc. Allows quick reconfiguration of vocabulary for best accuracy. Supports speaker identification beside simple speech recognition.
    3. Kaldi API for offline speech recognition on Android, iOS, Raspberry Pi and servers with Python, Java, C# and Node
    1. import all the necessary libraries into our notebook. LibROSA and SciPy are the Python libraries used for processing audio signals. import os import librosa #for audio processing import IPython.display as ipd import matplotlib.pyplot as plt import numpy as np from scipy.io import wavfile #for audio processing import warnings warnings.filterwarnings("ignore") view raw modules.py hosted with ❤ by GitHub View the code on <a href="https://gist.github.com/aravindpai/eb40aeca0266e95c128e49823dacaab9">Gist</a>. Data Exploration and Visualization Data Exploration and Visualization helps us to understand the data as well as pre-processing steps in a better way. 
    2. TensorFlow recently released the Speech Commands Datasets. It includes 65,000 one-second long utterances of 30 short words, by thousands of different people. We’ll build a speech recognition system that understands simple spoken commands. You can download the dataset from here.
    3. In the 1980s, the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) was applied to the speech recognition system. HMM is a statistical model which is used to model the problems that involve sequential information. It has a pretty good track record in many real-world applications including speech recognition.  In 2001, Google introduced the Voice Search application that allowed users to search for queries by speaking to the machine.  This was the first voice-enabled application which was very popular among the people. It made the conversation between the people and machines a lot easier.  By 2011, Apple launched Siri that offered a real-time, faster, and easier way to interact with the Apple devices by just using your voice. As of now, Amazon’s Alexa and Google’s Home are the most popular voice command based virtual assistants that are being widely used by consumers across the globe. 
    4. Learn how to Build your own Speech-to-Text Model (using Python) Aravind Pai, July 15, 2019 Login to Bookmark this article (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); Overview Learn how to build your very own speech-to-text model using Python in this article The ability to weave deep learning skills with NLP is a coveted one in the industry; add this to your skillset today We will use a real-world dataset and build this speech-to-text model so get ready to use your Python skills!
    1. One can imagine that this whole process may be computationally expensive. In many modern speech recognition systems, neural networks are used to simplify the speech signal using techniques for feature transformation and dimensionality reduction before HMM recognition. Voice activity detectors (VADs) are also used to reduce an audio signal to only the portions that are likely to contain speech. This prevents the recognizer from wasting time analyzing unnecessary parts of the signal.
    2. Most modern speech recognition systems rely on what is known as a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). This approach works on the assumption that a speech signal, when viewed on a short enough timescale (say, ten milliseconds), can be reasonably approximated as a stationary process—that is, a process in which statistical properties do not change over time.
    3. The first component of speech recognition is, of course, speech. Speech must be converted from physical sound to an electrical signal with a microphone, and then to digital data with an analog-to-digital converter. Once digitized, several models can be used to transcribe the audio to text.
    4. How speech recognition works, What packages are available on PyPI; and How to install and use the SpeechRecognition package—a full-featured and easy-to-use Python speech recognition library.
    5. The Ultimate Guide To Speech Recognition With Python
    1. there is also strong encouragement to make code re-usable, shareable, and citable, via DOI or other persistent link systems. For example, GitHub projects can be connected with Zenodo for indexing, archiving, and making them easier to cite alongside the principles of software citation [25].
      • Teknologi Github dan Gitlab fokus kepada modus teks yang dapat dengan mudah dikenali dan dibaca mesin/komputer (machine readable).

      • Saat ini text mining adalah teknologi utama yang berkembang cepat. Machine learning tidak akan jalan tanpa bahan baku dari teknologi text mining.

      • Oleh karenanya, jurnal-jurnal terutama terbitan LN sudah lama memiliki dua versi untuk setiap makalah yang dirilis, yaitu versi PDF (yang sebenarnya tidak berbeda dengan kertas zaman dulu) dan versi HTML (ini bisa dibaca mesin).

      • Pengolah kata biner seperti Ms Word sangat bergantung kepada teknologi perangkat lunak (yang dimiliki oleh entitas bisnis). Tentunya kode-kode untuk membacanya akan dikunci.

      • Bahkan PDF yang dianggap sebagai cara termudah dan teraman untuk membagikan berkas, juga tidak dapat dibaca oleh mesin dengan mudah.

    1. Its superior not because its faster, nor because there are shortcuts for you to do things, but because you can make shortcuts to do things.
  12. Mar 2020
    1. Thisprovidesthestudentwithanexperienceakintosittingnexttotheinstructorinhisorherofficewhilegoingthroughtheassignment

      Equivalent but not identical

    2. Anumberofstudieshavedemonstratedthebenefitsofvoicefeedbackforstudents.Butfacultyneednotstopthere.Theproliferationofinexpensivescreencastingsoftwaremakesiteasyforfacultytodeliverscreencastedfeedbacktostudents

      so there is evidence of the benefits of voice feedback and now that it is more readily available, instructors should use it more often.

    1. That is, we are members of the same species.

      This is true but it used to be false. Biologists (Linnaeus) grouped different races into different species. That false classification still has modern-day ramifications.

