In this way Quintilian reveals himself to be quite ignorant of dialectic, for he has either not heard or not read anything about the role of judging, and about the many types of syllogisms, both simple and complex.

he was completely silent about method; in a loud sophistic debate over quite useless rules he handed down to us nothing about the use of the art as a universal, but only as a particular.

He thinks rhetoric is one of the liberal arts, not in fact a common art, and yet at the same time he deems rhetoric to be an art, a science, and a virtue

that the arts of dialectic and rhetoric have been confused by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.

For although I admit that rhetoric is a virtue, it is virtue of the mind and the intelligence, as in all the true liberal arts, whose followers can still be men of the utmost moral depravity. Nor is rhetoric a moral virtue as Quintilian thinks, so that whoever possesses it is incapable )f being a wicked man.

There are two universal, general gifts be-stowed by nature upon man, Reason and Speech; dialectic is the theory of the former, grammar and rhetoric of the latter.

Quintilian decrees that there are five parts to the art of rhetoric - I shall talk about these afterwards - invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. He thinks there are no more and no less.

Is it because the orator ought to control the state and its citizens that moral training will therefore be a proper part of rhetoric?

I assert indeed that such a definition of an orator seems to me to be useless and stupid: Why? Because a definition of any artist which covers more than is included in the rules of his art is superfluous and defective.

ine are truthful and distinct, as both the art and its practice prove when they have been thoroughly investigated.

Because the dialectical and rhetorical arts of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian are fallacious and confused in their treatment of the dialectical and rhetorical usage of reason, and then of speech - -the usage, I repeat, which one observes in their books.

But the writings of these scholars reveal that while they indeed collected a lot of material, they did not evaluate it sufficiently, for in some places I look in vain for a syllogism.

I wish I had not known the wretched-ness of wasting so much of my youth in this way. I wish that the scholars of rhetoric and dialectic would heed my advice and would sometimes think of the truth and usefulness of their subjects instead of tenaciously and obstinately quarreling over matters which they have naively accepted at a first hearing, without ever giving them proper consideration

n this disputation, however, I shall, as far as I may, apply dialectic, the mentor of speaking with truth and constancy, in order that I may evaluate the subject with more incisiveness and wisdom.

For prudence is not a moral virtue but a virtue of the intelligence and mind. Therefore rhetoric will not be a moral virtue.

Rhetoric should demonstrate the embellishment of speech first in tropes and figures, second in dignified delivery

The grammarian is defined as skilled in speaking and writing cor-rectly; he is not defined as skilled in speaking, writing, and singing. Why not? Because gram-mar provides no precepts about the last. The geometrician is not defined as skilled in mea-surement and medicine. Why not? Because there is no precept in geometry which teaches how to cure illnesses.

dialectic, the mentor of speaking with truth and constanc

Yet I add the observation that if they had applied as many months as I have years to judg-ing these precepts accurately and to arranging them in order, I certainly do not doubt that they would have left us arts that are far truer and more distinct.

I wish I had not known the wretched-ness of wasting so much of my youth in this way

unwavering reaso

we shall sep-arate its true properties, remove weak and useless subtleties, and point out the things that are miss-ing

my close colleague Audomarus Ta-laeus cast light on style and delivery and pointed out their deficiencie

rather I feel ashamed to look back upon them due to the very meager results they produced

Next, Quintilian's greater weakness concerns effects. For he put these forward in the topics of persons, yet here once again he repeats them as if they were now different.

"If signs are infallible," he says, "they are not arguments, because where they exist there is no room for question; even if they are doubtful, they are not arguments because they themselves need the support of arguments."

Thus Quin-tilian here concludes nothing, solves nothing, but confuses himself.

Here Quintilian says that the dialecti-cians lay claim to invention and judgment (which contains a large part of arrangement in the con-clusions of each argument and in syllogisms). And finally in the second chapter of the eleventh book he says that if memory belongs to any art, then it belongs completely to arrangement and order. Therefore he should say that the dialecticians could rightly claim this part also, because in dialectic that has been rightly described, one should teach the truest theory of order and ar-rangement according to the precepts of the syl-logism and method.

What then, 0 Quintilian? is he who knows what is honest and just, himself honest and just?

I propose to under-take against Quintilian, for I shall undertake to teach that his instructions on oratory were not correctly ordered, organized, described - es-pecially so since he seems to define an orator brilliantly at the start, then to divide elegantly the parts of the subjects covered by the definition and finally to delineate the property and nature of each part with extreme care and accuracy.

