183 Matching Annotations
  1. May 2019
    1. Текст без каркаса — беспомощный слизняк. Лаконичный текст с каркасом — удав, гипнотизирующий юзера как кролика.
  2. Apr 2019
    1. The music we listen to highly impacts our decision making, especially as adolescents. Adolescents are extremely impressionable, and the music they listen to has a great impact on how they decide to live their day to day lives. Popular musicians are seen as role models by the people who idolize them, and adolescents may try to represents the songs in which they favor through their actions every day.

      Recent studies have found that adolescents who listen to music that supports substance abuse and violence have a greater chance to act upon what they listen to. What young adults and teenagers listen to through music and popular media will affect their decision making process. Specifically with substance abuse, and there is a direct uptake in use of illegal substances by adolescents who listen to music that promotes such activities. This can cause a whole societal problem considering most of todays popular music among adolescents touches upon substance abuse and violence. Adolescents are extremely impressionable and the music they listen can shape how a person tries to act, or represent themselves.

  3. Mar 2019
    1. We'll stick to working with prose text in our examples—most people can grasp easily enough what we are doing there without having to have special backgrounds in mathematics or science as they would to gain equal comprehension for some of the similar sorts of things we do with diagrams and mathematical equations.

      I think this sentence is one of the most overlooked key points. This virtual, and in '68 the live demo was a quantum leap in managing text and locked the attention on that level. However, the essence of this framework is managing symbols and making statements by them directly - not editing texts on pages and navigate around them. For example, seeing and managing the following statements in parallel: 1: there is an idea of "Locatable" represented by an entity. 2: "Locatable" in this environment contains X and Y attributes represented by their respective entity instances. 3: Another entity (be it a mouse pointer, a window or a car on a street) can or must be "Locatable" (among many other possible aspects). 4: "My car" entity is "Locatable" at 40, 20. We need a system that allows managing such statements and allow other systems behave according to them.

  4. Feb 2019
    1. novice

      At first, Engelbart's text seems aimed at experts at his level. It is challenging to think how to relate to his work as a novice.

      I have been reflecting on this paragraph in my blog. http://eltnotes.blogspot.com/2019/02/amid-experts-and-augmented-novices.html

    1. by these elucidations given rise or increase to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place

      Following Dr. Rivers's postmodern note, this reminds me of our discussion in class related to Nietzsche, how we're so often trained to assume that the text means something other than the text itself, and we search for the "true" meaning buried underneath the text, perhaps in the author's subconscious. I'm reminded to of a comment made in Dr. Johnston's poetry class, that we as critics don't spend enough time on simply characterizing texts; in place of depth arrived at through analysis, we should strive for complexity in our attempt to take the words on the page at their word.

  5. Jan 2019
    1. This is the meaning of the “Day of Resurrection,” spoken of in all the scriptures, and announced unto all people. Reflect, can a more precious, a mightier, and more glorious day than this be conceived, so that man should willingly forego its grace, and deprive himself of its bounties, which like unto vernal showers are raining from the heaven of mercy upon all mankind?

      I think this meaning is that "Resurrection" is the return of a Manifestation in another human frame. And this is stated to be clearly more glorious than the literal interpretations of past scripture.

      Why is it clearly more glorious?

      1. Everyone has access. And it leads to empowerment.
      2. It allows us to keep science, which is pretty awesome.
      3. It doesn't allow us to just wait for the rapture - see point 1 about empowerment.
      4. It allows us to see all religions as united in spirit.
      5. Related to point 3 and 4, it allows us to unite with non-religious people.
      6. All of this without "doing violence to the facts".
  6. Dec 2018
  7. Oct 2018
    1. Do you do you OMG jinx Go ahead no no you go first Naaaa after u no but I interrupted you tho On the contrary I'm tired we're not in shape how about a little deep breathing I'm tired of breathing word

      Mimicking content/ information

    1. Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of its future on each occasion.2

      Heidegger: "Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of its future on each occasion.2" ||

    2. Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein’s Being remains only one way which we may take. Our aim is to work out the question of Being in general. The thematic analytic of existence, however, first needs the light of the idea of Being in general, which must be clarified beforehand.

      Heidegger: "our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein’s Being remains only one way which we may take" || Baffling for many reasons, this statement throws the whole "necessity" of the questioning into suspension and adds a strange luminescence to the "thematic" idea of Being which doesn't clearly map onto the previous rhetoric of "lighting up" / "dimming down" / "lichtung" etc.

    3. The historiological disclosure of the ‘past’ is based on fateful repetition, and is so far from ‘subjective’ that it alone guarantees the ‘Objectivity’ of historiology. For the Objectivity of a science is regulated primarily in terms of whether that science can confront us with the entity which belongs to it as its theme, and can bring it, uncovered in the primordiality of its Being, to our understanding. In no science are the ‘universal validity’ of standards and the claims to ‘universality’ which the “they” and its common sense demand, less possible as criteria of ‘truth’ than in authentic historiology. Only because in each case the central theme of historiology is the possibility of existence which has-been-there, and because the latter exists factically in a way which is world-historical, can it demand of itself that it takes its orientation inexorably from the ‘facts’. Accordingly this research as factical has many branches and takes for its object the history of equipment, of work, of culture, of the spirit, and of ideas. As handing itself down, history is, in itself, at the same time and in each case always in an interpretedness which belongs to it, and which has a history of its own; so for the most part it is only through traditional history that historiology penetrates to what has-been-there itself. This is why concrete historiological research can, in each case, maintain itself in varying closeness to its authentic theme. If the historian ‘throws’ himself straightway into the ‘world-view’ of an era, he has not thus proved as yet that he understands his object in an authentically historical way, and not just ‘aesthetically’. And on the other hand, the existence of a historian who ‘only’ edits sources, may be characterized by a historicality which is authentic. H. 396 Thus the very prevalence of a differentiated interest even in the most remote and primitive cultures, is in itself no proof of the authentic historicality of a ‘time’. In the end, the emergence of a problem of ‘historicism’ is the clearest symptom that historiology endeavours to alienate Dasein from its authentic historicality. Such historicality does not necessarily require historiology. It is not the case that unhistoriological eras as such are unhistorical also.

      Heidegger: "history is, in itself, at the same time and in each case always in an interpretedness which belongs to it, and which has a history of its own" || So much going on here: what seems like a critique of Hegelian history (i.e. "Africa does not have a history") and an anticipation of Nietzsche. I'm curious what is meant by the phrase "not just 'aesthetically," especially given that Heidegger has already tied a classical Greek conception of aesthesis with the truth of Dasein itself.

    4. The idea of historiology as a science implies that the disclosure of historical entities is what it has seized upon as its own task. Every science is constituted primarily by thematizing. That which is familiar prescientifically in Dasein as disclosed Being-in-the-world, gets projected upon the Being which is specific to it. With this projection, the realm of entities is bounded off. The ways of access to them get ‘managed’ methodologically, and the conceptual structure for interpreting them is outlined. If we may postpone the question of whether a ‘history of the Present’ is possible, and assign [zuweisen] to historiology the task of disclosing the ‘past’, then the historiological thematizing of history is possible only if, in general, the ‘past’ has in each case already been disclosed. Quite apart from the question of whether sufficient sources are available for the historiological envisagement of the past, the way to it must in general be open if we are to go back to it historiologically. It is by no means patent that anything of the sort is the case, or how this is possible.

      Heidegger: "Every science is constituted primarily by thematizing" || Just as Heidegger does not reject facticity outright he is equally careful in his critique of the limits of thematization. Indeed, the two discussions seem to correspond on many points. Is thematization a kind of meta-factualization? A factualization with a temporal component?

    5. Indeed history is neither the connectedness of motions in the alterations of Objects, nor a free-floating sequence of Experiences which ‘subjects’ have had. Does the historizing of history then pertain to the way subject and Object are ‘linked together’? Even if one assigns [zuweist] historizing to the subject-Object relation, we then have to ask what kind of Being belongs to this linkage as such, if this is what basically ‘historizes’. The thesis of Dasein’s historicality does not say that the worldless subject is historical, but that what is historical is the entity that exists as Being-in-the-world. The historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the-world. Dasein’s historicality is essentially the historicality of the world, which, on the basis of ecstatico-horizontal temporality, belongs to the temporalizing of that temporality. In so far as Dasein exists factically, it already encounters that which has been discovered within-the-world. With the existence of historical Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world. Equipment and work—for instance, books—have their fates; buildings and institutions have their history. And even Nature is historical. It is not historical, to be sure, in so far as we speak of ‘natural history’;ix but Nature is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonized or exploited, as a battlefield, or as the site of a cult. These entities within-the-world are historical as such, and their history does not signify something ‘external’ which merely accompanies the ‘inner’ history of the ‘soul’. We call such entities “the world-historical“. Here we must notice that the expression ‘world-history’ which we have chosen and which is here understood ontologically, has a double signification. The expression signifies, for one thing, the historizing of the world in its essential existent unity with Dasein. At the same time, we have here in view the ‘historizing’ within-the-world of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, in so far as entities within-the-world are, in every case, discovered with the factically existent world. The historical world is factical only as the world of entities within-the-world. That which ‘happens’ with equipment and work as such has its own character of movement, and this character has been completely obscure up till now. When, for instance, a ring gets ‘handed over’ to someone and ‘worn’, this is a kind of Being in which it does not simply suffer changes of location. The movement of historizing in which something ‘happens to something’ is not to be grasped in terms of motion as change of location. This holds for all world-historical ‘processes’ and events, and even, in a certain manner, for ‘natural catastrophes’. Quite apart from the fact that if we were to follow up the problem of the ontological structure of world-historical historizing, we would necessarily be transgressing the limits of our theme, we can refrain from this all the more because the very aim of this exposition is to lead us face to face with the ontological enigma of the movement of historizing in general.

