From Sri Lanka to Nepal, scientists with limited resources are working feverishly to discover which variants are driving outbreaks.

India’s neighbours race to sequence genomes as COVID surges

(CNN)Taiwan has imposed new restrictions including limits on gatherings in its capital as it battles its biggest coronavirus outbreak since the start of the pandemic last year.

Taiwan was a Covid success story. Now it's fighting its biggest outbreak

The international scheme to ensure equal access to Covid-19 vaccines is 140 million doses short because of India's continuing Covid crisis. The Serum Institute of India (SII), the largest single supplier to the Covax scheme, has made none of its planned shipments since exports were suspended in March. The UN children's agency Unicef buys and distributes vaccines for Covax. It is urging leaders of G7 nations and EU states to share their doses.They are due to meet in the UK next month. How India's vaccine drive went horribly wrongExtra $45bn needed for Covax plan to vaccinate poorTracking vaccine progress around the worldUnicef says data it has commissioned suggests that together this group of countries could donate around 153 million doses, while still meeting their commitments to vaccinate their own populations.

India's Covid crisis hits Covax vaccine-sharing scheme

Rapid antigen testing in COVID-19 responses

The value of rapid antigen testing of people (with or without COVID-19 symptoms) to reduce transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has been discussed extensively (1–5) but remains a topic of policy debates (6, 7). Lateral flow devices (LFDs) to test for SARS-CoV-2 antigen are inexpensive, provide results in minutes, and are highly specific (2–4), and although less sensitive than reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) tests to detect viral RNA, they detect most cases with high viral load (2, 3, 8), which are likely the most infectious (8, 9). Successful mass testing relies on public trust, the social and organizational factors that support uptake, contact tracing, and adherence to quarantine. On page 635 of this issue, Pavelka et al. (10) report the substantial reduction in transmission that population-wide rapid antigen testing had, in combination with other measures, in Slovakia.Slovakia ran mass testing interventions from the last week of October to the second week of November 2020, with 65% of the target populations taking rapid antigen tests. Testing started in the four counties with the highest rates of infection, continued with national mass testing, then was followed up with more testing in high-prevalence areas. Nasopharyngeal swabs for the LFDs were taken by clinical staff, not self-administered. Sample quality and test accuracy are higher with tests taken by health professionals (3). Although the specific impact of Slovakia's mass testing could not be disentangled from the contribution of other concurrent control measures (including closure of secondary schools and restrictions on hospitality and indoor leisure activities), statistical modelling by Pavelka et al. estimated a 70% reduction in the prevalence of COVID-19 cases compared with unmitigated growth.The UK piloted mass testing in Liverpool in November 2020 after the city experienced the highest COVID-19 prevalence in the country. Slovakia applied more pressure on its citizens to get tested than did Liverpool, by requiring anyone not participating in mass testing to quarantine. The Liverpool testing uptake was consequently lower than Slovakia's, involving 25% of the population in 4 weeks. Liverpool's public health service valued the testing as an additional control measure, but impacts were limited by lack of support for those in socioeconomically deprived areas facing income loss from quarantine after a positive test (2): Test positivity rates were highest and testing uptake lowest in the most deprived areas (2, 11). Similar socioeconomic barriers were reported for test uptake among care home staff (12). This highlights the importance of addressing public perceptions of testing and support for low-income workers to quarantine when implementing mass testing.

An update to the 'politics' page of our COVID-19 vaccination communication handbook. Thanks to @kostas_exarhia for his diligent and constant work on this 1/n

This page provides information and resources to help public health departments and laboratories investigate and report COVID-19 vaccine breakthrough cases. Vaccine breakthrough cases are expected. COVID-19 vaccines are effective and are a critical tool to bring the pandemic under control. However, no vaccines are 100% effective at preventing illness in vaccinated people. There will be a small percentage of fully vaccinated people who still get sick, are hospitalized, or die from COVID-19. More than 130 million people in the United States have been fully vaccinated as of May 24, 2021. Like with other vaccines, vaccine breakthrough cases will occur, even though the vaccines are working as expected. Asymptomatic infections among vaccinated people will also occur. There is some evidence that vaccination may make illness less severe for those who are vaccinated and still get sick. Current data suggest that COVID-19 vaccines authorized for use in the United States offer protection against most SARS-CoV-2 variants currently circulating in the United States. However, variants will cause some vaccine breakthrough cases.

