Just realised this doesn't actually work. If store is just something exported by the app, there's no way to prevent leakage. Instead, it needs to be tied to rendering, which means we need to use the context API. Sapper needs to provide a top level component that sets the store as context for the rest of the app. You would therefore only be able to access it during initialisation, which means you couldn't do it inside a setTimeout and get someone else's session by accident:

Go is introducing publicly-visible API changes related to these issues in an upcoming major release, which risks making the vulnerabilities public without explicit public disclosure. 

The Jamstack removes multiple moving parts and systems from the hosting infrastructure resulting in fewer servers and systems to harden against attack.

The only completely secure system is the one that doesn't exist in the first place.

How can I create Internet ingress and egress security patterns for AWS

to be listed on Mastodon’s official site, an instance has to agree to follow the Mastodon Server Covenant which lays out commitments to “actively moderat[e] against racism, sexism, homophobia and transphobia”, have daily backups, grant more than one person emergency access, and notify people three months in advance of potential closure. These indirect methods are meant to ensure that most people who encounter a platform have a safe experience, even without the advantages of centralization.

In our estimations, Trusted Types might effectively kill XSS for serverless applications.

This is addressing a security issue; and the associated threat model is "as an attacker, I know that you are going to do FROM ubuntu and then RUN apt-get update in your build, so I'm going to trick you into pulling an image that ​_pretents_​ to be the result of ubuntu + apt-get update so that next time you build, you will end up using my fake image as a cache, instead of the legit one." With that in mind, we can start thinking about an alternate solution that doesn't compromise security.

So let's say we pull down evil/foo which is FROM ubuntu followed by RUN apt-get update except with a small surprise included in the image. Subsequent builds using those same commands will be compromised.

at least in the meantime allow users to bypass the security protections in situations where they are confident of the source of the layers

If your Svelte components contain <style> tags, by default the compiler will add JavaScript that injects those styles into the page when the component is rendered. That's not ideal, because it adds weight to your JavaScript, prevents styles from being fetched in parallel with your code, and can even cause CSP violations. A better option is to extract the CSS into a separate file. Using the emitCss option as shown below would cause a virtual CSS file to be emitted for each Svelte component. The resulting file is then imported by the component, thus following the standard Webpack compilation flow.

Now let me get back to your question. The FBI presents its conflict with Apple over locked phones as a case as of privacy versus security. Yes, smartphones carry a lot of personal data—photos, texts, email, and the like. But they also carry business and account information; keeping that secure is really important. The problem is that if you make it easier for law enforcement to access a locked device, you also make it easier for a bad actor—a criminal, a hacker, a determined nation-state—to do so as well. And that's why this is a security vs. security issue.

Barr makes the point that this is about “consumer cybersecurity” and not “nuclear launch codes.” This is true, but it ignores the huge amount of national security-related communications between those two poles. The same consumer communications and computing devices are used by our lawmakers, CEOs, legislators, law enforcement officers, nuclear power plant operators, election officials and so on. There’s no longer a difference between consumer tech and government tech—it’s all the same tech.

Malicious code pushed to your .gitlab-ci.yml file could compromise your variables and send them to a third party server regardless of the masked setting. If the pipeline runs on a protected branch or protected tag, it could also compromise protected variables.

The Cyber Test Range is the largest commercial cyber range in Australia, providing safe virtual environment to practice handling real-world cyber warfare scenarios, deliver world class training and evaluation of the latest cyber threats, cyber technologies and cyber talent.

Could you please explain why it is a vulnerability for an attacker to know the user names on a system? Currently External Identity Providers are wildly popular, meaning that user names are personal emails.My amazon account is my email address, my Azure account is my email address and both sites manage highly valuable information that could take a whole company out of business... and yet, they show no concern on hiding user names...

Another thing you can do is to add pain to the second part of it. Attackers want the list of valid usernames, so they can then try to guess or brute force the password. You can put protections in place with that as well, whether they are lockouts or multi-factor authentication, so even if they have a valid username, it's much harder to gain access.

That is certainly a good use-case. One thing you can do is to require something other than a user-chosen string as a username, something like an email address, which should be unique. Another thing you could do, and I admit this is not user-friendly at all, to let them sign up with that user name, but send the user an email letting them know that the username is already used. It still indicates a valid username, but adds a lot of overhead to the process of enumeration.