      Heidegger: Dasein's "historicality" and "world-historicality" || I'm particularly interested in the line: "Equipment and work—for instance, books—have their fates; buildings and institutions have their history." So far as I can tell Heidegger would see the "fate" of the book springing from the fundamental historicality of Dasein. My question is whether this fate is compatible with the kind de Man assigns to texts a material events?

    6. If the question of historicality leads us back to these ‘sources’, then the locus of the problem of history has already been decided. This locus is not to be sought in historiology as the science of history. Even if the problem of ‘history’ is treated in accordance with a theory of science, not only aiming at the ‘epistemological’ clarification of the historiological way of grasping things (Simmel) or at the logic with which the concepts of historiological presentation are formed (Rickert), but doing so with an orientation towards ‘the side of the object’, then, as long as the question is formulated this way, history becomes in principle accessible only as the Object of a science. Thus the basic phenomenon of history, which is prior to any possible thematizing by historiology and underlies it, has been irretrievably put aside. How history can become a possible object for historiology is something that may be gathered only from the kind of Being which belongs to the historical—from historicality, and from the way it is rooted in temporality.

      Heidegger: seeking "the basic phenomenon of history" as object "prior to any possible thematizing" ||

    7. The world is already presupposed in one’s Being alongside the ready-to-hand concernfully and factically, in one’s thematizing of the present-at-hand, and in one’s discovering of this latter entity by Objectification; that is to say, all these are possible only as ways of Being-in-the-world. Having its ground [gründend] in the horizonal unity of ecstatical temporality, the world is transcendent. It must already have been ecstatically disclosed so that in terms of it entities within-the-world can be encountered. Temporality already maintains itself ecstatically within the horizons of its ecstases; and in temporalizing itself, it comes back to those entities which are encountered in the “there”. With Dasein’s factical existence, entities within-the-world are already encountered too. The fact that such entities are discovered along with Dasein’s own “there” of existence, is not left to Dasein’s discretion. Only what it discovers and discloses on occasion, in what direction it does so, how and how far it does so—only these are matters for Dasein’s freedom, even if always within the limitations of its thrownness. Thus the significance-relationships which determine the structure of the world are not a network of forms which a worldless subject has laid over some kind of material. What is rather the case is that factical Dasein, understanding itself and its world ecstatically in the unity of the “there”, comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them. Coming back to these entities understandingly is the existential meaning of letting them be encountered by making them present; that is why we call them entities “within-the-world”. The world is, as it were, already ‘further outside’ than any Object can ever be. The ‘problem of transcendence’ cannot be brought round to the question of how a subject comes out to an Object, where the aggregate of Objects is identified with the idea of the world. Rather we must ask: what makes it ontologically possible for entities to be encountered within-the-world and Objectified as so encountered? This can be answered by recourse to the transcendence of the world—a transcendence with an ecstatico-horizonal foundation. If the ‘subject’ gets conceived ontologically as an existing Dasein whose Being is grounded in temporality, then one must say that the world is ‘subjective’. But in that case, this ‘subjective’ world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is ‘more Objective’ than any possible ‘Object’.

      Heidegger: "The world is ...‘further outside’ than any Object can ever be" / the "'subjective' world...is 'more Objective' than any possible 'Object'" ||

    8. The scientific projection of any entities which we have somehow encountered already lets their kind of Being be understood explicitly and in such a manner that it thus becomes manifest what ways are possible for the pure discovery of entities within-the-world. The Articulation of the understanding of Being, the delimitation of an area of subject-matter (a delimitation guided by this understanding), and the sketching-out of the way of conceiving which is appropriate to such entities—all these belong to the totality of this projecting; and this totality is what we call “thematizing“. Its aim is to free the entities we encounter within-the-world, and to free them in such a way that they can ‘throw themselves against’42 a pure discovering—that is, that they can become “Objects”. Thematizing Objectifies. It does not first ‘posit’ the entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine their character ‘Objectively’. Being which Objectifies and which is alongside the present-at-hand within-the-world, is characterized by a distinctive kind of making-present.xxiii This making-present is distinguished from the Present of circumspection in that—above all—the kind of discovering which belongs to the science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of the present-at-hand. This awaiting of discoveredness has its existentiell basis in a resoluteness by which Dasein projects itself towards its potentiality-for-Being in the ‘truth’. This projection is possible because Being-in-the-truth makes up a definite way in which Dasein may exist. We shall not trace further how science has its source in authentic existence. It is enough now if we understand that the thematizing of entities within-the-world presupposes Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein, and if we understand how it does so. H. 364 If the thematizing of the present-at-hand—the scientific projection of Nature—is to become possible, Dasein must transcend the entities thematized. Transcendence does not consist in Objectifying, but is presupposed by it. If, however, the thematizing of the present-at-hand within-the-world is a change-over from the concern which discovers by circumspection, then one’s ‘practical’ Being alongside the ready-to-hand is something which a transcendence of Dasein must already underlie. If, moreover, thematizing modifies and Articulates the understanding of Being, then, in so far as Dasein, the entity which thematizes, exists, it must already understand something like Being. Such understanding of Being can remain neutral. In that case readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand have not yet been distinguished; still less have they been conceived ontologically. But if Dasein is to be able to have any dealings with a context of equipment, it must understand something like an involvement, even if it does not do so thematically: a world must have been disclosed to it. With Dasein’s factical existence, this world has been disclosed, if Dasein indeed exists essentially as Being-in-the-world.43 And if Dasein’s Being is completely grounded in temporality, then temporality must make possible Being-in-the-world and therewith Dasein’s transcendence; this transcendence in turn provides the support for concernful Being alongside entities within-the-world, whether this Being is theoretical or practical.

      Heidegger: "thematizing of the present-at-hand" as "the scientific projection of Nature" || The crucial question is whether Dasein is capable of "transcend[ing] the entities being thematized." Especially the entities which have been prosthetically grafted onto its theoretical insight

    9. In our first description of the genesis of the theoretical attitude out of circumspection, we have made basic a way of theoretically grasping entities within-the-world—physical Nature—in which the modification of our understanding of Being is tantamount to a change-over. In the ‘physical’ assertion that ‘the hammer is heavy’ we overlook not only the tool-character of the entity we encounter, but also something that belongs to any ready-to-hand equipment: its place. Its place becomes a matter of indifference. This does not mean that what is present-at-hand loses its ‘location’ altogether. But its place becomes a spatio-temporal position, a ‘world-point’, which is in no way distinguished from any other. This implies not only that the multiplicity of places of equipment ready-to-hand within the confines of the environment becomes modified to a pure multiplicity of positions, but that the entities of the environment are altogether released from such confinement [entschränkt]. The aggregate of the present-at-hand becomes the theme.

      Heidegger: "The aggregate of the present-at-hand becomes the theme." || Very interesting take on thematization especially in how it seems to clash with Heidegger's use of "thematic" in the language of the existential analytic itself ("...has not been grasped thematically"). Are these two uses of "theme" (for Dasein and for Us) really interchangeable? At stake would be the difference between Heideggerian and Hegelian phenomenology.