COVID-19 Vaccine Breakthrough Case Investigation and Reporting

News & Notes > An easy access dashboard now provides links to scientific discussion and evaluation of bioRxiv preprints.An easy access dashboard now provides links to scientific discussion and evaluation of bioRxiv preprints.bioRxiv  |  2021-05-14Part of our mission at bioRxiv is to alert readers to reviews and discussion of preprints and support the different ways readers provide feedback to authors on their work. These include tweets, comments on preprints and community- or journal-organized peer reviews. bioRxiv improves discoverability of such efforts by linking to peer reviews, community discussions and mentions of the preprint in social and traditional media. By aggregating this information in a new dashboard, we are now making these even easier for readers to find and access.

An easy access dashboard now provides links to scientific discussion and evaluation of bioRxiv preprints.

That team of authors is not the most dependable, if I may put it that way.

so was that USA today open letter basically misinformation in this regard?

Lots to say, but just quickly: (1) Exceptions are permitted on a case-by-case basis https://skolverket.se/regler-och-ansvar/ansvar-i-skolfragor/skolplikt-och-ratt-till-utbildning… (2) Everyone is encouraged to work from home whenever possible

V. sorry to see a colleague spread what can only be described as conspiracy theories on Twitter. I think academics have a particular duty to keep their heads cool in a moment of crisis.Quote TweetBenjamin L. Jones@BoardshortsBen · 3hIn many other countries, society would be furious and demanding answers to why their children have been used to spread a virus that we now know has potential neurological implications for children. But not in Sweden. https://theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/17/swedens-covid-19-strategist-under-fire-over-herd-immunity-emails

Erik, as people inside and outside Sweden continue to grapple with what exactly the Swedish strategy might have been, there are two aspects that have seemed potentially troubling to me (and only more so in light of the FOI email releases):

2/2 1. mandatory schooling (where there exemptions for immune-compromised parents?) 2. encouraging household members of infected individuals to go to work/school Could you provide more background here and how you see these policies in the wider context?

10.1080/17512786.2020.1805791

This study empirically examined studies on fake news through a content analysis of 103 peer-reviewed articles obtained from the eight major databases. The articles were published between 2000 and 2018. This systematic review of the journals, progression, theories, methodologies, media genres, common used words, and geospatial distribution indicated that the majority of the articles were published in Journalism Practice, Popular Communication, Digital Journalism, and Journalism Studies. Regarding progression, the highest number of publications was recorded for 2017 and 2018. At least one article was published each year beginning in 2005; 2006 and 2014 were exceptions. The results indicate that the majority of the articles were atheoretical. Qualitative research methods, content analysis, and surveys which were applied oftentimes. The studies were equally distributed across all media genres (traditional, digital, and social media). However, television and Twitter were the platforms that received the greatest amount of scholarly attention. The articles focused on the United States more than any other country. Finally, “news,” “media,” and “fake” were the most regularly frequently occurring words.

Mapping the Scholarship of Fake News Research: A Systematic Review

Are you interested in #preregistration and have experience with either #EEG or #fMRI? We, the MPI CBS #OpenScience initiative, are hosting a hackathon on August 20, 3-6 pm (GMT+2) to continue working on preregistration templates for EEG and fMRI and we need YOUR help! 1/2

10.1016/j.eclinm.2020.100479

Pandemic SARS-CoV-2 was first reported in Wuhan, China on December 31, 2019. Twenty-one days later, the US identified its first case––a man who had traveled from Wuhan to the state of Washington. Recent studies in the Wuhan and Seattle metropolitan areas retrospectively tested samples taken from patients with COVID-like symptoms. In the Wuhan study, there were 4 SARS-CoV-2 positives and 7 influenza positives out of 26 adults outpatients who sought care for influenza-like-illness at two central hospitals prior to January 12, 2020. The Seattle study reported 25 SARS-CoV-2 positives and 442 influenza positives out of 2353 children and adults who reported acute respiratory illness prior to March 9, 2020. Here, we use these findings to extrapolate the early prevalence of symptomatic COVID-19 in Wuhan and Seattle.