  13. Feb 2020
  14. Dec 2019
    1. Your task list is a plain text file, not some proprietary format owned by a company or locked to a specific application.
    2. A simple and timeless format Plain text is the simplest file format there is. It will always be accessible, by some kind of application, forever.
    1. The beauty of using Google Sheets or another spreadsheet tool for your to do list is that you have so many formatting options. Sometimes I change the color of a cell to indicate that it's high priority. Other times I bold it. And other times I just write IMPORTANT in front of it. Whatever works. But if you like to be more consistent, you can choose colors to indicate specific things: priority, level of effort, type of tasks, or anything else you want to be able to see at a glance. For example, I always highlight a row in blue if I'm going to be out of the office. That way, I don't overschedule the week. And I highlight a row in red if it's a non-negotiable—something I have to do the day it's scheduled because of an external deadline. And because you have text formatting options—which many to do lists don't—you can make your formatting as granular as you'd like. Bold certain types of tasks, italicize others, or even add a border around cells. Whatever stands out to you visually, go with that

      Free-form text formatting has its pros and its cons.

      Pros: It's very flexible. Since it's free-form, you can ad hoc make any new system you want, and designate, say, bold or blue to mean whatever you want it to.

      Cons: No way to enforce the rules you made for yourself. In fact, it may be hard to even remember the rules you made for yourself. You may have to create a key/legend for yourself to be safe.

      This is like why I dislike software where the only way to change font is to manually choose a font. I like it better when you can define a style/class (I think Word can do this, IIRC; and obviously HTML/CSS can), choose how that class should be formatted (font, etc.) and then can style any text with that class. This is a better way to go because classes have semantic meaning. This is the same dilemma I remember facing ~10 years ago when WYM editor was fairly new: It let you select use semantic classes/elements, whereas WYSIWIG editors were the norm (probably still are) and only let you do manual free-form formatting, with no semantic meaning conveyed.

  15. plaintext-productivity.net plaintext-productivity.net
    1. Plaintext files are tiny, simple, quick to work with, editable by tons of great programs, searchable by all modern operating systems, easy to back up, perfect for versioning, trivial to sync between devices, and are amazingly flexible in their uses and formats.
    2. In this system, plaintext files are used for most of the backbone of your organizational system.
    1. You're not going to find many checkboxes, drop-downs, reminders, or date pickers here.

      Thankfully, some clients like https://github.com/QTodoTxt/QTodoTxt2 do have nice features like autocomplete, and date pickers.

    2. Countless productivity apps and sites store your tasks in their own proprietary database and file format. But you can work with your todo.txt file in every text editor ever made, regardless of operating system or vendor.
  16. burnsoftware.wordpress.com burnsoftware.wordpress.com
    1. made to work alongside the various plain-text, Dropbox syncing mobile notes apps such as Denote for Android and Jottings for iPhone from an app for the Ubuntu desktop. Plain text notes anywhere you want. Easily synced between your desktop and phone. Notes, plain and simple.
  17. burnsoftware.wordpress.com burnsoftware.wordpress.com
    1. Future proofs your journal entries by saving them as plain text and organizing them as you go. This means you can read or create entries when you don’t have DayJournal.
    1. The file contents should be human-readable without requiring any tools other than a plain text viewer or editor.
    2. A user can manipulate the file contents in a plain text editor in sensible, expected ways. For example, a text editor that can sort lines alphabetically should be able to sort your task list in a meaningful way.
    3. Plain text is software and operating system agnostic. It's searchable, portable, lightweight, and easily manipulated. It's unstructured. It works when someone else's web server is down or your Outlook .PST file is corrupt. There's no exporting and importing, no databases or tags or flags or stars or prioritizing or insert company name here-induced rules on what you can and can't do with it.
  18. Nov 2019
    1. were the peoples of the world to grasp the true significance of the words of God, they would never be deprived of their portion of the ocean of His bounty

      Bounty comes from understanding the words. The Revelation is, firstly, the words (and the spiritual energy they contain).

    1. Author Douglas Lieberman provides insights into how to use text to improve learning. Suggestions for type of text, volume of text, animations, and graphics are discussed to maximize their usefulness and convey information to learners and/or facilitate discussion among learners. Rating: 6/10

  19. Oct 2019
  20. Sep 2019
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  21. Aug 2019
    1. Reading development involves a range of complex language-underpinnings including awareness of speech sounds (phonology), spelling patterns (orthography), word meaning (semantics), grammar (syntax) and patterns of word formation (morphology), all of which provide a necessary platform for reading fluency and comprehension.

      When thinking of literacy many people are just thinking of reading and being able to understand language. But there is so much more to being literate in a language.

    2. The key to literacy is reading development, a progression of skills which begins with the ability to understand spoken words and decode written words, and which culminates in the deep understanding of text.

      This is a focus on text in literacy.

    1. When an assignment to some particular “towards-this” has been thus circumspectively aroused, we catch sight of the “towards-this” itself, and along with it everything connected with the work—the whole ‘work-shop’—as that wherein concern always dwells. The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself.

      Heidegger: lighting of the the "work-shop" ||

    2. A. The Concept of Phenomenon H. 29 The Greek expression φαινόμενον, to which the term ‘phenomenon’ goes back, is derived from the verb φαίνεσθαι, which signifies “to show itself”. Thus φαινόμενον means that which shows itself, the manifest [das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare]. φαίνεσθαι itself is a middle-voiced form which comes from φαίνω—to bring to the light of day, to put in the light. Φαίνω comes from the stem φα—, like φῶς, the light, that which is bright—in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself. Thus we must keep in mind that the expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Accordingly the φαινόμενα or ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light—what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with τὰ ὄντα (entities). Now an entity can show itself from itself [von ihm selbst her] in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not. When it shows itself in this way, it ‘looks like something or other’ [“sieht”… “so aus wie…”]. This kind of showing-itself is what we call “seeming” [Scheinen]. Thus in Greek too the expression φαινόμενον (“phenomenon”) signifies that which looks like something, that which is ‘semblant’, ‘semblance’ [das “Scheinbare”, der “Schein”]. Φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν means something good which looks like, but ‘in actuality’ is not, what it gives itself out to be. If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon, everything depends on our seeing how what is designated in the first signification of φαινόμενον (‘phenomenon’ as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second (‘phenomenon’ as semblance) are structurally interconnected. Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself—that is, of being a phenomenon—can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it ‘merely look like so-and-so’. When φαινόμενον signifies ‘semblance’, the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded. We shall allot the term ‘phenomenon’ to this positive and primordial signification of φαινόμενον, and distinguish “phenomenon” from “semblance”, which is the privative modification of “phenomenon” as thus defined. But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all to do with what is called an ‘appearance’, or still less a ‘mere appearance’.22