    10. In characterizing the change-over from the manipulating and using and so forth which are circumspective in a ‘practical’ way, to ‘theoretical’ exploration, it would be easy to suggest that merely looking at entities is something which emerges when concern holds back from any kind of manipulation. What is decisive in the ‘emergence’ of the theoretical attitude would then lie in the disappearance of praxis. So if one posits ‘practical’ concern as the primary and predominant kind of Being which factical Dasein possesses, the ontological possibility of ‘theory’ will be due to the absence of praxis—that is, to a privation. But the discontinuance of a specific manipulation in our concernful dealings does not simply leave the guiding circumspection behind as a remainder. Rather, our concern then diverts itself specifically into a just-looking-around [ein Nur-sich-umsehen]. But this is by no means the way in which the ‘theoretical’ attitude of science is reached. On the contrary, the tarrying which is discontinued when one manipulates, can take on the character of a more precise kind of circumspection, such as ‘inspecting’, checking up on what has been attained, or looking over the ‘operations’ [“Betrieb”] which are now ‘at a standstill’. Holding back from the use of equipment is so far from sheer ‘theory’ that the kind of circumspection which tarries and ‘considers’, remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with which one is concerned. ‘Practical’ dealings have their own ways of tarrying. And just as praxis has its own specific kind of sight (‘theory’), theoretical research is not without a praxis of its own. Reading off the measurements which result from an experiment often requires a complicated ‘technical’ set-up for the experimental design. Observation with a microscope is dependent upon the production of ‘preparations’. Archaeological excavation, which precedes any Interpretation of the ‘findings’, demands manipulations of the grossest kind. But even in the ‘most abstract’ way of working out problems and establishing what has been obtained, one manipulates equipment for writing, for example. However ‘uninteresting’ and ‘obvious’ such components of scientific research may be, they are by no means a matter of indifference ontologically. The explicit suggestion that scientific behaviour as a way of Being-in-the-world, is not just a ‘purely intellectual activity’, may seem petty and superfluous. If only it were not plain from this triviality that it is by no means patent where the ontological boundary between ‘theoretical’ and ‘atheoretical’ behaviour really runs!

      Heidegger: "just as praxis has its own specific kind of sight (‘theory’), theoretical research is not without a praxis of its own." ||

    11. That with which one’s concernful dealings fail to cope, either by producing or procuring something, or even by turning away, holding aloof, or protecting oneself from something, reveals itself in its insurmountability. Concern resigns itself to it.36 But resigning oneself to something is a mode peculiar to circumspectively letting it be encountered. On the basis of this kind of discovery concern can come across that which is inconvenient, disturbing, hindering, endangering, or in general resistant in some way. The temporal structure of resigning oneself to something, lies in a non-retaining which awaitingly makes present. In awaitingly making present, one does not, for instance, reckon ‘on’ that which is unsuitable but none the less available. “Not reckoning with” something, is a mode of “taking into one’s reckoning” that which one cannot cling to. That which one has “not reckoned with” does not get forgotten; it gets retained, so that in its very unsuitability it remains ready-to-hand.37 That which is ready-to-hand in this manner belongs to the everyday stock or content of the factically disclosed environment.

      Heidegger: "That which one has “not reckoned with” does not get forgotten; it gets retained, so that in its very unsuitability it remains ready-to-hand" ||

    12. The upshot of this is that if in our analysis of dealings we aim at that which is dealt with, then one’s existent Being alongside the entities with which one concerns oneself must be given an orientation not towards some isolated item of equipment which is ready-to-hand, but towards the equipmental totality. This way of taking what is dealt with, is forced upon us also if we consider that character of Being which belongs distinctively to equipment that is ready-to-hand—namely, involvement.xvii We understand the term “involvement” ontologically. The kind of talk in which we say that something has with it an involvement in something, is not meant to establish a fact ontically, but rather to indicate the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand. The relational character of involvement—of its ‘with… in…’—suggests that “an” equipment is ontologically impossible. Of course just a solitary item of equipment may be ready-to-hand while another is missing. But this makes known to us that the very thing that is ready-to-hand belongs to something else. Our concernful dealings can let what is ready-to-hand be encountered circumspectively only if in these dealings we already understand something like the involvement which something has in something. The Being-alongside which discovers circumspectively in concern, amounts to letting something be involved—that is, to projecting an involvement understandingly. Letting things be involved makes up the existential structure of concern. But concern, as Being alongside something, belongs to the essential constitution of care; and care, in turn, is grounded in temporality. If all this is so, then the existential condition of the possibility of letting things be involved must be sought in a mode of the temporalizing of temporality.

      Heidegger: ontological meaning of "involvement" || Return to the claim that "'an' equipment is ontologically impossible"

    13. Inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself as an awaiting which makes present [gegenwärtigendes Geswärtigen]—an awaiting to whose ecstatical unity there must belong a corresponding “having been“. The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming-back to one’s ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its individualization. This ecstasis makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which it already is. In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call it “repetition“.10 But when one projects oneself inauthentically towards those possibilities which have been drawn from the object of concern in making it present, this is possible only because Dasein has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-for-Being. This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a ‘positive’ ecstatical mode of one’s having been—a mode with a character of its own. The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away in the face of one’s ownmost “been”, and of doing so in a manner which is closed off from itself—in such a manner, indeed, that this backing-away closes off ecstatically that in the face of which one is backing away, and thereby closes itself off too.11 Having forgotten [Vergessenheit] as an inauthentic way of having been, is thus related to that thrown Being which is one’s own; it is the temporal meaning of that Being in accordance with which I am proximally and for the most part as-having-been. Only on the basis of such forgetting can anything be retained [behalten] by the concernful making-present which awaits; and what are thus retained are entities encountered within-the-world with a character other than that of Dasein. To such retaining there corresponds a non-retaining which presents us with a kind of ‘forgetting’ in a derivative sense. Just as expecting is possible only on the basis of awaiting, remembering is possible only on that of forgetting, and not vice versa; for in the mode of having-forgotten, one’s having been ‘discloses’ primarily the horizon into which a Dasein lost in the ‘superficiality’ of its object of concern, can bring itself by remembering.12 The awaiting which forgets and makes present is an ecstatical unity in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself with regard to its temporality. The unity of these ecstases closes off one’s authentic potentiality-for-Being, and is thus the existential condition for the possibility of irresoluteness. Though inauthentic concernful understanding determines itself in the light of making present the object of concern, the temporalizing of the understanding is performed primarily in the future.

      Heidegger: "remembering is possible only on that of forgetting, and not vice versa" ||

    14. We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself—hearing. If we have not heard ‘aright’, it is not by accident that we say we have not ‘understood’. Hearing is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening to… is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears, because it understands. As a Being-in-the-world with Others, a Being which understands, Dasein is ‘in thrall’ to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thraldom it “belongs” to these.60 Being-with develops in listening to one another [Aufeinander-hören], which can be done in several possible ways: following,61 going along with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away. It is on the basis of this potentiality for hearing, which is existentially primary, that anything like hearkening [Horchen] becomes possible. Hearkening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is defined ‘in the first instance’ as “hearing” in psychology—the sensing of tones and the perception of sounds. Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands. What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. H. 164 It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside ‘sensations’; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a ‘world’. Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood. Likewise, when we are explicitly hearing the discourse of another, we proximally understand what is said, or—to put it more exactly—we are already with him, in advance, alongside the entity which the discourse is about. On the other hand, what we proximally hear is not what is expressed in the utterance. Even in cases where the speech is indistinct or in a foreign language, what we proximally hear is unintelligible words, and not a multiplicity of tone-data.62 Admittedly, when what the discourse is about is heard ‘naturally’, we can at the same time hear the ‘diction’, the way in which it is said [die Weise des Gesagtseins], but only if there is some co-understanding beforehand of what is said-in-the-talk; for only so is there a possibility of estimating whether the way in which it is said is appropriate to what the discourse is about thematically. In the same way, any answering counter-discourse arises proximally and directly from understanding what the discourse is about, which is already ‘shared’ in Being-with. Only where talking and hearing are existentially possible, can anyone hearken. The person who ‘cannot hear’ and ‘must feel’63 may perhaps be one who is able to hearken very well, and precisely because of this. Just hearing something “all around” [Das Nur-herum-hören] is a privation of the hearing which understands. Both talking and hearing are based upon understanding. And understanding arises neither through talking at length [vieles Reden] nor through busily hearing something “all around”. Only he who already understands can listen [zuhören]. H. 165 Keeping silent is another essential possibility of discourse, and it has the same existential foundation. In talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ (that is, he can develop an understanding), and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short of words. Speaking at length [Viel-sprechen] about something does not offer the slightest guarantee that thereby understanding is advanced. On the contrary, talking extensively about something, covers it up and brings what is understood to a sham clarity—the unintelligibility of the trivial. But to keep silent does not mean to be dumb. On the contrary, if a man is dumb, he still has a tendency to ‘speak’. Such a person has not proved that he can keep silence; indeed, he entirely lacks the possibility of proving anything of the sort. And the person who is accustomed by Nature to speak little is no better able to show that he is keeping silent or that he is the sort of person who can do so. He who never says anything cannot keep silent at any given moment. Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say—that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. In that case one’s reticence [Verschwiegenheit] makes something manifest, and does away with ‘idle talk’ [“Gerede”]. As a mode of discoursing, reticence Articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a Potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent.