Using the COVID-19 to influenza ratio to estimate early pandemic spread in Wuhan, China and Seattle, US

Might be of interest. In 2017, @PHE underwent an independent international peer-review from @IANPHIhealth - the International Association of National Public Health Institutes. An organisation that strengthens government agencies responsible for public health. Thread/

Pushing the theory on to bigger platforms proved to be the key to Qanon’s spread — and the originators’ financial gain.

How three conspiracy theorists took 'Q' and sparked Qanon

Closed WC blocks and Covid-19 hygiene fears lead to sellout of bring-your-own conveniences

A tents situation – UK staycation boom fuels run on camping toilets

Thinktank warns of ‘Great Depression’ unemployment levels unless jobs support scheme is kept in place

End of UK furlough scheme ‘means needless loss of 2m jobs’

11/ I’m continually impressed by the powerful insights that come from epidemiologists who draw from our conceptual and methodology traditions but also tested and validated theory.

10/ When someone in spring 2020 tells @HealthEquityDoc that we are “all in the same boat” re: chances of getting exposed to #SARSCoV2 and dying of #COVID19, she too is going to have some questions... https://iaphs.org/racism-in-the-

9/ When people tell @JuliaLMarcus that shaming folks & involving criminal justice is an effective tool for slowing the spread of #COVID19, she’s going to have a few questions for you...

8/ The problem with data divorced from theory is that statistics can lie. And we humans are fallible and susceptible to suggestion. The theoretical grounding of the researchers that I respect most helps keeps them clear-eyed & ethical.

7/ And the novel coronavirus #SARSCoV2 has presented many novel situations...

6/ The thing is, solid theory gives us a basis for predicting likely outcomes in novel situations...

5/ Visionary, truth-telling epidemiologists like @HealthEquityDoc, who has an MPH in health behavior and a PhD in social epidemiology...

4/ Future-gazing epidemiologists like @JuliaLMarcus, who has an undergrad double major in sociology and women’s studies...

3/ When I think about the most forward-thinking epidemiologists I know re: #SARSCoV2 and #COVID19, a common bond is a grounding and training in social theory...

2/ Many epidemiologists are not trained in social or health behavior theory. Its value is often overlooked in a field that values quantitative analysis.

1/ An #EpiTwitter about theory...GIFQuote TweetThe Atlantic@TheAtlantic · 13hThe University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has switched to remote learning after a spike in COVID-19 cases. “Universities have no business reopening if they can’t provide a healthy environment," Julia Marcus and Jessica Gold wrote in July. http://on.theatln.tc/WIHQzDo

New research suggests that children are at minimal risk, yet their education has suffered greatly

There is now clear data on Covid-19 and children: it should be safe to reopen English schools

How to copy tables directly into your word processor using JASP. #stats #openSource

Anders Tegnell appears to have asked if higher death rate for older people might be acceptable

Sweden's Covid-19 strategist under fire over herd immunity emails

Many scientists use Twitter to carry on conversations (with varying degrees of formality) about published papers, the good, bad, and ugly. The people in this conversation all do this frequently. None of us are anti-science (cont...)

When it comes to leading a happy and fulfilled life, many of us focus on long-term goals: what job we want, whether or not we want children, or how to reach a certain level of skill at a particular hobby or interest. There’s a reason so much research looks at how to achieve the things you value in life.

Small Pleasures Are Just As Important For Our Wellbeing As Long-Term Goals

Coronavirus infections take a heavy toll on Latino people in their prime working years, data show

