668 Matching Annotations
1. Oct 2019
2. blog.statebox.org blog.statebox.org
1. Pursuit, which can even search for functions based on type signature.As we hinted already, all our diagrams can be neatly translated to text, ultimately corresponding to equations in our underlying categorical syntax. This allows for the development of very advanced search features, even capable of identifying a pattern independently of the way it was expressed graphically. We want to say again that this is not magic! It works like this: Every diagram corresponds to a term in a category. If a term can be rewritten into another and vice-versa, then the terms are describing the same thing. This way, when you click on some boxes in a diagram and search for equivalent patterns, the engine in the background is looking for all terms that are equivalent to the one describing whatever you selected.

isomorphisms and Eq relationships

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3. graphicallinearalgebra.net graphicallinearalgebra.net
1. to prove that the following is true. W

Interesting. So we could phrase it as: "Prove that a vertical flip of the unit diagram preserves meaning/semantics"

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4. graphicallinearalgebra.net graphicallinearalgebra.net
1. he did manage to convince some people, who became known as the algorists. The conservatives, those who preferred to stick with the status quo, were called abacists. They used the abacus, and converted to and from the Roman number system between calculations.

Abacists == Java Developers?

2. First, ‘+’ is an operation. The left hand side of equation ①, the stuff to the left of the symbol ‘=’, can be understood as a procedure, a computation. It’s the processing that you did with your fingers when the teacher was talking about apples.

also: 3 and 4 are operands

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5. Aug 2019

This is statistics of how they wanted to repeal it

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7. May 2019
8. theintercept.com theintercept.com
1. “If Facebook is providing a consumer’s data to be used for the purposes of credit screening by the third party, Facebook would be a credit reporting agency,” Reidenberg explained. “The [FCRA] statute applies when the data ‘is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for … credit.'” If Facebook is providing data about you and your friends that eventually ends up in a corporate credit screening operation, “It’s no different from Equifax providing the data to Chase to determine whether or not to issue a credit card to the consumer,” according to Reidenberg.
2. “It sure smells like the prescreening provisions of the FCRA,” Reidenberg told The Intercept. “From a functional point of view, what they’re doing is filtering Facebook users on creditworthiness criteria and potentially escaping the application of the FCRA.”

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9. eroskosmos.org eroskosmos.org
1. Цель ACT — преобразовать наше взаимодействие с неприятными мыслями и ощущениями так, чтобы мы их больше не воспринимали как «симптомы».

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10. www.mormonnewsroom.org www.mormonnewsroom.org
1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act

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11. Oct 2018
12. hybridpedagogy.org hybridpedagogy.org
1. Learning is a subversive act.

YES! In American schools you are indoctrinated with the premise: "There is no difficult material. There are only difficult learners." The "trial-by-failure" prevalent in the 70's and 80's, that if you repeat a subject you truly do not nor will not ever understand, Algebra in my case, you are somewhat "subversive" to the rest of classroom, the teacher and especially the school. Report card comments: asks too many questions/asks no questions, disruptive/sleeps in class, no effort given, won't get tutored after school labels the learner without labelling the conformity of the classroom: fit in or be shut out. Excellent point!

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13. primarydocuments.ca primarydocuments.ca
1. A Legislative union of the British North American Provinces is not liable to all the objections which, as I believe, apply. to a Federal or Federative union; but it is liable to the objection that great discontent in the Lower Provinces would follow the centralization in one Government, and in one Legislature, at Quebec or Montreal, of the powers and authority now vested in the Governments and Legislatures of the several provinces; and, moreover, I believe that no single Government or single Legislature could, in present circumstances, satisfactorily govern and legislate for a territory extending over an area so immense, and so sparsely populated as many portions of that territory are.

Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

2. Again, the establishment of a Federal or Federative union would, as l believe, be immediately followed by an agitation in favour of the election or the Local Governors, instead of their being nominated by the Crown. And it would be the more difficult to resist this application on account of the purely local or municipal character of the powers with which the Governors would he intrusted ; but the compliance with the request would he in my opinion-highly dangerous, not only because it would at once be fatal to British influence in the Local Governments and Local Legislatures, but also because it would, I believe, be followed quickly by a similar application from the United ‘Provinces, with regard to the Gov,ernor-Generalship, still more difficult to resist from the force With which it would be pressed, but the compliance with which would at once practically sever the connexion between the Crown and British North America.

Preamble, §§.58, 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

3. union which they contemplate is not to be necessarily of the same character as that which binds together the several States of the neighbouring Republic. But upon whatever basis a Federative union might be formed, it must, I think, be liable -to one of two objections, either of which ought, as it appears to me, to be fatal to such a scheme. For if the Local Governments and Local Legislatures are still to- continue to exercise the same authority in local legislation and local matters which now appertains to them (and there is comparatively little business of any other description which they are now called upon to discuss), then the result of such a union will be still further to degrade the Local Governments and Legislatures without diminishing their authority while the ‘Central Government and Central Legislature, nominally endorsed with high powers, and proud of their position, but with little or no business of a purely Colonial character to occupy their attention, would, I fear, claim an authority on subjects not purely Colonial, but also of Imperial importance (such as questions of foreign trade, &c.), and shortly be brought into collision with Her Majesty’s Government and with the Imperial Parliament. If, on the other hand, the Local Governments and Local Legislatures were shorn of a large portion or their present powers (to which proposal 1 do not believe that the Lower Provinces would agree), the inhabitants of the Lower Provinces would, in my opinion, very soon, if not immediately, become discontented with an arrangement which would deprive them of -the power they now possess over the management of their own affairs, and render New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward’s Island, Provinces of Canada, instead of being, as they now are, Provinces of the British Empire.

Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

4. I presume that the word ‘”Federative” has been used ‘in the Memorandum of the Executive Council of Canada to imply that the

Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

5. should embrace the question of a Legislative, as well as that of a Federal or Federative union, and the expediency of uniting some, as well as that of uniting all the provinces

Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

6. It is possible that a Federative union of the British North American Provinces would afford to the Canadian Government the – readiest mode of escape from the difficulties and embarrassments which now surround the settlement of the “seat of Government ” question, and I presume that I am right in supposing that, although the ostensible object of the proposed inquiry is the union by Federative bonds with Canada of the other British North American Provinces, the Canadian Government have no less in view the, severance of the bond which now joins the two Canadas in a Legislative Union, and the substitution for that bond of a more elastic tie of a Federal or a Federative character.

§.16 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

7. ment to this may be added that, by the proposed distribution of the revenue, each province would have a direct pecuniary interest in the preservation of the authority of the Federal Government. In these respects’ it is conceived that the proposed Confederation would possess greater inherent strength than that of the United States, and would combine the advantages of the unity for general purposes of a Legislative union, with so much of the Federative principle as -would give all the benefits of local government and legislation upon questions of provincial interest.

Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

8. The Local Legislatures would not be in a position to claim the exercise of the same sovereign power-, which have frequently been the cause of difference between the American States and their General Govern-

Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

9. It will be observed that the basis of confederation now proposed differs from that of-the-United States in several important particulars. It does not profess to be derived from the people, but would be the Constitution provided by the Imperial Parliament; thus affording the means of remedying any defect, which is now practically impossible under the American Constitution.

§§.91, 91(1), and 92(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.

10. The Confederation might include the constitution of a Federal Court of Appeal.

§.101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

11. It will form. a subject for mature deliberation whether the powers of the Federal Government should be confined to the points named, or should be extended to all matters not specially entrusted to the Local Legislatures.

§.91(29) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

12. That the powers of the Federal Legislature and Government should comprehend the Customs, Excise, and all trade questions; postal service, militia, banking, currency, weights and measures, and bankruptcy; public works of a national character; harbours and lighthouses; fisheries, and their protection; criminal justice; public lands, public debt, and government of unincorporated and Indian territories.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

13. When Mr. Galt, therefore, came into office; it was natural that the question of an union of the Colonies should at once be discussed-. I found him and several of the gentlemen about to assume office deeply impressed with the idea that, in some such union alone could be found the ultimate solution of the great question which had been made a ground of agitation by Mr. Brown, and his friends, at the general election, viz., the existing equality of representation -of Upper and Lower Canada, and the alleged injustice inflicted on the former by such equality. This question is one, I need not say, which threatened to touch the root of the present union of the two sections of Canada -as by law established, and might imperil its existence by reviving all the old antagonism of race and religion.

§.51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

14. The union of Lower with Upper Canada was based upon perfect equality being preserved between these Provinces-a condition the more necessary from the differences in their respective language, law, and. religion; and although there is now a large English population in Lower Canada, still these differences exist to an extent, which prevents any perfect and complete assimilation of the views of the two sections.

§.51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

15. The population, trade, and resources of all these Colonies have so rapidly increased of late years, and the removal f trade-restrictions has made them, in so great a degree, self-sustaining, that it appears to the Government of Canada exceedingly important to bind still more closely the ties of their common allegiance to the British Crown, and to obtain for general purposes, such an identity in legislation as may seem to consolidate their growing power, thus raising, under, the protection of the Empire, an important Confederation on the North American Continent. At present, each Colony is totally distinct in its government, its customs and trade, and its general legislation. To each other no greater facilities are extended than to any foreign State; and the only common tie is that which binds all to the British Crown. This state of things is considered to be neither promotive of the physical prosperity of all, nor of that moral union which ought to be preserved in the presence of the powerful Confederation of the United States.

§.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

16. That the Federal, Government should be composed of a Governor General, or Viceroy, to be appointed by the Queen; of an Upper House, or Senate, elected upon a territorial basis of representation and of a House of Assembly, elected on the basis of population., The Executive to be composed of Ministers, responsible to the Legislature:

Preamble, §§.22, 91, and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

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14. nonfics.com nonfics.com
1. General Butt Naked for example

Sample annotation:

1. Are there any other examples that might fit either type of documentary?
2. Explain whether and why war crime documentaries might be trending a specific direction.

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15. Sep 2018
16. digital.library.wayne.edu digital.library.wayne.edu
1. Fra. This is most strange,That she, who even but now, was your best object,The argument of your praise, balm of your age,The best, the dearest, should in this trice of timeCommit a thing so monstrous, to dismantleSo many folds of favour: sure her offenceMust be of such unnatural degree,That monsters it: Or your fore-voucht affectionFall into Taint; which to believe of herMust be a faith, that reason without miracleShould never plant in me.

In this passage the King of France is acknowledging the difference in Cordelia's answer about how much she loves her father. The King of France finds it strange that Cordelia's answer changes Lear's whole perspective of his daughter so quickly, yet he understands the amount of disrespect he is feeling. At the same time King of France finds bravery in Cordelia and still wants to marry her.

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17. primarydocuments.ca primarydocuments.ca
1. The whole of the clauses which refer to the latter are as complete as the most ardent supporters of union could desire, tempered by the lew exceptions by means of which the provinces have wished to shelter their local institutions from attack.

§§.92(14) and 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

2. The 34th paragraph of the 29th clause of the scheme reads thus: ” The establishment of a General Court of Appeal for the Federated Provinces.” What is the object—what will be the character of the tribunal?

§§.92(14) and 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

3. We ought to look at the question apart from party considerations, and on its own merits: that is to say, we ought to place in the Constitution a counterpoise to prevent any party legislation, and to moderate the precipitancy of any government which might be disposed to move too fast and go too far,—I mean a legislative body able to protect the people against itself and against the encroachments of power. (Hear, hear.) In England, the Crown has never attempted to degrade the House of Peers by submerging it, because it knows well that the nobility are a bulwark against the aggressions of the democratic element. The House of Lords, by their power, their territorial possessions, and their enormous wealth, are a great defence against democratic invasion, greater than anything we can oppose to it in America. In Canada, as in the rest of North America, we have not the castes—classes of society—which are found in Europe, and the Federal Legislative Council, although immutable in respect of number, inasmuch as all the members belonging to it will come from the ranks of the people, without leaving them, as do the members of the House of Commons, will not be selected from a privileged class which have no existence. Here all men are alike, and are all equal; if a difference is to be found, it arises exclusively from the industry, the intelligence, and the superior education of those who have labored the most strenuously, or whom Providence has gifted with the highest faculties. (Hear, hear.) Long ago the privileges of caste disappeared in this country. Most of our ancient nobility left the country at the conquest, and the greater number of those who remained have sunk out of sight by inaction. Accordingly, whom do we see in the highest offices of state? The sons of the poor who have felt the necessity of study, and who have risen by the aid of their intellect and hard work. (Hear, hear.) Everything is democratic with us, because everyone can attain to everything by the efforts of a noble ambition. The legislative councillors appointed by the Crown will not be, therefore, socially speaking, persons superior to the members of the House of Commons; they will owe their elevation only to their own merit.