Cicero seems to have spoken in an age of gold, Quin-tilian in an age of iron. But nevertheless, com-pared to the eloquent men of that time, he was without doubt counted among the eloquent.

each man should practice the art which he knows.

sine qua non

For I see that the scholars and teachers of this art have spent greater zeal in collecting the in-structions of the ancients and in thinking up new instructions than they have used judgment in dis-criminating among their own and others' discov-eries.

The whole of dialectic concerns the mind and reason, whereas rhetoric and grammar concern language and speech.

Like any other discipline, the theory of invention and arrangement must be practiced in two ways: first, in order that by its means we should through external examples learn common sense from argument, judgment from the manner of conclusion, and complete prudence from the method of arrangement and order; secondly, that by means of the same art we should devise similar examples in speech and writing.

confused dialectic itself with rhetoric, since in-vention, arrangement, and memory belong to di-alectic and only style and delivery to rhetoric.

The whole of the following sixth book is taken up with the arts for stirring the emotions and causing delight; here nothing is the property of dialectic or of rhetoric. Since rhetoric and di-alectic are general arts, they should therefore be explained in a general fashion, the one in respect to style and delivery, the other in respect to in-vention and arrangement.

I shall not object to your opinion that moral virtue is undoubtedly useful and suitable for the use of all arts, but in no way shall I admit that any art is a moral virtue.

In the third chapter rhetoric is separated into five parts: invention, arrangement, style, mem-ory, delivery. I am now not at all surprised that Quintilian is so bereft of dialectic in this division, for he was unable to recognize that here he h is confused dialectic itself with rhetoric, since in-vention, arrangement, and memory belong to di-alectic and only style and delivery to rhetoric. Indeed, Quintilian's reason for dividing rhetoric into these five parts derived from the same single source of error as did the causes of the previous confusion. The orator, says Quintilian, cannot be perfected without virtue, without grammar, with-out mathematics, and without philosophy. There-fore, one must define the nature of the orator from all these subjects. The grammarian, the same man says, cannot be complete without mu-sic, astrology, philosophy, rhetoric, and history. Consequently there are two parts of grammar, methodology and literary interpretation. As a re-sult Quintilian now finally reasons that rhetoric cannot exist unless the subject matter is first of all discovered, next arranged, then embellished ' and finally committed to memory and delivered. Thus these are the five parts of rhetoric.

panegyric

Nor is rhetoric a moral virtue as Quintilian thinks, so that whoever possesses it is incapable )f being a wicked man.

If moral philosophy were a part of rhetoric, it would have to be expounded in some part f rhetoric.

In use these should be united, so that the same oration can expound purely, speak ornately, and express thought wisely. However, the precepts of pure diction, ornate delivery, and intelligent treatment must be kept separate and should not be confused.

If these arts have been kept separate and enclosed within their own proper limits, then certainly what grammar will teach in its rightful province will not be confused with rhetoric, and dialectic will not encroach upon what each of the others has clearly described.

This is what Quintilian says, and consequently when he wishes to give a name to a human being who is an ideal leader in the republic and is perfect in every virtue and branch of knowledge, he calls him an "orator" - as if to make him a god rather than just a man skilled in a single art.

and is consistent within itself.

In this disputation, however, I shall, as far as I may, apply dialectic, the mentor of speaking with truth and constancy, in order that I may evaluate the subject with more incisiveness and wisdom.

At present I am not inquiring after the su-preme virtues of other kinds, such as those accorded the Apollos or the Jupiters.

And is it necessary to think them not men, but gods in all things?

method

wretchedly spent on false conjectures about these disciplines?

This is the first, the mid-dle, and the final support of my argument. I do not make evil use of the testimonies of men who can lie, but I establish my argument by the truth-fulness of unwavering, natural usage, the usage, I repeat, which I have been following for so many years with the greatest effort through daily practice and by experience in the subject.

Yet I add the observation that if they had applied as many months as I have years to judg-ing these precepts accurately and to arranging them in order, I certainly do not doubt that they would have left us arts that are far truer and more distinct.

I am discuss-ing now the precepts of dialectic and rhetoric, which I admit were almost all in fact either first discovered by those men, to the great glory of their names, or certainly were collected from others.

However, must those who excel in one or many virtues necessarily excel in them all? And is it necessary to think them not men, but gods in all things?