How would you remediate this? One way could be to have the application pad the responses with a random amount of time, throwing off the noticeable difference.

Sometimes, user enumeration is not as simple as a server responding with text on the screen. It can also be based on how long it takes a server to respond. A server may take one amount of time to respond for a valid username and a very different (usually longer) amount of time for an invalid username.

By default all content inside template strings is escaped. This is great for strings, but not ideal if you want to insert HTML that's been returned from another function (for example: a markdown renderer). Use nanohtml/raw for to interpolate HTML directly.

When processing untrusted user input for (web) applications, filter the input, and encode the output.

The default groups, that we talked about before, like domain users and domain admins are security groups. They're used to grant or deny access to IT resources.

strict-origin: Only send the origin of the document as the referrer when the protocol security level stays the same (e.g. HTTPS→HTTPS), but don't send it to a less secure destination (e.g. HTTPS→HTTP).

There are clever ways around trackers

These creeping changes help us forget how important our privacy is and miss that it’s being eroded.

While stylesheets can be reworked relatively easily with AMP by inlining the CSS, the same is not true for JavaScript. The tag 'script' is disallowed except in specific forms. In general, scripts in AMP are only allowed if they follow two major requirements: All JavaScript must be asynchronous (i.e., include the async attribute in the script tag). The JavaScript is for the AMP library and for any AMP components on the page. This effectively rules out the use of all user-generated/third-party JavaScript in AMP except as noted below.

If you have worked with emails before, the idea of placing a script into an email may set off alarm bells in your head! Rest assured, email providers who support AMP emails enforce fierce security checks that only allow vetted AMP scripts to run in their clients. This enables dynamic and interactive features to run directly in the recipients mailboxes with no security vulnerabilities! Read more about the required markup for AMP Emails here.

Determine if who is using my computer is me by training a ML model with data of how I use my computer. This is a project for the Intrusion Detection Systems course at Columbia University.

It's possible for a document to match more than one match statement. In the case where multiple allow expressions match a request, the access is allowed if any of the conditions is true

If you want rules to apply to an arbitrarily deep hierarchy, use the recursive wildcard syntax, {name=**}

Security rules apply only at the matched path, so the access controls defined on the cities collection do not apply to the landmarks subcollection. Instead, write explicit rules to control access to subcollections

Does a non- negligible failure rate affect the security of TLS?

only the @firebase/testing Node.js module supports mocking auth in Security Rules, making unit tests much easier

Plenty of journalists, attorneys, and activists are equally if not more threatened by so-called evil maid attacks, in which a housekeeper or other stranger has the ability to tamper with firmware during brief physical access to a computer.

See the documentation for HTML::Pipeline’s SanitizationFilter class for the list of allowed HTML tags and attributes. In addition to the default SanitizationFilter allowlist, GitLab allows span, abbr, details and summary elements.

As billions of conversations transition online over the coming weeks and months, the widespread adoption of end-to-end encryption has never been more vital to national security and to the privacy of citizens in countries around the world.

Proponents of this bill are quick to claim that end-to-end encryption isn’t the target. These arguments are disingenuous both because of the way that the bill is structured and the people who are involved.

For a political body that devotes a lot of attention to national security, the implicit threat of revoking Section 230 protection from organizations that implement end-to-end encryption is both troubling and confusing. Signal is recommended by the United States military. It is routinely used by senators and their staff. American allies in the EU Commission are Signal users too. End-to-end encryption is fundamental to the safety, security, and privacy of conversations worldwide.

The EARN IT act turns Section 230 protection into a hypocritical bargaining chip. At a high level, what the bill proposes is a system where companies have to earn Section 230 protection by following a set of designed-by-committee “best practices” that are extraordinarily unlikely to allow end-to-end encryption. Anyone who doesn’t comply with these recommendations will lose their Section 230 protection.

Matrix provides state-of-the-art end-to-end-encryption via the Olm and Megolm cryptographic ratchets. This ensures that only the intended recipients can ever decrypt your messages, while warning if any unexpected devices are added to the conversation.

More than two billion users exchange an unimaginable volume of end-to-end encrypted messages on WhatsApp each day. And unless an endpoint (phone) is compromised, or those chats are backed-up into accessible cloud platforms, neither owner Facebook nor law enforcement has a copy of those encryption keys.

The industry argues that encryption backdoors will result in a weakening of end device security, making it more likely they will be compromised.