§.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

4. He said that even if the Lower House were altogether liberal, the Upper House would remain composed of conservatives; this was his fear. He has been a long while trying to gain predominance for his democratic notions, but it is evident he will not succeed.

§.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

5. relative to the constitution of the Legislative Council, and said that he had not looked at the question, while speaking the other evening, in the same light as the honorable member for the county of Quebec. He spoke of the conservatives as a party, and his fear was, not that the Upper House would not be conservative enough, but that it would be too much so.

§.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

6. MR. GEOFFRION—YOU have equality between the two provinces. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Yes, we have equality, but not as a race, nor in respect of religion. When the leader for Lower Canada shall have sixty-five members belonging to his section to support him, and command a majority of the French-Canadians and of the British from Lower Canada, will he not be able to upset the Government if his colleagues interfere with his recommendations to office? That is our security. At present, if I found unreasonable opposition to my views, my remedy would be to break up the Government by retiring, and the same thing will happen in the Federal Government.

§.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

7. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Am I not in a minority at present in appointing judges? And yet when I propose the appointment of a judge for Lower Canada, is he not appointed?

§.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

8. the objection of the honorable member for the county of Quebec is well founded, because the Federal Government may appoint all English or all French-Canadians as legislative councillors for Lower Canada. If the honorable member had read the resolutions, he would have found that the appointments of legislative councillors are to be made so as to accord with the electoral divisions now existing in the province. Well, I ask whether it is probable that the Executive of the Federal Government, which will have a chief or leader as it is nowVI ask whether it is very probable that he will recommend the appointment of a French-Canadian to represent divisions like Bedford or Wellington for instance?

§.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

9. Lower Canada is in a peculiar position. We have two races of people whose interests are distinct from each other in respect to origin, language and religion. In preparing the business of the Confederation at Quebec, we had to conciliate these two interests, and to give the country a Constitution which might reconcile the conservative with the democratic element; for the weak point in democratic institutions is the leaving of all power in the hands of the popular element. The history of the past proves that this is an evil. In order that institutions may be stable and work harmoniously, there must be a power of resistance to oppose the democratic element. In the United States the power of resistance does not reside in the Senate, nor even in the President.

§.22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

10. a class of men who would not represent the province for which they are appointed, and who could give no pledge that they would maintain its institutions.

§§.24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

11. he will see that the first nominations are to be made by the existing governments. Thus the Government of Canada, that of New Brunswick and that of Nova Scotia will appoint legislative councillors, but afterwards the Federal Government will make the appointments. The honorable member for Quebec can, with reason, draw the conclusion that there is no guarantee that the views of the provinces will be respected. I for my part have investigated the matter, more in connection with the power that will be vested in the legislative councillors. I asserted that by appointing them for life and limiting their number, an absolute authority would be created, which would be quite beyond the control of the people and even of the Executive; that the power of this body will be so great, that they will always be in a position to prevent every reform if they thought proper, and that a collision between the two branches would be inevitable and irremediable. The danger arising from the creating of such a power is exactly that of being obliged to destroy it if they resist too obstinately the popular demands. In England there is no necessity for breaking down the obstructions sometimes presented by the House of Lords, because the Crown having it in its power to appoint new peers, can overcome the difficulty. Here there will be no means of doing it, when the number of councillors is fixed. Accordingly, I have looked at the question through the medium of the powers assigned to the councillors, whereas the honorable member for the county of Quebec fears lest the Government should make choice of men who would not represent public opinion in the provinces; that they might appoint members all of French origin or all of English origin to represent Lower Canada, or take them all from among

§§.24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

12. In our Constitution it is the duty of the Legislative Council to exercise the conservative influence, and to modify the legislation too energetic and too full of outside effervescence, which is sent for their consideration from the House of Commons. But when public opinion gains vigor from the obstacles which it encounters, and the reforms demanded are rational and come before them in due course, there is no danger that the legislation which embodies them will be obstructed in its progress; for the people will rise in their majesty and in their sense of justice, as did the people of England in 1832, and the obstacles they might meet with on their way would be swept away as by a torrent. (Hear, hear.) HON. MR. DORION—That is exactly where the danger lies. HON. MR. CAUCHON—That is the danger which assailed the House of Lords in 1832, but no one would venture to confront to the last extremity a danger such as this. But the honorable member for Quebec tells us, if I understand him rightly, that we have not sufficient guarantees for Lower Canada in the appointment of the legislative councillors. The selection of legislative councillors has no bearing whatever on the question we are now considering, viz., whether the appointment by the Crown is or is not preferable to the elective principle. But in answer to him I will say, that the scheme before us seems to be quite clear. According to this plan the candidates for the Legislative Council will be recommended by the local governments and appointed by the General Government, and it is by this very division of powers that the selections are sure to be good, and made in conformity with the desire and sentiments of the provinces. HON. MR. DORION—Only the first nominations are to be made in this manner, not those which may be made afterwards. HON. MR. CAUCHON—The first nominations will be made by the present Governments, and the federal councillors will be taken from the present legislative councillors to the number prescribed, 24, provided so many can be found who will accept the post, and who possess the requisite property qualification. The Conference has engaged, by the terms of the scheme, to respect the rights of the Opposition, and any government who should fail to carry out so solemn an engagement would well deserve to lose the public confidence. (Hear, hear.) I repeat that the mode of appointing the councillors in no wise affects the conservative principle of nomination on which the constitution of the Legislative Council ought to be based.

§§.24, 25, 26, and 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

13. It is true that the House of Lords, Conservative though it be, finds itself removed from all popular influence; but its numbers may be increased upon the recommendation of the responsible advisers of the Crown, if such a measure were to become necessary to obtain the concurrence of both Houses, or to prevent a collision between them. The position which its members occupy in it establishes a sort of compromise between the Crown and the popular element. But this new House, after Confederation, will be a perfectly independent body; its members will be nominated for life, and their number cannot be increased. How long will this system work without bringing about a collision between the two branches of the Legislature? Let us suppose the Lower House composed in a great part of Liberals, for how long a time would it submit to an Upper House named by Government? Be kind enough to observe, Mr. SPEAKER, that under the old system, the Legislative Council possessed the same elements of existence as the House of Lords, and that the Crown could increase its numbers at need; it augmented it in 1849, as it threatened to augment the House of Lords in 1832. Observe, again, that it is precisely this control exercised by the Crown over the Upper House that the hon. gentleman found so fatal to legislation previous to 1856. But there is a more rational manner of appreciating the part sustained by the House of Lords in the British Constitution. No one denies to the Sovereign the abstract right of increasing at will the House of Lords; but such right has never been exercised but for the purpose of rewarding men distinguished for great national services and when, in 1832, WILLIAM IV. granted Earl GREY the tremendous power to swamp the representative body of the great landed nobility, it was because the country was moving with rapid strides towards revolution, and because there remained to the Sovereign but two alternatives, either to lessen the moral weight of the House of Lords, or to see his own throne knocked to pieces from under his feet.

§§.22, 24, 26, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

14. It must then have been a real revolution, this nomination of one hundred new peers, a revolution as real as that which menaced the Throne; and do we not feel persuaded that if one day our Federal Legislative Council were to place itself obstinately and systematically in opposition to popular will, matured and strengthened by ordeals, it would not be swept away by a revolutionary torrent such as threatened to sweep away the House of Lords in 1832? This Council, limited as to numbers , because the provinces insist on maintaining in it an equilibrium without which they would never have consented to a union, this Council, sprung from the people—having the same wants, hopes and even passions, would resist less the popular will in America, where it is so prompt and active, than could the House of Lords in England, where the masses are inert because they have not political rights; reason tells us thus because they would be a less powerful body socially or politically.

§§.22, 24, 26, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

15. We have accorded the principle of representation based upon population in the House of Commons of the Federal Government, and that is without doubt a great sacrifice; but we ought only to make so important a concession on the condition that we shall have equality of representation in the Legislative Council, and the right reserved to ourselves to appoint our twenty-four legislative councillors, in order that they may be responsible to the public opinion of the province and independent of the Federal Government.—Without this essential guarantee I affirm that the rights of Lower Canada are in danger. For my part I am ready, on behalf of Lower Canada, to give up her right to elect directly her twenty-four legislative councillors, although the retention of the elective principle might perhaps be the surest means of preserving our institutions; but I am anxious that the new Constitution now proposed should give us adequate guarantees that the legislative councillors to be appointed for life should, at all events, be selected by the Local Government of Lower Canada, which would be responsible to the people. These not ill-grounded sources of anxiety I should like to see removed.

§§.22, 24, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

16. in relation to the qualifications and appointment of the legislative councillors. Like him, I am quite of opinion that the conservative element ought, of necessity, to be the basis of the Legislative Council, to counterbalance the popular element. This principle governed the constitution of the House of Lords in England, that of the Legislative Council in Belgium, and that of every well organized representative government.

§.23 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

17. In the scheme of the Quebec Conference there was no delegation of the supreme authority, either from above or below, inasmuch as the provinces, not being independent states, received, their political organizations from the Parliament of the Empire.

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

18. The hon. member for Hochelaga has declared that he was willing to accord to the Protestants the guarantees of protection which they sought for the education of their children; but in this he has been forestalled by the Quebec Conference and by the unanimous sentiment of the Catholic population of Lower Canada. If the present law be insufficient, let it be changed. Justice demands that the Protestant minority of Lower Canada shall be protected in the same manner as the Catholic minority of Upper Canada, and that the rights acquired by the one and the other shall not be assailed either by the Federal Parliament or the local legislatures.

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

19. Protestantism dominates in the government and in the legislature, and yet has not Catholicity been better treated, and has it not been better developed, with more liberty and more prosperity than under the regime of the Constitution of 1791. (Hear, hear.) Living and laboring together we have learned to know, to respect, to esteem each other, and to make mutual concessions for the common weal.

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

20. On the contrary, did it not emancipate the latter, civilly and religiously, and did it not give that minority privileges which it had not hitherto possessed? If our people are inflexibly attached to our faith, it is also full of toleration, of good-will towards those who are not of the same belief.

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

21. Before the union, the parliamentary majority in Lower Canada was Catholic, and although it was long involved in a struggle with power, was it ever guilty of an injustice towards the Protestant minority?

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

22. And yet when the honorable member for Joliette asked with much reason of the honorable member for Lotbinière why he did not speak of Confederation based upon monarchical principles, the latter gentleman answered that he could not speak of what did not exist, and of what was absurd.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

23. They did not act wrongly then, those forty chosen men of British North America who came to Quebec to erect a new nation on the monarchical basis, and as much as possible on the principles of the Parliament of Great Britain.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

24. M. DE TOCQUEVILLE has lived too long; his admirable work on democracy in America produces upon our minds, at the present day, only the effect of an heroic poem; it is the Isle of Calypso, so admirably sung by FENELON, but which fades away when you have closed Telemachus.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

25. We have also seen, not far from our own homes, that same democracy wrapped in the mantle of republicanism, moving at a rapid pace towards demagogy, and from demagogy to an intolerable despotism.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

26. vinces, and secure efficiency, harmony and permanency in the working of the union, would be a General Government, charged with matters of common interest to the whole country; and Local Governments for each of the Canadas, and for the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, charged with the control of local matters in their respective sections. Provision being made for the admission into the union, on equitable terms, of Newfoundland, the Northwest Territory, British Columbia, and Vancouver.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

27. principles which threatened society at large. What the Opposition detest the most in the project of the Quebec Conference, is its monarchical character, as also those words found at the commencement of that remarkable work :— The best interests and present and future prosperity of British North America will be promoted by a Federal union under the Crown of Great Britain, provided such union can be effected on principles just to the several provinces. In the Federation of the British North American Provinces, the system of government best adapted, under existing circumstances, to protect the diversified interests of the several pro-

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

28. It appears therefore that the only alternative which now offers itself to the inhabitants of Lower Canada is a choice between dissolution pure and simple, or Confederation on one side, and representation by population on the other. And however opposed Lower Canada may be to representation by population, is there not imminent danger that it may be finally imposed upon it, if it resist all measures of reform, the object of which is to leave to the local authorities of each section the control of its own interests and institutions. We should not forget that the same authority which imposed on us the Act of Union, or which altered it without our consent, by repealing the clause which required the concurrence of two thirds of the members of both Houses in order to change the representation respecting the two sections, may again intervene to impose upon us this new change.