In fact I shall not only gladly but also perhaps truly admit that of all the men who are, have been, and will in the future be, he was the most eloquent.

Therefore let us allow Aristotle as sharp an intelligence in various subjects and branches of knowledge as any Aristotelian could imagine, for I admit that that philosopher had an amazing fecundity of talent.

As a result, if the arts were taught with greater conciseness they would certainly be more easily understood, and once the true method for their use was revealed, they would be more easy to practice.

By means of a confined, organized, and illustrated classification of subjects, my close colleague Audomarus Ta-laeus cast light on style and delivery and pointed out their deficiencies. To this extent therefore we have here expelled the darkness.

ten general topics - -causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, opposites, comparisons, names, divisions, definitions, wit-nesses

single argument

Maecenas

What objection then is there against calling Quintilian to the same account?

I con-sider the subject matters of the arts to be distinct and separate.

For all that, Quintilian continues and main-tains his own opinion that since dialectic is a virtue, so therefore is rhetoric. Quintilian should turn the whole thing around and should more correctly conclude that since dialectic is not a moral virtue which can shape a good man, so neither is rhetoric.

-and that no one can be an orator unless he is a good man (this is in the first chapter of the twelfth book) and for this reason, I believe, he will conclude that instruction in virtue is a part of rhetoric.

There are two universal, general gifts be-stowed by nature upon man, Reason and Speech; dialectic is the theory of the former, grammar and rhetoric of the latte

Therefore there are only two parts of rhetoric, style and delivery.

Since rhetoric and di-alectic are general arts, they should therefore be explained in a general fashion, the one in respect to style and delivery, the other in respect to in-vention and arrangement.

invention is a process which supplies arguments, whereas arrangement is a different process which organizes arguments.

dialectic, that is to the natural use of reason

From the development of language and speech only two proper parts will be left for rhetoric, style, and delivery; rhetoric will possess nothing proper and of its own beyond these.

The whole of dialectic concerns the mind and reason, whereas rhetoric and grammar concern language and speech. Therefore dialectic comprises, as proper to it, the arts of invention, arrangement, and memory

I have decided not to use up the greater part of my discourse against these by teaching that they are stupid and false

Yet at this point Quintilian has proposed that he should give instructions about one certain art and virtue, not about perfection in every art and vir-tue. He thinks rhetoric is one of the liberal arts, not in fact a common art, and yet at the same time he deems rhetoric to be an art, a science, and a virtue.

Quintilian decrees that there are five parts to the art of rhetoric - I shall talk about these afterwards - invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.

There are two universal, general gifts be-stowed by nature upon man, Reason and Speech; dialectic is the theory of the former, grammar and rhetoric of the latter.

Because a definition of any artist which covers more than is included in the rules of his art is superfluous and defective. For the artist must be defined according to the rules of his art, so that only as much of the art as the true, proper principles cover - this much is attributed to the artist, and nothing further.

And so, all you dialecticians - that is, whoever can form a judgment about this question with truth and constancy - come here, pay at-tention, sharpen your wits, drive far away from you (in case passions of this kind have been ready to seize your minds), drive far away, I say, love, hate, prejudice, levity, fickleness, and rashness

Mine are truthful and distinct, as both the art and its practice prove when they have been thoroughly investigated. This is the first, the mid-dle, and the final support of my argument. I do not make evil use of the testimonies of men who can lie, but I establish my argument by the truth-fulness of unwavering, natural usage, the usage, I repeat, which I have been following for so many years with the greatest effort through daily practice and by experience in the subject.

I do not make evil use of the testimonies of men who can lie, but I establish my argument by the truth-fulness of unwavering, natural usage, the usage, I repeat, which I have been following for so many years with the greatest effort through daily practice and by experience in the subject.

But the writings of these scholars reveal that while they indeed collected a lot of material, they did not evaluate it sufficiently, for in some places I look in vain for a syllogism. And they did not arrange it in a sufficiently fitting order, for else-where I find a lack of method. I confidently state that I have truly judged and correctly organized this same material in my teachings.

Yet I add the observation that if they had applied as many months as I have years to judg-ing these precepts accurately and to arranging them in order, I certainly do not doubt that they would have left us arts that are far truer and more distinct.