As uber-secure messaging platform Signal has warned, “Signal is recommended by the United States military. It is routinely used by senators and their staff. American allies in the EU Commission are Signal users too. End-to-end encryption is fundamental to the safety, security, and privacy of conversations worldwide.”

“End-to-end encryption,” NSA says, “is encrypted all the way from sender to recipient(s) without being intelligible to servers or other services along the way... Only the originator of the message and the intended recipients should be able to see the unencrypted content. Strong end-to-end encryption is dependent on keys being distributed carefully.” So, no backdoors then.

On April 24, the U.S. National Security Agency published an advisory document on the security of popular messaging and video conferencing platforms. The NSA document “provides a snapshot of best practices,” it says, “coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security.” The NSA goes on to say that it “provides simple, actionable, considerations for individual government users—allowing its workforce to operate remotely using personal devices when deemed to be in the best interests of the health and welfare of its workforce and the nation.” Again somewhat awkwardly, the NSA awarded top marks to WhatsApp, Wickr and Signal, the three platforms that are the strongest advocates of end-to-end message encryption. Just to emphasize the point, the first criteria against which NSA marked the various platforms was, you guessed it, end-to-end encryption.

And while all major tech platforms deploying end-to-end encryption argue against weakening their security, Facebook has become the champion-in-chief fighting against government moves, supported by Apple and others.

EFF describes this as “a major threat,” warning that “the privacy and security of all users will suffer if U.S. law enforcement achieves its dream of breaking encryption.”

Once the platforms introduce backdoors, those arguing against such a move say, bad guys will inevitably steal the keys. Lawmakers have been clever. No mention of backdoors at all in the proposed legislation or the need to break encryption. If you transmit illegal or dangerous content, they argue, you will be held responsible. You decide how to do that. Clearly there are no options to some form of backdoor.

While this debate has been raging for a year, the current “EARN-IT’ bill working its way through the U.S. legislative process is the biggest test yet for the survival of end-to-end encryption in its current form. In short, this would enforce best practices on the industry to “prevent, reduce and respond to” illicit material. There is no way they can do that without breaking their own encryption. QED.

Governments led by the U.S., U.K. and Australia are battling the industry to open up “warrant-proof” encryption to law enforcement agencies. The industry argues this will weaken security for all users around the world. The debate has polarized opinion and is intensifying.

One thing that would certainly be a game-changer would be some form of standardized RCS end-to-end encryption that allows secure messages to be sent outside Google Messages.

You should not use a messaging platform that is not end-to-end encrypted, it really is as simple as that.

Such is the security of this architecture, that it has prompted law enforcement agencies around the world to complain that they now cannot access a user’s messages, even with a warrant. There is no backdoor—the only option is to compromise one of the endpoints and access messages in their decrypted state.

The answer, of course, is end-to-end encryption. The way this works is to remove any “man-in-the-middle” vulnerabilities by encrypting messages from endpoint to endpoint, with only the sender and recipient holding the decryption key. This level of messaging security was pushed into the mass-market by WhatsApp, and has now become a standard feature of every other decent platform.

The issue, though—and it’s a big one, is that the SMS infrastructure is inherently insecure, lending itself to so-called “man-in-the-middle attacks.” Messages run through network data centres, everything can be seen—security is basic at best, and you are vulnerable to local carrier interception when travelling.

Despite its opposition, EARN-IT is the clearest threat yet to end-to-end encryption, given this clever twist in pushing the onus onto the platforms to avoid transmitting illegal content, rather than mandating a lawful interception approach.

Putting that risk more simply, the EARN-IT bill is cleverly leaving it to the tech platforms to keep themselves safe—there would be little option other than some form of access to encrypted content, even though it would not be specified in law. Sophos describes this as “the backdoor virus that law enforcement agencies have been trying to inflict on encryption for years.”

On the encryption front, HRW echoes others that have argued vehemently against the proposals—that weakened encryption will “endanger all people who rely on encryption for safety and security—once one government enjoys special access, so too will rights-abusing governments and criminal hackers.” Universal access to encryption “enables everyone, from children attending school online to journalists and whistleblowers, to exercise their rights without fear of retribution.”

Lawmakers and security agencies want legally warranted access to encrypted data. That can’t happen without some form of backdoor in those end-to-end systems.