Preamble, Part V, §§.51, 52, 91, 91(1), 92, and 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

29. The example of the neighboring states, in which the application of the Federal system has shown us how fitting it was to the government of an immense territory, inhabited by people of different origins, creeds, laws and customs, has no doubt suggested the idea; but it was only in 1856 that this proposition was enunciated before the Legislature by the Lower Canadian Opposition, as offering, in its opinion, the only effective remedy for the abuses produced by the present system.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

30. The honorable member for Brockville, the Postmaster General, the Speaker, and other members representing Lower Canadian counties, in the present Parliament, have already voted for representation by population. Before long, it will become impossible to resist the demand of Upper Canada in this respect. If representation by population be not granted now, it will infallibly obtain it later, but then without any guarantee for the protection of the French Canadians.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

31. Representation “based upon population was one of the least causes of this project. [And further on] : But, as soon as the Government found itself, after its defeat, obliged either to resign or to appeal to the people, gentlemen on the other side of the House, without there being the slightest agitation on this question, prepared to embrace their most violent adversaries, and said to themselves: ” We are going to forget our past differences, provided we can preserve our portfolios. “

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

32. Necessarily, I do not mean to say that I shall always be opposed to Confederation. The population may extend itself, and cover the virgin forests which exist between Canada and the Maritime Provinces, and commercial relations may increase in such a manner as to render Confederation necessary.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

33. Mr. DORION argued that when Lower Canada had the preponderance of population, complaints were of the inequality of the representation of that section. The union of Belgium and Holland, which was somewhat similar to that at present existing between Upper and Lower Canada was dissolved when it was found it did not work advantageously to both countries. He instanced a number of questions on which it was impossible for Upper and Lower Canada to agree; public feeling being quite dissimilar— subjects popular in one section being the reverse in the other. He warned Lower Canada members, that when the time came that the whole of the representatives from the western portion of the province would be banded together on the question, they would obtain representation by population, and secure the assistance of the Eastern Township members in so doing. He regarded a Federal union of Upper and Lower Canada as a nucleus of the great Confederation of the North American Provinces to which all looked forward. He concluded by saying he would vote for the resolution, as the only mode by which the two sections of the province could get out of the difficulties in which they now are. He thought the union ought to be dissolved, and a Federal union of the provinces would in due time follow.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

34. The honorable member for Brockville, the Honorable Postmaster General, the Speaker, and other members representing Lower Canadian counties in the present Parliament, have voted for representation by population. Before long, it will be impossible to resist the demands of Upper Canada in this respect. If representation by population is not granted now, it will infallibly obtain it at a later period, but then without any guarantees for the protection of the French- Canadians. The repeal of the union, a Federal union, representation based on population, or some other great change must in all necessity take place, and for my part I am disposed to consider the question of representation by population, in order to see if it may not be conceded with guarantees for the protection of the religion, the language, and the laws of Lower Canadians. I am equally ready to take into consideration the project of a Confederation of the provinces, leaving to each section the administration of its local affairs, as for example the power of regulating its own civil, municipal and educational laws; and to the General Government the administration of the public works, the public lands, the post-office department, and commerce.

§§.51, 52, 91, and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

35. With the control of our public lands in our own hands, we can attract the tide of emigration, retain our own people in the country, and advance in prosperity as rapidly as the other provinces.

§§.92(5), 95, and 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

36. It will be said that the national life of Lower Canada is so deeply rooted, that it is impossible to destroy it; but, if we desire to secure its safety, we must accept the present scheme of Confederation, under which all the religious interests of Lower Canada, her educational institutions, her public lands, in fact everything that constitutes a people’s nationality, will find protection and safety.

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

37. The Conservative party has always opposed representation by population under the present union, because under this union we are face to face with the population of a country of which the products are different from ours, and of which the interests are not always identical with ours. This question was strongly agitated. The whole people of Lower Canada resisted that demand, and the whole Conservative party firmly refused to consent to it, while the other party—the Opposition party—held out hopes to those who demanded that measure, and allied themselves with them.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

38. The Federal system is the normal condition of American populations; for there are very few American nations which have not a political system of that nature. The Federal system is a state of transition which allows the different races inhabiting the same part of the globe to unite, with the view of attaining national unity and homogeneousness. Spain, Belgium, France, and several other European countries were formerly peopled by different races, who constituted so many different communities; but they became united, they entered into confederations, and in the course of ages all the communities were consolidated into those which we now see—into everything that is held to be beautiful, noble and great throughout the whole world. When the Federal system has been put in practice in an enlightened manner, it has always sufficed for the requirements of those who adopted it.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

39. Without uniformity, without unity, it is impossible to make any serious attempt at defence in case of attack, and the divided country falls an easy prey to the enemy.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

40. These powers of the Federal Government are not, as we understand the matter, to be exercised, except as regards the following subjects, viz., Commerce, comprising purely commercial laws, such as laws respecting banks and other institutions of a general financial character, coinage, and weights and measures; Customs, including the establishment of a uniform tariff, and the collection of the revenue resulting therefrom; great Public Works and Navigation, such as canals, railways, telegraph lines, great seaport works and the lighting of the coast; Post Office arrangements, both in their entirety and in their internal and external details; the Militia in the entirety of its organization; Criminal justice, comprising all offences which do not come under the jurisdiction of the police courts and justices of the peace. Everything else connected with civil law, education, public charities, the settlement of public lands, agriculture, city and rural police, road works, in fact, with all matters relating to the family life, so to speak, of each province, will remain under the exclusive control of the respective Local Government of each one of them, as by inherent right; the powers of the Federal Government being looked upon as merely a concession of rights, which are specially designated.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

41. What hopes may we not be allowed to indulge respecting the material future of the immense country which includes the two Canadas, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, the Hudson’s Bay Territory and Vancouver’s Island, when we reflect on the wealth of a soil which is almost everywhere remarkably fertile, (except the extreme North,) on the resources which the forests have treasured up for the settler in the lapse of ages, on the immense fisheries in the Gulf, sufficient of themselves to feed the whole world with fish of the finest quality; when we consider that the whole of this vast continent offers to us, in its various geological formations mineral wealth of the most precious kinds, and that nature has arranged for us channels of intercommunication of incredible grandeur. The fertile soil of these provinces intersected throughout their entire length by the rivers St. Lawrence and St. John, bathed by the waters of the Gulf and those of the Great Lakes, the superb forests through which flow the immense Ottawa, the St. Maurice and the Saguenay, the mines of copper bordering on lakes Superior and Huron, the iron mines of Canada, the coal measures of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the seaports of Quebec, Halifax and St. John, the ores of all kinds dispersed throughout the provinces—all those form an aggregate of means which, if we suppose them to be turned to account by a competent population, governed by a political system based on true principles of order and liberty, justifies the most extravagant calculations of profit, the most extraordinary predictions of growth, as compared with the present state of things.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

42. [Page 576]

§.92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867

43. [Page 575]

§.92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867

44. we shall always have our court of final appeal in Her Majesty’s Privy Council

§. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867

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18. primarydocuments.ca primarydocuments.ca
1. At most, the resolutions are not a treaty, but the mere draft of an agreement come to between those gentlemen. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Oh, yes, it is a treaty, and we are now fighting to uphold it. MR. DUNKIN—Well, it is a draft of a treaty if you like, but it is not a treaty. Plenipotentiaries, who frame treaties, have full authority to act on behalf of their respective countries. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—It is the same as any other treaty entered into under the British system. The Government is responsible for it to Parliament, and if this does not meet your approval, you can dispossess us by a vote of want of confidence.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

2. Her Majesty says in her Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Imperial Parliament, that she approves of the Conference that framed the treaty. Is not the royal sanction sufficient authority?

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

3. We are asking for that authority now

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

4. Well, a treaty, I suppose, implies authority on the part of those who framed it to enter into it.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

5. MR. DUNKIN—I think we shall, if we maintain and strengthen our relations with the parent state; but I do not think we shall, if we adopt a scheme like this, which must certainly weaken the tie between us and the Empire. Our language to England had better be the plain truth—that we are no beggars, and will shirk no duty; that we do not want to go, and of ourselves will not go; that our feelings and our interests alike hold us to her; that, even apart from feeling, we are not strong enough, and know our own weakness, and the strength of the power near us; and that the only means by which we can possibly be kept from absorption by that power, is the maintaining now—and for all time that we can look forward to—of our connection with the Mother-Land.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

6. Now, I am not desirous that our acceptance of the scheme should go home to be cited (as it would be) to the people of England, as a proof that we so view it—a proof that we wish to be separated from the Empire. I am quite satisfied separation will never do. We are simply sure to be overwhelmed the instant our neighbors and we differ, unless we have the whole power of the Mother Country to assist us.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

7. The people of England have no desire to snap asunder abruptly the slender links which still unite them with their trans-atlantic fellow-subjects, or to shorten by a single hour the duration of their common citizenship. * * * * We are led irresistibly to the inference that this stage has been well nigh reached in the history of our trans-Atlantic provinces. Hence it comes to pass that we accept, not with fear and trembling, but with unmixed joy and satisfaction, a voluntary proclamation, which, though couched in the accents of loyalty, and proffering an enduring allegiance to our Queen, falls yet more welcome on our eats as the harbinger of the future and complete independence of British North America.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

8. If, as has been alleged, a legislative union is unattainable, because inconsistent with due securities for the rights guaranteed to the French Canadians, by treaty or by the Quebec Act, and Federation is therefore the only alternative, the vital question for the framers of this Constitution is how the inherent weakness of all federations can in this instance be cured, and the Central Government armed with a sovereignty which may be worthy of the name. It is the essence of all good governments to have somewhere a true sovereign power. A sovereignty which ever eludes your grasp, which has no local habitation, provincial or imperial, is in fact no government at all. Sooner or later the shadow of authority which is reflected from an unsubstantial political idea must cease to have power among men. It has been assumed by those who take a sanguine view of this political experiment, that its authors have steered clear of the rock on which the WASHINGTON Confederacy has split. But if the weakness of the Central Government is the rock alluded to, we fear that unless in clear water and smooth seas, the pilot who is to steer this new craft will need a more perfect chart than the resolutions of the Quebec Conference afford, to secure him against the risks of navigation.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

9. What we have to fear, and if possible to guard against, is the constant peril of a three-fold conflict of authority implied in the very existence of a federation of dependencies retaining, as now proposed, any considerable share of intercolonial independence.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

10. We are to buy the Hudson’s Bay territory, and take care of it, and make a grand road all across the continent, which Great Britain shrinks from contemplating herself.

§§.121 and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

11. The completion of the Intercolonial Railway, and the probable annexation of the fertile portions of the Great North-Western territory to the new Confederation, form a portion only of the probable consequences of its formation, the benefits of which will not be limited to the colonies alone, but in which Europe and the world at large will eventually participate. When the Valley of the Saskatchewan shall have been colonized, the communications between the Red River Settlement and Lake Superior completed, and the harbour of Halifax united by one continuous line of railway, with the shores of Lake Huron, the three missing links between the Atlantic and Pacific ocean will have been supplied.

§§.121 and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

12. The result of these proposals, if carried into effect, would be the creation of a new state in North America, still retaining the name of a British dependency, comprising an area about equal to that of Europe, a population of about four millions, with an aggregate revenue in sterling of about two millions and a half, and carrying on a trade (including exports, imports and intercolonial commerce) of about twenty-eight millions sterling per annum. If we consider the relative positions of Canada and the Maritime Provinces—the former possessing good harbors, but no back country, the former an unlimited supply of cereals, but few minerals; the latter an unlimited supply of iron and coal, but little agricultural produce. The commercial advantages of union between states so circumstanced, are too obvious to need comment. The completion of the Intercolonial Railway, and the probable annexation of the fertile portions of the Northwest territory to the new Confederation, form a portion only of the probable consequences of its formation, but in which Europe and the world at large will eventually participate. When the—

Preamble, §§.121 and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

13. A very important question, on which these papers afford no information, is that relating to the future condition of those territories and dependencies of the Crown in North America, which are not included within the present boundaries of the five provinces. “We allude more particularly to the territories now held by the Hudson’s Bay Company, under the Crown, by charter or lease. The Crown is doubtless bound to take care that the interest of its grantees—[it never seems to have occurred to our friend that we, too, are grantees]—are not prejudiced by these changes; but, on the other hand, an English trading company is ill qualified to carry on the government and provide for the defence of a vast and inaccessible expanse of continental territory.

§.146 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

14. It is scarcely surprising that any project which may offer a prospect of escape from a political situation so undignified and unsatisfactory should be hailed with a cordial welcome by all parties concerned. But one meaning can be put upon all this. In the opinion of the writer, England does not believe that these provinces are worth anything to her, while the connection with the Mother Country is worth all to us ; and she would hail with satisfaction any way of escape from the obligations and dangers that we are said to cast upon her.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

15. Retainers who will neither give nor accept notice to quit our service, must, it is assumed, be kept for our service. There are, nevertheless, special and exceptional difficulties which beset us in this portion of our vast field of empire.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

16. It might puzzle the wisest of our statesmen, if he were challenged to put his finger on any single item of material advantage resulting to ourselves from our dominions in British North America, which cost us at this moment about a million sterling a year.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

17. It is not unnatural that the desire to maintain a connection with the power and wealth of the Mother Country should be stronger on the side of the colonies than it is on that of the British public, for they owe almost everything to us, and we receive but little from them. Moreover, the existing system of colonial government enables them to combine all the advantages of local independence with the strength and dignity of a great empire. But the Imperial Government in the meantime has to decide, not as of old, whether Great Britain is to tax the colonies, but to what extent the colonies are to be permitted to tax Great Britain—a question which is daily becoming more urgent and less easy of solution.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

18. There are problems of colonial policy the solution of which cannot, without peril, be indefinitely delayed; and though Imperial England is doing her best to keep up appearances in the management of her five and forty dependencies, the political links which once bound them to each other and to their common centre are evidently worn out. Misgivings haunt the public mind as to the stability of an edifice which seems to be founded on a reciprocity of deception, and only to be shored up for the time by obsolete and meaningless traditions.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

19. I am well enough satisfied that Lord DERBY himself has not the most remote idea of falling in with the views of the so-called colonial reformers in England, who desire to see the colonies pay for every thing or be cast off; but he knows the hold that their views have gained at home, and he speaks accordingly.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

20. Under these circumstances I see with additional satisfaction—[Meaning of, course, though courtesy may have disallowed the phrase, “less dissatisfaction,” for he certainly did not see those other matters with any satisfaction at all]—I see with additional satisfaction the announcement of a contemplated important step. I mean the proposed Federation of the British American Provinces. (Hear, hear.) I hope I may regard that Federation as a measure tending to constitute a power strong enough, with the aid of this country, which I trust may never be withdrawn from those provinces, to acquire an importance which, separately, they could not obtain. (Hear, hear.) If I saw in this Federation a desire to separate from this country, I should think it a matter of much more doubtful policy and advantage; but I perceive with satisfaction, that no such wish is entertained. Perhaps it is premature to discuss, at present, resolutions not yet submitted to the different provincial legislatures, but I hope I see in the terms of that Federation an earnest desire on the part of the provinces to maintain for themselves the blessing of the connection with this country, and a determined and deliberate preference for monarchical over republican institutions.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

21. “We are supposed, by one of these noble lords, to bo taking a step analogous to that taken by the authors of the Declaration of Independence ; and by the other, to be moved by the same impulse of empire that has been leading to the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

22. the northern provinces of British America. I heartily concur in all—[the all being as we have just seen, not much]—that has been said by my noble friend the mover of this address in his laudation of that project. It is, my lords, a most interesting contemplation that that project has arisen, and has been approved by Her Majesty’s Government. It is certainly contrary to what might be considered the old maxims of government in connection with the colonies, that we should here express —and that the Crown itself should express— satisfaction at a measure which tends to bind together, in almost independent power, our colonies in North America. We do still believe that though thus banded together, they will recognize the value of British connection, and that while they will be safer in this amalgamation, we shall be as safe in their fealty. The measure will no doubt, my lords, require much prudent consideration and great attention to provincial susceptibilities.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

23. Why should these resolutions suggest to any one’s mind the declaration of independence? Did the gentlemen who signed these resolutions in order to authenticate them—pledge their lives and fortunes, and I don’t know what besides, to anything, or risk anything, by appending their signatures to the document? Was it a great exercise of political heroism? Why, the men who signed the declaration of independence qualified themselves in the eyes of the Imperial Government for the pleasant operations of heading and hanging. They knew what they were about. They were issuing a rebel declaration of war. But this is a piece of machinery, on the face of it at least, to perpetuate our connection with the Mother Country! Why then does it suggest the idea that so great a scheme of self-government, or one shadowing forth so many similar and possible changes, ” hardly ever before occurred?” It is because there is, underlying the speaker’s thought, just that idea of the anti-colonial school in England, that we are going to slip away from our connection with the Mother Country; and in this respect, therefore, it seems to him that it is like the declaration of independence. The remaining sentence indicates a curious misapprehension as to the present posture of this question. ” If the delegates of these several colonies finally agree to the resolutions framed by their committee, and if these resolutions be approved by the several legislatures of the several colonies, Parliament will be asked to consider and complete this federation of our Northern American possessions.” The noble lord, the mover of the Address, seems to take the resolutions for a mere report of a committee which (on their way here) had yet to be submitted to the consideration of the delegates ! Next, I turn to the language of Lord HOUGHTON, the seconder of the Address ; and from his lips too, we have an almost distinct utterance of the idea of our coming independence. He says :—

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

24. If it is a declaration that this thing is a treaty, which may not be amended by us without flying in the face of Her Majesty’s Government, I do not understand the meaning of words. (Hear, hear.) In connection with the Speech from the Throne, we had, the other night, some notice taken, on the floor of this House, of language used in discussing the address in the Imperial Parliament. Lords CLAREMONT, HOUGHTON, GRANVILLE and DERBY had something to say in respect of this scheme in the House of Lords ; as also, Mr. HANBURY TRACY in the House of Commons. I do not attach great weight to what was there said, because there really was little said any way, and that little could not indicate any great amount of knowledge upon the subject treated. However, I will quote first what the mover of the address, the Earl of CLAREMONT, said. After referring to the war in New Zealand, he went on :— My Lords, although these operations in India, New Zealand, and Japan, are matters of more or less interest or concern to the nation, and, as such, are fully deserving of notice, yet they are small in comparison to the importance of the probable change in the constitution of our North American Colonies. Since the declaration of independence by the colonies, since known as the United States of America, so great a scheme of self-government, or one shadowing forth so many similar and possible changes, has not occurred.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

25. These delegates adopted resolutions having for their object a closer union of those provinces under a central government. If those resolutions shall be approved by the provincial legislatures, a bill will be laid before you for carrying this important measure into effect”

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

26. The language addressed from the Throne to the Imperial Parliament is this: ” Her Majesty has had great satisfaction in giving Her sanction—”to what?—” to the meeting of a conference of delegates from the several North American Provinces, who, on invitation from Her Majesty’s Governor General, assembled at Quebec.”

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

27. It is true we are not actually giving up the American colonies,—nay, the despatch we are quoting does not contain the slightest hint that such a possibility ever crossed the mind of the writer; but yet it is perfectly evident—and there is no use in concealing the fact—that the Confederation movement considerably diminishes the difficulty which would be felt by the colonies in separating from the Mother Country. Even now the North American Confederation represents a state formidable from the numbers of its hardy and energetic population, and capable, if so united, of vigorously defending the territories it possesses. A few years will add greatly to that population, and place Canada, Hochelaga, Acadia, or by whatever other name the Confederacy may think fit to call itself, quite out of the reach of invasion or conquest. Such a state would not only be strong against the Mother Country under the impossible supposition of our seeking to coerce it by force, but it might be separated from us without incurring the disgrace of leaving a small and helpless community at the mercy of powerful and warlike neighbors.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

28. “The second point which Her Majesty’s Government desire should be reconsidered”—and this phrase is positively, so far as words can give it, a command on the part of Her Majesty’s Government that it shall be reconsidered :— The second point which Her Majesty’s Government desire should be reconsidered is the constitution of the Legislative Council. They appreciate the considerations which have influenced the Conference in determining the mode in which this body, so important to the constitution of the Legislature, should be composed. But it appears to them to require further consideration whether, if the members be appointed “for life, and their number be fixed, there will be any sufficient means of restoring harmony between the Legislative Council and the popular Assembly, if it shall ever unfortunately happen that a decided difference of opinion shall arise between them. These two points, relating to the prerogative of the Crown and the Constitution of the Upper Chamber have appeared to require distinct and separate notice. Is not that a pretty emphatic dissent ?

§§.24 and 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

29. Her Majesty’s Government cannot but express the earnest hope, that the arrangements which may be adopted in this respect may not be of such a nature as to increase—at least in any considerable degree—the whole expenditure, or to make any material addition to the taxation, and thereby retard the internal industry, or tend to impose new burdens on the commerce of the country.

§.92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

30. First, an objection is raised as to the want of accurate determination of the limits between the authority of the Central and that of the local legislatures.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

31. we are trying to strengthen our union with the Mother Country—that we care far less about a mere union with neighboring provinces, which will frighten no one in the least, but that we arc determined to maintain at all hazards and draw closer, that connection with the Mother Country which alone, so long as it lasts, can and will protect us from all serious aggression. (Hear, hear.) But we are told that, on account of a variety of considerations connected with the state of opinion at home, and out of deference to that opinion, we must positively carry out this scheme.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

32. If, now, a different idea is to prevail—if the notion is to go abroad that we are, by creating ourselves into a new nationality, to be somewhat less connected with the Empire than these provinces heretofore have been, then I do apprehend that a very different future is before us, and that in all sorts of ways, by vexations of all kinds, by the fomenting of every trouble within our own borders, whether originating from abroad, or only reacted on from abroad, we shall be exposed to dangers of the most serious kind.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

33. In and before 1840, after the troubles which had been distracting Canada were put down, it was declared, and perfectly well understood, that the Imperial Government was simply determined to hold on to the connection with this country.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

34. It is quite right that the General Government should have such powers; but the very fact of our having to make a reservation of this kind, is an unpleasant recognition of the fact, in itself the reverse of encouraging, of the all darkening neighborhood of the United States.

§.33 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

35. We are here proposing to create in this part of the Queen’s dominions a mere sub-federation, so to speak, tending, so far as it tends to anything, towards the exclusion of this kind of provision.

Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

36. if our connection with the Empire is to last, we must have—this department of our public affairs attended to by a regularly appointed Minister of the Crown here, who, whenever occasion requires, may explain them and who shall be responsible to this House. Of course, nobody denies that the Governor General is the channel of communication between us and the Imperial Government. He is the Queen’s representative and servant, and his communications with the Home Government must be of the most confidential character, except in so far as he may see fit to make them known. But fully admitting this, still besides those communications of this character which he may, have and indeed at all times must have unrestrictedly with the Imperial Government, there should be—and, if our Imperial relations are to be maintained, there must be—a further class of communications between the two governments, as to which the Governor should be advised by a minister whose particular duty it should be to manage affairs between the Mother Country and ourselves, and to be in effect a local adviser, as to such matters, of the Imperial advisers of the Crown in England.

Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

37. dency. (Hear, hear.) All the great provinces are flying off too much, attending too exclusively to mere local considerations, too little to those of the general or Imperial kind. And at home, as we seem to be flying off, they, too, are thinking of us and of the interests they and we have in common less and less. What is wanting, if one is to look to the interest of the Empire, which is really that of all its parts—what is wanting, as I have said, is an effective federalization of the Empire as a whole, not a subordinate federation here or there, made up out of parts of it. I have neither time nor strength to-night to go fairly into the question of how this thing should be done; but a few words more as to that, I must be pardoned for.

Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

38. Your Federal Government will occupy about as anomalous a position between the Imperial and provincial governments as I showed, last night, will be occupied by your lieutenant governors between the Federal authority and the provinces. Both will be out of place, and to find themselves in work they must give trouble. I do not see how they can do good, but I do see how they can do any quantity of harm. (Hear, hear.) The real difficulty in our position is one that is not met by the machinery here proposed. What is that difficulty? In the larger provinces of the empire we have the system of responsible government thoroughly accorded by the Imperial Government, and thoroughly worked out; and the difficulty of the system that is now pressing, or ought to be, upon the attention of our statesmen is just this—that the tie connecting us with the Empire, and which ought to be a federal tie of the strongest kind, is too slight, is not, properly speaking, so much as a federal tie at all. These provinces, with local responsible government, are too nearly in the position of independent communities; there is not enough of connection between them and the parent state to make the relations between the two work well, or give promise of lasting long. There is in the machinery too much of what may be called the centrifugal ten-

Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

39. when we propose to create a Federal Government between the Imperial and Provincial, we are equally proposing to create a something which, having nothing of its own to do, must find work by encroaching on the functions of the Imperial and provincial governments in turn, with no place among nations, no relations with other countries, no foreign policy; it will stand in just the same position towards the Imperial Government as Ganada now stands in, or as Upper or Lower Canada before the union used to occupy. That intermediate work of government which is now done by the Province of Canada, the Province of New Brunswick, the Province of Nova Scotia, the Province of Prince Edward Island and the Province of Newfoundland, is to be done, part by the Federal Government and part by the provinces. The work is simply divided that is now done by the provincial legislatures and governments, and in my opinion there is no use in this subdivision of work at all. You are putting this fifth wheel to the coach, merely to find out that a misfitting odd wheel will not serve any useful purpose, nor so much as work smoothly with the other four.