Such then were the qualities of Aristo-tle, Cicero, and Quintilian, and such was their stature.

we shall rely on the supreme help of unwavering reason in our attempt to establish the true description and practice of the arts

The whole of the following sixth book is taken up with the arts for stirring the emotions and causing delight; here nothing is the property of dialectic or of rhetoric.

for he does not see that this "hypothesis" is the proposition of a connected syllogism

"Therefore all artistic proof," says Quintilian, "consists either of signs, arguments, or exam-ples" - as if examples and signs were not arguments!

First, since there are countless questions about those subjects and arts which use the evi-dence of scholars and learned men although they do not come into the forum, in what way can they be called inartistic? Again, how can we call something inartistic which is taught by the pre-cepts of art

Our instructor teaches that all the things which one can say about anything are either causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, opposites, compari-sons, names, divisions, definitions, or witnesses, and he carefully explains these thing

But indeed I shall instead agree with Quinti-lian's opinion that rhetoric is defined as the sci-ence of speaking well, not about this or that, but about all subjects. Rhetoric therefore requires no partition of its areas of investigation

I say first of all that this partition is false, since there are countless questions which are not contained in any part of these classes.

there is one faculty of judgment which the syllogism alone executes and accomplishes

Therefore dialectic comprises, as proper to it, the arts of invention, arrangement, and memory

For although I admit that rhetoric is a virtue, it is virtue of the mind and the intelligence, as in all the true liberal arts, whose followers can still be men of the utmost moral depravity. Nor is rhetoric a moral virtue as Quintilian thinks, so that whoever possesses it is incapable )f being a wicked man

The parts of the material which belong to the art of rhetoric are only two, style and delivery

Rhetoric should demonstrate the embellishment of speech first in tropes and figures, second in dignified delivery

Because a definition of any artist which covers more than is included in the rules of his art is superfluous and defective

"I teach," he says, "that the orator cannot be perfect unless he is a good man. Con-sequently I demand from him not only outstand-ing skill in speaking but all the virtuous qualities of character." This is the type of orator that Quin-tilian constructs for us. Afterwards in the twelfth book, where he defines him in similar terms as a good man skilled in speaking well, he identifies those virtuous qualities of character as justice, courage, self-control, prudence, likewise knowl-edge of the whole of philosophy and of law, a thorough acquaintance with history, and many other attributes worthy of praise.

Cicero seems to have spoken in an age of gold, Quin-tilian in an age of iron

If you wish, attribute to Cicero these equal ornaments of dialectic, invention, and arrangement

As a result, if the arts were taught with greater conciseness they would certainly be more easily understood, and once the true method for their use was revealed, they would be more easy to practice

We shall distinguish the art of rhetoric from the other arts, and make it a single one of the liberal arts, not a confused mixture of all art

We have added to the art the virtues it lacked

I admit that that philosopher had an amazing fecundity of talent

supreme help

he created unfathomable darkness

Most excellent Maecenas

Because a definition of any artist which covers more than is included in the rules of his art is superfluous and defective.

But we are not to suppose that it is against rule to mingle these various styles: taste. For when we keep monotonously to one style, we fail to retain the hearer's attention; but when we pass from one style to another, the discourse goes off more gracefully, even though it extend to greater length.

THIS WORK NOT INTENDED AS A TREATISE ON RHETORIC.

APOLOGY FOR THE LENGTH OF THE WORK.

TRUTH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EXPRESSION.WHAT IS MEANT BY STRIFEABOUT WORDS.

THE CHRISTIAN TEACHER MUST USE DIFFERENT STYLES ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS.

THE SACRED WRITERS UNITE ELOQUENCE WITH WISDOM.

WISDOM OF MORE IMPORTANCE THAN ELOQUENCE TO THE CHRIST!AN TEACHER

T IS LAWFUL FOR A CHRISTIAN TEACHER TO USE THE ART OF RHETORIC

but he must also sway the mind so as to subdue the will.

For if a man be not moved by the force of truth

It is sufficiently clear, I think, that this eloquence calls passionately upon women to avoid tampering with their appearance by deceitful arts, and to cultivate modesty and fear.

Only two conditions are to be insisted upon, that our hearer or companion should have an earnest desire to learn the truth, and should have capacity of mind to receive it in whatever form it may be communicated

capacity

but in making clear what was obscure

LL

duty

unarmed against falsehood

And thus they cease to listen with submission to a man who does not listen to himself, and in despising the preacher they learn to despise the word that is preached.