      Heidegger: "The Concept of Phenomenon" ||

    3. The work produced refers not only to the “towards-which” of its usability and the “whereof” of which it consists: under simple craft conditions it also has an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it. The work is cut to his figure; he ‘is’ there along with it as the work emerges. Even when goods are produced by the dozen, this constitutive assignment is by no means lacking; it is merely indefinite, and points to the random, the average.

      Heidegger: craftsman's "work is cut to his figure; he ‘is’ there along with it as the work emerges" ||

    4. Proximally and for the most part, de-severing69 is a circumspective bringing-close—bringing something close by, in the sense of procuring it, putting it in readiness, having it to hand. But certain ways in which entities are discovered in a purely cognitive manner also have the character of bringing them close. In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness. All the ways in which we speed things up, as we are more or less compelled to do today, push us on towards the conquest of remoteness. With the ‘radio’, for example, Dasein has so expanded its everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the ‘world’—a de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized.

      Heidegger: radio and the "conquest of remoteness" ||

    5. The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zurückzuziehen] in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves [die Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered.12

      Heidegger: "The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered" ||

    6. The upshot of this is that if in our analysis of dealings we aim at that which is dealt with, then one’s existent Being alongside the entities with which one concerns oneself must be given an orientation not towards some isolated item of equipment which is ready-to-hand, but towards the equipmental totality. This way of taking what is dealt with, is forced upon us also if we consider that character of Being which belongs distinctively to equipment that is ready-to-hand—namely, involvement.xvii We understand the term “involvement” ontologically. The kind of talk in which we say that something has with it an involvement in something, is not meant to establish a fact ontically, but rather to indicate the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand. The relational character of involvement—of its ‘with… in…’—suggests that “an” equipment is ontologically impossible. Of course just a solitary item of equipment may be ready-to-hand while another is missing. But this makes known to us that the very thing that is ready-to-hand belongs to something else. Our concernful dealings can let what is ready-to-hand be encountered circumspectively only if in these dealings we already understand something like the involvement which something has in something. The Being-alongside which discovers circumspectively in concern, amounts to letting something be involved—that is, to projecting an involvement understandingly. Letting things be involved makes up the existential structure of concern. But concern, as Being alongside something, belongs to the essential constitution of care; and care, in turn, is grounded in temporality. If all this is so, then the existential condition of the possibility of letting things be involved must be sought in a mode of the temporalizing of temporality.

      Heidegger: ontological meaning of "involvement" || Return to the claim that "'an' equipment is ontologically impossible"

    7. The context of assignments or references, which, as significance, is constitutive for worldhood, can be taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations. But one must note that in such formalizations the phenomena get levelled off so much that their real phenomenal content may be lost, especially in the case of such ‘simple’ relationships as those which lurk in significance.

      Heidegger: context of reference and the 'leveling' of phenomena ||

    8. Regions are not first formed by things which are present-at-hand together; they always are ready-to-hand already in individual places. Places themselves either get allotted to the ready-to-hand in the circumspection of concern, or we come across them. Thus anything constantly ready-to-hand of which circumspective Being-in-the-world takes account beforehand, has its place. The “where” of its readiness-to-hand is put to account as a matter for concern, and oriented towards the rest of what is ready-to-hand. Thus the sun, whose light and warmth are in everyday use, has its own places—sunrise, midday, sunset, midnight; these are discovered in circumspection and treated distinctively in terms of changes in the usability of what the sun bestows. Here we have something which is ready-to-hand with uniform constancy, although it keeps changing; its places become accentuated ‘indicators’ of the regions which lie in them. These celestial regions, which need not have any geographical meaning as yet, provide the “whither” beforehand for every63 special way of giving form to the regions which places can occupy. The house has its sunny side and its shady side; the way it is divided up into ‘rooms’ [“Räume”] is oriented towards these, and so is the ‘arrangement’ [“Einrichtung”] within them, according to their character as equipment. Churches and graves, for instance, are laid out according to the rising and the setting of the sun—the regions of life and death, which are determinative for Dasein itself with regard to its ownmost possibilities of Being in the world. Dasein, in its very Being, has this Being as an issue; and its concern discovers beforehand those regions in which some involvement is decisive. This discovery of regions beforehand is co-determined [mitbestimmt] by the totality of involvements for which the ready-to-hand, as something encountered, is freed. The readiness-to-hand which belongs to any such region beforehand has the character of inconspicuous familiarity, and it has it in an even more primordial sense than does the Being of the ready-to-hand.64

      Heidegger: "inconspicuous familiarity" of the "region" || familiarity of mind maps / infographics

    9. The psychological Interpretation according to which the “I” has something ‘in the memory’ [“im Gedächtnis”] is at bottom a way of alluding to the existentially constitutive state of Being-in-the-world.