Covid-19 Deaths Skew Younger Among Minorities

10.1016/S2213-8587(20)30274-6

On July 27th, 2020, the UK government released the new national strategy for tackling obesity. In big bold font, the heading of the official press release urges people to “Lose weight to beat COVID-19 and protect the NHS”.In the first 4 months of the pandemic, England witnessed the greatest rate of excess deaths in Europe. According to a New York Times analysis, between March 14 and July 17, 2020, the UK has had 62 600 more deaths, a 31% increase, compared with the same period last year.Obesity, along with other chronic conditions such as diabetes, is a recognised risk factor for severe clinical outcomes of COVID-19. The new obesity strategy, published alongside the ‘Better Health’ campaign, led by Public Health England, intends to restrict advertisements and promotions of unhealthy foods, improve nutritional labelling of foods and drinks in restaurants and stores, and expand weight management services.The ambition for a healthier nation, during and beyond COVID-19, is to be praised. However, at a time where our economies are fragile, bans on food promotions and advertisements could also result in higher prices and growing inequalities, which themselves contribute to obesity and poor health outcomes. Equally troubling, by targeting almost exclusively the obesogenic environment, and only a small part of it, the new policies fail to take into account the intricacy of biological, societal, and psychological factors that underpin obesity.The suggestion that it is necessary to lose weight to “reduce pressure on doctors and nurses in the NHS, and free up their time to treat other sick and vulnerable patients”, communicated in the policy document, is also one of the most glaring examples of health promotion strategies that draws on guilt and shame. Past Public Health history has shown that such campaigns are ineffective and even detrimental.The COVID-19 culture has become a blame culture. The obesity rates in England are concerning, but they are not the main culprit for the nation's high COVID-19 death toll. Let's not forget that people with obesity are vulnerable patients too.

Obesity and COVID-19: Blame isn't a strategy

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration issued an emergency authorization on Saturday allowing public use of a saliva-based test for the coronavirus developed at Yale University and funded by the NBA and the National Basketball Players Association.The test, known as SalivaDirect, is designed for widespread public screening. The cost per sample could be as low as about $4, though the cost to consumers will likely be higher than that -- perhaps around $15 or $20 in some cases, according to expert sources.

Saliva-based coronavirus test funded by NBA, NBPA gets emergency authorization from FDA

Before answering, I should say that I am responding from a particular perspective, given that I was part of an open letter to the UK government on this issue in March of this year. The following piece outlines in a bit more detail our thinking in writing that letter:https://behavioralscientist.org/why-a-group-of-behavioural-scientists-penned-an-open-letter-to-the-uk-government-questioning-its-coronavirus-response-covid-19-social-distancing/

13335

We analyze the con­se­quences of the decision of French gov­ern­ment to maintain the first round of the municipal elections on March 15, 2020 on local excess mortality in the following weeks. We exploit het­ero­gene­ity across mu­nic­i­pal­i­ties in voter turnout, which we in­stru­ment using a measure of the intensity of local com­pe­ti­tion. The results reveal that a higher turnout was as­so­ci­ated with a sig­nif­i­cantly higher death counts for the elderly pop­u­la­tion in the five weeks after the elections. If the his­tor­i­cally low turnout in 2020 had been at its 2014 level, the number of deaths would have been 21.8 percent higher than the one that was recorded. More than three quarters of these ad­di­tional deaths would have occurred among the in­di­vid­u­als aged 80 and above.

This paper provides a critical review of models of the spread of the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) epidemic that have been influential in recent policy decisions. There is tremendous opportunity for social scientists to advance the relevant literature as new and better data becomes available to bolster economic outcomes and save lives.

10.3386/w27007

Policy Implications of Models of the Spread of Coronavirus: Perspectives and Opportunities for Economists

10.3386/w27438

We analyze the behavior of 401(k) plan participants during the first quarter of 2020, when COVID-19 generated historic volatility, large negative returns, and significant unemployment. Only 2.1% of participants invested in TDFs made any changes to their portfolios, with even lower rates of change among those defaulted into robo-advised managed accounts, suggesting that delegation can decrease the likelihood of portfolio mistakes by less sophisticated participants. While 16.6% of non-delegated participants made portfolio changes, these changes were more likely among more sophisticated participants and appear not to have reduced participants’ quarterly returns. Consistent with liquidity constraints, however, withdrawals spike following job loss.