§§.91, 92, and 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

40. The Imperial Government will be the head of the Empire as much as ever, and will alone have to attend to all foreign relations and national matters ; while we shall be nothing more than we are now. Half-a-dozen colonies federated are but a federated colony after all. Instead of being so many separate provinces with workable institutions, we are to be one province most cumbrously organised—nothing more.

§.132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

41. Unlike the people of the United States, we are to have no foreign relations to look after, or national affairs of any kind; and therefore our new nationality, if we could create it, could be nothing but a name. I must say that according to my view of the change we ought to aim at, any idea of Federation that we may entertain had need take an Imperial direction. Whenever changing our institutions, we had need develop and strengthen—not merely maintain, but maintain, develop and strengthen—the tie, not yet Federal as it ought to be, between us and the parent state.

§.132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

42. I am free to admit that a reduction of the tariff on certain articles, or even some measure of reduction all round, might be no material loss, or might even be a gain, to the revenue— in ordinary or prosperous times, that is to say. But when the object of reducing the tariff is to meet other exigencies than those of revenue, one can hardly hope to get such a tariff as shall give us the largest revenue attainable. And besides, no one can deny that we are about entering upon a time, commercially speaking, that may be termed hard.

§.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

43. We are marching fast and steadily towards free trade. We must meet the views of the people of the Lower Provinces, who are hostile to high tariffs, and the demand of the Imperial authorities that we should not tax their manufactures so heavily as—in their phrase—almost to deprive them of our market. It was distinctly and officially stated the other day, in Newfoundland, that assurance had been given to the Government of Newfoundland that the views of the Canadian Government are unmistakably in this direction. And I do not think there is any mistake about that, either. To show how people at home, too, expect our tariff to come down, I may refer to the speech of Mr. HAMBURY TRACY, in seconding the Address in answer to the Speech from the Throne, in the House of Commons the other day. He could not stop, after saying generally that he was pleased with this Confederation movement, without adding that he trusted it would result in a very considerable decrease in the absurdly high and hostile tariff at present prevailing in Canada.

§.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

44. The same sort of thing may be looked for in reference to the New Brunswick timber export duty and the Nova Scotia mineral export duty. Here is one form of the cry that may be raised; ” You give these exceptional privileges to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; give them, or some equivalent, to us also.”

§.109 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

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§.92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867

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§§. 91(27) & 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867

3. In order to protect local interests, and to prevent sectional jealousies, it was found requisite that the three great divisions into which British North America is separated, should be represented in the Upper House on the principle of equality. There are three great sections, having different interests, in this proposed Confederation.

§§. 21-36 & § 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867

4. To the Upper House is to be confided the protection of sectional interests ; therefore is it that the three great divisions are there equally represented, for the purpose of defending such interests against the combinations of majorities in the Assembly.

§§. 21-36 & § 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867

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§.92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867

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§.92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867

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§§. 91(27) & 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867

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1. We may, however, place just confidence in the development of our resources, and repose in the belief that we shall find in our territorial domain, our valuable mines and our fertile lands, additional sources of revenue far beyond the requirements of the public service.

§.118 of the Constitution Act, 1867

2. [Page 69]

§§. 91(27) & 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867

3. If we require to find an example of the benefits of free commercial intercourse, we need not look beyond the effects that have followed from the working of the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States. In one short year from the time when that treaty came into operation, our trade in the natural productions of the two countries swelled from less than \$2,000,000 to upwards of \$20,000,000 per annum, and now, when we are threatened with an interruption of that trade—when we have reason to fear that the action of the United States will prove hostile to the continuance of free commercial relations with this country, when we know that the consideration of this question is not grounded on just views of the material advantages resulting to each country but that the irritation connected with political events exercises a predominant influence over the minds of American statesmen, it is the duty of the House to provide, if possible, other outlets for our productions. If we have reason to fear that one door is about to be closed to our trade, it is the duty of the House to endeavour to open another; to provide against a coming evil of the kind feared by timely expansion in [Page 65] another direction; to seek by free trade with our own fellow colonists for a continued and uninterrupted commerce which will not be liable to be disturbed at the capricious will of any foreign country.

§.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867

Referenced in R v Comeau, 2016 NBPC 3 (CanLII).

4. Now, when we were united together, if union were attained, we would form a political nationality with which neither the national origin, nor the religion of any individual, would interfere. It was lamented by some that we had this diversity of races, and hopes were expressed that this distinctive feature would cease. The idea of unity of races was Utopian—it was impossible. Distinctions of this kind would always exist. Dissimilarity, in fact, appeared to be the order of the physical world and of the moral world, as well as in the political world. But with regard to the objection based on this fact, to the effect that a great nation could not be formed because Lower Canada was in great part French and Catholic, and Upper Canada was British and Protestant, and the Lower Provinces were mixed, it was futile and worthless in the extreme. Look, for instance, at the United Kingdom, inhabited as it was by three great races. (Hear, hear.) Had the diversity of race impeded the glory, the progress, the wealth of England? Had they not rather each contributed their share to the greatness of the Empire? Of the glories of the senate, the field, and the ocean, of the successes of trade and commerce, how much was contributed by the combined talents, energy and courage of the three races together? (Cheers.) In our own Federation we should have Catholic and Protestant, English, French, Irish and Scotch, and each by his efforts and his success would increase the prosperity and glory of the new Confederacy. (Hear, hear.) We viewed the diversity of races in British North America in this way: we were of different races, not for the purpose of warring against each other, but in order to compete and emulate for the general welfare.

§.101 of the Constitution Act, 1867

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§. 26 of the Constitution Act, 1867

2. But the very essence of our compact is that the union shall be federal and not legislative. Our Lower Canada friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step ; and, for my part, I am quite willing they should have it. In maintaining the existing sectional boundaries and handing over the control of local matters to local bodies, we recognize, to a certain extent, a diversity of interests ; and it was quite natural that the protection for those interests, by equality in the Upper Chamber, should be demanded by the less numerous provinces.

§§. 21-36 & § 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867

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1. accustom the people to direct taxation

§§.91(3) and 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

2. Men who for years past have devoted their pen to the unhallowed work of undermining the Catholic religion and vilifying its ministers, who have long aimed at destroying in the minds of French-Canadians all love for their peculiar institutions—the safeguards of our nationality

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

3. any injustice to Upper Canada could arise. And then my honorable friend will see how it is to be distributed afterwards in the way of population, so that although there might be a little loss in the first instance, there would be an immense gain in the end.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

4. We find a section of the people in Lower Canada opposing the work on the ground that it will tend to destroy their language and nationality ; and we find also the British element in Lower Canada complain that in the arrangement for the Local Legislature their rights and privileges will be swept away. (Hear, hear.) On the other hand, Upper Canadians are opposing the scheme as injurious to their true interests, and asserting that the financial difficulties likely to arise under it will be detrimental to the welfare of the west ; so that where there is such great diversity of opinion, it was impossible to mature a scheme which should be in all respects perfect and satisfactory. No doubt Upper Canada has some cause to complain. For instance, the eighty cents per head for carrying on the local governments appears unfair in principle to Upper Canada, and as such they have reason to feel dissatisfied. This apportionment is on the present basis of population, and whatever may be the increase in numbers of the western section of the province, if even we increase during the next ten years in the same ratio that we have been increasing for the past ten years ; if we double our population we shall still only get the eighty cents per head for the present population. There is no doubt this is an objectionable feature. HON. MR. BROWN—Will my honorable friend allow me to assure him that he is slightly in error, and to show him how he is so ? Supposing we increase in population, the other provinces will increase also, and the only unfairness that could possibly exist in the case supposed would be in so far as the population of Upper Canada was relatively greater than that of the other provinces. HON. MR. HOLTON—It is a matter of ratio. HON. MR. BROWN—Yes, it is simply a question of ratio. My honorable friend will see how the principle works. At the rate we are proceeding now, some 2 1/2, 3, or 4 per cent., it would take a great many years before

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

5. But I have failed to see, and I yet fail to see, that the Liberal party of Upper Canada have ever given up the advocacy of representation by population. We found all parties in Lower Canada—both the English-speaking population and French-speaking population —refusing to concede to us what we conceived to be this just and proper principle; and when the opportunity was offered to us of relieving the country from its difficulties, we felt that no party considerations or party ties should be allowed to interfere with what we conceived to be our sacred duty to our constituents and our country.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

6. As a commercial work, I have looked into it in all its bearings, and have failed to see the advantages it will confer. The farmers of the grain-producing districts of Upper Canada have the same market to sell their surplus products as the farmers of the States, that is, the English market. Now, I think it is impossible to show that the produce of Upper Canada can be conveyed by this Intercolonial Railway to the seaboard, and thence to Liverpool, as profitably as the Americans can carry it to the seaboard at New York and thence to the English market. If by the one route the grain cannot be carried as cheaply as by the other, it is impossible for the Canadian farmer or merchant to be placed in as good a position as the American. But if, having constructed the Intercolonial Railway, our Government says, ” We will compete with the Americans ; we will put the rates of transportation so low as to offer our farmers as cheap a route by it as by the States,” then the cost of this will have to be borne by the people in another way, for the road failing to pay even expenses, the excess of expenditure will become a charge upon the country for years.

§.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

7. Now, sir, I believe that in a commercial, agricultural, and defensive point of view, the union would be desirable. Placed as we are now, with the abrogation of the Reciprocity treaty threatened, does it not become our duty, I ask, to make some effort to change and improve our condition ? As I stated, sir, the subject has been so ably placed before this House by honorable gentlemen who have preceded me, and who are so much more capable of dealing with it than I am, that I will not attempt to repeat the arguments in favor of this scheme, commercially, financially, and politically, which have already been adduced. But there are one or two points as to the resources of the whole of British North America, to which I would for a moment invite the attention of the House. The union is desirable with a view to the development of our mineral resources. In British Columbia and Vancouver’s Island the gold fields equal, if they do not exceed in value, those of any other part of the world. Iron we have in that vast extent of country lying between the Rocky Mountains and Lake Superior, a country equal if not superior, for the purposes of settlement and cultivation to any we have in Canada, and whose area is estimated at from eighty to one hundred million acres. Then, again, we have magnificent iron and copper mines in Canada, while the Lower Provinces possess vast mineral resources, extensive coal fields, and valuable fisheries.

§.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

8. 33rd sub-section gives to the General Gov.- ornament the power of ” rendering uniform all or any of the laws relative to property and civil rights in Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island, and rendering uniform the procedure of all or any of the courts in these provinces ; but any statute for this purpose shall have no force or authority in any province until sanctioned by the legislature thereof.” So that in reality no such law will be binding until it has the sanction of the Local Legislature of the province particularly affected thereby. Such being the guarded terms of the resolution, why is it not made applicable to Lower Canada as well as to the other provinces ? Nothing could be done respecting its peculiar laws without the consent of its Local Legislature, and it is quite possible to my mind, that there are some laws which it would be advantageous to all parts of the Confederation to assimilate. But they emphatically declare in these redo- lotions that there shall be no interference with the laws of Lower Canada. So that while it is proposed to assimilate the laws of the other provinces, there is a large section of intervening country which is to have, for all time to come, laws separate and distinct from the rest.

§§.93 and 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

9. Well, provision has been made for the consolidation of these laws; but observe how religiously the laws of Lower Canada are guarded from interference. The

§§.93 and 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

10. ” The Local Government and Legislature of each province shall be constructed in such manner as the existing legislature of each such province shall provide.” I do not understand from this whether it is competent or not for us in this Legislature, before there is a Federal union, to make provision for the Local Government and Legislature, or whether we are to await the action upon the subject of Federation of the Imperial Government. Our action, one should suppose, ought to be taken after the Imperial Government has pronounced. Perhaps this is the intention. Mr. SPEAKER, they refuse to tell us anything about it. It may be that, as soon as these resolutions are carried, we will be sent about our business ; that the Imperial Legislature will be invited to pass an act, and that they will convene us again, provision being made for that course, and so in point of fact, having once affirmed the principle of Federation, we will have to accept such local legislatures as they choose to give us.