THE MAN WHOSE LIFE IS IN HARMONY WITH HIS TEACHING WILL TEACH WITH GREATER EFFECT.

On the other hand, without perspicuity this style cannot give pleasure. And so the three qualities, perspicuity, beauty, and persuasiveness. are to be sought in this style also; beauty, of course, being its primary object.

And therefore we must be on our guard, lest, in striving to carry to a higher point the emotion we have excited, we rather lose what we have already gained.

But after the interposition of matter that we have to treat in a quieter style, we can return with good effect to that which must be treated forcibly, thus making the tide of eloquence to ebb and flow like the sea.

We can bear the subdued style, however, longer without variety than the majestic style. For the mental emotion which it is necessary to stir up in order to carry the hearer's feelings with us, when once it has been sufficiently excited, the higher the pitch to which it is raised, can be maintained the shorter time.

But we are not to suppose that it is against rule to mingle these various styles: taste. For when we keep monotonously to one style, we fail to retain the hearer's attention; but when we pass from one style to another, the discourse goes off more gracefully, even though it extend to greater length.

as infants cannot learn to speak except by learning words and phrases from those who do speak

or what does it profit a man that he both confesses the truth and praises the eloquence, if he does not yield his consent, when it is only for the sake of securing his consent that the speaker in urging the truth gives careful attention to what he says? If the truths taught are such that to believe or to know them is enough, to give one's assent implies nothing more than to confess that they are true. When, however, the truth taught is one that must be carried into practice, and that is taught for the very purpose of being practised, it is useless to be persuaded of the truth of what is said, it is useless to be pleased with the manner in which it is said, if it be not so learnt as to be practised.

For when he says, "Though I be rude in speech, yet not in knowledge, (2) he seems to speak as if granting so much to his detractors, not as confessing that he recognized its truth. If he had said, "I am indeed rude in speech, but not in knowledge," we could not in any way have put another meaning upon it. He did not hesitate plainly to assert his knowledge, because without it he could not have been the teacher of the Gentiles. And certainly if we bring forward anything of his as a model of eloquence, we take it from those epistles which even his very detractors, who thought his bodily presence weak and his speech contemptible, confessed to be weighty and powerful

Who is such a fool as to think this wisdom?

For it is because they are eloquent that they exemplify these rules; it is not that they use them in order to be eloquent.

THIS WORK NOT INTENDED AS A TREATISE ON RHETORIC

I need not go over all the other things that can be done by powerful eloquence to move the minds of the hearers, not telling them what they ought to do, but urging them to do what they already know ought to be done.

But as there is a certain analogy between learning and eating, the very food without which it is impossible to live must be flavored to meet the tastes of the majority.

the rules which are laid down in the art of oratory could not have been observed, and noted, and reduced to system, if they had not first had their birth in the genius of orators

wisdom not aiming at eloquence, yet eloquence not shrinking from wisdom

For there are who read and yet neglect them; they read to remember the words, but are careless about knowing the meaning. It is plain we must set far above these the men who are not so retentive of the words, but see with the eyes of the heart into the heart of Scripture. Better than either of these, however, is the man who, when he wishes, can repeat the words, and at the same time correctly apprehends their meaning.

the hearers require to be roused rather than instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they admit, greater vigor of speech is needed.

For it is because they are eloquent that they exemplify these rules; it is not that they use them in order to be eloquent.

For even the art of grammar, which teaches correctness of speech, need not be learnt by boys, if they have the advantage of growing up and living among men who speak correctly.

For men of quick intellect and glowing temperament find it easier to become eloquent by reading and listening to eloquent speakers than by following rules for eloquence.

There are, indeed, some men who have a good delivery, but cannot compose anything to deliver. Now, if such men take what has been written with wisdom and eloquence by others, and commit it to memory, and deliver it to the people, they cannot be blamed, supposing them to do it without deception

And assuredly it is preferable, even though what is said should be less intelligible, less pleasing, and less persuasive, that truth be spoken, and that what is just, not what is iniquitous, be listened to with pleasure.

Accordingly a great orator has truly said that "an eloquent man must speak so as to teach, to delight, and to persuade." Then he adds: "To teach is a necessity, to delight is a beauty, to persuade is a triumph."(2) Now of these three, the one first mentioned, the teaching, which is a matter of necessity, depends on what we say; the other two on the way we say it.