Portfolio Delegation and 401(k) Plan Participant Responses to COVID-19

10.3386/w27100

We construct a quantitative model of an economy hit by an epidemic. People differ by age and skill, and choose occupations and whether to commute to work or work from home, to maximize their income and minimize their fear of infection. Occupations differ by wage, infection risk, and the productivity loss when working from home. By setting the model parameters to replicate the progression of COVID-19 in South Korea and the United Kingdom, we obtain three key results. First, government-imposed lock-downs may not present a clear trade-off between GDP and public health, as commonly believed, even though its immediate effect is to reduce GDP and infections by forcing people to work from home. A premature lifting of the lock-down raises GDP temporarily, but infections rise over the next months to a level at which many people choose to work from home, where they are less productive, driven by the fear of infection. A longer lock-down eventually mitigates the GDP loss as well as flattens the infection curve. Second, if the UK had adopted South Korean policies, its GDP loss and infections would have been substantially smaller both in the short and the long run. This is not because Korea implemented policies sooner, but because aggressive testing and tracking more effectively reduce infections and disrupt the economy less than a blanket lock-down. Finally, low-skill workers and self-employed lose the most from the epidemic and also from the government policies. However, the policy of issuing “visas” to those who have antibodies will disproportionately benefit the low-skilled, by relieving them of the fear of infection and also by allowing them to get back to work.

Inequality of Fear and Self-Quarantine: Is There a Trade-off between GDP and Public Health?

10.3386/w26981

We study the optimal lockdown policy for a planner who wants to control the fatalities of a pandemic while minimizing the output costs of the lockdown. We use the SIR epidemiology model and a linear economy to formalize the planner's dynamic control problem. The optimal policy depends on the fraction of infected and susceptible in the population. We parametrize the model using data on the COVID19 pandemic and the economic breadth of the lockdown. The quantitative analysis identifies the features that shape the intensity and duration of the optimal lockdown policy. Our baseline parametrization is conditional on a 1% of infected agents at the outbreak, no cure for the disease, and the possibility of testing. The optimal policy prescribes a severe lockdown beginning two weeks after the outbreak, covers 60% of the population after a month, and is gradually withdrawn covering 20% of the population after 3 months. The intensity of the lockdown depends on the gradient of the fatality rate as a function of the infected, and on the assumed value of a statistical life. The absence of testing increases the economic costs of the lockdown, and shortens the duration of the optimal lockdown which ends more abruptly. Welfare under the optimal policy with testing is higher, equivalent to a one-time payment of 2% of GDP.

A Simple Planning Problem for COVID-19 Lockdown

10.3386/w26948

Evaluating the economic impact of "social distancing" measures taken to arrest the spread of COVID-19 raises a fundamental question about the modern economy: how many jobs can be performed at home? We classify the feasibility of working at home for all occupations and merge this classification with occupational employment counts. We find that 37 percent of jobs in the United States can be performed entirely at home, with significant variation across cities and industries. These jobs typically pay more than jobs that cannot be done at home and account for 46 percent of all US wages. Applying our occupational classification to 85 other countries reveals that lower-income economies have a lower share of jobs that can be done at home.

How Many Jobs Can be Done at Home?

10.3386/w27152

We study supply and demand shocks in a general disaggregated model with multiple sectors, multiple factors, input-output linkages, downward nominal wage rigidities, credit-constraints, and a zero lower bound. We use the model to understand how the Covid-19 crisis, an omnibus of supply and demand shocks, affects output, unemployment, and inflation, and leads to the coexistence of tight and slack labor markets. Negative sectoral supply shocks are stagflationary, whereas negative sectoral demand shocks are deflationary. Furthermore, complementarities in production amplify Keynesian spillovers from negative supply shocks but mitigate them for negative demand shocks. In a stylized quantitative model of the US, we find supply and demand shocks each explain about half the reduction in real GDP. Although there is as much as 7% Keynesian unemployment, this is concentrated in certain markets. Hence, aggregate demand stimulus is less than half as effective as in a typical recession where all labor markets are slack.

Supply and Demand in Disaggregated Keynesian Economies with an Application to the Covid-19 Crisis

10.3386/w27289

We examine how policymakers should react to a pandemic when there is significant uncertainty regarding key parameters relating to the disease. In particular, this paper explores how optimal mitigation policies change when incorporating uncertainty regarding the Case Fatality Rate (CFR) and the Basic Reproduction Rate (R0) into a macroeconomic SIR model in a robust control framework. This paper finds that optimal policy under parameter uncertainty generates an asymmetric optimal mitigation response across different scenarios: when the disease’s severity is initially underestimated the planner increases mitigation to nearly approximate the optimal response based on the true model, and when the disease’s severity is initially overestimated the planner maintains lower mitigation as if there is no uncertainty in order to limit excess economic costs.