      Heidegger: inwardness of memory ["Gedächtnis"] as an allusion to "Being-in-the-world" ||

    10. Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially ‘something in-order-to…’ [“etwas um-zu…”]. A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the ‘in-order-to’, such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability.

      Heidegger: "Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment" || c.f. Enframing

    11. Αἴσθησις, the sheer sensory perception of something, is ‘true’ in the Greek sense, and indeed more primordially than the λόγος which we have been discussing. Just as seeing aims at colours, any αἴσθησις aims at its ἴδια (those entities which are genuinely accessible only through it and for it); and to that extent this perception is always true. This means that seeing always discovers colours, and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure νοεῖν is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at them.34 This νοεῖν is what is ‘true’ in the purest and most primordial sense; that is to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such a way that it can never cover up. This νοεῖν can never cover up; it can never be false; it can at worst remain a non-perceiving, άγνοεῖν, not sufficing for straightforward and appropriate access.

      Heidegger: truth of "aesthesis" ||

    12. In characterizing the change-over from the manipulating and using and so forth which are circumspective in a ‘practical’ way, to ‘theoretical’ exploration, it would be easy to suggest that merely looking at entities is something which emerges when concern holds back from any kind of manipulation. What is decisive in the ‘emergence’ of the theoretical attitude would then lie in the disappearance of praxis. So if one posits ‘practical’ concern as the primary and predominant kind of Being which factical Dasein possesses, the ontological possibility of ‘theory’ will be due to the absence of praxis—that is, to a privation. But the discontinuance of a specific manipulation in our concernful dealings does not simply leave the guiding circumspection behind as a remainder. Rather, our concern then diverts itself specifically into a just-looking-around [ein Nur-sich-umsehen]. But this is by no means the way in which the ‘theoretical’ attitude of science is reached. On the contrary, the tarrying which is discontinued when one manipulates, can take on the character of a more precise kind of circumspection, such as ‘inspecting’, checking up on what has been attained, or looking over the ‘operations’ [“Betrieb”] which are now ‘at a standstill’. Holding back from the use of equipment is so far from sheer ‘theory’ that the kind of circumspection which tarries and ‘considers’, remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with which one is concerned. ‘Practical’ dealings have their own ways of tarrying. And just as praxis has its own specific kind of sight (‘theory’), theoretical research is not without a praxis of its own. Reading off the measurements which result from an experiment often requires a complicated ‘technical’ set-up for the experimental design. Observation with a microscope is dependent upon the production of ‘preparations’. Archaeological excavation, which precedes any Interpretation of the ‘findings’, demands manipulations of the grossest kind. But even in the ‘most abstract’ way of working out problems and establishing what has been obtained, one manipulates equipment for writing, for example. However ‘uninteresting’ and ‘obvious’ such components of scientific research may be, they are by no means a matter of indifference ontologically. The explicit suggestion that scientific behaviour as a way of Being-in-the-world, is not just a ‘purely intellectual activity’, may seem petty and superfluous. If only it were not plain from this triviality that it is by no means patent where the ontological boundary between ‘theoretical’ and ‘atheoretical’ behaviour really runs!

      Heidegger: "just as praxis has its own specific kind of sight (‘theory’), theoretical research is not without a praxis of its own." ||

    13. And if we are inquiring about the meaning of Being, our investigation does not then become a “deep” one [tiefsinnig], nor does it puzzle out what stands behind Being. It asks about Being itself in so far as Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein. The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as the ‘ground’ which gives entities support; for a ‘ground’ becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness.45

      Heidegger: "‘ground’ becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness." || The metaphorical "ground" of meaning only makes sense within the context of an equally metaphorical space of ideas that impend / depend / build / undermine one another. The metaphor which grants conceptual / theoretical language this spatiality (this sine qua non of reason) is itself meaningless or, as de Man / Schlegel would say, arbitrary. The "arbitrariness" of irony / language, the mechanicity of the "text machine" are related to this Abgrund of Grund.

    14. However much this understanding of Being (an understanding which is already available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance with a word, its very indefiniteness is itself a positive phenomenon which needs to be clarified.

      Heidegger: "indefiniteness is itself a positive phenomenon..." || c.f. algorithmic visibility of unreadability

    15. With regard to the awkwardness and ‘inelegance’ of expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the ‘grammar’.

      Heidegger: lacking a "grammar" of Being ||

    16. When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the lumen naturale in man, we have in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it is in such a way as to be its “there”. To say that it is ‘illuminated’ [“erleuchtet”] means that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing.2 Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, Dasein brings its “there” along with it. If it lacks its “there”, it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness.

      Heidegger: "lumen naturale" / Dasein "is itself the clearing" ||

    17. Its own past—and this always means the past of its ‘generation’—is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it.

      Heidegger: future past of a "generation" ||

    18. So if it is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that it is the one which is clearest or that it needs no further discussion. It is rather the darkest of all.