Part V of the Constitution Act, 1867.

11. they have declined to allow us to understand what sort of a local legislature we are to have They will not tell us how our Executive is to be formed. They will not tell us whether we are to have legislative councils in Upper and Lower Canada, and whether or not they will be elected councils. They will not tell us what number of members will constitute the Executive Council of the Confederation, nor what influence each individual province will have in that government. They will not bring down the scheme for the local legislatures. They tell us that it is better to withhold those details—that we are dealing with Federation alone, and have no business discussing local governments What is the object of all this vagueness ?

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

12. however, have said that they were in favor of direct taxation for the support of the local governments, because it would lead those who have to pay the taxes to look more closely into what was going on, and the manner in which their money was expended. (Hear, hear.) There seems also to have been a feeling in the Lower Provinces in favor of a legislative union, and the Hon. Mr. GREY seems to be combatting that idea. He says that with a legislative union, municipal institutions, and direct taxation in every province, would be the only means of getting along. He expressed himself as opposed to that and in favor of a Federal union, which he thought would afford them all the advantage that could be attained, commercially, by union, and would allow each province to retain control over its own local affairs. The local legislatures, he said, were to be deprived of no power over their own affairs that they formerly possessed. But in Canada it was represented that the local legislatures were to be only the shadow of the General Legislature—that they were to have merely a shadow of power, as all their proceedings were to be controlled by the Federal Government. That is the position taken by the advocates of the measure on this floor. So it seems that those gentlemen who have represented to us that they acted in great harmony, and came to a common decision when they were in conference, take a widely different view of the questions supposed to have been agreed upon, and give very different accounts of what were the views of parties to the conference on the various subjects. (Hear, hear.) In the Lower Provinces they were strongly opposed to direct taxation, while here it was present end as one of the advantages to accrue from the Federation. (Cries of No, no.) Well, Mr. SPEAKER, I say yes. That view of the case has been taken. If the amount allowed for the expenses of local legislation—the 80 cents per head—was found insufficient, the local parliaments must resort to direct taxation to make up the deficiency, while in tile Lower Provinces, it seems, nothing of that kind was to follow.

§§.91(3), 92(2), and 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

13. The Federal character of the United States Government has been referred to prove that it has increased the prosperity of the people living under it; but in point of fact the great and relentless war that is now raging there—that fratricidal war in which brother is arrayed against brother, filled with hatred toward each other, and which has plunged the country into all the horrors of the deadliest strife—is the strongest comment upon the working of the Federal principle—the strongest argument against its application to these provinces. (Hear, hear.) The French element in Lower Canada will be separated from us in its Local Legislature and become less united with us than it is now ; and therefore there is likely to be disagreement between us. Still more likely is there to be disagreement when the people of Upper Canada find that this scheme will not relieve them of the burdens cast upon them, but, on the contrary, will subject them to a legislature that will have the power of imposing direct taxation in addition to the burdens imposed by the General Government. When they find that this power is exercised, and they are called upon to contribute as much as before to the General Government, while taxed to maintain a separate Local Legislature—when they find that the material question is to weigh with them, they will look to the other side of the line for union. I feel that we are going to do that which will weaken our connection with the Mother Country, because if you give power to legislate upon the same subjects to both the local and the federal legislatures, and allow both to impose taxation upon the people, disagreements will spring up which must necessarily have that effect. (Hear, hear.) Then again, by this scheme that is laid before us, certain things are to be legislated upon by both the general and the local legislatures, and yet the local legislation is to be subordinate to the legislation of the Federal Parliament. For instance, emigration and agriculture are to be subject to the control of both bodies. Now suppose that the Federal Legislature chooses to decide in favor of having emigration flow to a particular locality, so as to benefit one province alone—I do not menu this expression to be understood in its entire sense, because I think that emigration in any one portion will benefit the whole, but it will benefit the particular locality much more at the time—and if provision is made by the General Legislature for emigration of that kind, and grants are made from the public funds to carry it out, it will cause much complaint, as the people who are paying the greatest proportion of the revenue will be subject to the drafts upon them as before.

Preamble, §§.91, 92, and 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

14. He says :—” It is not a question of interest, or mere commercial advantage ; no, it is an effort to establish a new empire in British North America.”

§.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

15. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Allow me to make a remark. A little while ago the honorable gentleman quoted from a speech of Hon. Mr. TILLEY, in which that gentleman supposed the case, that on some evil day Upper Canada, actuated by selfish motives, would endeavor to obtain the passing of some measure that would be conducive to her exclusive aggrandizement. ” In that event,” said Hon. Mr. TILLEY, addressing himself to his people below, with the view of meeting that hypothetical case, “you will have the sixty-five members from Lower Canada and the forty-seven from below, to unite in resisting any attempt of the kind.” On that account the honorable member for North Ontario has stated that he is opposed to this scheme of Federation. He prefers a legislative union ; but of course with a legislative union there would be the same ratio of representation, and his opposition, on this particular ground, ought to apply to the one system as much as to the other.

§.51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

16. Hon. Mr. TILLEY made this representation in a speech which he delivered on the 17th November last :— So close is the contest between parties in the Canadian Legislature, that even the five Prince Edward Island members by their vote could turn victory on whatever side they chose, and have the game entirely in their own hands. Suppose that Upper Canada should attempt to carry out schemes for her own aggrandizement in the west, could she, with her eighty-two representatives, successfully oppose the sixty-five of Lower Canada and the forty-seven of the Lower Provinces, whose interests would be identical ? Certainly not ; and she would not attempt it. MR. H. MACKENZIE—What has that to do with representation by population ? MR. M. C. CAMERON—” What has that to do with representation by population ?” asks the hon. gentleman. Representation by population was agitated, so far as Upper Canada is concerned, because we are paying so large a proportion of the revenue of the country ; and should the Lower Provinces have a corresponding voice, we should still pay the same proportion of revenue—instead, in fact, of standing on an equality, we would have thirty voices more to contend against. (Hear, hear.) Now, let us see whether, in another point of view, it is going to benefit us. It is represented by this same gentleman in the Lower Provinces that, when this change takes place, they will be relieved from the burdens they now bear

§.51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

17. it would be exceedingly inconvenient to manage the local affairs of so widely extended a country. I did not say that we could not exercise a general control over the country.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

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1. I believe that when these colonies are combined, acting in concert, and quickened and invigorated by a feeling of mutual dependence and interest, the tendency will be to increase their wealth and manufactures, and general strength. And, sir, I am satisfied one of the great advantages cf this union will be found in this that wk. will be raised above our sectionalisms, and come to feel and to act as the citizens of a great country, with destinies committed to us such as may well evoke the energies of a great people.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

2. Ourselves from that protection we have so long enjoyed; but we desire, while remain- in under that protection, to do all that lies in our power for our self-defence, and for the development of all the great interests which Providence has committed to our trust; and we seek at the hands of the British Parliament such legislation as will enable us to accomplish these great ends for the whole of British America.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

3. But, as I have stated, I think the Conference has been exceedingly happy in the plan they have submitted for our adoption A community of British free- men as we are, deliberately surveying our past as well as our present position, and look- in forward to our future, we in effect resolve that we will adhere to the protection of the British Crown; that we will tell the GOLDWIN SMITH school–these who are crying out for cutting off the colonies—that we will cling to the old Mother Land –(hear, hear)–we desire to maintain our connection; we have no desire to withdraw

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

4. The first steps towards a Federation of the American Colonies would thus bus to form them all into one state, to give that state a completely organized government, and then to delegate to each of the colonies out of which that great state is formed, such powers of local government as may be thought necessary, reserving to the Central Government all such powers as are not expressly delegated. The Government of New Zealand forms a precedent well worthy the attention of those who are undertaking this arduous negotiation. And I cannot doubt that the framers of this Constitution have studied the precedent as well of the proposed Constitution of Australia, as that of the Constitution of New Zealand, which has been in use for ten years past.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

5. The great weakness of the American system has lain in the fact that the several states, on entering the union, claimed independent jurisdiction ; that they demitted to the Central Government certain powers, and that they claimed equal and sovereign powers with regard to everything not so delegated and demitted. The weaknesses aid difficulties of that system have been avoided in the project now before us, and we have the central power with defined and sovereign powers, and the local parliaments with their defined and delegated powers, but subordinated to the central power. The article says: — It is quite clear that the Federal Constitution of the United States of America forms a precedent which cannot possibly be followed in its principles or details by the united colonies, so long as they remain part of the dominions of the Imperial Crown. The principle of the American Federation is, that each is a sovereign state, which consents to delegate to a central authority a portion of its sovereign power, leaving the remainder, which is not so delegated, absolute and intact in its own hands. This is not the position of the colonies, each of which, instead of being an isolated sovereign state, is an integral part of the British Empire. They cannot delegate their sovereign authority to a central government, because them do not possess the sovereign authority to delegate. The only alternative as it seems to us would be to adopt a course exactly the contrary of that which the United States adopted, and instead of taking for their motto E Pluribus Unum, to invert it by saying In Uno Plural.

Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

6. That the separate states be not so powerful as to be able to rely for protection against foreign encroachment on their individual strength. That is a condition which applies most forcibly in our case. (Hear, hear.) The third condition is :— That there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

7. that prestige and power which go with every British subject to every civilized part of the globe, enabling him to say, like the old Roman, ” I am a British citizen.” EARL GREY states that :— The possession of a number of steady and faithful allies, in various quarters of the globe, will surely be admitted to add greatly to the strength of any nation ; while no alliance between independent states can be so close and intimate as the connection which unites the colonies to the United Kingdom as parts of the Great British Empire. Nor ought it to be forgotten, that the power of a nation does not depend merely on the amount of physical force it can command, but rests, in no small degree, upon opinion and moral influence. In this respect British power would be diminished by the loss of our colonies, to a degree which it would be difficult to estimate. Passing on a little, we find him saying :— To the latter [i. e. the colonists] it is no doubt of far greater importance than to the former, because, while still forming comparatively small and weak communities, they enjoy, in return for their allegiance to the British Crown, all the security and consideration which belongs to them as members of one of the most powerful states in the world. No foreign power ventures to attack or interfere with the smallest of them, while every colonist carries with him to the remotest quarters of the globe which he may visit, in trading or other pursuits, that protection which the character of a British subject everywhere confers. (Hear, hear.) But to view the subject in another aspect. I believe it will be found that all the conditions are combined in the scheme now before us, that are considered necessary for the formation on a permanent basis of a Federative union. I hold in my hand a book of some note on Representative Government, by JOHN STUART MILL, and I find that he lays down three conditions as applicable to the union of independent states, and which, by parity of reasoning, are applicable to provinces which seek to have a closer alliance with each other, and also, thereby, a closer alliance with the Mother Country. The conditions he lays down are first,— That there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations. And he states that the sympathies which they should have in common should be— Those of race, language, religion, and, above all, of political institutions, as conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest.

Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

8. I proposed and drew up a plan for the union of all the colonies under one government, so far as might be necessary for defence and other important general purposes. By my plan, the General Government was to be administered by a President- General, appointed and supported by the Crown, and a General Council, to be chosen by the representatives of the people of the several colonies, met in the respective assemblies. The plan was agreed to in Congress, but the assemblies of the provinces did not adopt it, as they thought there was too much prerogative in it, and in England it was judged to have too much of the democratic. The different and contrary reasons of dislike to my plan made me suspect that it was really the true medium, and I am still of opinion it would have been happy for both sides if it had been adopted. The colonies so united would have been strong enough to have defended themselves; there would then have been no need of troops from England ; of course the subsequent pretext for taxing America, and also the bloody contest it occasioned, would have been avoided.

Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

9. The New York Conner and Inquirer, in an article published at that time, came to the conclusion “that the union would, in fact, be an argument for a continuance of the existing relations between the two countries: is a matter of policy and gratitude, and that such a change of government could be met with no objection of any weight.”

Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

10. But I will state why this union is c: inculcated to prolong our connection with Britain. I t is well known that there has been an entire and radical change of late in the colonial policy of England. That policy has been to extend to us the utmost liberty in our relations to the Empire. What is after all the nature of the bond, which links us to Great Britain, apart from our allegiance and loyalty? What is it but a Federative bond ? That is what links us to Britain,and I feel quite satisfied, in the words of an English publicist of some eminence, that ” the new colonial policy is calculated to prolong the connection of the colonies with the Mother Country.” I believe it will raise these provinces as part of the British Empire, and so secure to us the permanency of British institutions, and bind us more closely to the Crown.

Preamble, §§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

11. I believe that the plan of union proposed will be found to meet the exigencies of our local position, give latitude to local development, and due protection to local interests, and yet secure that general control which is essentially necessary for the proper government of a country placed under the dominion of the British Crown.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

12. It was pledged to introduce the Federative system into the Government of Canada, with special provisions for the incorporation into this Federation of the Maritime Provinces, and it was also pledged to send delegates to those provinces and invite them to join us in this Federation.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

13. ” I propose, in the course of the recess, to communicate with Her Majesty’s Government and with the government of the sister colonies, on another matter of very great importance. I am desirous of inviting them to discuss with us the principles on which a bond of a federal character uniting the provinces of British North America may, perhaps, hereafter be practicable.”

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

14. And when we look to the vast territory we have in the North-West; when we know that the great rivers which flow through that territory, flow through immense beds of coal, and that the whole country is rich in mineral deposits of all kinds—petroleum, copper, gold and iron; that the land is teeming with resources of wealth calculated to build up an extensive and valuable commerce, and support a powerful nation; that all this we can touch and seize upon the moment we are prepared to open up a way to reach them and allow the settler to enter ; when we remember this, I say, I think we can look forward with hope to a prodigious increase in our population and an immense development of strength and power.

§.146 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

15. Everything is not provided for, because a great deal is trusted lo the common sense of the people. I think it is quite fair and safe to assert that there is not the slightest danger that the Federal Parliament will perpetrate any injustice upon the local legislatures, because it would cause such a reaction as to compass the destruction of the power thus unjustly exercised. The veto power is necessary in order that the General Government may have a control over the proceedings of the local legislatures to a certain extent. The want of this power was the great source of weakness in the United States, and it is a want that will be remedied by an amendment in their Constitution very soon. So long as each state considered itself sovereign, whose acts and laws could not be called in question, it was quite clear that the central authority was destitute of power to compel obedience to general laws. If each province were able to enact such laws as it pleased, everybody would be at the mercy of the local legislatures, and the General Legislature would become of little importance. It is contended that the power of the General Legislature should be held in check by a veto power with reference to its own territory, resident in the local legislatures, respecting the application of general laws to their jurisdiction. All power, they say, comes from the people and ascends through them to their representatives, and through the representatives to the Crown. But it would never do to set the Local above the General, Government. The Central Parliament and Government must, of necessity, exercise the supreme power, and the local governments will have the exercise of power corresponding to the duties they have to perform. The system is a new and untried one, and may not work so harmoniously as we now anticipate, but there will always but p ¡war in the British Parliament and our own to remedy any defects that may be discovered after the system is in operation. Altogether, I regard the scheme as a magnificent one, and I look forward to the future with anticipate- tins of seeing a country and a government possessing great power and respectability, and of being, before I die, a citizen of an immense empire built up on our part of the North American continent, where the folds of the British flag will float in triumph over a people possessing freedom, happiness and prosperity equal to the people of any other nation on the earth.

§.90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

16. If the power that the central authority is to have—of vetoing the doings of the Local Legislature— is used, it will be ample, I think, to prevent anything of that kind. But the veto itself is objected to.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

17. The question of the Northwest is most intimately connected with our prosperity as a people, and some exception has justly been taken to the 68th and 69th paragraphs in though resolutions, which say :— 68. The General Government shall secure, without delay, the completion of the Intercolonial Railway from Rivière du Loup through New Brunswick, to Truro in Nova Scotia. 69. The communications with the North-Western Territory and the improvements required for the development of the trade of the Great West with the sea-board, are regarded by this Conference as subjects of the highest importance to the Federated Provinces, and shall be prosecuted at the earliest possible period that the state of though finances will admit. MR. T. C. WALLBRIDGE—That is the point. MR. A. MACKENZIE—Yes, that is the point my hon. friend is very much exercised over, but he is quite as much in favor of Confederation as I am. In this paragraph, while it is pronounced indispensable to have the Intercolonial Railway built at once, it is only promised that as soon as the state of the finances will permit, the Northwest is to be taken in hand. I think it is absolutely necessary for the prosperity of this colony that our canal connection with the upper lakes should be perfected as early as possible. Our canal system must be improved so as to accommodate the large trade that is coming from the Northwest. On the northern shores of Lake Superior we have sources of wealth that are perfectly inexhaustible. We read only the other day that a mountain of iron had been discovered close to the coast, quite sufficient to supply the demands of the world for 500 years. We have in that locality an abundant supply of minerals of all kinds, and unless our canals are made capable of carrying that traffic, it will necessarily find channels in another direction. (Hear.)

§.146 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

18. HON. MR. BROWN—Hear, hear. That is the point, and therefore I accept, as a fair compromise, a second chamber nominated by the Confederate Cabinet.

§.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

19. establishing an Upper House. They have— reasoning doubtless from the same premises —not only given the legislatures of the respective states the power of nominating the members of the Senate, but have also given that body powers entirely different from those possessed by the elective branch.

§.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

20. And, besides that, we have provision made for extending the representation east or west, as occasion may require, according to the increase of our population shown at the decennial periods for taking the census. Any thing fairer than that could not possibly be demanded. And if Lower Canada increases more rapidly in population than Canada West, she will obtain representation accordingly. For, although the number of her members cannot be changed from sixty-five, the proportion of that number to the whole will be changed relatively to the progress of the various colonies. On the other hand if we extend, as I have no doubt we will do, westward, towards the centre of the continent, we will obtain a large population for our Confederation in the west. In that quarter we must look for the largest increase of our population in British America, and before many years elapse the centre of population and power will tend westward much farther than most people now think. The increase in the representation is therefore almost certain to be chiefly in the west, and every year will add to the influence and power of Western Canada, as well as to her trade and commerce. The most important question that arises relates to the constitution of the Upper House. It is said that in this particular the scheme is singularly defective—that there has been a retrograde movement in going back from the elective to the nominative system. I admit that this statement is a fair one from those who contended long for the application of the elective principle to the Upper House; but it can have no weight with another large class, who, like myself, never believed in the wisdom of electing the members of two Houses of Parliament with coordinate powers. I have always believed that a change from the present system was inevitable, even with our present political organization. (Hear, hear.) The constitution of an Upper House or Senate seems to have originated in the state of society which prevailed in feudal times ; and from being the sole legislative body—or at least the most powerful—in the State, it has imperceptibly become less powerful, or secondary in importance to the lower chamber, as the mass of the people became more intelligent, and popular rights became more fully understood. Where there is an Upper House it manifestly implies on the part of its members peculiar duties or peculiar rights. In Great Britain, for instance, there is a large class of landed proprietors, who have long held almost all the landed property of the country in their hands, and who have to pay an immense amount of taxes. The fiscal legislation of Britain for many years has tended to the reduction of impost and excise duties on articles of prime necessity, and to the imposition of heavy taxes on landed property and incomes. Under such a financial system, there are immense interests at stake, and the House of Lords being the highest judicial tribunal in the kingdom, there is a combination of peculiar rights and peculiar duties appertaining to the class represented which amply justify its maintenance. We have no such interests, and we-impose no such duties, and hence the Upper House becomes a mere court of revision, or one of coordinate jurisdiction ; as the latter it is not required ; to become the former, it should be constituted differently from the House of Assembly. The United States present the example of a community socially similar to ourselves,

§§.24 and 51 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Preamble, §§.51, 52, and 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

23. We felt that it was not fair—that it could not be just—that four men in Lower Canada should be equal, politically, to five men in Upper Canada. We complained that an eastern majority, in spite of our protestations, framed our laws.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

24. reform of the representation on the basis of population as one remedy I believe to be an effective one.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

25. I am not myself bound down to representation by population as the only possible measure. If the opponents of that measure can suggest any other remedy, I am quite willing to give it a candid consideration ; and I am quite sure that the large constituency I represent will support me in considering any measure which will place it out of the power of the Government of the day to perpetrate sectional injustice ; but until such a remedy is suggested, I feel bound to advocate

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

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1. It is a principle of the British Constitution that the appropriation of any moneys from the taxes paid by the people, shall beat the disposal of Parliament.

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

2. It is called for by military reasons and commercial necessity, and the date of its construction cannot safely be postponed. Why, what have we not seen within a very recent period ? Restrictions have been put on goods sent through the United States, by the establishment of consular certificates, to such an extent that you could not send a bale of goods through the States without accompanying it with one of these certificates, the cost of which I am told was nearly \$2—perhaps more than the worth of the package, or more than the cost of the freight. (Hear, hear.) Still further, the Senate of the United States had also before them a motion to consider under what regulations foreign merchandise is allowed to pass in bond through the neighbouring country ; and this was evidently done with an in tension of abolishing the system under which goods were permitted to pass in bond from England through the United States. I do not hesitate to say that if the bonding system were done away with, half the merchants in Canada would be seriously embarrassed if not ruined for the time. (Hear, hear.) In the winter season you could not send a barrel of flour to England—you could not receive a single package of goods therefrom. The merchants would have to lay in a twelve months’ stock of goods, and the farmer would be dependent on the condition of the market in spring, and would be compelled to force the sale of his produce at that moment, whether there was a profitable market for it then or not, instead of having as now a market at all seasons, as well in England as the United States. So that whatever sacrifices attach to the construction of the Intercolonial Railway, we must have it, seeing that it is impossible for us to remain in our present position of isolation and suspense. It is one of the unfortunate incidents of our position which we cannot get rid of. It will be a costly undertaking, but it is one we must make up our minds to pay for, and the sooner we set about its construction the better.

§.121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

3. is of either religion, the dissentient minority —either Catholic or Protestant—have the right to establish dissentient schools. In the cities the majority being Catholics, the dissentient schools are Protestant, but in the townships, the majority is sometimes Protestant and the dissentient schools Catholic. MR. POPE—What will be the provision made, where the population is pretty sparse, as in some parts of my county ? Will you allow the minority of one township to join with a neighboring township for the purpose of establishing a dissentient school ? HON. MR. CARTIER—Yes. There will be a provision enabling the minority to join with their friends in a contiguous municipality in order to make up the requisite number. HON. J.S. MACDONALD—While the Government is in a communicative mood— (laughter)—I think it is of some importance that we should know whether it is the intention of the Government to extend the same rights and privileges to the Catholic minority of Upper Canada that are to be given to the Protestants of Lower Canada ? HON. MR. CARTIER—I cannot do my own work and the work of others. The Hon. Attorney General for Upper Canada is not present, but I have no doubt that on some future occasion he will be able to answer my honorable friend from Cornwall. HON. J . S. MACDONALD—In the absence of the Hon. Attorney General West, perhaps the Hon. President of the Council will be kind enough to give us the desired information ? HON. MR. BROWN—If my hon. friend wants an answer from me, I can only say that the Government has not yet considered the provisions of the School bill relating to Upper Canada. As soon as a bill is framed there will be no delay in laying it before the House.

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

4. HON. MR. CARTIER—The honorable member for Chateauguay has the laws of Lower Canada in his possession. Well, he will not find there that there is any such thing as Catholic or Protestant schools mentioned. What are termed in Upper Canada separate schools, come under the appropriate word, in Lower Canada, of dissentient. It is stated that where the majority

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

5. Everywhere. Not to Catholics alone either.

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

6. shall not have the same privilege of saying that his taxes shall be given to a dissentient school as if he resided upon the property.

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

7. The first thing I wish to mention has caused a good deal of difficulty in our present system, and that is, whether non-resident proprietors shall have the same right of designating the lass of schools to which their taxes shall be given as actual residents. That is one point—whether a person living out of the district or township

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

8. I would ask my honorable friend the Attorney General East, whether the system of education which is in force in Lower Canada at the time of the proclamation is to remain and be the system of education for all time to come ; and that whatever rights are given to either of the religious sections shall continue to be guaranteed to them ?