      Heidegger: hearing / hearkening [Horchen] / keeping silent || This fascinating ontological exposition needs to be considered in the context of modern communication technology (e.g. social media). What does it mean when the force shaping the sphere of Gerede is no longer primarily one of embodied interpersonal communication? Does Dasein's relation to others undergo a primordial transformation when the interval / caesura / epoche / possibility of silence is foreclosed / enframed? It would be useful to explore this alongside Habermas' theory of the public sphere and his quarrel with Derrida (Limited Inc.)

    15. And if we are inquiring about the meaning of Being, our investigation does not then become a “deep” one [tiefsinnig], nor does it puzzle out what stands behind Being. It asks about Being itself in so far as Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein. The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as the ‘ground’ which gives entities support; for a ‘ground’ becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness.45

      Heidegger: "‘ground’ becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness." || The metaphorical "ground" of meaning only makes sense within the context of an equally metaphorical space of ideas that impend / depend / build / undermine one another. The metaphor which grants conceptual / theoretical language this spatiality (this sine qua non of reason) is itself meaningless or, as de Man / Schlegel would say, arbitrary. The "arbitrariness" of irony / language, the mechanicity of the "text machine" are related to this Abgrund of Grund.

    16. That which is understood gets Articulated when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretatively by taking as our clue the ‘something as something’; and this Articulation lies before [liegt vor] our making any thematic assertion about it. In such an assertion the ‘as’ does not turn up for the first time; it just gets expressed for the first time, and this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible.38 The fact that when we look at something, the explicitness of assertion can be absent, does not justify our denying that there is any Articulative interpretation in such mere seeing, and hence that there is any as-structure in it. When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp something free, as it were, of the “as”, requires a certain readjustment. When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the “as”, is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands. It is not more primordial than that kind of seeing, but is derived from it. If the ‘as’ is ontically unexpressed, this must not seduce us into overlooking it as a constitutive state for understanding, existential and a priori.

      Heidegger: "articulartion lies before [liegt vor] our making any thematic assertion about it || This is a typical enough evocation of the circularity of interpretation and perception / hermeneutic circle. Stiegler will question the extent to which this idea of articulation can include the tertiary retentions of technical being. As it concerns the question of thematization, Stiegler's question gives us occasion to ask whether thematic intervention is possible without such a mnemotechnical intervention

    17. The fact that, even though states-of-mind are primarily disclosive, everyday circumspection goes wrong and to a large extent succumbs to delusion because of them, is a μὴ ὄν [non-being] when measured against the idea of knowing the ‘world’ absolutely. But if we make evaluations which are so unjustified ontologically, we shall completely fail to recognize the existentially positive character of the capacity for delusion. It is precisely when we see the ‘world’ unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific worldhood, which is never the same from day to day. By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed it down to the uniformity of what is purely present-at-hand, though admittedly this uniformity comprises a new abundance of things which can be discovered by simply characterizing them. Yet even the purest θεωρία [theory] has not left all moods behind it; even when we look theoretically at what is just present-at-hand, it does not show itself purely as it looks unless this θεωρία lets it come towards us in a tranquil tarrying alongside…, in ῥαστώνη and διαγωγή.iv Any cognitive determining has its existential-ontological Constitution in the state-of-mind of Being-in-the-world; but pointing this out is not to be confused with attempting to surrender science ontically to ‘feeling’.

      Heidegger: theoretical moods || theory 'dims' the deep texture of equipment / stuff / pragmata / zuhandenheit (i.e. its projection into and weaving within time / history) into the merely present-at-hand. Heidegger's acknowledgment of a "new abundance of things" here is interesting. Does this refer to the prior equipmental totality that has been dimmed by theoretical insight or is he suggesting a new layer of readiness-to-hand that emerges only when that totality has been grasped theoretically. Might this "new abundance" of theory suggest what de Man calls the "generative" power's of trope. It will be especially helpful to contrast this theoretical dimming with de Man's theory of theoretical blindness and insight since that latter was formulated earlier in de Man's career when he was (arguably) more swayed by the rhetoric of Heideggerian temporality. Certainly this discussion also approaches the crux of pathos in de Man / Derrida / Rousseau. At the moment, though, I'm more concerned with the possibility of mapping the "psycholinguistic" dimension of tropes that de Man alludes to in Allegories of Reading. Heidegger gives us this gives us this theory of pathos / pathos of theory which are clearly never far from de Man's mind. Both want to install "rhetoric" in a space that isn't simply inside or outside the world...

    18. When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the lumen naturale in man, we have in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it is in such a way as to be its “there”. To say that it is ‘illuminated’ [“erleuchtet”] means that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing.2 Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, Dasein brings its “there” along with it. If it lacks its “there”, it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness.

      Heidegger: "lumen naturale" / Dasein "is itself the clearing" ||

    19. The psychological Interpretation according to which the “I” has something ‘in the memory’ [“im Gedächtnis”] is at bottom a way of alluding to the existentially constitutive state of Being-in-the-world.

      Heidegger: inwardness of memory ["Gedächtnis"] as an allusion to "Being-in-the-world" ||

    20. Regions are not first formed by things which are present-at-hand together; they always are ready-to-hand already in individual places. Places themselves either get allotted to the ready-to-hand in the circumspection of concern, or we come across them. Thus anything constantly ready-to-hand of which circumspective Being-in-the-world takes account beforehand, has its place. The “where” of its readiness-to-hand is put to account as a matter for concern, and oriented towards the rest of what is ready-to-hand. Thus the sun, whose light and warmth are in everyday use, has its own places—sunrise, midday, sunset, midnight; these are discovered in circumspection and treated distinctively in terms of changes in the usability of what the sun bestows. Here we have something which is ready-to-hand with uniform constancy, although it keeps changing; its places become accentuated ‘indicators’ of the regions which lie in them. These celestial regions, which need not have any geographical meaning as yet, provide the “whither” beforehand for every63 special way of giving form to the regions which places can occupy. The house has its sunny side and its shady side; the way it is divided up into ‘rooms’ [“Räume”] is oriented towards these, and so is the ‘arrangement’ [“Einrichtung”] within them, according to their character as equipment. Churches and graves, for instance, are laid out according to the rising and the setting of the sun—the regions of life and death, which are determinative for Dasein itself with regard to its ownmost possibilities of Being in the world. Dasein, in its very Being, has this Being as an issue; and its concern discovers beforehand those regions in which some involvement is decisive. This discovery of regions beforehand is co-determined [mitbestimmt] by the totality of involvements for which the ready-to-hand, as something encountered, is freed. The readiness-to-hand which belongs to any such region beforehand has the character of inconspicuous familiarity, and it has it in an even more primordial sense than does the Being of the ready-to-hand.64

      Heidegger: "inconspicuous familiarity" of the "region" || familiarity of mind maps / infographics

    21. The context of assignments or references, which, as significance, is constitutive for worldhood, can be taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations. But one must note that in such formalizations the phenomena get levelled off so much that their real phenomenal content may be lost, especially in the case of such ‘simple’ relationships as those which lurk in significance.

      Heidegger: context of reference and the 'leveling' of phenomena ||

    22. When an assignment to some particular “towards-this” has been thus circumspectively aroused, we catch sight of the “towards-this” itself, and along with it everything connected with the work—the whole ‘work-shop’—as that wherein concern always dwells. The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself.

      Heidegger: lighting of the the "work-shop" ||

    23. The work produced refers not only to the “towards-which” of its usability and the “whereof” of which it consists: under simple craft conditions it also has an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it. The work is cut to his figure; he ‘is’ there along with it as the work emerges. Even when goods are produced by the dozen, this constitutive assignment is by no means lacking; it is merely indefinite, and points to the random, the average.

      Heidegger: craftsman's "work is cut to his figure; he ‘is’ there along with it as the work emerges" ||

    24. The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zurückzuziehen] in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves [die Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered.12

      Heidegger: "The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered" ||

    25. Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially ‘something in-order-to…’ [“etwas um-zu…”]. A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the ‘in-order-to’, such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability.

      Heidegger: "Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment" || c.f. Enframing

    26. With regard to the awkwardness and ‘inelegance’ of expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the ‘grammar’.

      Heidegger: lacking a "grammar" of Being ||

    27. Αἴσθησις, the sheer sensory perception of something, is ‘true’ in the Greek sense, and indeed more primordially than the λόγος which we have been discussing. Just as seeing aims at colours, any αἴσθησις aims at its ἴδια (those entities which are genuinely accessible only through it and for it); and to that extent this perception is always true. This means that seeing always discovers colours, and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure νοεῖν is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at them.34 This νοεῖν is what is ‘true’ in the purest and most primordial sense; that is to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such a way that it can never cover up. This νοεῖν can never cover up; it can never be false; it can at worst remain a non-perceiving, άγνοεῖν, not sufficing for straightforward and appropriate access.