      Heidegger: Being as "darkest" concept || c.f. "lumen naturale" (below)

    19. In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being—that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which [woraufhin] entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity

      Heidegger: "The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity." ||

    20. We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself—hearing. If we have not heard ‘aright’, it is not by accident that we say we have not ‘understood’. Hearing is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening to… is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears, because it understands. As a Being-in-the-world with Others, a Being which understands, Dasein is ‘in thrall’ to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thraldom it “belongs” to these.60 Being-with develops in listening to one another [Aufeinander-hören], which can be done in several possible ways: following,61 going along with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away. It is on the basis of this potentiality for hearing, which is existentially primary, that anything like hearkening [Horchen] becomes possible. Hearkening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is defined ‘in the first instance’ as “hearing” in psychology—the sensing of tones and the perception of sounds. Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands. What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. H. 164 It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside ‘sensations’; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a ‘world’. Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood. Likewise, when we are explicitly hearing the discourse of another, we proximally understand what is said, or—to put it more exactly—we are already with him, in advance, alongside the entity which the discourse is about. On the other hand, what we proximally hear is not what is expressed in the utterance. Even in cases where the speech is indistinct or in a foreign language, what we proximally hear is unintelligible words, and not a multiplicity of tone-data.62 Admittedly, when what the discourse is about is heard ‘naturally’, we can at the same time hear the ‘diction’, the way in which it is said [die Weise des Gesagtseins], but only if there is some co-understanding beforehand of what is said-in-the-talk; for only so is there a possibility of estimating whether the way in which it is said is appropriate to what the discourse is about thematically. In the same way, any answering counter-discourse arises proximally and directly from understanding what the discourse is about, which is already ‘shared’ in Being-with. Only where talking and hearing are existentially possible, can anyone hearken. The person who ‘cannot hear’ and ‘must feel’63 may perhaps be one who is able to hearken very well, and precisely because of this. Just hearing something “all around” [Das Nur-herum-hören] is a privation of the hearing which understands. Both talking and hearing are based upon understanding. And understanding arises neither through talking at length [vieles Reden] nor through busily hearing something “all around”. Only he who already understands can listen [zuhören]. H. 165 Keeping silent is another essential possibility of discourse, and it has the same existential foundation. In talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ (that is, he can develop an understanding), and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short of words. Speaking at length [Viel-sprechen] about something does not offer the slightest guarantee that thereby understanding is advanced. On the contrary, talking extensively about something, covers it up and brings what is understood to a sham clarity—the unintelligibility of the trivial. But to keep silent does not mean to be dumb. On the contrary, if a man is dumb, he still has a tendency to ‘speak’. Such a person has not proved that he can keep silence; indeed, he entirely lacks the possibility of proving anything of the sort. And the person who is accustomed by Nature to speak little is no better able to show that he is keeping silent or that he is the sort of person who can do so. He who never says anything cannot keep silent at any given moment. Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say—that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. In that case one’s reticence [Verschwiegenheit] makes something manifest, and does away with ‘idle talk’ [“Gerede”]. As a mode of discoursing, reticence Articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a Potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent.

      Heidegger: hearing / hearkening [Horchen] / keeping silent || This fascinating ontological exposition needs to be considered in the context of modern communication technology (e.g. social media). What does it mean when the force shaping the sphere of Gerede is no longer primarily one of embodied interpersonal communication? Does Dasein's relation to others undergo a primordial transformation when the interval / caesura / epoche / possibility of silence is foreclosed / enframed? It would be useful to explore this alongside Habermas' theory of the public sphere and his quarrel with Derrida (Limited Inc.)

    21. Inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself as an awaiting which makes present [gegenwärtigendes Geswärtigen]—an awaiting to whose ecstatical unity there must belong a corresponding “having been“. The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming-back to one’s ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its individualization. This ecstasis makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which it already is. In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call it “repetition“.10 But when one projects oneself inauthentically towards those possibilities which have been drawn from the object of concern in making it present, this is possible only because Dasein has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-for-Being. This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a ‘positive’ ecstatical mode of one’s having been—a mode with a character of its own. The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away in the face of one’s ownmost “been”, and of doing so in a manner which is closed off from itself—in such a manner, indeed, that this backing-away closes off ecstatically that in the face of which one is backing away, and thereby closes itself off too.11 Having forgotten [Vergessenheit] as an inauthentic way of having been, is thus related to that thrown Being which is one’s own; it is the temporal meaning of that Being in accordance with which I am proximally and for the most part as-having-been. Only on the basis of such forgetting can anything be retained [behalten] by the concernful making-present which awaits; and what are thus retained are entities encountered within-the-world with a character other than that of Dasein. To such retaining there corresponds a non-retaining which presents us with a kind of ‘forgetting’ in a derivative sense. Just as expecting is possible only on the basis of awaiting, remembering is possible only on that of forgetting, and not vice versa; for in the mode of having-forgotten, one’s having been ‘discloses’ primarily the horizon into which a Dasein lost in the ‘superficiality’ of its object of concern, can bring itself by remembering.12 The awaiting which forgets and makes present is an ecstatical unity in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself with regard to its temporality. The unity of these ecstases closes off one’s authentic potentiality-for-Being, and is thus the existential condition for the possibility of irresoluteness. Though inauthentic concernful understanding determines itself in the light of making present the object of concern, the temporalizing of the understanding is performed primarily in the future.

      Heidegger: "remembering is possible only on that of forgetting, and not vice versa" ||

    22. The fact that, even though states-of-mind are primarily disclosive, everyday circumspection goes wrong and to a large extent succumbs to delusion because of them, is a μὴ ὄν [non-being] when measured against the idea of knowing the ‘world’ absolutely. But if we make evaluations which are so unjustified ontologically, we shall completely fail to recognize the existentially positive character of the capacity for delusion. It is precisely when we see the ‘world’ unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific worldhood, which is never the same from day to day. By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed it down to the uniformity of what is purely present-at-hand, though admittedly this uniformity comprises a new abundance of things which can be discovered by simply characterizing them. Yet even the purest θεωρία [theory] has not left all moods behind it; even when we look theoretically at what is just present-at-hand, it does not show itself purely as it looks unless this θεωρία lets it come towards us in a tranquil tarrying alongside…, in ῥαστώνη and διαγωγή.iv Any cognitive determining has its existential-ontological Constitution in the state-of-mind of Being-in-the-world; but pointing this out is not to be confused with attempting to surrender science ontically to ‘feeling’.

      Heidegger: theoretical moods || theory 'dims' the deep texture of equipment / stuff / pragmata / zuhandenheit (i.e. its projection into and weaving within time / history) into the merely present-at-hand. Heidegger's acknowledgment of a "new abundance of things" here is interesting. Does this refer to the prior equipmental totality that has been dimmed by theoretical insight or is he suggesting a new layer of readiness-to-hand that emerges only when that totality has been grasped theoretically. Might this "new abundance" of theory suggest what de Man calls the "generative" power's of trope. It will be especially helpful to contrast this theoretical dimming with de Man's theory of theoretical blindness and insight since that latter was formulated earlier in de Man's career when he was (arguably) more swayed by the rhetoric of Heideggerian temporality. Certainly this discussion also approaches the crux of pathos in de Man / Derrida / Rousseau. At the moment, though, I'm more concerned with the possibility of mapping the "psycholinguistic" dimension of tropes that de Man alludes to in Allegories of Reading. Heidegger gives us this gives us this theory of pathos / pathos of theory which are clearly never far from de Man's mind. Both want to install "rhetoric" in a space that isn't simply inside or outside the world...

    23. That which is understood gets Articulated when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretatively by taking as our clue the ‘something as something’; and this Articulation lies before [liegt vor] our making any thematic assertion about it. In such an assertion the ‘as’ does not turn up for the first time; it just gets expressed for the first time, and this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible.38 The fact that when we look at something, the explicitness of assertion can be absent, does not justify our denying that there is any Articulative interpretation in such mere seeing, and hence that there is any as-structure in it. When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp something free, as it were, of the “as”, requires a certain readjustment. When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the “as”, is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands. It is not more primordial than that kind of seeing, but is derived from it. If the ‘as’ is ontically unexpressed, this must not seduce us into overlooking it as a constitutive state for understanding, existential and a priori.

      Heidegger: "articulartion lies before [liegt vor] our making any thematic assertion about it || This is a typical enough evocation of the circularity of interpretation and perception / hermeneutic circle. Stiegler will question the extent to which this idea of articulation can include the tertiary retentions of technical being. As it concerns the question of thematization, Stiegler's question gives us occasion to ask whether thematic intervention is possible without such a mnemotechnical intervention

    24. If the question of historicality leads us back to these ‘sources’, then the locus of the problem of history has already been decided. This locus is not to be sought in historiology as the science of history. Even if the problem of ‘history’ is treated in accordance with a theory of science, not only aiming at the ‘epistemological’ clarification of the historiological way of grasping things (Simmel) or at the logic with which the concepts of historiological presentation are formed (Rickert), but doing so with an orientation towards ‘the side of the object’, then, as long as the question is formulated this way, history becomes in principle accessible only as the Object of a science. Thus the basic phenomenon of history, which is prior to any possible thematizing by historiology and underlies it, has been irretrievably put aside. How history can become a possible object for historiology is something that may be gathered only from the kind of Being which belongs to the historical—from historicality, and from the way it is rooted in temporality.

      Heidegger: seeking "the basic phenomenon of history" as object "prior to any possible thematizing" ||

    25. Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein’s Being remains only one way which we may take. Our aim is to work out the question of Being in general. The thematic analytic of existence, however, first needs the light of the idea of Being in general, which must be clarified beforehand.

      Heidegger: "our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein’s Being remains only one way which we may take" || Baffling for many reasons, this statement throws the whole "necessity" of the questioning into suspension and adds a strange luminescence to the "thematic" idea of Being which doesn't clearly map onto the previous rhetoric of "lighting up" / "dimming down" / "lichtung" etc.

    26. That with which one’s concernful dealings fail to cope, either by producing or procuring something, or even by turning away, holding aloof, or protecting oneself from something, reveals itself in its insurmountability. Concern resigns itself to it.36 But resigning oneself to something is a mode peculiar to circumspectively letting it be encountered. On the basis of this kind of discovery concern can come across that which is inconvenient, disturbing, hindering, endangering, or in general resistant in some way. The temporal structure of resigning oneself to something, lies in a non-retaining which awaitingly makes present. In awaitingly making present, one does not, for instance, reckon ‘on’ that which is unsuitable but none the less available. “Not reckoning with” something, is a mode of “taking into one’s reckoning” that which one cannot cling to. That which one has “not reckoned with” does not get forgotten; it gets retained, so that in its very unsuitability it remains ready-to-hand.37 That which is ready-to-hand in this manner belongs to the everyday stock or content of the factically disclosed environment.

      Heidegger: "That which one has “not reckoned with” does not get forgotten; it gets retained, so that in its very unsuitability it remains ready-to-hand" ||

    27. The idea of historiology as a science implies that the disclosure of historical entities is what it has seized upon as its own task. Every science is constituted primarily by thematizing. That which is familiar prescientifically in Dasein as disclosed Being-in-the-world, gets projected upon the Being which is specific to it. With this projection, the realm of entities is bounded off. The ways of access to them get ‘managed’ methodologically, and the conceptual structure for interpreting them is outlined. If we may postpone the question of whether a ‘history of the Present’ is possible, and assign [zuweisen] to historiology the task of disclosing the ‘past’, then the historiological thematizing of history is possible only if, in general, the ‘past’ has in each case already been disclosed. Quite apart from the question of whether sufficient sources are available for the historiological envisagement of the past, the way to it must in general be open if we are to go back to it historiologically. It is by no means patent that anything of the sort is the case, or how this is possible.