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

9. Now we, the English Protestant minority of Lower Canada, cannot forget that whatever right of separate education we have was accorded to us in the most unrestricted way before the union of the provinces, when we were in a minority and entirely in the hands of the French population. We cannot forget that in no way was there any attempt to prevent an educating our children in the manner we saw fit and deemed best ; and I would be untrue to what is just if I forgot to state that the distribution of State funds fur educational purposes was made in such a way as to cause no complaint on the part of the minority. I believe we have always had our fair share of the public grants in so far as the French element could control them, and not only the liberty, but every facility, for the establishment of separate dissentient schools wherever they were deemed desirable. A single person has the right, under the law, of establishing a dissentient school and obtaining a fair share of the educational grant, if he can gather together fifteen children who desire instruction in it. Now, we cannot forget that in the past this liberality has been shown to us, and that whatever we desired of the French majority in respect to education, they were, if it was at all reasonable, willing to concede. (Hear, hear.) We have thus, in this also, the guarantee of the past that nothing will be done in the future unduly to interfere with our rights and interests as regards education, and I believe that everything we desire will be as freely given by the Local Legislature as it was before the union of the Canadas. (Hear, hear.) But from whence comes the practical difficulty of dealing with the question at the present moment ? We should not forget that it does not come from our French-Canadian brethren in Lower Canada, but that it arises in this way—and I speak as one who has watched the course of events and the opinion of the country upon the subject—that the Protestant majority in Upper Canada are indisposed to disturb the settlement made a couple of years ago, with regard to separate schools, and rather to hope that the French majority in Lower Canada should concede to the English Protestant minority there, nothing more than is given to the minority in the other section of the province.

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

10. I wish to know what share of representation the English-speaking population of Lower Canada will have in the Federal Legislature, and whether it will be in the same proportion as their representation in this Parliament ? This is one point in which I think the English inhabitants of Lower Canada are strongly interested.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

11. any law it might pass to this effect and set it at nought. HON. MR. HOLTON—Would you advise it? HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Yes, I would recommend it myself in case of injustice. (Hear, hear.) HON. MR. ROSE—I am quite sure my hon. friend would do it rather than have an injustice perpetrated. There is another pout upon which I would like to have from the Attorney General East an explicit statement of the views of the Government. I refer to the provision in the 23rd resolution which I have just read ; what I wish to know is whether the Legislature therein spoken of means the Legislature of the province of Canada as it is now constituted, and whether it is contemplated to have any change in the boundaries of the electoral districts for representation in the first session of the Federal Legislature ? HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—With regard to Lower Canada, it is not the intention to make any alteration in the electoral districts, because there will be no change in the number of representatives sent to the General Parliament. But with regard to Upper Canada, there will be a change in the electoral districts, because there will be an increase of members from that section. HON. MR. ROSE—So that I clearly understand from the statement of the hon. gentleman that in Lower Canada the constituencies, for the purposes of the first ejection to the Federal Legislature, will remain as they are now ? HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Yes, as they are now. HON. MR. ROSE—And that as regards the representation in the Local Legislature, the apportionment of the electoral districts by it will be subject to veto by the General Government. HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Yes, in case of injustice being done. (Hear, hear.)

§§.40 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

12. The 23rd resolution reads : ” The Legislature of each province shall divide such province into the proper number of constituencies, and define the boundaries of each of them.” Then the 24th resolution provides that ” the Local Legislature may from time to time alter the electoral districts for the purpose of representation in such Local Legislature, and distribute the representatives to which the province is entitled in such Local Legislature, in any manner such legislature may see fit.” In these resolutions I presume that power is given to the Legislature of each province to divide the province into the proper number of constituencies for representation in the Federal Parliament, and to alter the electoral districts for representation in the Local Legislature. Now, to speak quite plainly, the apprehension which I desire to say again I do not personally share in, but which has been expressed to me by gentlemen in my own constituency, is this, that with respect to the Local Legislature, it will be competent for the French majority in Lower Canada to blot out the English-speaking minority from any share in the representation, and so to apportion the electoral districts that no English speaking member can be returned to the Legislature. That is an apprehension upon which I would be very glad to have an expression of opinion by my hon. ironed the Attorney General East. As I read the resolutions, if the Local Legislature exercised its powers in any such unjust manner, it would be competent for the General Government to veto its action, and thus prevent the intention of the Local Legislature being carried into effect—even although the power be one which is declared to be absolutely vested in the Local Government, and delegated to it as one of the articles of its constitution.

§.40 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

13. Looking at the scheme, then, from the standpoint of an English Protestant in Lower Canada, let me see whether the interests of those of my own race and religion in that section are safely and properly guarded. There are certain points upon which they feel the greatest interest, and with regard to which it is but proper that they should be assured that there are sufficient safeguards provided for their preservation. Upon these points, I desire to put some questions to the Government. The first of these points is as to whether such provision has been made and will be carried out that they will not suffer at any future time from a system of exclusion from the federal or local legislatures, but that they will have a fair share in the representation in both; and the second is, whether such safeguards will be provided for the educational system of the minority in Lower Canada as will be satisfactory to them ?

§§.40 and 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

14. Belonging to different races and professing a different faith, we live near each other ; we come in contact and mix with each other, and we respect each other ; we do not trench upon the rights of each other ; we have not had those party and religious differences which two races, speaking different languages and holding different religious beliefs, might be supposed to have had ; and it is a matter of sincere gratification to us, I say, that this state of things has existed and is now found amongst us. (Hear, hear.) But if, instead of this mutual confidence; if, instead of the English-speaking minority placing trust in the French majority in the Local Legislature, and the French minority placing the same trust in the English majority in the General Legislature, no such feeling existed, how could this scheme of Confederation be made to work successfully ? (Hear, hear.) I think it cannot be denied that there is the utmost confidence on both sides; I feel assured that our confidence in the majority in the Local Government will not be misplaced, and I earnestly trust that the confidence they repose in us in the General Legislature will not be abused. (Hear, hear.) I hope that this mutual yielding of confidence will make us both act in a high-minded and sensitive manner when the rights of either side are called in question

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

15. This is unquestionably a grave and serious subject of consideration, and especially so to the minority in this section of the province, that is the English-speaking minority to which I and many other members of this House belong, and with whose interests we are identified. I do not disguise that I have heard very grave and serious apprehensions by many men for whose opinions I have great respect, and whom I admire for the absence of bigotry and narrow-mindedness which they have always exhibited. They have expressed themselves not so much in the way of objection to specific features of the scheme as in the way of apprehension of something dangerous to them in it— apprehensions which they cannot state explicitly or even define to themselves. They seem doubtful and distrustful as to the consequences, express fears as to how it will affect their future condition and interests, and in fact they almost think that in view of this uncertainty it would be better if we remained as we are. Now, sir, I believe that the rights of both minorities—the French minority in the General Legislature and the English-speaking minority in the Local Legislature of Lower Canada—are properly guarded. I would admit at once that without this protection it would be open to the gravest objection ; I would admit that you were embodying in it an element of future difficulty, a cause of future dissension and agitation that might be destructive to the whole fabric ; and therefore it is a very grave and anxious question for us to consider —especially the minorities in Lower Canada —how far our mutual rights and interests are respected and guarded, the one in the General and the other in the Local Legislature. With reference to this subject, I think that I , and those with whom I have acted—the English speaking members from Lower Canada—may in some degree congratulate ourselves at having brought about a state of feeling between the two races in this section of the province which has produced some good effect. (Hear, hear.)

§.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

16. of the scheme, without which it would certainly, in my opinion, have been open to very serious objection. (Hear, hear.) I will not now criticize any other of the leading features of the resolutions as they touch the fundamental conditions and principles of the union. I think there has been throughout a most wise and statesmanlike distribution of powers, and at the same time that those things have been carefully guarded which the minorities in the various sections required for their protection, and the regulation of which each province was not unnaturally desirous of retaining for itself. So far then as the objection is concerned of this union being federative merely in its character, and liable to all the difficulties which usually surround federal governments, I think we may fairly consider that there has been a proper and satisfactory distribution of power, which will avert many of those difficulties. (Hear, hear.)

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

18. They see in it that which tends to a disruption, and collision with the Central Government. Now, sir, I do not deny that if a legislative union, pure and simple, had been practicable, I, for one, would have preferred it ; but I cannot disguise from myself that it was, and is at present, utterly impracticable, and I cannot help expressing my astonishment and extreme gratification, that five colonies which had been for so many years separate from each other, had so many separate and distinct interests and local differences, should come together and agree upon such a scheme. Remembering the difficulties that had to be encountered in the shape of local interests, personal ambition, and separate governments, I certainly am surprised at the result, and I cannot withhold from the gentlemen who conducted these negotiations, the highest praise for the manner in which they overcame the difficulties that met them at every step, and for the spirit in which they sunk their own personal differences and interests in preparing this scheme of Confederation. (Hear, hear.) It is remarkable that a proposition having so few of the objections of a Federal system, should have been assented to by the representatives of five distinct colonies, which had heretofore been alien, practically independent, not only of each other, but almost of England, and almost hostile to each other. (Hear, hear.) There had been very much to keep these colonies apart, and very little to bring them together, and the success which has attended their efforts speaks well for those statesmen who applied their minds earnestly to the work of union. (Hear, hear.)

§§.91, 92, and 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

19. one of the very strongest arguments in favor of the Confederation of the provinces, that it enables us to prepare appropriate defences along the whole frontier of our country.

§.91(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

20. We will be enabled shortly, I trust, to commence to bring from the Mother Country a constant stream of immigration by which those sentiments of attachment to home and devotion to the Crown will be perpetuated. And in this continuous recruiting of our population I see one of the great elements we will have to look to for the perpetuation of the attachment of this country to the Crown

Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.

21. We should, probably, in time aspire to have foreign relations of our own, to have our own army and navy, and to seek for that complete emancipation which with communities as with individuals, maturity prompts. But independence in a state must always be relative, and none of us can expect to live to see the day when the British dominions in this part of the world will be peopled to such an extent, and become so powerful, that they can afford to be independent of England. We must, from the necessities of our geographical position—so long as the United States continue to be as powerful as they are ; and even if they were divided into two or three portions—we must always find in them a source of danger which must force upon us a dependence on England.

§§.15, 91(7), and 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

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1. whatever the increase of the population in the other provinces, the part from Lower Canada is fixed and known. Thus, for instance, if the population of Upper Canada should increase more than that of Lower Canada, the latter will always have sixty-five members, the other provinces receiving such increased number of representatives as their increased population would entitle them to. But the resolutions do not prevent Lower Canada from having more than sixty-five representatives, if its population should increase faster than that of the other provinces. The French translation of these resolutions is erroneous, for it says that ” for the purpose of determining the number of representatives from each province at the end of every decennial census, Lower Canada shall never have either more or less than sixty-five representatives,” whereas the English version of the resolutions, which is the official version, says : ” Lower Canada shall always be assigned sixty-five members.” This does not mean that Lower Canada can never have more than sixty-five members, but that it can not have less than sixty-five members.

§§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

2. îslo questions will be decided in the Federal Parliament but such as relate to general matters. Local matters will not be treated of, nor questions of race, of religion, or of institutions peculiar to the several provinces, and consequently there can be no collision of opinions on such questions. Such a fear, therefore, is quite unfounded.

§§.91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

3. bishop gave judgment, declaring the marriage null in a canonical sense. Regarded in a civil point of view, the marriage was still valid until it should have been declared null by a civil tribunal. It became necessary, therefore, to carry the cause before the Superior Court, and my honorable friend, the member for Because, who took the case in hand with his usual zeal and legal address, obtained from the court, after a suitable inquiry, a judgment declaring the marred null in a civil sense, and ordering that it should be registered as such in all places where it should be needful. If this affair had occurred in Upper Canada, what recourse would the parties have had ? The parties being Catholics, the case would have been brought before the bishop, who would also have declared the marriage null after suitable inquiry; but the cause would not have had the same conclusion in the civil court, particularly had it depended on certain impediments which have force in Lower Canada, but none in Upper Canada. It would have become necessary to go to Parliament to pray for an act, which, in a Catholic point of view, would be a mere decree of separation, but which the Parliament would have termed an act of divorce. This power to grant a separation is therefore necessarily vested in the Parliament, by whatever names such separation may be designated, and we are not to be reproached for the interpretation which others may give to such name, different from that which we assign to it. I thought it right to make myself understood on this point, because I do not choose that people should be able to say we are afraid of explaining our position with regard to the question of divorce and marriage, and I believe that I have shown that our position is consistent with our religious laws and our principles as Catholics. I regret that I have dwelt so long on the matters touched upon by the honorable member for Hochelaga ; but after his speech, and considering the position he assumed, he must have expected an answer.

§§.91(26) and 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.