      Heidegger: truth of "aesthesis" ||

    28. A. The Concept of Phenomenon H. 29 The Greek expression φαινόμενον, to which the term ‘phenomenon’ goes back, is derived from the verb φαίνεσθαι, which signifies “to show itself”. Thus φαινόμενον means that which shows itself, the manifest [das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare]. φαίνεσθαι itself is a middle-voiced form which comes from φαίνω—to bring to the light of day, to put in the light. Φαίνω comes from the stem φα—, like φῶς, the light, that which is bright—in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself. Thus we must keep in mind that the expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Accordingly the φαινόμενα or ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light—what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with τὰ ὄντα (entities). Now an entity can show itself from itself [von ihm selbst her] in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not. When it shows itself in this way, it ‘looks like something or other’ [“sieht”… “so aus wie…”]. This kind of showing-itself is what we call “seeming” [Scheinen]. Thus in Greek too the expression φαινόμενον (“phenomenon”) signifies that which looks like something, that which is ‘semblant’, ‘semblance’ [das “Scheinbare”, der “Schein”]. Φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν means something good which looks like, but ‘in actuality’ is not, what it gives itself out to be. If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon, everything depends on our seeing how what is designated in the first signification of φαινόμενον (‘phenomenon’ as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second (‘phenomenon’ as semblance) are structurally interconnected. Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself—that is, of being a phenomenon—can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it ‘merely look like so-and-so’. When φαινόμενον signifies ‘semblance’, the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded. We shall allot the term ‘phenomenon’ to this positive and primordial signification of φαινόμενον, and distinguish “phenomenon” from “semblance”, which is the privative modification of “phenomenon” as thus defined. But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all to do with what is called an ‘appearance’, or still less a ‘mere appearance’.22

      Heidegger: "The Concept of Phenomenon" ||

    29. Its own past—and this always means the past of its ‘generation’—is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it.

      Heidegger: future past of a "generation" ||

    30. In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being—that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which [woraufhin] entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity

      Heidegger: "The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity." ||

    31. However much this understanding of Being (an understanding which is already available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance with a word, its very indefiniteness is itself a positive phenomenon which needs to be clarified.

      Heidegger: "indefiniteness is itself a positive phenomenon..." || c.f. algorithmic visibility of unreadability

    32. So if it is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that it is the one which is clearest or that it needs no further discussion. It is rather the darkest of all.

      Heidegger: Being as "darkest" concept || c.f. "lumen naturale" (below)

    33. Proximally and for the most part, de-severing69 is a circumspective bringing-close—bringing something close by, in the sense of procuring it, putting it in readiness, having it to hand. But certain ways in which entities are discovered in a purely cognitive manner also have the character of bringing them close. In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness. All the ways in which we speed things up, as we are more or less compelled to do today, push us on towards the conquest of remoteness. With the ‘radio’, for example, Dasein has so expanded its everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the ‘world’—a de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized.

      Heidegger: radio and the "conquest of remoteness" ||

    1. The genetic/epigenetic relation is a dimension of différance qua the history of life. The question then is that of a specification of différance differing and deferred, of the possibility of such specification, if it is true that Leroi-Gourhan’s major point consists in putting into question a clear break between the animal and the human. His way of broaching this problem brings him back, in the final analysis, to the heart of a simple opposition, albeit one shifted to the also quite traditional level of faber/sapiens. He is brought back in the same stroke (the coup of the second origin) to the metaphysics of an opposition between the inside and the outside, the before and the after, of the animal human and the spiritual human, and so on. We are trying to preserve and to broach the aporetic impossibility of simply opposing the interior to the exterior in speaking of an instrumental maieutics that alone permits an understanding of how tools do not derive from a creation or from a consciousness present to itself, master of matter, but pursue a process engaged long before the rupture yet nevertheless constitute a rupture— a new organization of différance, a différance of différance. Now, if the central concept is in fact that of epiphylogenetic memory, allowing for both the contestation of oppositions and the description and preservation of differentiations, it does not seem to us to have any equivalent in grammatological deconstructions. We shall develop this question further on the level of linear writing. Without such a concept, it seems to us impossible to specify the différance, differing and deferring, with respect to différance in general qua the history of life in general, or to say what the human is or is not. We are left: with the ambiguity of the invention of the human, that is, of the subject of the verb “to invent,” that which holds together the who and the what, as being that which binds them while separating them; this is, then, différance— this double movement, this intersection of reflection, this reflecting whereby the who and the what are constituted as the twin faces of the same phenomenon.

      Stiegler: (partial) critique of "différance" || interested to know whether Derrida ever responds to this point directly

    2. The question is time, becoming qua the bringing into play of the non- programmed, the improbable, and destiny qua nonpredestination. The temporality of the human, which marks it off among the other living beings, presupposes exteriorization and prostheticity: there is time only because memory is “artificial,” becoming constituted as already-there since [from the point of: depuis] its “having been placed outside of the species.” And this “since” must be taken literally: inheriting the name “human” is inheriting the entire past already there, everything that has taken place, since the “appallingly ancient.”

      Stiegler: "there is time only because memory is "artificial" ||

    3. Expression is the possibility of generalization, that is, of anticipation qua intellectualization. The symbol is always already an “intellectual,” “general” symbol, and never simply the “technical symbol” of a merely technical language— and it is always with such adverbs that thought deals offhandedly with its limits. Moreover, all operating sequences, qua combinatorics, already presuppose such a possibility.

      Stiegler: "technical symbol" / "it is always with such adverbs that thought deals offhandedly with its limits" ||

    4. It must of course be understood in the cybernetic sense, but cybernetics is itself intelligible only in terms of a history of the possibilities of the trace as the unity of a double movement of protention and retention. This movement goes far beyond the possibilities of “intentional consciousness.” It is an emergence that makes the grammē appear as such (that is to say according to a new structure of nonpresence) and undoubtedly makes possible the emergence of the systems of writing in the narrow sense. (Derrida 1974, 84) The grammē structures all levels of the living and beyond, the pursuit of life by means other than life, “since genetic inscription’ . . . up to the passage beyond alphabetic writing to the orders of the logos and of a certain Homo sapiens.” And it must be thought from out of the process of the “freeing of memory” described by Leroi-Gourhan: “an exteriorization always already begun but always larger than the trace which, beginning from the elementary programmēs of so-called ‘ instinctive’ behavior up to the constitution of electronic card indexes and reading machines, enlarges différance and the possibility of putting in reserve” (Derrida 1974, 84).

      Stiegler > Derrida: the "program...must... be understood in a cybernetic sense" ||

    5. There is here an actual techno-logical maieutic. Certainly, what is invented, exhumed, brought to light, brought into the world by the object exists in the laws of physics. But in physics they exist only as possibilities. When they are freed, they are no longer possibilities but realities, irreversibly— pure possibilities that have become effects which must from that point on be taken into account. They become reality only through the technical object’s potential of inventiveness, in the process of concretization characterized by the fact that the human has no longer the inventive role but that of an operator. If he or she keeps the inventors role, it is qua an actor listening to cues from the object itself, reading from the text of matter. To draw further on the metaphor, the actor is not the author— and that is why existing technical objects are never thoroughly concrete; they are never consciously conceived and realized by the human from out of this “logic,” which is strictly speaking empirical, experimental, and in a sense quasi-existential (it is the object’s mode of existence), the sense, namely, that this logic is revealed only in its realization, in the experience of the object itself, or, as it were, on stage, and not at the time of conception. In this move the logic of invention becomes in essence unpredictable, as in Maunoury; and this is why “the technical object is never totally known.” For this very reason, it is never totally rational nor “ever totally concrete, except in the quite rare case of a fortuitous encounter” (Simondon 1958, 35). Thus does concretization call on technics to transform itself into technoscience and on technoscience to replace science. But this means that concretization calls for technoscientific experimentation to replace scientific deduction.

      Stiegler: the "techno-logical maieutic" || My understanding is that the human attends the "labor" of the machine but I'm a bit lost when he adds the performative dimension of the actor to this metaphor. Perhaps it is the relay from the metaphor of birth (where the "technical object" would seem to be personified as child if personification weren't already superseded by this point) to the metaphor of performance (where the human acts semi-autonomously improvising upon "the text of matter") that we actually touch on what the strangeness of the maieutic. It is a mixed metaphor wherein each scene the central figure (child / actor) is a concretion of man and machine (mixed parentage) while the more one-sided tutelary figures are exchanged (from the distinctly human "midwife" to the overtly technical "text of matter"). Or is it, rather, that the reading of the text of matter is the becoming-human of the machine (language) and the becoming-machine of the actor. C.f. Benjamin's idea of being on camera as a performance of one's humanity

    6. Accounting for the technical dynamic non-anthropologically, by means of the concept of “process,” means refusing to consider the technical object as a utensil, a means, but rather defining it “in itself.” A utensil is characterized by its inertia. But the inventiveness proper to the technical object is a process of concretization by functional overdetermination. This concretization is the history of the technical object; it gives the object “its consistency at the end of an evolution, proving that it cannot be considered as a mere utensil” (Simondon 1958, 15). The industrial technical object is not inert. It harbors a genetic logic that belongs to itself alone, and that is its “mode of existence.” It is not the result of human activity, nor is it a human disposition, only registering its lessons and executing them. The lessons of the machine are “inventions” in the ancient sense of the term: exhumations.