      Heidegger: "Every science is constituted primarily by thematizing" || Just as Heidegger does not reject facticity outright he is equally careful in his critique of the limits of thematization. Indeed, the two discussions seem to correspond on many points. Is thematization a kind of meta-factualization? A factualization with a temporal component?

    28. Indeed history is neither the connectedness of motions in the alterations of Objects, nor a free-floating sequence of Experiences which ‘subjects’ have had. Does the historizing of history then pertain to the way subject and Object are ‘linked together’? Even if one assigns [zuweist] historizing to the subject-Object relation, we then have to ask what kind of Being belongs to this linkage as such, if this is what basically ‘historizes’. The thesis of Dasein’s historicality does not say that the worldless subject is historical, but that what is historical is the entity that exists as Being-in-the-world. The historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the-world. Dasein’s historicality is essentially the historicality of the world, which, on the basis of ecstatico-horizontal temporality, belongs to the temporalizing of that temporality. In so far as Dasein exists factically, it already encounters that which has been discovered within-the-world. With the existence of historical Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world. Equipment and work—for instance, books—have their fates; buildings and institutions have their history. And even Nature is historical. It is not historical, to be sure, in so far as we speak of ‘natural history’;ix but Nature is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonized or exploited, as a battlefield, or as the site of a cult. These entities within-the-world are historical as such, and their history does not signify something ‘external’ which merely accompanies the ‘inner’ history of the ‘soul’. We call such entities “the world-historical“. Here we must notice that the expression ‘world-history’ which we have chosen and which is here understood ontologically, has a double signification. The expression signifies, for one thing, the historizing of the world in its essential existent unity with Dasein. At the same time, we have here in view the ‘historizing’ within-the-world of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, in so far as entities within-the-world are, in every case, discovered with the factically existent world. The historical world is factical only as the world of entities within-the-world. That which ‘happens’ with equipment and work as such has its own character of movement, and this character has been completely obscure up till now. When, for instance, a ring gets ‘handed over’ to someone and ‘worn’, this is a kind of Being in which it does not simply suffer changes of location. The movement of historizing in which something ‘happens to something’ is not to be grasped in terms of motion as change of location. This holds for all world-historical ‘processes’ and events, and even, in a certain manner, for ‘natural catastrophes’. Quite apart from the fact that if we were to follow up the problem of the ontological structure of world-historical historizing, we would necessarily be transgressing the limits of our theme, we can refrain from this all the more because the very aim of this exposition is to lead us face to face with the ontological enigma of the movement of historizing in general.

      Heidegger: Dasein's "historicality" and "world-historicality" || I'm particularly interested in the line: "Equipment and work—for instance, books—have their fates; buildings and institutions have their history." So far as I can tell Heidegger would see the "fate" of the book springing from the fundamental historicality of Dasein. My question is whether this fate is compatible with the kind de Man assigns to texts a material events?

    29. In our first description of the genesis of the theoretical attitude out of circumspection, we have made basic a way of theoretically grasping entities within-the-world—physical Nature—in which the modification of our understanding of Being is tantamount to a change-over. In the ‘physical’ assertion that ‘the hammer is heavy’ we overlook not only the tool-character of the entity we encounter, but also something that belongs to any ready-to-hand equipment: its place. Its place becomes a matter of indifference. This does not mean that what is present-at-hand loses its ‘location’ altogether. But its place becomes a spatio-temporal position, a ‘world-point’, which is in no way distinguished from any other. This implies not only that the multiplicity of places of equipment ready-to-hand within the confines of the environment becomes modified to a pure multiplicity of positions, but that the entities of the environment are altogether released from such confinement [entschränkt]. The aggregate of the present-at-hand becomes the theme.

      Heidegger: "The aggregate of the present-at-hand becomes the theme." || Very interesting take on thematization especially in how it seems to clash with Heidegger's use of "thematic" in the language of the existential analytic itself ("...has not been grasped thematically"). Are these two uses of "theme" (for Dasein and for Us) really interchangeable? At stake would be the difference between Heideggerian and Hegelian phenomenology.

    30. The scientific projection of any entities which we have somehow encountered already lets their kind of Being be understood explicitly and in such a manner that it thus becomes manifest what ways are possible for the pure discovery of entities within-the-world. The Articulation of the understanding of Being, the delimitation of an area of subject-matter (a delimitation guided by this understanding), and the sketching-out of the way of conceiving which is appropriate to such entities—all these belong to the totality of this projecting; and this totality is what we call “thematizing“. Its aim is to free the entities we encounter within-the-world, and to free them in such a way that they can ‘throw themselves against’42 a pure discovering—that is, that they can become “Objects”. Thematizing Objectifies. It does not first ‘posit’ the entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine their character ‘Objectively’. Being which Objectifies and which is alongside the present-at-hand within-the-world, is characterized by a distinctive kind of making-present.xxiii This making-present is distinguished from the Present of circumspection in that—above all—the kind of discovering which belongs to the science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of the present-at-hand. This awaiting of discoveredness has its existentiell basis in a resoluteness by which Dasein projects itself towards its potentiality-for-Being in the ‘truth’. This projection is possible because Being-in-the-truth makes up a definite way in which Dasein may exist. We shall not trace further how science has its source in authentic existence. It is enough now if we understand that the thematizing of entities within-the-world presupposes Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein, and if we understand how it does so. H. 364 If the thematizing of the present-at-hand—the scientific projection of Nature—is to become possible, Dasein must transcend the entities thematized. Transcendence does not consist in Objectifying, but is presupposed by it. If, however, the thematizing of the present-at-hand within-the-world is a change-over from the concern which discovers by circumspection, then one’s ‘practical’ Being alongside the ready-to-hand is something which a transcendence of Dasein must already underlie. If, moreover, thematizing modifies and Articulates the understanding of Being, then, in so far as Dasein, the entity which thematizes, exists, it must already understand something like Being. Such understanding of Being can remain neutral. In that case readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand have not yet been distinguished; still less have they been conceived ontologically. But if Dasein is to be able to have any dealings with a context of equipment, it must understand something like an involvement, even if it does not do so thematically: a world must have been disclosed to it. With Dasein’s factical existence, this world has been disclosed, if Dasein indeed exists essentially as Being-in-the-world.43 And if Dasein’s Being is completely grounded in temporality, then temporality must make possible Being-in-the-world and therewith Dasein’s transcendence; this transcendence in turn provides the support for concernful Being alongside entities within-the-world, whether this Being is theoretical or practical.

      Heidegger: "thematizing of the present-at-hand" as "the scientific projection of Nature" || The crucial question is whether Dasein is capable of "transcend[ing] the entities being thematized." Especially the entities which have been prosthetically grafted onto its theoretical insight

    31. The world is already presupposed in one’s Being alongside the ready-to-hand concernfully and factically, in one’s thematizing of the present-at-hand, and in one’s discovering of this latter entity by Objectification; that is to say, all these are possible only as ways of Being-in-the-world. Having its ground [gründend] in the horizonal unity of ecstatical temporality, the world is transcendent. It must already have been ecstatically disclosed so that in terms of it entities within-the-world can be encountered. Temporality already maintains itself ecstatically within the horizons of its ecstases; and in temporalizing itself, it comes back to those entities which are encountered in the “there”. With Dasein’s factical existence, entities within-the-world are already encountered too. The fact that such entities are discovered along with Dasein’s own “there” of existence, is not left to Dasein’s discretion. Only what it discovers and discloses on occasion, in what direction it does so, how and how far it does so—only these are matters for Dasein’s freedom, even if always within the limitations of its thrownness. Thus the significance-relationships which determine the structure of the world are not a network of forms which a worldless subject has laid over some kind of material. What is rather the case is that factical Dasein, understanding itself and its world ecstatically in the unity of the “there”, comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them. Coming back to these entities understandingly is the existential meaning of letting them be encountered by making them present; that is why we call them entities “within-the-world”. The world is, as it were, already ‘further outside’ than any Object can ever be. The ‘problem of transcendence’ cannot be brought round to the question of how a subject comes out to an Object, where the aggregate of Objects is identified with the idea of the world. Rather we must ask: what makes it ontologically possible for entities to be encountered within-the-world and Objectified as so encountered? This can be answered by recourse to the transcendence of the world—a transcendence with an ecstatico-horizonal foundation. If the ‘subject’ gets conceived ontologically as an existing Dasein whose Being is grounded in temporality, then one must say that the world is ‘subjective’. But in that case, this ‘subjective’ world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is ‘more Objective’ than any possible ‘Object’.

      Heidegger: "The world is ...‘further outside’ than any Object can ever be" / the "'subjective' world...is 'more Objective' than any possible 'Object'" ||

    32. Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of its future on each occasion.2

      Heidegger: "Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of its future on each occasion.2" ||

    33. The historiological disclosure of the ‘past’ is based on fateful repetition, and is so far from ‘subjective’ that it alone guarantees the ‘Objectivity’ of historiology. For the Objectivity of a science is regulated primarily in terms of whether that science can confront us with the entity which belongs to it as its theme, and can bring it, uncovered in the primordiality of its Being, to our understanding. In no science are the ‘universal validity’ of standards and the claims to ‘universality’ which the “they” and its common sense demand, less possible as criteria of ‘truth’ than in authentic historiology. Only because in each case the central theme of historiology is the possibility of existence which has-been-there, and because the latter exists factically in a way which is world-historical, can it demand of itself that it takes its orientation inexorably from the ‘facts’. Accordingly this research as factical has many branches and takes for its object the history of equipment, of work, of culture, of the spirit, and of ideas. As handing itself down, history is, in itself, at the same time and in each case always in an interpretedness which belongs to it, and which has a history of its own; so for the most part it is only through traditional history that historiology penetrates to what has-been-there itself. This is why concrete historiological research can, in each case, maintain itself in varying closeness to its authentic theme. If the historian ‘throws’ himself straightway into the ‘world-view’ of an era, he has not thus proved as yet that he understands his object in an authentically historical way, and not just ‘aesthetically’. And on the other hand, the existence of a historian who ‘only’ edits sources, may be characterized by a historicality which is authentic. H. 396 Thus the very prevalence of a differentiated interest even in the most remote and primitive cultures, is in itself no proof of the authentic historicality of a ‘time’. In the end, the emergence of a problem of ‘historicism’ is the clearest symptom that historiology endeavours to alienate Dasein from its authentic historicality. Such historicality does not necessarily require historiology. It is not the case that unhistoriological eras as such are unhistorical also.

      Heidegger: "history is, in itself, at the same time and in each case always in an interpretedness which belongs to it, and which has a history of its own" || So much going on here: what seems like a critique of Hegelian history (i.e. "Africa does not have a history") and an anticipation of Nietzsche. I'm curious what is meant by the phrase "not just 'aesthetically," especially given that Heidegger has already tied a classical Greek conception of aesthesis with the truth of Dasein itself.