24. Now a strong desire for clearness sometimes leads to neglect of the more polished forms of speech, and indifference about what sounds well, compared with what dearly expresses and conveys the meaning intended.

These three clauses are best pronounced when the voice is suspended on the first two members of the period, and comes to a pause on the third.

So that it is at the discretion of the speaker whether he finish each clause separately and make six altogether, or whether he suspend his voice at the first, the third, and the fifth, and by joining the second to the first, the fourth to the third, and the sixth to the fifth, make three most elegant periods of two members each: one describing the imminent catastrophe; another, the lascivious couch; and the third, the luxurious table.

These six clauses form three periods of two members each.

see, then, that I must say something about the eloquence of the prophets also, where many things are concealed under a metaphorical style, which the more completely they seem buried under figures of speech, give the greater pleasure when brought to light. In this place, however, it is my duty to select a passage of such a kind that I shall not be compelled to explain the matter, but only to commend the style.

the educated man observes that those sections which the Greeks call kommata, and the clauses and periods of which I spoke a short time ago,

And in those passages where the learned do note its presence, the matters spoken of are such, that the words in which they are put seem not so much to be sought out by the speaker as spontaneously to suggest themselves; as if wisdom were walking out of its house,--that is, the breast of the wise man, and eloquence, like an inseparable attendant, followed it without being called for. (2)

nothing can be called eloquence if it be not suitable to the person of the speaker,

ut what is better than wholesome sweetness or sweet wholesomeness? For the sweeter we try to make such things, the easier it is to make their wholesomeness serviceable. And so there are writers of the Church who have expounded the Holy Scriptures, not only with wisdom, but with eloquence as well; and there is not more time for the reading of these than is sufficient for those who are studious and at leisure to exhaust them.

both to teach what is right and to refute what is wrong, and in the performance of this task to conciliate the hostile, to rouse the careless, and to tell the ignorant both what is occurring at present and what is probable in the future. But once that his hearers are friendly, attentive, and ready to learn, whether he has found them so, or has himself made them so the remaining objects are to be carried out in whatever way the case requires. If the hearers need teaching, the matter treated of must be made fully known by means of narrative. On the other hand, to clear up points that are doubtful requires reasoning and the exhibition of proof. If, however, the hearers require to be roused rather than instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they admit, greater vigor of speech is needed. Here entreaties and reproaches, exhortations and upbraidings, and all the other means of rousing the emotions, are necessary.

For without knowing the names of any of the faults, they will, from being accustomed to correct speech, lay hold upon whatever is faulty in the speech of any one they listen to, and avoid it; just as city-bred men, even when illiterate, seize upon the faults of rustics.

But only by those who can learn them any one who cannot learn this art quickly can never thoroughly learn it

THE PROPER AGE AND THE PROPER MEANS FOR ACQUIRING RHETORICAL SKILL.

THE CHRISTIAN TEACHER MUST USE DIFFERENT STYLES ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS

For teaching, of course, true eloquence consists, not in making people like what they disliked, nor in making them do what they shrank from, but in making clear what was obscure

For the more he discerns the poverty of his own speech, the more he ought to draw on the riches of Scripture, so that what he says in his own words he may prove by the words of Scripture; and he himself, though small and weak in his own words, may gain strength and power from the confirming testimony of great men.

Better than either of these, however, is the man who, when he wishes, can repeat the words, and at the same time correctly apprehends their meaning.

If, however, the hearers require to be roused rather than instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they admit, greater vigor of speech is needed. Here entreaties and reproaches, exhortations and upbraidings, and all the other means of rousing the emotions, are necessary.

THE PROPER MEANS FOR ACQUIRING RHETORICAL SKILL

Now, the art of rhetoric being available for the enforcing either of truth or falsehood, who will dare to say that truth in the person of its defenders is to take its stand unarmed against falsehood? For example, that those who are trying to persuade men of what is false are to know how to introduce their subject, so as to put the hearer into a friendly, or attentive, or teachable frame of mind, while the defenders of the truth shall be ignorant of that art? That the former are to tell their falsehoods briefly, clearly, and plausibly, while the latter shall tell the truth m such a way that it is tedious to listen to, hard to understand, and, in fine, not easy to believe it? That the former are to oppose the to melt, to enliven, and to rouse them, while the latter shall in defence of the truth be sluggish, and frigid, and somnolent? Who is such a fool as to think this wisdom? Since, then, the faculty of eloquence is available for both sides, and is of very great service in the enforcing either of wrong or right, why do not good men study to engage it on the side of truth, when bad men use it to obtain the triumph of wicked and worthless causes, and to further injustice and error?