      Stiegler > Simondon: "genetic logic" of the "technical object" / "invention" as "exhumation" || "concretization by functional overdetirmination" is an interesting way of restoring a sense of facticity to something that is untraceable causally. Just because the causal knot cannot be untangled does not prevent it from being registered (here again I have in mind an algorithmic mapping of rhetoric). It seems necessary to compare the "genetic logic" of the technical object with the generativity of the trope (c.f. de Man). Also, thinking of the rhetoric of the en-abyme / abground surrounding the "understanding" Being and Time, one might ask what, exactly, is this "ground" from which technical "inventions" are exhumed?

  8. Aug 2018
    1. This text analysis that it contains words written in hebrew and deciphering of the first sentence of the text using hebrew translation seems to align with what this author is saying about the text being passed down through the family.

      She made recommendations to the priest, man of the house and me and people.

      [Source] (https://hyp.is/GB7sZKjvEeidoGeGo8L6jA/www.independent.co.uk/news/science/mysterious-manuscript-decoded-computer-scientists-ai-a8180951.html)

    1. Comments, questions, suggestions? Your feedback is welcome.

      Sukhwant Singh's analysis here seems to fit with a lot of other's partial analysis/observations such as multiple characters representing the same character, certain characters only appearing at the end of words etc. It seems quite compelling. The dates however, are a century too early although that does not necessarily dispel his theory that it is written in Landa Khojki.

    2. Many "words" differ by only one character and are found in each other's vicinity

      This might suggest the same thing as Tiltman's analysis in that a single character may take several forms.

    3. Tiltman treats f as a variant form of k and p as a variant form of t

      When learning that there were over 100 characters used in the manuscript my first thought was that perhaps variations of a character were used to represent the same character.

    4. Speaking generally, each character behaves as if it has its own place in an 'order of precedence' within words; some symbols such as o and y seem to be able to occupy two functionally different places.

      This is very interesting. It seems to suggest that each word may be scrambled based on the characters used.

  9. www.swingvilles.com www.swingvilles.com
    1. Could it be possible to justify the texts in general? (pop-ups, dances descriptions, etc...) So it has a classier outcome.

    2. n’est

      n'ait

    3. d’une

      d'un

    4. au

      aux

    5. et leurs

      et de leurs (add "de" in between)

    6. LES DANSES DE COUPLES LES DANSES DE COUPLES LES DANSES DE COUPLES LES DANSES DE COUPLES

      COUPLE (without the "s" at the end)

    7. Thématique

      Thématiques (add the "s" at the end)

    8. Illimité

      illimité (small "i" at the beginning cause the typo makes it hard to read with the 2 'l' afterward)

    9. Swing Lab

      SwingLab (no space between the 2 words)

    10. Détail du niveau

      "Détail du cours" (let's put this for that one). And right now it doesn't open any pop-up. Could it be possible to open a pop-up with the class description? (doesn't matter to me to have this repeated twice). I copy the text here to facilitate your task: Le Street Dance est un cours enfants (6 à 18 ans). Au sein de ce cours, nous y explorerons les danses urbaines des plus contemporaines (Hip Hop, Dance Hall, Afro,…) aux plus anciennes (Swing, Charleston, …). L’idée pour ce cours est de mélanger les tranches d’âge afin de proposer une experience enrichissante pour tout le monde (motivation pour les plus jeunes regardant les plus âgés et responsabilisation/parrainage pour les plus âgés envers les plus jeunes).

    11. Lindy hop 1

      Lindy Hop 1 (capital "H" for Hop)

    12. Lindy hop 2

      Lindy Hop 2 (capital "H" for Hop)

    13. Lindy hop 3

      Lindy Hop 3 (capital "H" for Hop)

    14. Danses de couples

      Danses de couple (without the "s" at the end)

    15. Lindy hop

      Lindy Hop (capital "H" for Hop)

    16. N

      n (small size instead of capital)

    17. Swing Lab

      SwingLab (without the space between the 2 words)

    18. N

      n (small size instead of capital)

    19. Accèss

      Accès (without the second "s" at the end)

    20. Avenue

      avenue (small letter "a")

    21. 3400

      34000 (one zero extra)

    22. Vous n’en avez

      Vous n'avez (scratching the "en")

    23. Ce

      ce (small "c")

    24. Lindy Hop , sortez

      (...) Lindy Hop. Vous sortez(...) (separate the long sentence in two sentences)

    25. Register now

      S'inscrire

    26. Register now

      S'inscrire

    27. Abonnenments

      Abonnements

    28. Intermediarie

      Intermédiaire

    29. Intermédiarie

      Intermédiaire

    30. Intermédiarie

      Intermédiaire

  10. Jun 2018
    1. Text is not going away, but if we really want it to be understood and remembered, we should integrate it better with physical and emotional experience. This convergence may happen with the “physicalization” of the digital world, where digital experiences become part of our physical life.

      Como nos filmes, será que um dia a Web vai extrapolar o digital e ir para o mundo físico?

  11. Apr 2018
  12. Feb 2018
    1. Love

      ‘S í an teanga Ghaodheilge is greannta cló, Go blasta léightear í mar cheol ‘S í chanas briathra binn-ghuth beóil, ‘S is fíor gur mór a h-áille (v)

      Hyde’s romantically excessively verse translates roughly as:

      It is the Gaelic language whose shape is most fine, She reads as a tuneful music, It is she who sings the mouth’s sweetest syllables, And truly her beauty is great

    1. Trojan

      in reference to the story of how the Greeks used a wooden horse to win a ten-year long war against the Trojans.

    2. Cn. Octavius

      The firs consul of Octavii. Octavii like many other plebian families, became known during the first Punic Wars.

  13. Dec 2017
  14. Nov 2017
    1. In conformity with the principles of our constitution, which places all sects of religion on an equal footing, with the jealousies of the different sects in guarding that equality from encroachment & surprise, and with the sentiments of the legislature in favor of freedom of religion manifested on former occasions, we have proposed no professor of Divinity

      I find this point in the document to be forward-thinking, particularly considering the time period it was written in. It is well known that Thomas Jefferson wanted to create a university centered around learning rather than religion, which is why the Rotunda (a library) serves as the center of the university rather than a chapel or church, as was common among other colleges at the time. This concept of religious freedom and equality is especially intriguing after taking "Can a text be ethical?" with Professor Spittler this semester. Just as the commissioners of the university proposed not to force a prescribed set of religious beliefs on its students who may not have similar religious backgrounds, many of my discussion groups in the ethical engagement came to the conclusion that the New Testament cannot be used as the sole basis for an ethical argument, because not everyone holds the New Testament to be a sacred and valid text. Claire Waterhouse

    1. The majority of time allocated to working with text focused on disciplinary knowledge activities that did not actively engage students in making sense of texts.

      What would be some instructional designs that helps students to make sense of the texts?

  15. Oct 2017
    1. The objects of this primary education determine its character & limits. These objects would be, To give to every citizen the information he needs for the transaction of his own business. To enable him to calculate for himself, and to express & preserve his ideas, his contracts & accounts in writing. To improve by reading, his morals and faculties. To understand his duties to his neighbours, & country, and to discharge with competence the functions confided to him by either. To know his rights; to exercise with order & justice those he retains; to choose with discretion the fiduciaries of those he delegates; and to notice their conduct with diligence with candor & judgment. And, in general, to observe with intelligence & faithfulness all the social relations under which he shall be placed.

      This portion of the document is extremely important because it addresses the purpose of the University, but is also somewhat ironic regarding what was stated earlier in the document. In the first paragraph, it is revealed that the University's location was chosen based on its centrality to the white population in Virginia. Although this statement implies a bias against non-white Virginians, the listed purposes of the University and what it hopes to impart to its students paint a different picture, one in which a student would use his education to behave morally in society. In this light, the purpose of the University can be interpreted in different ways, either as a way to serve the white population so that they may "preserve [the] ideas" of the time Oppositely, students could use the knowledge they gain to "improve [their] morals," and work to bring about change in society by educating others about the ethical way to interact with people of all races.

      Claire W.

    1. I chose the supplemental reading titled Mystery of Russian Fake on Facebook Solved, By a Brazilian. The article followed the story of how Russia created fake profiles on Facebook in order to spread Russian propaganda and denounce Hillary Clinton. A Brazilian salesman noticed that his pictures of him and his daughter were being used for fake American profiles. The profile in question was "Melvin Redick", and he would openly promote the Russian propaganda website DCLeaks.com. The NY Times tried to track down Mr. Redick, but upon further investigation, he did not seem to exist. After the Times reported this to Facebook the profile was soon removed from the website. Reading this article which contained quotes from Mr. Costacurta on how he felt about his pictures being used was eye-opening. The article shows how little the Russians care for the privacy of others as well as how our internet profiles may be a lot less secure than we think. The Russian government stole the pictures of an innocent Brazilian man, in order to influence another country's election. The blatant disregard for morals and Costacura's value as a person are very evident through Russia's actions. They took advantage of how Google blocks image searches of its Brazilian users (a rule that is intended to protect the privacy of users) in order to influence the 2016 election.

  16. Sep 2017
    1. This doctrine is the genuine fruit of the alliance between church and State

      While Jefferson is often accredited with being on of the primary figures supporting a separation of church and state, this line brings that into question. This seems to assert that the church and the government have a bond and are on the same side. In many ways, this is true; both religion and public education have similar goals in educating youth so that they can be productive and valued people in the future. The only difference being that these institutions have different definitions for what is "valued". In the Can a text be Ethical engagement class, it is frequently discussed how the Bible is used as evidence for many philosophical arguments. It is clear that the writers of the Rockfish Gap Report do respect the church and its basic beliefs because they freely admit to being in an alliance with the church. However, in spite of this, it must still be asked whether Jefferson and the other writers of this document were for or against the complete separation of church and state.

      Ryan Keane

    2. Some of these have rendered the elements themselves subservient to the purposes of man

      Ideas themselves don't support an argument. People can skew the meanings of ignore the overall context to serve their own purposes. Interpretation is a large factor whenever we learn or teach. It isn't unethical to use knowledge as evidence, but it's wrong to purposefully assume meanings without considering the full history and still continue to publish it.

      Wei Guan

  17. Aug 2017
    1. A Buschle & Lepper é referência na fabricação, comercialização e distribuição de produtos químicos, insumos agrícolas, magnésio e derivados. Pioneira na extração de magnésio, atende mais de 12 mil clientes dos mercados alimentício, farmacêutico, cosmético e industrial e está presente em mais de 23 estados brasileiros e 17 países.

      Não gostei deste texto. Muda ai

  18. Jul 2017
    1. Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação do Equador.

      ejemplo

    Tags

    Annotators

    1. User Package The Packages/User/ folder is the User package. It is unique in that it is loaded last by Sublime Text. This allows users to place changes to .sublime-settings and .sublime-keymap files in this folder. Sublime Text loads these files by name. Thus if a package has a file named Package Control.sublime-settings in the package, a file with the same name in the User package will override any of the settings in the original file. The same is true for key bindings.

      This explains why customizing Packages/User is a way to customize settings from various installed packages in ST3.

    1. This third research question led to the formulation of agile text mining, a new methodologyagile textminingto support the development of efficient TMAs. Agile text mining copes with the unpredictablerealities of creating text-mining applications.
  19. Apr 2017
    1. it really so easy, forexample, to distinguish between a speaker, an audience, a message, anda context?

      After last week, we can probably agree that "no"--it isn't. Vatz and Bitzer were talking inside the same "box," regarding the speaker, audience, and context as discrete parts, and the post-human is part of the movement which pushes us outside that box, wanting to argue that the parts are not, in fact, discrete.

    1. the"music"cannotbemadeclearanddistinctfromotherfactors,suchasitsnearinaudibility,thecompetingsoundsofwindandrain,moodsetterssuchaslight,andsoon.Themusic,inotherwords,mergeswithitssurroundings,

      This is akin to Edbauer's use of "bleeding" or "flux"

    1. nallcases,however,criticsstilltak:eastheirfoundingpresumptionacausalrelationbetweentheconstituentelementscomprisingtheeventasawhole

      Gloss: "but everyone was wrong until me!"

      This whole series of readings has been very sassy and self-important. Well . . . the way I'm reading them, they sound sassy.

    2. Thepresentdiscussionwillnottrytoreviewthisbodyofarguments;ratheritwillattempttotumwhatappearstobeanimpasse(doessituationorspeakeroccupythepositionoforigin?)intoaproductivecontradiction,onethatmakesitpossibleforustorethinkrhetoricinanewway.

      This was almost exactly what Consigny said about his goal. I wonder if they were writing at the same time, since Biesecker is clearly not afraid of calling people out directly for the flaws she sees in their arguments.

    1. Problemsdonotformulatethemselves,andtherhetordoesnotsimplyfindwell-posedproblemsinasituation

      I feel like I'm missing something here. Perhaps problems do not formulate themselves in a vacuum and the problems may not be well-posed, but there is a large degree to which problems occur outside of a rhetor's influence. The President might have the responsibility to determine what problems he should try to address, but that ignores the fact that the question of what to say at the inaugural address is itself a problem that formulated long before any individual President is born. Similarly, the problems he must choose to address likely formed outside of his control, as well.

    2. ThusBitzer'sclaimthat"'situation'isnotastandardterminthevocabularyofrhetoricaltheory"24ismisleading

      Yet the one thing all three of them seem to agree upon is that the very term "situation" is unclear. Bitzer seems right to say that there is no standard meaning, and Consigny seems awfully self-righteous, here, considering his point is essentially "he was right, but in the wrong way!"

    1. Through lack of prac-tice and not having others who can speak it, I've lost most of the Paclmco tongue.

      As with signifyin(g), practice and the social interchange with others are crucial.

    2. looking into the mirror.

      More mirror imagery, as in Gates

    3. I write the myths in me,

      As Byron is saying above, this is a really interesting new spin on embodiment and the connections between language and imagination. This feels a lot like Cixous' impassioned speaker.

    4. o be a mouth- the cost is too high- her whole life enslaved to that de-vouring mouth.

      A thematic return to the mouth, with which we began the piece.

    1. For the third Text Color, choose the same color you chose for the previous text.

      If we must use the same color we used for the previous text color, it is easier to just copy and paste the previous color's item code number (the short phrase beginning with a hashtag).

  20. Mar 2017
    1. f a committed doubter says to us that he will not accept the valued fact of man's rhetorical na-ture, we see now that he cannot avoid illustrating it as he tries to atgue against it: we discuss our doubt together, therefore we are. If he chooses to '· deny the value we are placing on the fact that this ~ is how we are made, we cannot, it is true, offer C him any easy disproof, in his sense of the word.

      Hey, Nathaniel, did you . . . did you by chance want to talk about love in the context of this reading? I just got this weird, uncanny sense you wanted us to think about love when I noticed it written in all caps in the margins for the third? fourth? time in this text.

      So to make that connection explicit, this is a good example of the problem Corder was trying to address at the end of his piece, in which an earnest attempt to work out steadfast and competing narratives must come from a place of love, or will otherwise result in dissatisfaction/danger/subjection of one narrative.

      [I know this is brief, so feel free to build on this gloss, guys]

    1. if that were truly the mode of proceeding, it would re-quire a "neutral observation language" (p. I 25), a language that registers facts without any media-tion by paradigm-specific assumptions. The problem is that "philosophical investigation has not yet provided even a hint of what a language able to do that would be like" (p. 127).

      This sounds a lot like Corder's final line, declaring that the only truly "free speech" would be garbled nonsense devoid of meaning.

    2. The question can only be answered from within one or the other, and the evidence of one party will be regarded by the other either as illusory or as grist for its own mill.

      This sounds a lot like Corder's opposing narratives, particularly the idea that "evidence and reason are only evidence and reason" if the narratives are in sync.

    3. ·'emergencies"

      It seems unclear whether this use of quotation marks is mean to indicate that he is pulling the word directly from Wilkins' work, or if it is just somewhat sarcastic in tone. I suspect the former, but prefer the latter. The idea of language emerging as a result of so-called emergencies sounds a lot like it results from self-made conflicts -- perhaps like the clashing of narratives in Corder's piece.

    1. each of us is a narrative. We're always standing some place in our lives, and there is always a tale of how we came to stand there

      This sounds a lot like Cixous' "Who am I? I am 'doing' French history." (Of course, Cixous goes on to emphasize the body a great deal, but this sounds like a more abstract appreciation of individuals as historically situated.

    1. sexuality and politics;

      He is here discussing the prohibitions around the very topic, but of course there were doubly taboos on who could talk about the taboo subjects, and whose accounts of the matter were considered downright dangerous.

    2. I ~hould have preferred to be enveloped by speech, and carried away well beyond all possible beginnings, rather than have to begin it myself. I should have preferred to be-come aware that a nameless voice was already speaking long before me, so that I should only have needed to join in

      This narrative voice is interesting, considering the way he considers the problems of the author/narrator in the previous pages.

    3. the payment that he re-ceives from the community or from individuals;

      This is only one of many factors, but the materiality is--I think--crucial, and recalls Woolf's five hundred pounds a year.

    4. discourse i1, a form of social action

      This seems to link us back to the problem of embodiment, and those rhetors for whom the very fact of public speaking was an urgent political problem and social action. (Douglass, Palmer, Stewart, Grimke(s), etc.)

    1. his tradi-tion, in which the theory of invention is reduced to a minimum and interest is focused on the per-suasive aspect of discourse, is represented by such original works as George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) and Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric (1828)

      Oh, hey, we know those guys. It's been a while since they've been mentioned in our readings, though.

    2. All language is the language of a community,

      This idea seems similar to Nietzsche's that all language is a series of socially-agreed-upon lies.

    1. In addition, Neylon suggested that some low-level TDM goes on below the radar. ‘Text and data miners at universities often have to hide their location to avoid auto cut-offs of traditional publishers. This makes them harder to track. It’s difficult to draw the line between what’s text mining and what’s for researchers’ own use, for example, putting large volumes of papers into Mendeley or Zotero,’ he explained.

      Without a clear understanding of what a reference managers can do and what text and data mining is, it seems that some publishers will block the download of fulltexts on their platforms.

  21. Feb 2017
    1. instructional staff

      I think Nathaniel is right to point out a gender problem, as he has in his marginal comment, here. However, I think we also see a class problem arising more starkly. Whereas before there was a certain "professionalization" automatically associated with teaching at the college level, the "respectability" teaching once granted has disappeared. Although he does not explicitly invoke the word "class," Weaver clearly feels that those who make up the "instructional staff" are low in stature and respectability. To be a little crass, this sounds an awful lot like Weaver is complaining about "the neighborhood going down hill," so to speak. Although the "instructional staff" presumably have some sort of authority and experience to earn this teaching role, Weaver sees their arrival as signaling the decline of rhetoric as he once knew it, rather than seeing it as a sign that rhetoric is becoming more accessible and that more groups of people are actively engaging in rhetoric.

    2. Because rhetoric tries to orient the audience toward a worldview, it is imperative for the study of rhetoric to identify and evaluate the controlling ideas (or "god-terms") on which the ethics of any discourse is based.

      Ah ha! So I guess this answers my question about the Burke reading. I had a hard time following the Burke, but Weaver's connection to Plato is obviously much clearer. (And Weaver in general is also much clearer.)

    1. And the novels, without meaning to, inevitably lie.

      Ah, the lies again!

    2. That Miss Richardson gets so far as to achieve a sense of reality far greater than that produced by the ordinary means is un-doubted. But, then, which reality is it, the superfi-cial or the profound?

      The benefits of experimentation in consciousness writing, which Woolf goes on to utilize in her own fiction.

    1. inventing not only the matter of their texts, but appropriate personae to deliver thcm.

      Although this particular quote is about women rhetors, this ties us back to our discussion of Douglass' choice of carefully-tailored personae during his lecture circuits.

    1. I mean the doctrine of Usage. The doc-0 trine that there is a right or a good use for every -\+,....+ word and that literary virtue consists in making rtut...;..l. that good use of it

      It feels like we are finally getting to his most important point. This also seems related to Nietzsche, to an extent, in that to claim a "right" or "good" usage implies that we can improve on language by narrowing it, but this sort of view of language ignores that it's all just a system of metaphor.

    2. We should develop our theory of signs from observations of other people, and only admit evidence drawn from in-trospection when we know how to appraise it.

      But we are inherently trapped within our own perceptions of other people's perceptions. He is trying to call out the problem of introspection, but seems to overlook that the influence of introspection can not be completely avoided.

      This is the problem noted in the introduction, when Richards would remove the author and title from a poem and then critique the test subjects' responses as being "wrong" for various reasons, when he was drawing on his own outside knowledge of the poem and literature generally to establish how and why they were "wrong." He cannot get outside himself, but he seems to forget that, from time to time.

    3. for bona fide communications,

      It feels like this is a distinction between Nietzsche's social lies and anti-social lies. If I'm glossing this correctly, bona fide communications are those social lies which we have all agreed upon to enable communication. "Misdirection" is the anti-social lie for the purpose of trickery.

    1. If a pastor is present ask him to offer prayer

      An opportunity for a man to participate, but also ropes him in to offering an implicit endorsement of the group/meeting by blessing it. Willard is recommending another sort of testimonial.

    2. it may be reasonably claimed that men's hopes of hea~en will be im-measurnbly increased

      This reminds me of Douglass' argument that slavery was dangerous to whites as well as blacks because it corrupted even the most tender-hearted mistress. These sorts of appeals remind us that these rhetors are always thinking about the make up of their audience.

    3. one hundred and twenty in the Pentecostal chamber, and in that number women were clearly and indisputably included.

      I'm confused about what this is referencing. Is this the same passage Palmer refers to when she argues that the Bible indicates men and women were present when the apostles gained the ability to speak in different tongues?

    4. with an introduction comprising three letters from male

      Another example of white male testimony being necessary for Othered bodies to be taken seriously, connecting us to Palmer, Stewart, the Grimkes, and Douglass last week.

    1. "Such is the literal translation of the \fo10v,I ! passage," and leaves it with the reader to make sort c,f the application, with the exclamation, "The reader \i\LC. 1~e,t\{ may make of it what he pleascs."

      In the Douglass piece someone made a comment about the ethos of the author. Here, the author seems to be asserting the truth, based on his knowledge as a translator, but then throwing in the towel when it comes to interpretation.

    2. the lime has now come when ignorance will involve guilt;

      Nathaniel has drawn our attention to the phrase "ignorance will involve guilt," which I think is significant, but I also want to reflect on the idea that chiding for the wrongs of the past is not necessary because it was born of ignorance and that it is only the time (that is, the moment in which she was writing) which moves us from forgiveness to guilt in the audience. This seems like a similar move to Douglass when he posited that his mistress had been a good, tender-hearted person before she was poisoned by slavery. He called out slavery as a threat to white slave owners, just as Palmer here decries oppression of women will soon lead to a corruption of the souls of men who go on participating in it, once they have been stripped of their ignorance.

    1. lf physical weakness is alluded to, I cheerfully concede the superiority; if brute force is what my brethren arc claiming, I am willing to let them have all the honor they desire; but if they mean to intimate, that mental or moral weakness belongs to woman, more than to man, I utterly disclaim the charge.

      Here is that "mental and moral" argument referred to in The Rhetorical Tradition introduction to this section.

    2. male hecklers who threatened violence,

      This is a partial answer to my concern about Stewart's speaking experiences. I wonder whether heckling (and its consequences) was better recorded against the Grimke sisters because they were white women (and therefore viewed as more fragile and worthy of protection).

    3. which wa.'i burned to the ground by an angry mob shortly after she spoke.

      A second example of a well-documented consequence of women speaking to a mixed crowd. (Though, to be fair, it would be sort of difficult to overlook this one/fail to record it. It's pretty dramatic.)

  22. Jan 2017
  23. Oct 2016
  24. Jun 2016
    1. WHAT DOES IT MATTER WHO IS SPEAKING/' SOMEONE SAID, "WHAT DOES IT MATTER WHO IS SPEAKING": Beckett, Foucault, Barthes Alastair Hir

      Hird, Alastair. 2010. “‘WHAT DOES IT MATTER WHO IS SPEAKING,’ SOMEONE SAID, ‘WHAT DOES IT MATTER WHO IS SPEAKING’: Beckett, Foucault, Barthes.” Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui 22: 289–99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25781931.

      Picks up point that Beckett features very strongly in both Barthe's Death of an Author and Foucault's "What is an Author."

  25. Apr 2016
    1. preferably

      Delete "preferably". Limiting the scope of text mining to exclude societal and commercial purposes limits the usefulness to enterprises (especially SMEs that cannot mine on their own) as well as to society. These limitations have ramifications in terms of limiting the research questions that researchers can and will pursue.

    2. Encourage researchers not to transfer the copyright on their research outputs before publication.

      This statement is more generally applicable than just to TDM. Besides, "Encourage" is too weak a word here, and from a societal perspective, it would be far better if researchers were to retain their copyright (where it applies), but make their copyrightable works available under open licenses that allow publishers to publish the works, and others to use and reuse it.

  26. Mar 2016
  27. Feb 2016
  28. Jan 2016
  29. Dec 2015
    1. “Speakin’ o’ creeds,” and here old Mrs. Sargent paused in her work, “Elder Ransom from Acreville stopped with us last night, an’ he tells me they recite the Euthanasian Creed every few Sundays in the Episcopal Church.  I didn’t want him to know how ignorant I was, but I looked up the word in the dictionary.  It means easy death, and I can’t see any sense in that, though it’s a terrible long creed, the Elder says, an’ if it’s any longer ’n ourn, I should think anybody might easy die learnin’ it!” “I think the word is Athanasian,” ventured the minister’s wife.
  30. Oct 2015
  31. Sep 2015
  32. Mar 2015