Epidemic Responses Under Uncertainty

10.3386/w27239

Globalization is expected to be reversed, at least partially, in the post pandemic era. The Great Financial Recession of 2008–10 marked a historic turning point in the direction of weakening the degree of global economic integration. Now, in the post-pandemic era, policymakers appear poised to take deliberate steps to reinforce the movement toward de-globalization. At the same time, safety nets are expected to be strengthened. In this paper, we develop a model, with which we analyze central macroeconomic interactions between globalization and safety nets. We put together stylized elements of trade globalization, financial globalization, international tax competition, immigration, and welfare state, all in a two-skill, two-period stylized model, where policy (taxes and social benefits) is determined through majority voting.

DEglobalizaion and Social Safety Nets in Post-Covid-19 Era: Textbook Macroeconomic Analysis

10.3386/w27097

In response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the US government brought about a collection of fiscal stimulus measures: the 2020 CARES Act. Among other provisions, this Act directed cash payments to households. We analyze households’ spending responses using high-frequency transaction data. We also explore heterogeneity by income levels, recent income declines, and liquidity. We find that households respond rapidly to receipt of stimulus payments, with spending increasing by $0.25-$0.35 per dollar of stimulus during the first 10 days. Households with lower incomes, greater income drops, and lower levels of liquidity display stronger responses. Liquidity plays the most important role, with no observed spending response for households with high levels of bank account balances. Relative to the effects of previous economic stimulus programs in 2001 and 2008, we see much smaller increases in durables spending and larger increases in spending on food, likely reflecting the impact of shelter-in-place orders and supply disruptions. We hope that our results inform the current debate about appropriate policy measures.

Income, Liquidity, and the Consumption Response to the 2020 Economic Stimulus Payments

10.3386/w27369

The U.S. economy currently faces a truly extraordinary degree of uncertainty as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve could begin highlighting alternative scenarios to illustrate key risks to the economic outlook, and such scenarios could inform the Fed’s policy strategy and public communications. In this paper, we present a set of illustrative scenarios, including a baseline scenario with a rapid but incomplete recovery this year (an upward-tilting checkmark), a benign scenario in which an effective cure or vaccine becomes available and facilitates a nearly complete recovery by mid-2021, and a severely adverse scenario involving persistently high unemployment and disinflationary pressures. Insights into these scenarios can be drawn from key historical episodes, including the Spanish flu, the Great Depression, the end of World War II, and the global financial crisis. We conclude by identifying key challenges that the Federal Reserve might face in adjusting its monetary policy and emergency credit facilities under each of these alternative scenarios.

Incorporating Scenario Analysis into the Federal Reserve's Policy Strategy and Communications

10.3386/w27159

Using weekly administrative payroll data from the largest U.S. payroll processing company, we measure the evolution of the U.S. labor market during the first four months of the global COVID-19 pandemic. After aggregate employment fell by 21 percent through late-April, employment rebounded somewhat through late-June. The re-opening of temporarily shuttered businesses contributed significantly to the employment rebound, particularly for smaller businesses. We show that worker recall has been an important component of recent employment gains for both re-opening and continuing businesses. Employment losses have been concentrated disproportionately among lower wage workers; as of late June employment for workers in the lowest wage quintile was still 20 percent lower relative to mid-February levels. As a result, average base wages increased between February and June, though this increase arose entirely through a composition effect. Finally, we document that businesses have cut nominal wages for almost 7 million workers while forgoing regularly scheduled wage increases for many others.

The U.S. Labor Market during the Beginning of the Pandemic Recession

10.3386/w27060

The “shutdown” economy of April 2020 is compared to a normally functioning economy both in terms of market and nonmarket activities. Three novel methods and data indicate that the shutdown puts market production 25-28 percent below normal in the short run. At an annual rate, the shutdown is costing $7 trillion, or about $15,000 per household per quarter. Employment already fell 28 million by early April 2020. These costs indicate, among other things, the value of innovation in both health and general business sectors that can accelerate the time when normal activity resumes.

Economic Activity and the Value of Medical Innovation during a Pandemic

10.3386/w27134