Just like Blackberry, WhatsApp has claimed that they are end to end encrypted but in fact that is not trueWhatsApp (and Blackberry) decrypt all your texts on their servers and they can read everything you say to anyone and everyoneThey (and Blackberry) then re-encrypt your messages, to send them to the recipient, so that your messages look like they were encrypted the entire time, when in fact they were not

The only messaging app that has been proven, by an independent authoritative agency, is Apple’s Messages app (which uses Apple’s iMessage protocol that is truly end to end encrypted, Apple cannot read any of your texts which means that no one can read any of your texts)

When you make a call using Signal, it will generate a two-word secret code on both the profiles. You will speak the first word and the recipient will check it. Then he will speak the second word and you can check it on your end. If both the words match, the call has not been intercepted and connected to the correct profile

If the EU is set to mandate encryption backdoors to enable law enforcement to pursue bad actors on social media, and at the same time intends to continue to pursue the platforms for alleged bad practices, then entrusting their diplomatic comms to those platforms, while forcing them to have the tools in place to break encryption as needed would seem a bad idea.

First, the recognition that sensitive information needs to be transmitted securely over instant messaging platforms plays into the hands of the privacy advocates who are against backdoors in the end-to-end encryption used on WhatsApp, Signal, Wickr, iMessage and others. The core argument from the privacy lobby is that a backdoor will almost certainly be exploited by bad actors. Clearly, the EU (and others) would not risk their own comms with such a vulnerability.

Although WhatsApp has become the messaging platform of choice for many politicians and civil servants worldwide, there have been enough stories of potential vulnerabilities and hacks to spook people into adopting something else.

“End-to-end encryption” sounds nice — but if anyone can get into your phone’s operating system, they will be able to read your messages without having to decrypt them.

Security agencies use anti-terror efforts to justify planting backdoors. The problem is that such backdoors can also be used by criminals and authoritarian governments. No wonder dictators seem to love WhatsApp: its lack of security allows them to spy on their own people, so WhatsApp continues to be freely available in places like Russia or Iran, where Telegram is banned by the authorities

This is also useful for anyone that doesn't normally have root access but would like to easily become root on your host.

using SSH is likely the best approach because personal access tokens have account level access

Before enabling this, you should ensure jobs are visible to team members only. You should also erase all generated job logs before making them visible again.

Available documentation suggests that ED25519 is more secure.

There is a serious weakness in DSA (which extends to ECDSA) that has been exploited in several real world systems (including Android Bitcoin wallets and the PS3); the signature algorithm relies on quality randomness (bits that are indistinguishable from random); once the PRNG enters a predictable state, signatures may leak private keys. Systems that use ECDSA must be aware of this issue, and pay particular attention to their PRNG.

GanttLab does not store any information: everything runs in your browser. Under the hood, we use localForage to remember the state of the application, which enables great user experience without any security risk. Secured API requests are initiated in your computer's browser, hence coming straight from your local network. Those requests are going directly to the data source you selected (your GitHub or GitLab account) without ever transiting through any other server.

GanttLab does not store any information: everything runs in your browser. Under the hood, we use localForage to remember the state of the application, which enables great user experience without any security risk. Secured API requests are initiated in your computer's browser, hence coming straight from your local network. Those requests are going directly to the data source you selected (your GitHub or GitLab account) without ever transiting through any other server.

Image consumers can enable DCT to ensure that images they use were signed. If a consumer enables DCT, they can only pull, run, or build with trusted images. Enabling DCT is a bit like applying a “filter” to your registry. Consumers “see” only signed image tags and the less desirable, unsigned image tags are “invisible” to them.

In terms of their border dispute, India and China are struggling with what game theorists refer to as a “commitment problem.” Meaning A commitment problem arises when two states, who would be better off in the present if they consented to a mutually beneficial agreement, are unable to resolve their disputes due to different expectations of future strengths, and a consequent inability to commit to future bargaining power or a division of benefits.

Allowing port 80 doesn’t introduce a larger attack surface on your server, because requests on port 80 are generally served by the same software that runs on port 443.

CodeGuard relies upon industry best practices to protect customers’ data. All backups and passwords are encrypted, secure connections (SFTP/SSH/SSL) are utilized if possible, and annual vulnerability testing is conducted by an independent agency. To-date, there has not been a data breach or successful hack or attack upon CodeGuard.

Certified Ethical Hacker

However, it's possible to enforce both a whitelist and nonces with 'strict-dynamic' by setting two policies: