49 Matching Annotations
  1. Aug 2022
  2. Mar 2022
  3. Jan 2022
  4. Nov 2021
  5. Oct 2021
    1. Academia: All the Lies: What Went Wrong in the University Model and What Will Come in its Place

      “Students are graduating into a brutal job market.”

      The entreprecariat is designed for learned helplessness (social: individualism), trained incapacities (economic: specialization), and bureaucratic intransigence (political: authoritarianism).


      The Design Problem

      Three diagrams will explain the lack of social engagement in design. If (in Figure 1) we equate the triangle with a design problem, we readily see that industry and its designers are concerned only with the tiny top portion, without addressing themselves to real needs.

      Figure 1: The Design Problem

      (Design for the Real World, 2019. Page 57.)

      The other two figures merely change the caption for the figure.

      • Figure 1: The Design Problem
      • Figure 2: A Country
      • Figure 3: The World
  6. Sep 2021
  7. Jun 2021
  8. May 2021
  9. Mar 2021
  10. Feb 2021
  11. Oct 2020
  12. Sep 2020
  13. Aug 2020
  14. Jul 2020
  15. Jun 2020
  16. May 2020
    1. Van den Akker, O., Weston, S. J., Campbell, L., Chopik, W. J., Damian, R. I., Davis-Kean, P., Hall, A. N., Kosie, J. E., Kruse, E. T., Olsen, J., Ritchie, S. J., Valentine, K. D., van ’t Veer, A. E., & Bakker, M. (2019). Preregistration of secondary data analysis: A template and tutorial [Preprint]. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/hvfmr

  17. Apr 2020
  18. Jan 2019
    1. This distinction enlightens the reading of thegrowing social media and mass emergency lit-erature for three reasons. First, without it, thisnew literature risks undoing decades of work bysocial scientists who have dismantled the mythsof disaster, with a dominant discourse thatincludes panic and unlawful behavior by victims.But in disasters arising from natural hazards, weknow such behaviors are not typical. Massemergencies arising from criminal behavior canhave a much wider range of collective behaviorbecause the source of the hazard is unknown,unpredictable and perhaps more imminentlydangerous

      Palen and Hughes raise concern about boundaries and classification in mass emergency research. They define crisis as an overarching term that incorrectly generalizes sociobehavioral phenomena during natural and criminal events.

    2. Misinforma-tion arising from natural hazards or exogenousevents might be greater in kind, but less inimpact, with fewer in-common readers as it tra-verses a network that can move a little slowerthan it might in criminal mass emergency events.Because the problem-solving tends to be morediffuse in exogenous events, the same messagemight not reach enough people; in other words,the misinformation might also be thinly diffused.Misinformation in such events is more likely toage out, or not be relevant to enough locations topose a big threat—in other words, all informationin thefirst place is less likely to be categoricallycorrect or incorrect, and as such, it is hard tofindas much value in pursuing the threat of misin-formation in such situations.

      Not sure I entriely agree with this argument that misinformation in natural disaster/exogenous events.

      Mis/Dis-information definitely matters for those affected. (see Neal, 1997 and Phillips work on phases of response for minority groups).

      What about misinformation campaigns during mass migration or other politically-tinged humanitarian crises where the exogenous factor (long-standing war, religious conflict/persecution, colonialism, etc.) is far removed from the immediate crisis? (Think 2015 migration crisis in Europe, Rohingya genocide in Myanmar implications for Bangaldesh).

      Is there a middle ground between endogenous and exogenous hazards?

    3. Wefindendogeneityandexogeneityof haz-ards to be a meaningful distinction in socialmedia in mass emergencies research, one thatreadily clarifies for a range of researchers andreaders who are outside the social science disci-pline. Just as events that arise from exogenousand endogenous hazards differently impact legal,political, health, and other societal systems, so dothey differently impact social media behavior.8With exogenous events, the culprit is beyondreach, and unstoppable. With endogenous agents,the suspect lies within. Therefore, organizingfeatures of the communication are distinctlydifferent, because the source(s) of the problem(s),the nature of their solutions,and the ability forthe perception of the collective control of theoutcomeare different. Online participation focu-ses on in-common salient problems when theyare present; when the problems are lessin-common and must be addressed in parallel, thecrowd organizes in many smaller groupings and,often endogeneity and exogeneity of hazardspredicts this (Palen & Anderson,2016).

      Describes differences in social media response between 2012 Hurricane Sandy (exogenous) and 2013 Boston Bombing (endogenous) mass emergencies.

    4. We make this point because we worrythat the very idea of“social media”flattens themany meanings of“crisis”and“emergency”forwhich social sciencefields have worked to pro-vide insight. For example, because Twitter orFacebook are available for use in any kind ofcrises, it is easy to make these applications thesalient concern, and ask“Is Twitter or Facebookbetter in emergency response?,”rather thanquestion how the very nature of emergencyresponse might beg for different forms of infor-mation seeking and reporting. We refer to thisflattening of communication medium and hazardas thesocial media and crisis confound.

      Definition of social media and crisis confound