I do not think it of so much importance as to wish men who have arrived at mature age to spend time in learning it. It is enough that boys should give attention to it; and even of these, not all who are to be fitted for usefulness in the Church, but only those who are not yet engaged in any occupation of more urgent necessity, or which ought evidently to take precedence of it.

who will dare to say that truth in the person of its defenders is to take its stand unarmed against falsehood?

THIS WORK NOT INTENDED AS A TREATISE ON RHETORIC.

Indeed, I think there are scarcely any who can do both things--that is, speak well, and; in order to do this, think of the rules of speaking while they are speaking.

everything that we say is important;

though there is no one who does not praise Him in some measure

It was necessary, however, to reply to the ill-taught men who think our authors contemptible; not because they do not possess, but because they do not display, the eloquence which these men value so highly.

But wisdom is his guide, eloquence his attendant; he follows the first, the second follows him, and yet he does not spurn it when it comes after him.

As then I do not affirm that the apostle was guided by the rules of eloquence, so I do not deny that his wisdom naturally produced, and was accompanied by, eloquence.

For there are who read and yet neglect them; they read to remember the words, but are careless about knowing the meaning. It is plain we must set far above these the men who are not so retentive of the words, but see with the eyes of the heart into the heart of Scripture. Better than either of these, however, is the man who, when he wishes, can repeat the words, and at the same time correctly apprehends their meaning.

Indeed, I think there are scarcely any who can do both things--that is, speak well, and; in order to do this, think of the rules of speaking while they are speaking.

But as some men employ these coarsely, inelegantly, and frigidly, while others use them with acuteness, elegance, and spirit, the work that I am speaking of ought to be undertaken by one who can argue and speak with wisdom, if not with eloquence, and with profit to his hearers, even though he profit them less than he would if he could speak with eloquence too.

For even the art of grammar, which teaches correctness of speech, need not be learnt by boys, if they have the advantage of growing up and living among men who speak correctly.

And even outside the canon, which to our great advantage is fixed in a place of secure authority, there is no want of ecclesiastical writings, in reading which a man of ability will acquire a tinge of the eloquence with which they are written, even though he does not aim at this, but is solely intent on the matters treated of; especially, of course, if in addition he practise himself in writing, or dictating, and at last also in speaking, the opinions he has formed on grounds of piety them, and who speak with fluency and elegance, cannot always think of them when they are speaking so as to speak in accordance with them, unless they are discussing the rules themselves

For men of quick intellect and glowing temperament find it easier to become eloquent by reading and listening to eloquent speakers than by following rules for eloquence.

Who is such a fool as to think this wisdom? Since, then, the faculty of eloquence is available for both sides, and is of very great service in the enforcing either of wrong or right, why do not good men study to engage it on the side of truth, when bad men use it to obtain the triumph of wicked and worthless causes, and to further injustice and error?

Not that I think such rules of no use, but that whatever use they have is to be learnt elsewhere; and if any good man should happen to have leisure for learning them, he is not to ask me to teach them either in this work or any other.

let his manner of living be an eloquent sermon in itself

But the man who cannot speak both eloquently and wisely should speak wisely without eloquence, rather than eloquently without wisdom

THE MAN WHOSE LIFE IS IN HARMONY WITH HIS TEACHING WILL TEACH WITH GREATER EFFECT.

For as the function of all eloquence, whichever of these three forms it may assume, is to speak persuasively, and its object is to persuade, an eloquent man will speak persuasively, whatever style he may adopt;

And the speaker has it in his discretion to use the subdued style even where the majestic would be allowable, in order that the majestic when it is used may be the more majestic by comparison, and may as it were shine out with greater brilliance from the dark background

But after the interposition of matter that we have to treat in a quieter style, we can return with good effect to that which must be treated forcibly, thus making the tide of eloquence to ebb and flow like the sea

When, however, something is to be done, and we are speaking to those who ought, but are not willing, to do it, then great matters must be spoken of with power, and in a manner calculated to sway the mind.

even though he do not carry with him the assent of his hearer

either to teach, or to give pleasure, or to move, and should pray and strive, as we have said above, to be heard with intelligence, with pleasure, and with ready compliance· And when he does this with elegance and propriety, he may justly be called eloquent